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Abstract 
The failure of many System of Systems (SoS) enterprises can be attributed to the 
inappropriate application of traditional Systems Engineering (SE) processes within the SoS 
domain, because of the mistaken belief that a SoS can be regarded as a single large, or 
complex, system. SoS Engineering (SoSE) is a sub-discipline of SE; Risk Management and 
Modelling and Simulation (M&S) are key areas within SoSE, both of which also lie within the 
traditional SE domain. Risk Management of SoS requires a different approach to that 
currently taken for individual systems; if risk is managed for each component system then it 
cannot be assumed that the aggregated affect will be to mitigate risk at the SoS level. 
A literature review was undertaken examining three themes: (1) SoS Engineering (SoSE), (2) 
M&S and (3) Risk.  
Theme 1 of the literature provided insight into the activities comprising SoSE and its 
difference from traditional SE with risk management identified as a key activity.  
The second theme discussed the application of M&S to SoS, providing an output, which 
supported the identification of appropriate techniques and concluding that, the inherent 
complexity of a SoS required the use of M&S in order to support SoSE activities.  
Current risk management approaches were reviewed in theme 3 as well as the management 
of SoS risk. Although some specific examples of the management of SoS risk were found, no 
mature, general approach was identified, indicating a gap in current knowledge. However, it 
was noted most of these examples were underpinned by M&S approaches. 
It was therefore concluded a general approach SoS risk management utilising M&S methods 
would be of benefit. 
In order to fill the gap identified in current knowledge, this research proposed a new model 
based approach to Risk Management where risk identification was supported by a 
framework, which combined SoS system of interest dimensions with holistic risk types, 
where the resulting risks and contributing factors are captured in a causal network. 
Analysis of the causal network using a model technique selection tool, developed as part of 
this research, allowed the causal network to be simplified through the replacement of 
groups of elements within the network by appropriate supporting models. 
The Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) was identified as a suitable method to represent SoS risk. 
Supporting models run in Monte Carlo Simulations allowed data to be generated from which 
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the risk BBNs could learn, thereby providing a more quantitative approach to SoS risk 
management. A method was developed which provided context to the BBN risk output 
through comparison with worst and best-case risk probabilities.  
The model based approach to Risk Management was applied to two very different case 
studies: Close Air Support mission planning and the Wheat Supply Chain, UK National Food 
Security risks, demonstrating its effectiveness and adaptability. 
The research established that the SoS SoI is essential for effective SoS risk identification and 
analysis of risk transfer, effective SoS modelling requires a range of techniques where 
suitability is determined by the problem context, the responsibility for SoS Risk Management 
is related to the overall SoS classification and the model based approach to SoS risk 
management was effective for both application case studies. 
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1 Chapter 1: Introduction 
This research has delivered a new model based risk management approach aimed 
specifically at System of Systems (SoS), where a gap in current knowledge has been 
identified; incorrect application of risk management has contributed to several high profile 
SoS failures. 
This chapter provides the research motivation behind this PhD thesis and a brief description 
of the problem under consideration: this is followed by an outline of the aims and objectives 
for the research, planned research outputs, an overview of the research methodology used, 
the thesis and a summary of the research contribution made by this work carried out and 
reported on in this thesis. 
1.1 Background 
The Future Combat Systems (FCS) Program, launched in 2003, was the largest acquisition 
program in the US Army’s history with estimated costs of $200 (US) billion. On 23rd June 
2009 the US Undersecretary of Defence for Acquisition, Ashton Carter, cancelled the FCS 
programme, resulting in an estimated loss in the order of $1 Billion (Axelband et al., 2012). 
The Integrated Deepwater System (IDS) was a $27 billion US Coastguard program that had 
the aim of combining several acquisition programs, to replace aging assets into a single, 
integrated program. In December 2011, Rear Admiral Jake Korn, assistant commandant for 
acquisition and chief acquisition officer published an article with the headline, “Deepwater 
R.I.P.” (Korn, 2011) stating Deepwater was failing to support the modernisation of the US 
Coastguard capability and that no further work would be initiated under the contract. 
The National Programme for IT (NPfIT), launched in 2002, was a top down approach to the 
introduction of a nation wide, integrated electronic patient care system. It was intended to 
connect 30,000 General Practitioners to 300 hospitals providing secure access to patient 
data by health professionals. However, in 2009 the UK Department of Health announced 
“that it was changing its approach to a more locally-led system allowing NHS organisations 
to introduce smaller, more manageable change in line with their local business requirements 
and capacity. The Department no longer intends to replace systems wholesale, and will 
instead in some instances build on trusts’ existing systems” (National Audit Office, 2011). By 
2012 all major contractors had either quit or been removed from the program and had 
incurred major financial losses. 
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On June 9 2014 in Afghanistan, a B-1B Lancer bomber dropped its ordnance on five U.S. 
soldiers, including members of an elite Special Forces team; sadly all lost their lives. A U.S. 
military investigation found the incident was the result of poor communication, inadequate 
planning and “several other mistakes” (Lamothe, 2014).  
Initiated in 2004 the C-NOMIS program was intended to provide a single capability to 
support offender management across both the Prison and Probation services through a 
single database. By 2007 the program was two years behind schedule and lifetime projected 
costs had risen from £234 million to £690 million (National Audit Office, 2009). In 2008 the 
program was restructured and was divided into five separate projects. 
All the above are examples of high profile and high cost (both human and economic) System 
of Systems (SoS) failure, and hence either a failure of SoS Engineering (SoSE), or a failure to 
apply SoSE when appropriate. It is now widely accepted that aspects of the single System 
and the SoS are fundamentally different, requiring differing engineering approaches 
(Jamshidi, 2008), (Dahmann & Baldwin, 2008). Definitions and more detailed discussion 
differentiating SoS and SoSE from traditional single system perspectives are provided in 
section 3.2. 
Jamshidi (2008) refers to SoSE as an “extension” of Systems Engineering; this infers that it is 
a sub-discipline rather than a discipline. The failure of many SoS enterprises can be 
attributed to the inappropriate application of traditional SE processes within the SoS domain 
because of the mistaken belief that a SoS can be regarded as a single large, or complex, 
system. Within this sub-discipline Modelling and Simulation (M&S) and Risk Management 
are key areas, both of which also lie within the traditional Systems Engineering (SE) domain. 
This thesis is predicated on the premise that through modelling it is possible to predict SoS 
emergent behaviour; the greatest risk associated with a SoS is that this emergent behaviour 
will impact on the ability of the SoS to fulfil its purpose, with possible detrimental effects, 
although conversely, emergent behaviour may have a beneficial effect. 
As discussed, a common theme throughout SoS failure is the lack of application of SoS 
Engineering (SoSE) approaches, particularly the failure to identify and manage SoS wide 
risks. Indeed, regarding the NPfIT and NOMIS examples, no reference to “System of 
Systems” at all is made in the reports produced by the National Audit Office (National Audit 
Office, 2011, 2012).  
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Risk management typically focuses on a single system. For SoS, risk management must cross 
component system boundaries and take a holistic approach covering the entire SoS System 
of Interest (Creel & Ellison, 2008). 
This highlights two key problems: 
1. SoSE, including SoS Risk Management, as an emerging discipline is immature and not 
clearly defined. 
2. Traditional approaches to Systems Engineering and, in particular, Risk Management 
are still applied in the SoS domain, when these are not always adequate. 
SoS Risk Management is a component of SoSE and could be applied to numerous aspects 
including SoS enterprise, physical SoS, development and acquisition. This research will focus 
upon the management of operational risk within a physical SoS, as this is a relatively 
unexplored area and the implicit requirement for rapid generation of risk assessments and 
management would inevitably require the use of an element of modelling and simulation. 
However, the results of this research could equally be applied to other areas, including 
acquisition. 
1.2 Aims 
The aim of this research was to establish the factors that differentiate Risk Management of 
SoS from “traditional” single systems and to develop a generic model based approach that 
would address these differences. 
Hence, this research seeks to answer the following question: 
How can risk be managed using a model based approach for a physical System of Systems 
in an operational environment? 
This question raises the following lower level questions, which this research will seek to 
address: 
1) How is the management of SoS risk different from managing risk at the single 
system level? 
2) How is a model based approach beneficial? 
3) How can a model based approach be developed and how can it quantify risk? 
4) What are the types of risk associated with SoS? 
5) How does the application of risk management relate to the SoS ‘lifecycle’? 
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6) How can the impact of risk transfer be assessed within a SoS? 
Risks tend to be identified subjectively: using a formal model based approach the intent is to 
provide a more objective and realistic risk assessment. Risk mitigation approaches may be 
applied to a SoS model, enabling their effectiveness to be assessed. In the SoS domain, risks 
will not always be intuitive and, therefore, not identified.  For an operational SoS, risk may 
arise rapidly, requiring responsive identification, assessment and mitigation: a tool providing 
this capability, based on the identified modelling techniques, will potentially be of great 
benefit. 
1.3 Objectives 
The fulfilment of the stated research aims will be accomplished through the completion of a 
set of objectives identified below. Table 1 provides a mapping between the research 
questions and the associated objectives. 
Objective 1: Review of the applicability of a wide range of modelling techniques to SoS 
This research is proposing a model-based approach to SoS Risk Management. To accomplish 
this a broad understanding of current modelling techniques is required and their 
applicability to modelling SoS: contributes to research sub questions 2 and 3. 
Objective 2: Review current risk management approaches  
A sound understanding of current system level Risk Management approaches is required 
before establishing a SoS approach: contributes to research sub questions 1 and 4. 
Objective 3: Identify differences between system and SoS risk management 
With an understanding of system level Risk Management established, consideration will be 
given to how this differs from SoS Risk Management. This is accomplished through literature 
review and the use of case studies. Contributes to research sub questions 1, 4 and 5. 
Objective 4: Identify an initial SoS application to explore whether a risk management 
model based approach would provide benefit 
A practical application for the use of SoS Risk Management is identified: contributes to 
research sub questions 2 and 3. 
Objective 5: Apply the SoS Risk Management process to the initial SoS application, 
developing models using appropriate identified modelling techniques. 
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Having identified an application, appropriate modelling techniques are selected and the 
models implemented, verified and validated: contributes to research sub questions 2, 3 and 
6. 
Objective 6: Identify a second application (case study) in order to determine the 
adaptability of using the overall approach in a different domain 
With an initial version of the approach developed a second case study is selected with the 
intention of adapting and developing models for this domain. The intention of this objective 
is to determine how adaptable the approach is, i.e. is each instance completely bespoke or 
are there common elements: contributes to research sub questions 2, 3 and 6. 
Objective 7: Use model to assess transfer of risk within a SoS 
The models underlying the approach as indicated under objectives 5 and 6 will be used to 
experiment with transferring risks between nodes in the model as a method to assess the 
impact of transfer of risk within a SoS: contributes to research sub question 6. 
Objective 8: Define a SoS risk management methodology in which the approach can be 
encapsulated 
The results of the previous objectives are analysed in order to determine if a general SoS risk 
management methodology can be derived, covering the Risk management process and the 
potential development of a support tool: contributes to research sub question 1.  
The mapping of objectives to research questions is summarised in Table 1.  
Research Question Objective 
1 How is this management of SoS risk different from managing risk at 
the system level? 
2, 3, 7, 8 
2 How is a model-based approach beneficial? 1, 4, 5, 6 
3 How can a model-based approach be developed and how can it 
quantify risk? 
1, 4, 5, 6 
4 What are the types of risk associated with SoS? 2, 3 
5 How do the types of risk relate to the SoS ‘lifecycle’? 3 
6 How can impact of risk transfer be assessed within a SoS? 5, 6, 7 
Table 1 - Research Question to Objective Mapping 
1.4 Scope 
This research discusses SoS risk management throughout the lifecycle, although it should be 
noted that the proposed approach is focussed on the provision of support to development 
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and planning activities: the development of a real time risk analysis and decision support 
capability is beyond the scope of this study.  
The Close Air Support risk analysis, undertaken for case study 1, utilised a set of models 
produced using heterogeneous applications; the resulting data was integrated through a 
manual process rather than automatically. Integration of all models into a single application 
would require a software development project in its own right and was not considered 
necessary in order to demonstrate the concept. In accordance with this general philosophy, 
the fidelity of each model was deemed to be sufficient to demonstrate the risk-modelling 
concept in order to minimise complexity and thereby reducing development effort to 
realistic levels. For the second case study, UK Food Security Risk Management, supporting 
models were identified but not developed because the intent was to determine the 
extensibility and adaptability of the proposed risk management approach beyond its 
application to a physical, operational SoS. 
1.5 Research Contribution 
This research has resulted in the following key contributions to knowledge: 
• SoS, System of Interest (SoI) model 
• SoS Risk Modelling Approach enabling the combination of outputs from 
heterogeneous models to provide an estimate of risk. 
• SoS Risk Management Process 
 
The SoS System of Interest Model underpins SoS Risk Modelling Approach technique 
selection and the SoS Risk Identification activities. It is described in section 6.1 and in an 
associated conference paper (Kinder et al,, 2012) which is attached in Annex A.  
The proposed SoS Risk modelling approach uses a Monte Carlo simulation to run SoS 
heterogeneous models, the types of which are selected using the method described in 
chapter 6. This generates probability distributions, which are then used to update a central 
Bayesian Belief Network, capturing the identified risks. At the 2014 Electronic, Electrical and 
Systems Engineering faculty PhD conference, positive feedback was received from members 
of the Centre for Renewable Energy Systems Technology (CREST), who also use BBN 
modelling, agreeing this can be considered as a unique approach in this context.  
The management of risk in SoS is currently an immature discipline, requiring a holistic 
approach. However, current practice tends to assume that if all system level risk is managed 
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then SoS risk will implicitly be managed, but this does not account for emergent behaviour 
at the SoS level. The research contributed to the understanding of SoS risk, through the 
development of a generic Risk Management process, described in chapter 7. This was 
achieved through the application of two case studies; development of a Close Air Support 
risk management tool (chapter 8) and risk analysis of UK Food Security from a SoS 
perspective (chapter 9). 
A summary of the proposed risk management process, including the modelling approach, 
was presented at the 10th annual SoSE conference in 2015 and published in an associated 
conference paper (Kinder et al., 2015) which is attached in Annex C. 
The process was also presented, by invitation, to the INCOSE SoS Working Group and the 
Systems of Systems Engineering Collaborators Info Exchange (SoSCIE), which were well 
attended (the INCOSE webinar had over 50 attendees whilst the SoSCIE webinar had over 
80) and received positive feedback (e.g.; “Good presentation and interesting application of a 
BN”, “Worthwhile presentation. TKU”, “Interesting presentation. Thank you). 
Figure 1 describes the relationship between the research components within the context of 
the proposed model based approach. This figure will be repeated and annotated where 
necessary throughout the thesis within chapters related to specific components, providing 
further context for the reader. 
 
Figure 1 – Combining Research Contributions to Address the Research Question 
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1.6 Structure of the thesis 
Each chapter begins with an overview with its contents and concludes with a concise 
summary.  
Chapter 1 introduces the thesis and provides necessary background information.  
Chapter 2 describes the current State of the Art regarding Risk Management in the context 
of SoS, importance of this research, gaps, specific problems the research will alleviate and 
the research questions.  
The literature review results, covering the three themes of, SoSE, Modelling and Simulation, 
and Risk Management, are documented in Chapter 3.  
Chapter 4 describes the research methodological approach, methods used, the creation of 
SoS risk management method and process, illustrative case studies and the design approach.  
Chapter 5 provides theoretical background to the probabilistic modelling approaches, which 
underpin the model based SoS risk management approach. 
Chapter 6 describes the development of a SoS System of Interest model, and provides a 
framework for a SoS modelling technique process. 
The design approach, design and development of the SoS risk management method and 
process, are described in Chapter 7, with its application for Close Air Support and the UK 
Food Security prototype models documented in chapters 8 and 9 respectively.  
Chapter 10 contains an overall analysis of the model-based approach, analysis of its 
effectiveness and adaptability, with any potential refinements or extensions identified as 
well as outlining the theoretical basis for the approach to SoS Risk and the combinations of 
models.  
The research conclusions are documented in Chapter 11, analysing the achievement against 
the objectives, describing the contribution to knowledge and discussing potential for future 
exploitation and research.  
The thesis structure is visualised below in Figure 2 (the lines are coloured for clarity only, the 
colour infers no other meaning). 
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Figure 2:  Thesis organisation 
Figure 3 summarises the research design, indicating the relationships between research 
objectives, research outputs and the thesis structure, a detailed description of the research 
methodology is provided in Chapter 4. 
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Figure 3 – Mapping Research Activities to Research Structure
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1.7 Summary of Chapter 
The introductory chapter has provided an overview of the research background, identified 
the research aims and objectives, described the thesis structure and outlined the 
contribution to knowledge of the research. 
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2 Chapter 2: Detailed Description of problem area 
This chapter describes the current situation, regarding SoS, SoSE, modelling and simulation 
and risk management of systems and SoS. The potential impact of this research, gaps in 
current knowledge, specific problems the research will alleviate, and how research 
outcomes will address the gaps are also discussed. 
2.1 SoS Case Studies 
In order to demonstrate that this research does address a genuine problem the following 
examples are discussed, which highlight issues in the application, or indeed the lack of 
application, of SoSE.  
• The Future Combat Systems Program (Axelband et al., 2012)  
• The National Programme for IT (NPfIT) in the NHS (National Audit Office, 2011)  
• Integrated Deepwater System Program (Government Accounting Office, 2011)  
• National Offender Management System (C-NOMIS) (National Audit Office, 2009)  
• Close Air Support, fatal friendly fire airstrike, Afghanistan 2014 (Lamothe, 2014) 
• Hurricane Katrina Disaster Relief (Comfort, 2007) 
• Arizona and Southern California Power Grid (FERC & NERC, 2014) 
• Friendster; one of the first and largest Online Social Networks (Garcia et al., 2013) 
The exemplars listed above are chosen to ensure coverage of all types of SoS, it is 
anticipated that different aspects of SoSE may not be distributed evenly across all types; 
therefore this approach is intended to ensure that all these aspects are identified. The most 
widely accepted SoS classification (Dahmann & Baldwin, 2008) identifies the following types 
(this is discussed further in section 3.2.3): 
• Directed. Directed SoS are those in which the integrated system-of-systems is built 
and managed to fulfil specific purposes. It is centrally managed during long-term 
operation to continue to fulfil those purposes as well as any new ones the system 
owners might wish to address. The component systems maintain an ability to 
operate independently, but their normal operational mode is subordinated to the 
central managed purpose. 
• Acknowledged. Acknowledged SoS have recognized objectives, a designated 
manager, and resources for the SoS; however, the constituent systems retain their 
independent ownership, objectives, funding, and development and sustainment 
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approaches. Changes in the systems are based on collaboration between the SoS and 
the system. 
• Collaborative. In collaborative SoS the component systems interact more or less 
voluntarily to fulfil agreed upon central purposes. The Internet is a collaborative 
system. The Internet Engineering Task Force works out standards but has no power 
to enforce them. The central players collectively decide how to provide or deny 
service, thereby providing some means of enforcing and maintaining standards. 
• Virtual. Virtual SoS lack a central management authority and a centrally agreed 
upon purpose for the system-of-systems. Large-scale behaviour emerges—and may 
be desirable—but this type of SoS must rely upon relatively invisible mechanisms to 
maintain it. 
Table 2 below identifies the classification of each exemplar, however it should be noted that 
a SoS may evolve, and therefore change type, or may simultaneously exhibit the behaviour 
of more than one type. 
SoS Case Study SoS Classification 
The Future Combat Systems Program  Directed; this was a centrally controlled 
procurement programme 
The National Programme for IT (NPfIT) in 
the NHS  
Originally Directed but later moved towards 
Acknowledged 
Integrated Deepwater System Program  Directed, this was a centrally controlled 
procurement programme 
National Offender Management System 
(C-NOMIS)  
Originally Directed but later moved towards 
Acknowledged 
Close Air Support, fatal friendly fire 
airstrike, Afghanistan 2014  
Acknowledged with elements Directed which 
were under common command 
Hurricane Katrina Disaster Relief  Collaborative initially but moving towards 
Acknowledged as command and control was 
established. However, within individual 
agencies Acknowledged throughout relief and 
recovery. 
Arizona and Southern California Power 
Grid  
Acknowledged within elements Directed 
within individual regions 
Friendster Acknowledged with users forming Virtual 
elements of the SoS 
Table 2 - SoS Exemplar Classification 
2.1.1 Future Combat System 
The Future Combat Systems (FCS) Program, launched in 2003, was the largest acquisition 
program in the US Army’s history with estimated costs of $200 (US) billion. 
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The program was cancelled in 2009, due to increasing costs, poor requirement definition, 
immature technology and unpredicted risks resulting in unacceptable development 
progress. 
A key element of the project failure was the application of a System Engineering approach 
rather than SoSE which was more appropriate, as identified in a subsequent comprehensive 
project review (Axelband et al., 2012) stating: 
“requirements at the system level rather than the system-of-systems level dominated the 
Operational Requirements Document, focusing design efforts at the system level and 
constraining critical trade space at the SoS level” and 
 “a Family of Systems Operational Requirements Document structure was used in lieu of SoS 
allocations.” 
The requirements were derived from war games (Army After Next and Objective Force) 
undertaken by the US Army based on fictional future scenarios, which were effectively 
predictions based on past events. This resulted in the requirement for lightweight vehicles 
that could be deployed rapidly in large numbers, as it was anticipated that most conflicts 
would involve combat between states.  
The relatively low vehicle weight that was required put excessive constraints on the SoS 
component system design, eventually compromising the stated aim of the deployment of 
large numbers. However, with the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, it became clear that the 
original concept was fundamentally inappropriate in modern conflicts, with smaller numbers 
of highly armoured vehicles required. 
Another major contributor to the failure of FCS was the choice of communications medium. 
A key tenet of the FCS was that it would be highly networked providing high levels of 
situational awareness, thereby providing tactical advantage. However, this was based on 
immature technology, Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), and should have been identified as 
a SoS level risk. As development progressed the FCS design became dependent upon JTRS, 
which ultimately failed to reach the necessary maturity. 
RAND (Axelband et al., 2012) make reference throughout the review to the lack of a mature 
SoS Risk Management approach, e.g. 
“Traditional risk management has focused on a single system, and unfortunately there are 
no existing best practices for risk management tailored for the greater complexities of SoS 
acquisition.” 
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Disciplines required to enable effective SoSE in this case include: 
• Requirements Management  
• Project Management  
• Risk Management 
• Modelling and Simulation  
2.1.2 The National Programme for IT (NPfIT) in the NHS 
The NPfIT, launched in 2002, was a top down approach to the introduction of a nationwide, 
integrated electronic patient care system. It was intended to connect 30,000 GPs to 300 
hospitals providing secure access to patient data by health professionals. The heart of the 
programme was the NHS Care Records Service (i.e. “the Spine”), making relevant parts of a 
patient’s clinical record available NHS wide. Other component systems are now in use but 
operating independently. 
However, in 2009 the Department of Health announced “that it was changing its approach 
to a more locally-led system allowing NHS organisations to introduce smaller, more 
manageable change in line with their local business requirements and capacity. The 
Department no longer intends to replace systems wholesale, and will instead in some 
instances build on trusts’ existing systems.” (National Audit Office, 2011). 
By 2012 all major contractors had either quit or been removed from the program and had 
incurred major financial losses. It is widely conceded that the weight of program risk pushed 
onto the suppliers was excessive: 
The architect of those deals, former NHS IT director-general Richard Granger, famously said 
he would "hold suppliers' feet to the fire until the smell of burning flesh is overpowering" 
(Glick, 2012). 
Reasons for the project failure include, poor contract management, poor requirements 
elicitation and centralisation creating a single point of failure. Whilst requirements 
elicitation is generally a Systems Engineering centric activity an element is also required at 
the SoSE level, in cases where a capability is provided by the SoS emergent behaviour and 
not by an individual component system. It appears NPfIT failed at both levels. The failure of 
contract management in this case does suggest that it may be an essential element of SoSE 
and that a more ”engineering” based approach may be suitable.  
Disciplines required to enable effective SoSE in this case include: 
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• Requirements Management 
• Project Management  
• Risk Management  
• Contract Management  
• Network Architecture  
2.1.3 Integrated Deepwater System 
The Integrated Deepwater System (IDS) was a US Coastguard program that intended to 
combine several acquisition programs, to replace aging assets, into a single, integrated SoS 
program. 
The program was initiated in the late 1990’s when the Coastguard determined that many of 
their deepwater1 assets would reach their end of life within several years of each other. 
A private sector Lead Systems Integrator (LSI) was appointed to execute the SoS acquisition 
approach, responsible for designing, building and integrating the component systems. 
By 2007 many of the component systems were running behind schedule and over budget, at 
which point the Coastguard abandoned the SoS acquisition approach and reverted to a 
traditional set of individual system acquisitions. 
A report before the House of Representatives (Skinner, 2007) summarised the issues: 
“We previously identified several common themes and risks in our audits of assets and 
information technology systems being acquired under the Deepwater contract. These include 
the dominant influence of expediency, unfavorable (sic) contract terms and conditions, 
poorly defined performance requirements, and inadequate management and technical 
oversight. These deficiencies contributed to schedule delays, cost increases, and asset 
designs that did not meet minimum Deepwater performance requirements.” 
In addition to this, there was also a lack of domain knowledge within the LSI, as raised by 
Richard L. Skinner, Inspector General, U.S. Department Of Homeland Security: 
“According to the Coast Guard, its acquisition workforce did not have the requisite training, 
experience, and certification to manage an acquisition the size, scope, and complexity of the 
Deepwater Program”. 
An initial assessment of the evidence reviewed suggests that the LSI focused on the System 
Engineering of the individual component systems rather than concentrating efforts at the 
                                                          
1 Deepwater is considered to be waters more than 50 miles from shore. 
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SoS level. Combined with lack of appropriate domain knowledge, even with the benefit of 
hindsight, it seems inevitable that this project was destined to fail. 
This is another example of a project that failed to distinguish the essential differences 
between Systems and SoS engineering. 
Disciplines required to enable effective SoSE in this case include: 
• Requirements Management 
• Project Management  
• Risk Management  
• Modelling and Simulation  
2.1.4 National Offender Management System (C-NOMIS) 
Initiated in 2004 the C-NOMIS program was intended to provide a single capability to 
support offender management across both the Prison and Probation services through a 
single database. 
By 2007 the program was two years behind schedule and lifetime projected costs had risen 
from £234 million to £690 million (National Audit Office, 2009). 
In 2008 the program was restructured and was divided into five separate projects (National 
Audit Office, 2009): 
• Replacement of several prison systems with the C-NOMIS application. 
• Creation of a national probation case management system. 
• Introduction of a read-only data share facility between the prison and probation 
services. 
• The creation of a single offender risk assessment system. 
• Replacement of the current prison Inmate Information System. 
The public accounts committee identified several reasons for project failure (Public Accounts 
Committee, 2009). 
• Lack of clear senior management and Ministerial ownership and leadership. 
• There was little communication with stakeholders on project progress. With project 
plans failing to schedule engagement activities, many stakeholders were unsure how 
best to communicate with the project. 
• Lack of skills and proven approach to project management and risk management. 
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• Despite recognition that the project was high risk and had a challenging delivery 
schedule, there was no contingency within the budget, suggesting either a desire to 
keep costs down to achieve the go-ahead or a high degree of optimism. 
• Lack of understanding of and contact with the supply industry at senior levels of the 
organisation. 
• Lack of effective project team integration between clients, the supplier team and 
the supply chain. 
Reasons for failure are similar to those encountered on the NPfIT project (2.1.2) and appear 
to be typical of a failed large scale IT project. Again, contract management is shown to be a 
problematic area. 
Disciplines required to enable effective SoSE in this case include: 
• Requirements Management 
• Project Management  
• Risk Management  
• Contract Management  
• Network Architecture  
2.1.5 Close Air Support: fatal friendly fire airstrike, Afghanistan 2014 
On June 9 2014 in Afghanistan, a B-1B Lancer bomber dropped its ordnance on five U.S. 
soldiers, including members of an elite Special Forces team; sadly all lost their lives. A U.S. 
military investigation found the incident was the result of poor communication, inadequate 
planning and several other mistakes (Lamothe, 2014). 
The investigating officer stated; “The key members executing the close air support mission 
collectively failed to effectively execute the fundamentals, which resulted in poor situational 
awareness and improper target identification,” and “While this complex combat situation 
presented a challenging set of circumstances, had the team understood their system’s 
capabilities, executed standard tactics, techniques and procedures and communicated 
effectively, this tragic incident was avoidable.” 
The mission’s purpose was to disrupt the Taliban thereby improving security in the Gaza 
Valley and Zabul’s Arghandab district. However, the U.S. forces came under fire from 
insurgents whilst awaiting helicopter evacuation, at this point close air support was 
requested to neutralise the threat. The position of the troops under fire was not 
communicated effectively between the ground commander, joint terminal attack controller 
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(JTAC) and the B-1B aircrew. Infrared markers were used to indicate the position of the 
troops requesting support, however it was not realised by any of these participants that the 
B-1B targeting system did not have the capability to detect these markers. The final source 
of confusion was the assumption that visible muzzle flashes indicated the insurgent position, 
when in fact it was the troops returning fire, which appeared to be corroborated by no 
detection of infrared markers. 
The investigation revealed that, because of the stress and high tempo of the situation, 
decisions were not questioned at the time, the fatal error only became apparent following 
verbal radio communications immediately following the weapon strike. 
Whilst the investigation apportioned blame through the command chain and stated that 
procedures were not adequately followed, this tragic situation can also be viewed as failure 
of a SoS, in this case due to degraded communications between component systems, poor 
situational awareness throughout the SoS and incorrect identification of a component 
systems capability. 
Disciplines required to enable effective SoSE in this case include: 
• Logistics Management  
• Risk Management  
• Network Architecture  
• Command and Control  
• Modelling and Simulation  
2.1.6 Hurricane Katrina Disaster Relief 
On August 23rd 2005 Doppler radar systems identified a tropical low-pressure system in the 
Caribbean, on the 24th it was upgraded to a tropical storm, making landfall in south Florida 
on the 25th the storm was now defined as a category 1 hurricane. Crossing the Gulf of 
Mexico and reaching Louisiana and Mississippi on the 27th the hurricanes classification was 
raised to a category 3 (Comfort, 2007). The National Weather Service provided regular 
updates, which were provided to authorities from the local to federal level. However, the 
potential risk was not appreciated or acted upon at the time and co-ordination between 
agencies was limited. In the aftermath, different groups, including the coastguard, local 
emergency organisations and civilians, carried out rescue and clearance operations. 
However, these were largely uncoordinated because no overall authority was in control and 
none such had been planned in the event of a large-scale disaster. These disparate groups 
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were also hampered by the lack of a common operating picture, resulting in a limited 
situational awareness (Townsend, 2006). 
Many local state and local agencies capabilities were degraded, or even eliminated, as a 
result of the hurricane and the subsequent floods; for example numerous fire departments 
suffered “total destruction” of their facilities whilst others lost vehicles and stations. 
Additionally, the Orleans Parish Emergency Operations Centre was lost due to flooding, with 
the mayor of New Orleans being force to operate out of the upper floors of a hotel but 
without any communication capability for 48 hours. Indeed the entire communications 
network was disabled; flooding blocked access to the control centres, the “911” emergency 
system was inoperable and the backbone of the agencies radio system (the State of 
Louisiana’s 800 MHz radio system) ceased functioning. The Louisiana State Senator Robert 
Barham, chairman of the State Senate's homeland security committee, described the 
resulting situation; “People could not communicate. It got to the point that people were 
literally writing messages on paper, putting them in bottles and dropping them from 
helicopters to other people on the ground.” 
At this point a command structure could not be established which would have enabled the 
dissemination of information and co-ordination of the emergency agencies. Despite the lack 
of control and situational awareness a large-scale search and rescue (SAR) operation was 
undertaken by the Coast Guard, Urban Search and Rescue Task Forces, the Department of 
Defence and other Federal agencies. However, no plan was in place for the co-ordination of 
urban rescue (i.e. rescue from collapsed buildings) and traditional SAR, which included all 
other aspects. The lack of plan, along with the communications issues, caused co-ordination 
problems requiring agencies to determine their own priorities and work independently, i.e. 
conflicted Command and Control (Alberts, 2003).  
Military and National Guard personnel were drafted in to assist with the SAR and relief 
operations, however the communications issues were exacerbated because the emergency 
responders, National Guard and active military used different equipment reducing 
interoperability. Initially military personnel were operating under separate command 
structures, which were organised geographically. 
In order to rectify the communication issues the Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
the National Interagency Fire Centre and the Department of Defence began to provide 
communications assets including radios, satellite systems and command and control 
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facilities. As communications were restored a more integrated command and control 
approach was established, providing co-ordinated Command and Control. 
After a week the response had transitioned to a collaborative approach with an overall 
authority established providing full command and control of all remaining SAR and recovery 
activities. 
Disciplines required to enable effective SoSE in this case include: 
• Logistics Management  
• Risk Management  
• Network Architecture  
• Command and Control  
• Modelling and Simulation  
2.1.7 Arizona and Southern California Power System  
On the 8th September 2011 an 11-minute disturbance in the Pacific Southwest power grid 
triggered a series of cascading failures throughout Arizona, Southern California, San Diego 
and Mexico, resulting in 2.7 million customers being without power for up to 12 hours. The 
power outage coincided with the start of rush hour, disrupting flights, transport, schools, 
businesses2 as well as water treatment facilities resulting in coastal contamination. To 
further compound the problems it was also a hot day with many buildings reliant on air 
conditioning systems causing a peak in demand in the San Diego area. 
The outage began with a single 500kilovolt transmission line failure, however the power grid 
was designed to withstand this, and had done when the same problem had previously 
occurred. The line in question is a major transmission corridor, which transports power from 
generators on Arizona to San Diego. When this line tripped power was redistributed through 
lower power lines, which were already running at high demand due to the hot weather, 
although the San Diego and Mexico areas were running at lower than peak generation 
levels. The redistribution resulted in large voltage deviations and equipment overloads to 
the north, triggering a ripple effect as the overloading of lines and transformers spread as 
sub-systems initiated automatic load shedding measures. At this point a “separation 
scheme” deployed which disconnected a nuclear power station from the grid, resulting in a 
total blackout of San Diego. This event took 11 minutes to unfold during which the reliability 
co-ordinators (i.e. the authority) issued no directives and local operators only took limited 
                                                          
2 Sometimes referred to as “discovered” systems (Dahmann & Henshaw, 2016) 
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mitigating actions, the inability to stem this initial series of failures resulted in the further 
spread of outages and subsequent blackout. Time to restore power to customers took 
between 6 to 12 hours. 
Two key areas were identified which prevented early mitigation of the failures (FERC & 
NERC, 2014); operations planning and real-time situational awareness. If these functions had 
been adequately supported then it should have been possible to return the system to a 
secure state within 30 minutes. 
With regards to planning, it was found that not enough consideration was given to the 
status of transmission lines, load and generation forecasting, the effect of component 
system contingencies on other systems within the network, as well as the reliability of 
individual component systems and the impact on the network. The earlier prediction of the 
impact on component systems would have enabled contingency measures to be instigated 
thereby mitigating the overloads and preventing the cascading failures. 
The lack of situational awareness was mainly attributed to deficiencies in the real-time 
monitoring tools, based on models, which did not accurately reflect component systems and 
their functions. Recommendations made to improve the situation included greater visibility 
of models, through data sharing, between component system owners, ensuring the tools 
provide constant monitoring of systems and improvement of communications throughout 
all systems comprising the power grid. 
Disciplines required to enable effective SoSE in this case include: 
• Risk Management  
• Network Architecture  
• Modelling and Simulation  
• Network Theory 
2.1.8 Friendster 
Friendster was one of the first social networking websites, having around 117 million users 
in 2002. However, it subsequently suffered an exodus of users to other sites, such as 
Facebook, and shut down in 2011, although it has since been re-established, but as an online 
gaming site rather than social networking. 
One potential factor in the demise of Friendster was its change in role; it was initially set up 
as a dating site and subsequently adapted to become a more general social networking site. 
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Although, at its peak, there were a large number of users, most were not connected to many 
other members, which could be related to its original use. 
Through an examination of remaining residual data, Garcia, Mavrodiev and Schweitzer 
(2013) have determined that “the initial root of users of Friendster was much more tightly 
connected among themselves than towards other nodes, creating a denser subcommunity of 
old users”.  
This resulted in “weakly connected chains of friends that quickly disintegrated” according to 
Garcia3. 
 In 2009, Friendster introduced changes in its user interface, which coincided with technical 
problems and the rise of popularity of Facebook. This exacerbated the decrease of active 
users in the community, ending in its closure in 2011. 
Garcia, Mavrodiev and Schweitzer (2013) suggest that at the heart of successful social 
networking site are, so-called, K-cores. These are a subset of highly active users with many 
connections having “resilience and social influence”. A site with a “critical mass” of K-cores 
will survive design changes and technical issues (up to certain level) as these key users have 
a lot invested in the site through the building up of personal networks, it is therefore in their 
own interest to remain a part of it. 
In the case of Friendster, there were not sufficient K-cores to carry it through the difficulties 
encountered, as users with just a few connections could easily re-establish them through a 
competitor, most likely Facebook. 
It is clear that Network Theory is the key related discipline in this instance and should be an 
essential underpinning element to SoSE. The findings of Garcia et al may provide a method 
to determine SoS resilience. 
Disciplines required to enable effective SoSE in this case include: 
• Network Theory 
2.1.9 Case Study Summary 
The case studies described above have identified the following set of disciplines, which were 
required to create, manage and control SoS, i.e. SoSE: 
• Requirements Management (Rqmt Mgmt) 
• Project Management (Proj Mgmt) 
                                                          
3 http://www.wired.com/wiredenterprise/2013/02/friendster-autopsy/ 
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• Risk Management (Risk Mgmt) 
• Contract Management (Cntrt Mgmt) 
• Network Architecture (Net Arch) 
• Logistics Management (Log Mgmt) 
• Command and Control (C2) 
• Network Theory (Net Thry) 
• Modelling and Simulation (M&S) 
Table 3 summarises these results, cross-referencing the SoS exemplars with particular 
disciplines and, of particular significance to this research, highlighting the necessity of Risk 
Management as an element of SoSE which is indicated by its relevance to seven out of the 
eight case exemplars. It should be noted that adequate situational awareness is necessary 
for successful SoSE, indeed its lack was specifically identified as a contribution to SoS failure 
in some cases above. However, it is not a discrete discipline but rather an attribute, which 
cuts across all disciplines, hence it is not explicitly listed as a SoSE discipline. 
System Rqmt 
Mgmt 
Proj 
Mgmt 
Risk 
Mgmt 
Cntrt 
Mgmt 
Net 
Arch 
Log 
Mgmt 
M&S Net 
Thry 
C2 
FCS ! ! !    !   
NPfIT ! ! ! ! !     
IDS ! ! !    !   
C-NOMIS ! ! ! ! !     
Close Air Support !  !  ! ! !  ! 
Hurricane Katrina 
Disaster Relief 
! ! !  ! ! !  ! 
Power System   !  !  ! !  
Friendster        !  
Table 3 - SoSE Case Study Summary 
2.2 System of Systems Engineering 
Systems Engineering (SE) is a relatively new discipline, in comparison to more longstanding 
engineering disciplines. For example, the Institute of Civil Engineers was founded in 1818 
whereas the International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) was founded in 1990. In 
contrast to this the Systems Engineering Guide for Systems of Systems (US Department of 
Defense, 2008b) was first published in 2008.  
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With SoSE an immature sub-discipline, the engineering of a SoS has often been approached 
through the application of SE techniques where a SoS is regarded as a large-scale system 
with component systems viewed as sub-systems. Whilst this approach may be appropriate 
for certain aspects, such as interoperability of more clearly defined SoS, there are other 
aspects that are distinct and need to be treated accordingly. 
In an effort to determine appropriate SoSE approaches the INCOSE SoS Working Group has 
identified the following issues, or ‘pain points’ (Dahmann, 2014): 
• SoS Authorities: problems with overlapping authorities between the component 
systems 
• Leadership: identification of SoS leadership is problematic due to the issue of 
overlapping authorities 
• Constituent Systems’ Perspectives: in-service and legacy component systems 
purpose may not align fully with that required for the SoS 
• Capabilities and Requirement: SoS comprise component systems with their own 
requirements which may not fully align with the objectives of the SoS 
• Autonomy, Interdependencies and Emergence: component systems are 
independent and may change independently of the SoS 
• Testing, Validation, and Learning: Typically component systems are tested 
independently rather than within end to end SoS testing  
 
These pain points illustrate that a holistic approach is required for SoSE, it cannot be 
assumed that if each component system is controlled and managed the aggregate affect will 
be that the SoS will fulfil it’s intended purpose.  
The case studies summarised in section 2.1.9 highlight specific disciplines which should be 
applied holistically at the SoS level and which require different approaches to those 
currently taken at the component system level. 
Whilst SoSs that have well defined component systems, i.e. directed, may be suited to a 
more traditional SE approach, other classifications are less so. For example, in fulfilling a 
search and rescue mission several component systems will be required to act together. 
Some of these may have been designed to be interoperable, such as the coast guard 
command centre and a maritime rescue helicopter, however civilian vessels may also be 
involved with differing communication capabilities, in this case a traditional SE development 
cycle is clearly not applicable as the SoS is more of an ad-hoc arrangement, e.g. 
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collaborative/acknowledged as in this case part of the SoS is formed rapidly in order to fulfil 
the specific purpose. 
Table 4 lists the disciplines identified from the case studies summarised in section 2.1.9 that 
are required to enable effective SoSE with their relationship to the SoS pain points 
identified. Using this relationship, the description of the SoS pain points and comparison 
with traditional SE approaches the SoS perspective for each discipline is derived, providing a 
high level description of the required approach; hence Table 4 summarises the distinctions 
between SE and SoSE. 
SoSE Disciplines Related SoS Pain Point SoS perspective 
Requirements 
Management 
Capabilities and 
Requirement 
SoS Authorities 
Leadership 
Equates to the SoS purpose, 
requirements are traditionally levied at 
the component system level however 
the appropriate authority needs to be 
established. 
Project 
Management 
Leadership 
Constituent Systems’ 
Perspectives 
Autonomy, 
Interdependencies and 
Emergence 
Management of heterogeneous 
component systems lifecycle and 
maturity is required. 
Risk 
Management 
SoS Authorities 
Leadership 
Constituent Systems’ 
Perspectives 
Autonomy, 
Interdependencies and 
Emergence 
Holistic risk management approach is 
required; management of risk at the 
component system level will not 
mitigate risk at the SoS level. 
Contract 
Management 
Capabilities and 
Requirement  
SoS Authorities 
Manage asynchronous contracts across 
multiple component systems to ensure 
delivery of SoS capability 
Network 
Architecture 
Autonomy, 
Interdependencies and 
Emergence 
Interactions between component 
systems need definition although they 
may be created on an ad-hoc basis and 
change as the SoS evolves. 
Logistics 
Management 
Capabilities and 
Requirement  
SoS Authorities 
Autonomy, 
Interdependencies and 
Emergence 
The management of the availability of 
component systems is required, 
particularly in operational situations. 
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Modelling and 
Simulation 
Capabilities and 
Requirement 
Testing, Validation, 
and Learning 
 
Due to the inherent complexity 
associated with a SoS, M&S will provide 
understanding and decision support 
capability, heterogeneous models will 
be required to model all aspects. 
Command and 
Control 
SoS Authorities 
Leadership 
Authority needs to be established at the 
SoS level. 
Network Theory Autonomy, 
Interdependencies and 
Emergence 
Provides an understanding of the 
interactions within the SoS 
Table 4 - SoSE Disciplines 
In order to draw some more general conclusions from the case study analysis above, Table 5 
maps SoS classification (Dahmann & Baldwin, 2008) to SoSE discipline. It can be seen that 
only Network Theory is identified as applicable to Virtual SoS, however this can be explained 
by the lack of defined control and purpose which prevents the application of more 
traditional disciplines. Risk Management, Project Management, Requirements Management, 
Network Architecture and Modelling and Simulation are applicable across Directed, 
Collaborative and Acknowledged types although the approach taken will differ within these 
types, for example a Directed SoS may be at an acquisition stage in the lifecycle but an 
Acknowledged SoS may be operational. It is also noted that the disciplines required for 
engineering a Acknowledged SoS are a combination of those necessary for Directed and 
Collaborative types; an explanation may be that SoS do not always remain in a single state 
(or type) tending to move from Directed to Acknowledged or to Acknowledged 
Collaborative. Hence, in summary, Table 5 provides a guide to the appropriate application of 
specific SoSE disciplines: of particular relevance to this thesis is the conclusion that Risk 
Management is not applicable to virtual SoS, and which is discussed further in chapter 7. 
 
SoS Classification Rqmt 
Mgmt 
Proj 
Mgmt 
Risk 
Mgmt 
Cntrt 
Mgmt 
Net 
Arch 
Log 
Mgmt 
M&S Net 
Thry 
C2 
Directed ! ! ! ! ! ! !  ! 
Acknowledged ! ! ! ! ! ! !  ! 
Collaborative  ! ! !  ! ! !  ! 
Virtual        !  
 
Table 5 - SoSE Disciplines mapped to SoS Classification 
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2.3 Risk Management of SoS 
This section provides a brief overview of the issues surrounding the approach required for 
SoS Risk Management in contrast to the traditional system approach. A more detailed 
discussion is provided in section 3.4 and chapter 7. 
The case studies discussed above (section 2.1) illustrate that Risk Management is a key 
element of SoSE. The DoD SoSE guide (US Department of Defense, 2008b) succinctly 
describes the subtle distinction between system and SoS risk management; 
“Risk management for a SoS begins with the identification of SoS objectives and the 
identification of the risks that threaten the achievement of those objectives. While it is true 
that minor individual program risks could be major risks to the SoS, it is also true that 
significant system risks may have little or no impact on the SoS functionality. Furthermore 
there may be risk to a set of SoS objectives which are not risks to the constituent systems 
(e.g., unwanted emergent behaviour, infrastructure, integration risks, cost risk).” 
A common perception is that if all SoS component system risks are managed, then any SoS 
risks will be managed without further intervention. The quote above demonstrates that SoS 
risk may be decoupled from individual system risk and should be managed separately. 
When engineering ‘traditional’ systems, the likelihood of risk is typically determined through 
qualitative approaches resulting in the allocation of subjective (as opposed to objective) 
probability (Garvey, 2004).  Pinto et al (2012) argue that, when engineering these traditional 
systems, the tools and methodologies are available to address defined problems and, as the 
system boundaries are fixed and expected behavior is known, scoping these problems and 
the associated risks, is relatively straightforward. However, the SoS boundary is not 
necessarily static, the component systems may not all be identified and behavior is 
emergent: therefore new tools and methodologies are required.  
In addition, Conrow (2005) identifies the following SoS Risk Management issues, which are 
specific to this domain; multiple stakeholders and risk management processes, long life 
cycles, disparate technical risk assessment, integration risks, functional performance and 
interface complexity.  
2.4 Summary of Chapter 
This chapter discussed several exemplars covering all types of SoS; directed, collaborative, 
acknowledged and virtual (Dahmann & Baldwin, 2008). For each exemplar specific 
disciplines are identified (in Table 4) which are required to enable effective SoSE in each 
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case. These results are generalised in Table 5, which maps SoSE discipline to SoS type. Risk 
Management is identified as a key SoSE discipline being applicable to directed, collaborative 
and acknowledged types. However, as discussed above in section 2.3, Risk Management of 
SoS requires a different approach to that currently taken for individual systems and it cannot 
be assumed that if risk is managed for each component system then the aggregated effect 
will be to mitigate risk at the SoS level. 
  
A Model Based Approach to System of Systems Risk Management 
30 
3 Chapter 3: Literature review 
This chapter describes the strategy and approach of the state of the art literature review, 
identifies and justifies the key themes, analyses the results of the review and concludes with 
a summary of the results. 
3.1 Literature review strategy 
A literature review can be described as “the use of ideas in the literature to justify the 
particular approach to the topic, the selection of methods, and demonstration that this 
research contributes something new” (Hart, 1998). 
The state-of-the-art literature review approach was based on the three-stage review process 
as described by Levy & Ellis (2006) in Figure 4 below.  
 
Figure 4 - Three-stage literature review process (Levy & Ellis, 2006) 
The literature review initially utilised a combination of key word and recommended author 
searches providing familiarisation with the problem domain. However, as the researchers 
understanding increased and consequently the research question was refined, reducing the 
overall scope, specific themes were identified which allowed more targeted keyword 
searching. The initial results of the literature also identified key authors and journals to be 
searched providing greater coverage of the available knowledge base.   
Following the initial literature search, backward and forward searches (Levy & Ellis, 2006; 
Webster & Watson, 2002) were employed to expand the review coverage and probe more 
deeply into the subjects under investigation. These techniques searched using author and 
reference attributes. The backwards search approach was employed to investigate the 
originating sources (e.g. journal articles) of concepts and theories, while the forward search 
was used to extend the knowledge by reviewing follow-up studies and developments related 
to the concepts and theories under investigation. 
1. Know the literature
2. Comprehend the literature
3. Apply the literature
4. Analyse the literature
5. Synthesise the literature
6. Evaluate the literature
1. Input 3. Output
2. Processing
- What is, and what is 
not, helpful
- Gaps
- Understandings
… leading to hypotheses
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The literature review was divided into the following three themes: 
1. General definitions and differences between System and SOSE 
2. Modelling and Simulation and its applicability to SoS 
3. Risk Management and its application in the SoS domain 
These themes were selected to ensure all aspects of the research questions were surveyed, 
as described in section 1.2. Each theme required a more general review with a relatively 
broad scope in order to provide context for the subsequent more specific review; e.g. a 
general review of different Modelling and Simulation techniques was undertaken and then 
each technique was reviewed in the context of SoS applicability.  
For the first theme, some background publications regarding SE were surveyed but were 
limited to key sources, e.g. INCOSE, in order to enable the SoSE perspective to be compared. 
Numerous publications were available regarding SoS and SoSE, the review was initially 
undertaken using refined keyword combinations, developed from the initial search, as well 
as author, conference and publication attributes. Forward and backward searching 
techniques were also utilised to ensure greater survey coverage. This theme seeks to 
establish an understanding of the current state of SoSE, including its differentiation from 
traditional SE, how the SoS lifecycle differs from that of a single system, the characterisation 
and definition of SoS and identify the necessary components of SoSE. The output of this 
theme affords justification for the necessity of Risk Management as a specific SoSE activity 
as well as providing supporting information used in the development of the SoS System of 
Interest model, as described in section 6.1, with the associated conference paper (Kinder et 
al., 2012) attached in Annex A.  
The initial survey for the Modelling and Simulation theme revealed a vast amount of 
publications, in order to bound the review a set of most widely used M&S techniques was 
identified and only key publications were analysed in order to provide basic background 
understanding of this area. The number of publications relating to SoS M&S was far lower 
with an uneven spread between techniques; e.g. Discrete Event Specification (DEVS) has 
been promoted as a general approach to SoS M&S and hence numerous publications are 
available whereas the availability of publications relating Petri Nets and SoS applications is 
very limited. In order to provide context for the review a case study was used (Data Looping 
in Tactical Data Link architectures) which provided a framework of heterogeneous 
techniques to be compared from a SoS perspective, the results of this review were published 
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in the International Journal of SoSE (Kinder et al., 2014), the paper is attached in Annex C. 
This theme is essential to support the “model-based” aspect of this research, directly 
fulfilling research objective 1 (Review of a wide range of modelling techniques applicability 
to SoS) and providing input to objectives 5 (Identify appropriate modelling techniques and 
implement and test tool), 6 (Identify a case study and determine the adaptability of the tool) 
and 7 (Use model to assess transfer of risk within a SoS). 
The third theme also required a background knowledge review, in this case related to Risk 
and Risk Management, and again limiting the review to key publications. The number of 
publications found which related to the management of risk specifically within SoS was very 
low, as a result the search was widened to include SoS case study examples and in particular 
lessons learnt reports, these in turn were searched for reference to risk and risk 
management. The results of the theme 3 review support research objectives 2 (Review 
current risk management approaches), 3 (Identify differences between system and SoS risk 
management), 7 (Use model to assess transfer of risk within a SoS) and 8 (Define a SoS risk 
management methodology). 
The literature sources included the following: 
• IEEE IEXPLORE 
• INCOSE 
• Science Direct 
• Elseiver 
• Google/Google Scholar 
• Scopus  
• Loughborough University library 
3.2 Theme 1: Systems of Systems Engineering 
The first literature theme reviews the current state of SoSE, surveying SoS definitions, SoS 
characteristics, SoSE approaches and lifecycle models. Key elements of SoSE are identified as 
well as gaps in existing knowledge. 
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A brief review of system theory and systems engineering are also provided which are 
required to support subsequent arguments and discussions. 
3.2.1 System Theory 
Karl Ludwig Von Bertalanffy (1937) first proposed the “system” concept in 1937, defining a 
system as a “complex of interacting elements”. This concept spawned a proliferation of 
system approaches and disciplines, including Systems Engineering. It should be noted that, 
this section is included in order to provide basic coverage of foundational knowledge, which 
contributes to the subsequent sections, hence the depth of inquiry is necessarily limited.  
Beyond the basic system concept, Bertalanffy proposed General Systems Theory (Von 
Bertalanffy, 1968) which espoused the following system laws and which provide the basis for 
systems engineering and thinking methodologies: 
• Holism: the whole system is primary and the components are secondary, the whole 
is more than the sum of its parts. 
• Open/Closed Systems: open systems exchange matter, information and energy with 
their environment, whereas closed systems are unchanged by their environments. 
• Boundaries: defines the limit of a system. Closed system boundaries are static, open 
systems are dynamic. 
• Inputs/Outputs: input of information and output back into the environment by 
open systems; this is related to “boundaries”. 
• Feedback: outputs are fed back into the system as it transforms and adapts to the 
environment. 
• Single/Multiple Outcomes: relates to the system goal. 
• Equifinality: the relationship between the initial conditions and final outcome. 
• Entropy: the measure of disorder. 
• Hierarchies: the relationship of the system to its component parts. 
• Interrelated Components: by definition, systems are comprised of connected 
elements. 
• Dynamic Equilibrium: system equilibrium is attained if all component parts are in a 
state of equilibrium. 
• Internal Elaboration: closed systems move towards entropy and disorganisation 
whereas open systems move towards diversity and increased complexity. 
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Adams (2011) assessed system theory in the context of SoS and identified additional 
relevant principles, including: 
• Emergence: the whole is more than the sum of its parts; constitutive characteristics 
are not explainable from the characteristics of the individual parts. 
• Satisficing: rather than optimising an option chosen that is “good enough”. 
• Requisite variety: is calculated by the number of system states raised to the power 
of system elements and is directly related to complexity. The controller of a system 
must exhibit at least the same level of variety as the system under control (Ashby, 
1961). 
• Requisite parsimony: human beings can only deal simultaneously with between five 
and nine observations at one time (Miller, 1956). 
 
3.2.2 Systems Engineering 
This section is intended to provide a basic set of state of the art definitions regarding 
systems and SE upon which subsequent sections and chapters may refer to. It is not 
intended to provide a detailed literature review of the domain. 
ISO/IEC 15288, Systems and software engineering - System life cycle processes, defines a 
system as “combination of interacting elements organized to achieve one or more stated 
purposes” where a system element is defined as a “member of a set of elements that 
constitute a system” (British Standards, 2011). 
INCOSE provides similar system definition; “an integrated set of elements, or assemblies that 
accomplish a defined objective” (INCOSE, 2015). 
These definitions build upon Bertalanffy’s definition (a complex of interacting elements) 
through the addition of an association to a system purpose or objective.  
Systems Engineering (SE) is the “interdisciplinary approach governing the total technical and 
managerial effort required to transform a set of stakeholder needs, expectations, and 
constraints into a solution and to support that solution throughout its life” (British Standards, 
2011). 
In order to undertake SE the System of Interest (SoI) must be established, INCOSE defines 
the SoI for a system as; “The system whose life cycle is under consideration”, whilst ISO/IEC 
15288 (British Standards, 2011) takes a hierarchical view; “the top system in the system 
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structure is called a system-of-interest and consists of lower level systems. Except the lowest 
level is identified as being made up of system elements.” 
3.2.3 SoS Definition and Classification 
Ackoff made one of the first references to “Systems of Systems”, in 1971, proposing the 
grouping of disparate system concepts into single systems, which could be applied in the 
management of organisations (Ackoff, 1971). Even earlier, in 1964, Berry used the term 
“Systems within Systems” (Berry, 1964) when examining the evolution of cities through 
urban models. Clearly a distinction between single systems and SoS has been identified for 
some time; indeed SoSs been have developed for many years, for example the British 
railway network, which can be classified as a SoS, was developed in the mid-nineteenth 
century (Kemp et al., 2013). Another example is the Joint Tactical Information Distribution 
System (JTIDS) (NATO, 2008), which began development in the late 1960’s and enabled the 
exchange of situational awareness information between platforms. This was a key 
development in the evolution of the SoS, it allowed greater interaction between component 
systems, resulting in closer coupling even within SoS created on a more ad-hoc basis. When 
JTIDS became operational in the 1980’s it provided a step change in tactical awareness 
however there were many interoperability problems, which reduced the potential 
effectiveness of this new capability. This resulted in the creation of iSMART process, which 
provided a SoSE approach to solving interoperability issues (Lockheed Martin, 2016).  
However, this was a very specific solution tailored to the particular problem space, it was 
not until Maier’s seminal publication; Architecting principles for Systems of Systems (Maier, 
1998), that a more general differentiation between systems and SoSs was articulated, 
providing a sound basis for SoSE research. Maier argued that the two key properties, which 
differentiate the SoS from a system, are managerial and operational independence of the 
component systems. This countered the generally accepted view at the time that SoSs are 
geographically distributed but managed and developed conventionally (Eisner et al., 1991; 
Shenhar, 1995). Operational independence requires component systems to have the ability 
to operate independently. Managerial independence requires component system to be 
acquired, operated and integrated independently. Maier also observed that SoSs exhibit 
different characteristics, proposing the following categorisation based on managerial 
control: 
• Directed: Directed systems-of-systems are those in which the integrated system-of-
systems is built and managed to fulfill specific purposes. It is centrally managed 
A Model Based Approach to System of Systems Risk Management 
36 
during long-term operation to continue to fulfill those purposes, and any new ones 
the system owners may wish to address. The component systems maintain an ability 
to operate independently, but their normal operational mode is subordinated to the 
central managed purpose. 
• Collaborative: Collaborative systems-of-systems are distinct from directed systems in 
that the central management organization does not have coercive 
power to run the system. The component systems must, more or less, voluntarily 
collaborate to fulfill the agreed upon central purposes. 
• Virtual: Virtual systems-of-systems lack both a central management authority and 
centrally agreed upon purposes. Large-scale behavior emerges, and may be 
desirable, but the supersystem must rely upon relatively invisible mechanisms to 
maintain it. 
 
Dahmann et al (Dahmann & Baldwin, 2008) argued that a further SoS type exists which is 
similar to a Directed SoS in that they have a common managerial authority and purpose but 
are in fact a mix of new and legacy systems which can also operate independently. This 
additional type is classified as an “Acknowledged” SoS and is defined below: 
• Acknowledged. Acknowledged SoS have recognized objectives, a designated 
manager, and resources for the SoS; however, the constituent systems retain their 
independent ownership, objectives, funding, and development and sustainment 
approaches. Changes in the systems are based on collaboration between the SoS and 
the system. 
 
Maier (Maier, 1998) states that a Virtual SoS may be formed deliberately or accidently; as a 
result Kemp et al (Kemp et al., 2013) have proposed a fifth classification, “Accidental”, 
applicable to emergent SoS, which are entirely unplanned: 
• Accidental. Accidental SoS are completely unplanned and unpredicted but becomes a 
reality 
 
It is noted that an Accidental SoS is very similar to a Virtual SoS and indeed the distinction 
between them may not be of value. The definition of an Accidental SoS could be regarded as 
retrospective; once an Accidental SoS has been identified then, at that point, it also fits the 
definition of a Virtual SoS. A potential further refinement could explicitly classify deliberate 
and accidental Virtual SoS. 
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However, the ability to identify a system as a SoS and then to classify it as a specific type 
enables more appropriate methods of development, control and management to be applied, 
or at least provides an awareness that traditional approaches may not be suitable. However, 
this is less applicable to the Virtual SoS and, by definition, not applicable to the Discovered 
SoS. The misclassification of a SoS or monolithic system can have major impacts (Maier, 
1998); for example if a system is declared a monolithic SoS rather than a monolithic system 
the resulting architecture will incorporate unnecessary redundancy as every component 
system will be required to operate independently hence the overall system cost and 
complexity will also rise. If the converse is true and the system is incorrectly classified, as a 
monolithic system, then the system architecture will consist of tightly coupled component 
systems, which may not be appropriate if an adaptable, evolutionary system is required. 
Incorrect classification of a SoS (e.g. Directed rather than Acknowledged) may result in 
owners, developers or operators over or underestimating the level of control they process, 
leading to the adoption of inappropriate mechanisms for ensuring collaboration between 
component systems (Maier, 1998). 
Since Maier’s SoS definition numerous alternatives have been proposed, with many specific 
to particular domains. Through a literature review Jamshidi (2008) identified six different 
definitions alone and proposed the following alternative:  
“SoSs are large-scale integrated systems which are heterogeneous and independently 
operable on their own, but are networked together for a common goal” (Jamshidi, 2008). 
The DoS Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DoD, 2014) provides the following definition: 
“A SoS is described as a set or arrangement of systems that results when independent and 
useful systems are integrated into a larger system that delivers unique capabilities.” 
The ISO System and Software engineering standard (British Standards, 2011) closely follows 
Maier’s original definition, describing a SoS as: 
“..an SOI whose elements are themselves systems. A SoS brings together a set of systems for 
a task that none of the systems can accomplish on its own”. It is also states “SoS are 
characterized by the managerial and operational independence of the constituent systems”.  
The INCOSE SE Guide cites the two characteristics identified by Maier but removes the 
stipulation that both must be exhibited to enable a classification as a SoS, thereby deviating 
from the definition provided in ISO 15288: 
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“..an SOI whose elements are managerially and/or operationally independent systems” 
(INCOSE, 2015). 
There are now numerous examples of SoS managed by a single organisation and there are 
also constituent systems that, although they can theoretically be operated independently, 
provide limited independent functionality (Brook, 2016). Brook argues that Maier’s original 
definition is now overly prescriptive and proposes the following less restrictive definition: 
“A SoS is a system which results from the coupling of a number of constituent systems at 
some point in their life cycles” (Brook, 2016). 
This definition neatly encompasses the evolutionary nature of the SoS, which avoids the 
current confusion regarding the relevance of managerial and operational independence, and 
is the preferred definition within this thesis.  
Despite the number of SoS definitions available, it is often asked if a SoS consists of 
component systems, which can be regarded as sub-systems, then can a SoS be treated as a 
large system? 
Brook provides a compelling response through the application of systemic and systematic 
viewpoints (Brook, 2016). The Systemic view considers the whole system behaviour and its 
interaction with the environment whilst the systematic view is concerned with the 
composition of the system and the interactions with its component parts. Brook argues that 
SoS and individual systems are the same when viewed systemically because the internal 
structure is hidden and only the externally viewed behaviour is observed, although it is 
noted that emergence and the potential unpredictability of SoS is not considered. When 
viewed systematically “the differences between systems and SoS are major and deep-
seated”, in this case Brook argues that SoSE is focused upon the building of complex systems 
through the coupling of individual systems. Brooks’ SoS definition, as stated above, 
combines both systemic and systematic aspects and is therefore more generic than most 
alternatives, but also well founded.  
3.2.4 SoS Characteristics 
As illustrated in the discussion above, the search for a succinct, all encompassing definition 
of a SoS is somewhat elusive, with many attempting to encapsulate Maier’s properties. 
Boardman and Sauser (Boardman & Sauser, 2006) took a different approach, proposing the 
differentiation of SoS vice system through the following set of distinguishing characteristics 
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providing a more sophisticated approach to classification thereby reducing the risk of 
misclassification; Autonomy, Belonging, Connectivity, Diversity and Emergence. 
Autonomy aligns somewhat with Maier’s key SoS property, operational independence. From 
the system perspective a constituent that is deemed to serve the system, and is designed for 
a specific purpose, is regarded as a system part, hence the system itself is autonomous 
rather than the constituent parts. However, from the SoS perspective the component 
systems act autonomously whilst contributing to the SoS purpose. 
Belonging is related to the collaboration between system components. A system part 
inherently belongs to the parent system whereas component systems comprising a SoS 
develop belonging through an acceptance of the benefit of participation and contribution to 
the SoS purpose.  
Connectivity between components is essential to the function of a system or SoS. Within a 
system, parts are tightly coupled with interactions encapsulated and explicitly specified. The 
connectivity between component systems is provided on a dynamic basis with connections 
made on a real-time basis in order to support the SoS purpose as required.  
Diversity allows a SoS to adapt to external conditions or a change in its purpose, in 
accordance with Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety (Ashby, 1961) (section 3.2.1), which states 
that “for a system to maintain stability in an operating environment it must possess at least 
the same number of degrees of freedom or dimensionality of that environment”. The 
diversity is provided by the autonomy, belonging and dynamic connectivity of the 
component systems. In contrast, a system comprises a static set of parts where connectivity 
is fixed. 
Emergence is deliberately designed into a system; the resulting behaviour is intended to 
fulfil the systems purpose with testing used to eliminate unwanted behaviour. Within a SoS 
emergence arises through the characteristics autonomy, belonging, connectivity and 
diversity. Boardman and Sauser suggest that a SoS should support emergence but eliminate 
undesirable behaviour. 
Of the five characteristics, autonomy and connectivity provide a more intuitive distinction 
and are therefore more likely to be correctly determined. Belonging and diversity are 
somewhat esoteric and may be difficult to assess when considering actual systems or SoS. 
Emergence can be observed but again, it may be difficult to differentiate between behaviour 
arising from a tightly coupled system and that from a SoS, the suggested ability for a SoS to 
eliminate unwanted behaviour may not be easily predicted. Hence, although these proposed 
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characteristics provide richer descriptions and differentiation of system and SoS, in practice 
their application does not appear to be straightforward. 
Through a review of current knowledge Keating et al (Keating & Katina, 2011) identified the 
following characteristics: 
• Managerial Independence (Maier, 1998). 
• Operational Independence (Maier, 1998). 
• Evolutionary development: “changes have to be made to the SoS as more 
knowledge is acquired and circumstances shift” (Keating & Katina, 2011). This is in 
contrast to component systems where development is described as “front loaded”. 
• Emergent behaviour: develops over time through the interaction of component 
systems (Keating, 2009) 
• Geographical distribution (Eisner et al., 1991); it is noted that this is frequently 
attributed to Maier (Maier, 1998), however Maier states that component systems 
are commonly but not always geographically distributed, hence this is not 
necessarily a defining characteristic. 
• Interoperability: “the ability of two or more systems or components to exchange 
information and to use the information that has been exchanged” (IEEE, 1989). It is 
emphasised that a SoS functions through the interaction of its component systems. 
• Complementarity (Keating & Katina, 2011): “provides multiple perspectives of any 
given system”, it is stated that this should result in the most appropriate solution 
adopted and that component systems will compliment one another within the SoS. 
• Holism (Kovacic et al., 2008): a philosophical view, which states the SoS must be 
regarded as a whole and that reductionism is not appropriate to the understanding 
of SoS behaviour. 
 
Kinder et al (Kinder et al., 2012)4 take an alternative approach, rather than attempting to 
define SoS characteristics, a SoS System of Interest model is developed identifying nine 
“dimensions” which enable a SoS to be described and classified. The SoI model has been 
developed as a key element of the model based approach to SoS Risk Management; the 
dimensions are listed below but are described in greater detail in section 6.1: 
• Component Systems (including specific and general system types), 
• Classification 
                                                          
4 Paper is attached in Annex A 
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• Interactions  
• Nature of Relationships 
• Lifecycle 
• Variability 
• Functions 
• Systems Owners and Operations 
• Concept of Operation / Use / Employment 
 
Table 6 provides a direct comparison between the SoS characteristics and dimensions 
described above. 
SoI Dimensions (Kinder et al., 
2012) 
Characteristics 
(Boardman & Sauser, 
2006) 
Keating (Charles B Keating & 
Katina, 2011) 
Component Systems (including 
specific and general system 
types), 
Autonomy Managerial Independence 
Operational Independence 
Geographical distribution 
Classification Belonging Holism 
Interactions  Connectivity Interoperability 
Nature of Relationships   
Lifecycle  Evolutionary development 
Variability Diversity  
Functions Emergence Emergent Behaviour 
Systems Owners and 
Operations 
  
Concept of Operation / Use / 
Employment 
  
  Complementarity 
Table 6 - SoS Characteristics and Dimension Comparison 
3.2.5 SoS Engineering (SoSE) 
As stated previously, in section 1.1, SoSE is an immature, emerging sub-discipline of SE. All 
aspects of SoSE are still the subjects of debate; indeed even a globally accepted definition of 
SoSE has yet to be agreed.  
Although not intended to provide a comprehensive approach to SoSE, Maier (1998) 
suggested the following heuristics relating to the design of SoS architecture: 
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• Stable Intermediate Forms: system designers need to consider intermediate states 
of the SoS as it evolves and their stability. 
• Policy Triage: determine points at which leverage over system evolution is possible, 
e.g. communication standards. 
• Leverage at the Interfaces: the primary point at which the designer has control over 
the system. 
• Ensuring Cooperation: consider why component systems need to collaborate and 
ensure design provides support. 
These heuristics are valid if a SoS is “designed”, i.e. they appear more applicable to a 
directed SoS whereby control over the architecting and design phases is possible. However, 
when considering a collaborative or virtual SoS, this is not necessarily feasible as the SoS 
may be formed on an ad-hoc basis in response to an emerging, potentially urgent, need. 
Hence, although these heuristics provided early guidance on factors that should be 
considered when undertaking SoSE, they cannot be universally applied to all potential cases 
and cannot be considered comprehensive. 
The development of SoSE is still immature with no single coherent approach currently 
agreed across all domains. Indeed, Keating et al (Keating & Katina, 2011) argue that the SoSE 
field is diverging between hard and soft system approaches stating that; there is a lack of an 
accepted definition of SoSE, the relationship and differentiation of SoSE to SE is tenuous and 
there is an overemphasis on information technology (interoperability) and lack of emphasis 
on human, social, organisational, political, policy dimensions. 
The lack of accepted SoSE definitions is a valid concern, with few available. The DoD 
definition below appears more relevant to directed and acknowledged SoS, implying the use 
of traditional SE approaches thereby limiting the necessary scope of SoSE. Whereas the 
second definition is more generic hence the scope of SoSE is not limited in this case.  
The process of planning, analyzing, organizing, and integrating the capabilities of a mix of 
existing and new systems into a system-of-systems capability that is greater than the sum of 
the capabilities of the constituent parts (DoD, 2014). 
The evolving, designed combination of systems to form a system of systems in networks that 
are safe, secure, efficient and able to respond to changing requirements and operational 
situations (Barot et al., 2013).  
The key to defining SoSE is describing the meaning of “engineering” however, the dichotomy 
is that the definition of discrete activities may result in an overly prescriptive definition, 
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applicable only within a specific domain whereas a generic definition will provide a 
definition of “engineering”. Another problem with attempting to create a specific (tight) 
definition is that the SoSE approach will differ for each SoS classification, which without an 
excessively cumbersome definition will not provide this distinction. For these reasons it is 
suggested that a “tight” definition for SoSE is not appropriate, as a truly universal definition 
will never be achieved and that a “loose”, generic definition is the more suitable approach 
with the detail concerning specific activities covered in appropriate standards and guides. 
DoD SE Guide for SoS 
The DoD SE Guide for SoS (US Department of Defense, 2008b) was first published in 2008 
and provided the first comprehensive set of SoSE guidelines, describing how each aspect of 
SE should be applied from a SoS perspective. However, the guide relates to the defence 
domain and is focussed upon acknowledged SoS, although it is stated that future updates 
will include directed SoS but these have not, as yet, been forthcoming. The guide identifies 
the following seven core elements of SoSE, with the first three (highlighted) deemed critical 
to SoSE: 
• Translating capability objectives – translating capability into technical requirements 
and identifying new needs as the SoS evolves. 
• Understanding systems and relationships – understanding component system 
support to SoS objectives, interactions and asynchronous development paths. 
• Monitoring and assessing changes – understanding how changes in component 
systems affect the SoS. 
• Assessing performance to capability objectives – determine metrics and methods for 
monitoring SoS performance and feedback to component systems to enable system 
level changes. 
• Developing and evolving a SoS architecture – determine the relationships, functions 
and dependencies of component systems. 
• Addressing requirements and solution options – determine user needs and identify 
solution options, liaise at the system level to ensure systems can support these. 
• Orchestrating upgrades to SoS – orchestrate component systems to ensure support 
to the SoS is maintained. 
 
Each core element is mapped to one or many of the sixteen SE technical and technical 
management processes as defined in the SE chapter of the DoD Acquisition Guide (DoD, 
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2014). The sixteen processes are shown in Figure 5 and the mapping to the SoSE core 
elements in Figure 6. 
Of particular relevance to this research is the mapping of Risk Management, which is 
indicated, as applicable to all seven SoSE elements, and therefore can be considered a key 
discipline within SoSE. 
As stated previously these SoSE guidelines are intended for development of an 
Acknowledged SoS, which, by definition, will have a designated manager, hence an element 
of control over all component systems is possible. However, when considering collaborative 
and virtual SoS no centralised control is available, in these cases the proposed DoD SoSE, 
which is closely associated with the traditional SE approach, becomes less appropriate.  In 
these cases, where a SoS is created on a more ad-hoc basis it is not possible to influence 
individual component system design and the interfaces between them at the time of SoS 
creation. The “engineering” of the collaborative SoS is more related to the selection of 
appropriate component systems, which will provide the highest likelihood of achieving the 
SoS purpose or mission. However, the classification of a SoS is not always a single discrete 
state, as stated previously frequently sub-groups of component systems within a SoS may be 
classified differently to the overall classification. For example, this may occur when a group 
of component systems are assembled on an ad-hoc basis but interact through an established 
communications medium such as tactical data links or the internet protocol (IP).  
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Figure 5 - SE Activities (DoD, 2014) 
 
Figure 6 - SoSE mapping (US Department of Defense, 2008b) 
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ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288:2015 Annex G - Application of system life cycle processes to a system of 
systems 
The Systems and software engineering standard, ISO 15288 (British Standards, 2011) now 
includes an annex providing an informative overview of SoSE. The SoS classifications as 
defined in the DoD SoSE guide are re-iterated along with a brief description of emergence 
and the potential effects. The remainder of the annex discusses the relationship of SoS to 
the following processes: 
• Agreement processes 
• Organisational project-enabling processes 
• Technical Management processes 
• Technical processes 
Agreement processes are described as the “modes of developmental and operational control 
among the organizations responsible for the SoS”, it is also clarified that complete control of 
component systems is only possible for the directed SoS and that for acknowledged and 
collaborative SoS reciprocal co-operation is required and this becomes more informal for 
virtual SoS. 
Organisational project-enabling and technical management processes are described as 
“planning, analyzing, organizing, and integrating the capabilities of a mix of existing and 
new systems into a SoS capability”. It is also emphasised that the component systems 
development lifecycles are not necessarily synchronised and this is an issue that needs to be 
considered at the SoS level. Risk management is also identified as an activity that should be 
undertaken at the system and SoS level. 
Technical processes include traditional SE activities, requirements analysis, architecture 
definition, design, implementation, verification, validation, operations, maintenance and 
disposal but applied at the SoS level. 
15288:2015 Annex G currently provides only high-level descriptions of the SoS processes, 
which are generally replications of those performed at the system level but with general 
caveats stating that these also need to be carried out at the SoS level. 
DANSE Methodology 
The DANSE (Designing for adaptability and evolution in system of systems engineering) 
project “created and evaluated methodology and tools for SoS evolution and adaptation” 
(DANSE Consortium, 2015). 
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A key aspect of DANSE is the development of a SoS modelling and simulation approach, 
which is discussed under theme 2 of this literature review. However, DANSE also proposes a 
SoSE lifecycle methodology, providing a more innovative approach than merely retargeting 
traditional SE activities at the SoS level, which is “driven by the realization that a SoS is 
constantly changing”. An iterative, evolutionary approach is proposed consisting of whereby 
the lifecycle comprises three stages; SoS Initiation Phase, SoS Creation Phase and SoS 
Operations Phase. 
During the Initiation phase the SoS comes into existence through the connection of a group 
of component systems enabling the sharing of information and resources. These interactions 
result in emergent behaviour at the SoS level. It is stated that the SoS “manager” will 
attempt to gain control over the SoS at this point either through bottom up consensus, or 
top down authority and will begin to identify goals, contracts and needs. However, with the 
exception of virtual SoS, it is noted a need will tend to arise requiring a “manager” to select 
a set of component systems to form an initial SoS rather than the SoS forming first which the 
DANSE description does not appear to consider, although it is accepted that an initial 
formation of the SoS will always occur. 
The Creation Phase is described as optional and is required when the initial SoS emergent 
behaviour is severely deficient, requiring the SoS to be “re-envisioned and developed in a 
top-down approach”. In this phase models of alternate architectures are produced in order 
to determine a solution, which provides the required emergent behaviour. The component 
systems are also modelled in order to establish any necessary changes to support the 
desired emergent behaviour, however there is an assumption that influence over these 
system configurations or design will be possible which is not necessarily the case. 
In the Operational Phase the SoS operates providing the desired emergent behaviour, 
however the “manager” will monitor for additional potential needs and influence the 
component systems in order that the emergent behaviour is suitably modified. Again, this 
assumes influence over the development of the component systems is possible.  
In addition to three lifecycle phases, the following six engineering activities are described: 
• Model SoS behaviour 
• Operate the SoS 
• Define potential needs 
• Analyse possible architecture changes 
• Influence and Implement Changes 
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• Constituent Systems engineering 
 
Modelling SoS behaviour utilises the DoD Architectural Framework (DoDAF) to model the 
SoS architecture with SysML used to model component (constituent) systems. DoDAF and 
SysML are discussed within the paper (Kinder et al., 2014) attached in Annex C. 
Operation of the SoS is described as running in parallel with modelling, potentially allowing 
prediction of emergent behaviour thereby providing to support in managing the SoS. 
The definition of potential needs requires either SoS or component system capabilities to be 
updated in order to fulfil needs that arise. 
Additional needs may impact the SoS architecture hence an activity is described which 
requires the modelling of architecture changes enabling evaluation of potential options. 
It is acknowledged within the DANSE methodology that the SoS manager is unlikely to have 
the authority to force component systems owners to perform modifications, however it is 
assumed that it will be possible to influence these owners, with modelling artefacts 
providing support for this. As stated previously the “manager” may not even have any 
influence but may be restricted to the selection of component systems rather than 
modification. 
Finally, the engineering of changes to the component systems themselves is required. These 
are not specifically a SoSE activity but are necessary where changes to the component 
systems are required in order to support a SoS emergent need and are embedded within the 
DANSE lifecycle. 
COMPASS 
COMPASS (COMPASS Consortium, 2014a) is a, now complete, European Union project, 
which is intended to provide “Comprehensive Modelling and Analysis for Advanced Systems 
of Systems”. The modelling aspect of the COMPASS project is discussed under theme 2 of 
the literature review in section 3.3.7, however a SoSE approach is also proposed comprising 
an Ontology, Architectural Framework and Process Library. 
The Ontology “defines the concepts relevant to the approach, along with the relationships 
between these concepts” and covers the following areas: 
• SoS Requirements 
• Process and Competency 
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• Architectures and Architectural Frameworks 
• SoS Integration 
• Traceability 
• Refinement 
 
The COMPASS Architectural Framework comprises Viewpoints, which allows creation of 
views, in combination with ontology elements, providing visualisation of the SoS 
architecture. The Process Library comprises processes, which address particular aspects of 
SoSE. 
The COMPASS approach to SoSE considers the traditional SE lifecycle (Concept 
Development, Development, Production, Utilization, Support and Retirement (INCOSE, 
2015)) and suggests that SoSE is only applicable at the concept development stage and for 
integration within the development stage. Specifically, operational requirement 
identification and potential architecture definition are undertaken at the concept 
development stage, and test scenario development, constrained by individual component 
system design decisions as part of the integration activity, underpinned by a Model Based 
Systems Engineering (MBSE) approach (COMPASS Consortium, 2014b). This is in contrast to 
the DANSE approach, which does not attempt to consider SoSE activities in the context of 
the traditional SE lifecycle but rather from a purely SoS viewpoint through the proposed 
iterative SoS lifecycle. 
COMPASS also provides a provides a maturity, lifecycle definition that is applicable to SoS 
and component systems, as follows: 
• New: requires initial development, no current capabilities. 
• Middle-Life: enhance a current SoS or develop a new SoS utilising current 
capabilities. 
• Aging: existing SoS requiring major restructuring and change to component systems. 
These classifications are also applied at the component systems level, providing a greater 
understanding of the extent of collaboration and flexibility between the systems comprising 
the SoS. A key risk to SoS development is the effect of asynchronous development of the 
component system on the overall SoS capabilities; distinguishing between the different 
maturity states enables this impact to be modelled and hence, assessed. 
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A method of classifying component systems is also provided, enabling the degree of 
openness towards integration into the SoS to be modelled, thereby enabling the general 
level of SoS agility and adaptability to be assessed. The classifications are as follows: 
• Closed: the component system is integrated into the SoS with no changes to the 
component system itself. 
• Legacy: systems that have been in existence for a “long” period and may comprise 
out-dated technology; these are treated as closed systems. 
• Extensible: system allows dynamic installation of components, e.g. plug-ins. 
• Open: changes may be made to the component system. 
• Forbidden: system provides interfaces that cannot be used. 
 
SoS Characteristics Operational Management Matrix (SoSOMM) 
The SoSOMM approach (Gorod et al., 2007) is based upon the ISO Network Management 
Model (International Organization for Standardization, 1989), which comprises the following 
five areas defining terminology, structure and activities required for the management of net-
centric systems: 
• Fault Management: detection and correction of abnormal operation. 
• Configuration Management: identifies, controls, provides data to/from open 
systems enabling operation and termination of interconnection services. 
• Accounting Management: establishes charges and costs of use. 
• Performance Management: enables effectiveness of services to be evaluated. 
• Security Management: supports the application of security policies. 
 
Whilst these areas, referred to as FCAPS, are intended for the management of IT systems, 
there are clear similarities to the management of a SoS; both being distributed systems. The 
SoSOMM approach maps FCAPS to be following areas, which are generalised for SoS 
applicability: 
• Risk Management: monitor, identify, assess, analyse and mitigate SoS risk. 
• Configuration Management: carry out command and control, structural and 
software management. 
• Resource Management: provide usage information of Systems’ resources within the 
SoS. 
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• Performance Management: monitor and measure performance of individual 
systems for overall SoS performance to be maintained at the appropriate level. 
• Policy Management: provide SoS access to authorised processes and protect SoS 
from illegal access. 
 
Having established the five areas applicable to SoS, the management matrix is then 
constructed using the Boardman-Sauser SoS characteristics (Boardman & Sauser, 2006) (as 
discussed in section 3.2.4), as illustrated in Figure 7 (Gorod et al., 2007). However, whilst this 
appears a novel approach it does not appear to have been developed further since 
publication in 2007. 
 
Figure 7 – SoSOMM (Gorod et al., 2007) 
Whilst Keating et al (Keating & Katina, 2011) argue that SoSE cannot be progressed without 
establishing a sound theoretical foundation Dahman and Roedler (2016) take a more 
pragmatic approach stating that as “current standards and other authoritative references 
provide a strong foundation for the SoSE fundamentals” a move towards SoSE 
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standardisation is now possible. The argument for the development of a sound theoretical 
basis for SoSE is persuasive, however the engineering of real world SoS has been on going 
for many years hence SoSE approaches have been developed, admittedly in a somewhat 
uncoordinated manner, out of necessity. As a theoretical approach emerges, it is anticipated 
that current approaches will be re-evaluated against and, through an iterative process, be 
refined until the practical approaches eventually align with the theoretical underpinning. At 
this point, it is emphasised that this research has been undertaken using a sound 
methodological approach which is described in detail in chapter 4. 
3.2.6 Summary – Theme 1 
This section provides background information regarding system theory and engineering. 
References to systems theory are made both in the support of SE and SoSE, for example 
“holism” is particularly applicable to SoSE risk management, which requires a holistic 
approach.  
Many definitions of a SoS exist and have evolved as understanding of the domain has 
progressed, the preferred definition for this research, which was recently proposed, is: 
“A SoS is a system which results from the coupling of a number of constituent systems at 
some point in their life cycles” (Brook, 2016). 
There does not appear to be a generally agreed definition for SoSE, with many being domain 
specific, however the T-Area SoS has proposed the following, which can be applied 
generically and is therefore appropriate for this research: 
The evolving, designed combination of systems to form a system of systems in networks that 
are safe, secure, efficient and able to respond to changing requirements and operational 
situations (Barot et al., 2013).  
The SoS classifications; directed, acknowledged, collaborative and virtual (Dahmann & 
Baldwin, 2008) are now well established and are referenced throughout this research, 
although a SoS classification may evolve and parts of a SoS may simultaneously have 
different classifications. 
Several SoSE methodologies are reviewed, Risk Management is identified as a key element 
of SoSE however, although it is agreed a holistic approach is required, a detailed approach is 
not provided in any of the surveyed literature, indicating that this is a gap in current 
knowledge. 
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It is also noted that within the period of this research, definitions and approaches have 
evolved, for example the preferred SoS definition was proposed in 2016, which emphasises 
the current immaturity of SoSE. 
The output of the theme 1 literature review demonstrates the necessity for the 
development of a SoS Risk Management approach and identifies activities and lifecycle 
phases where it should be applied.  
3.3 Theme 2: Modelling and Simulation 
Theme 2 of the literature review discusses the general nature of M&S and seeks to establish 
a set of definitions, to which later sections refer back, as well as providing a deeper 
understanding of the philosophy behind the need for models and their use. The bulk of this 
part of the literature review consists of a survey, examining a wide range of M&S techniques 
and their applicability to the SoS domain, the results of it were published in the International 
Journal of System of Systems (Kinder et al., 2014), and is included as Annex C to this thesis. 
The section also reviews hybrid modelling, Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE), SoS 
specific modelling techniques and M&S Verification and Validation (V&V), concluding with a 
general summary. 
3.3.1 Background 
The are numerous definitions for a model; for example “A model is a physical, mathematical 
or otherwise logical representation of a system, entity, phenomenon or process” (US 
Department of Defense, 2008a), “An approximation, representation, or idealization of 
selected aspects of the structure, behavior, operation, or other characteristics of a real-world 
process, concept, or system” (IEEE, 1989) and “a representation of one or more concepts that 
may be realized in the physical world” (Friedenthal et al., 2009). However, all definitions can 
essentially be distilled down to: 
“A model is a representation of a system or process.” 
The term “simulation” is directly related to “model”; although somewhat inconsistently 
defined throughout literature, a common theme running through the many definitions is the 
generation of dynamic behaviour over time, e.g. “A method for implementing a model over 
time” (US Department of Defense, 2008a), “A model that behaves or operates like a given 
system when provided a set of controlled inputs” (IEEE, 1989), and “the implementation of a 
model (or models) in a specific environment that allows the model’s execution (or use) over 
time” (INCOSE, 2015). 
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Although the terms “model” and “simulation” are frequently used interchangeably, indeed 
the term “simulation model” is sometimes used (Carson, 2005), within this thesis where 
reference is made to “dynamic model” this can be regarded as equivalent to “simulation”, 
i.e. the model executes over time. It should also be noted that some modelling techniques 
only provide meaningful results when executed; for example the Agent Based Modelling and 
Simulation (ABMS) approach requires the definition of a set of autonomous agents, however 
it is only when the model is executed that the agents interact and emergent behaviour is 
observable. 
Different models (or simulations) and modelling techniques may be classified through the 
following key characteristics (Fritzson, 2010; Kinder et al., 2014) and is “useful for selecting 
the right type of model for the intended purpose and scope” (SEBoK, 2017): 
• Continuous: “A mathematical or computational model whose output variables 
change in a continuous manner” (US Department of Defense, 2008a) 
• Discrete: a model “has entities only possessing one of many values within a finite 
range” (Sulistio et al., 2004)  
• Deterministic: “no random events occurring, so repeating the same simulation will 
always return the same simulation results” (Sulistio et al., 2004) 
• Stochastic (Probabilistic): “random events occurring, so repeating the same 
simulation often returns different simulation results” (Sulistio et al., 2004) 
• Static: “model of a system in which there is no change” (US Department of Defense, 
2008a) 
• Dynamic: “model of a system characterized by continuous change, activity or 
progress” (US Department of Defense, 2008a), “time as part of the simulation” 
(Sulistio et al., 2004) 
 
Kinder et al (2014) (attached as Annex C) provide another perspective through the definition 
of a set of group classifications5, which are listed below and include reference to specific 
modelling techniques: 
• Graph-based models to create structure: 
o Enterprise Architecture Framework 
o Modelling Languages 
o Petri Nets 
                                                          
5 These are inspired by consideration of SoS, whereas the preceding classifications are more general. 
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• Inference testing for consistency, patterns, and completeness of models above: 
o Artificial Neural Networks 
o Network Models (Graph Theory) 
• Probabilistic simulation based on Directed Acyclic Graphs: 
o Bayesian Belief Networks 
o Markov Models 
o Decision Trees 
• System simulation: 
o Discrete Event Simulation 
o Discrete Event System Specification (DEVS)  
o Agent-Based Modelling and Simulation 
o System dynamics 
o Surrogate Models 
o Game Theory 
3.3.2 The Philosophy of Models 
All effective models are required to fulfil a specific purpose. Considering scientific models, 
their purpose is to deductively or inductively support or disprove a theory. Hesse (1963) 
suggested that in fact, without models, theories cannot fulfil all functions associated with 
them and cannot be genuinely predictive, hence theory and model are inextricably bound; 
the model is the theory. 
Hesse also identified some fundamental aspects of models, through discussion of positive, 
neutral, negative analogies. Using billiard balls as the basis for a model of the dynamical 
theory of gases, properties that are specific to the billiard balls but have no relevance to the 
model, such as colour, are described as negative analogies. Properties that are specific to 
the model and are directly analogous to the system under consideration are positive 
analogies; an example in this case is the billiard ball properties of impact and motion. 
Properties of the model that are not determined as positive or negative are deemed neutral 
analogies and are considered to be those characteristics that may result in new discovery. 
Whilst this discussion is more related to scientific theories it is also applicable to more 
general modelling; indeed having identified negative analogies within a model it may be 
possible to remove some capability thereby reducing complexity without diminishing the 
models effectiveness. The concept of neutral analogies is also applicable in the systems 
modelling domain, in that these analogies may reveal unexpected emergent behaviour; for 
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example fluid dynamics modelling has been applied to traffic flow analysis, the 
understanding of the similarities between these domains, i.e. the analysis of the neutral 
analogies, has resulted in new theories related to traffic management (Bretti et al., 2007). 
Analogical reasoning will generally support an inductive argument whereby if the premises 
are true then it is unlikely the conclusion is false (Bartha, 2016). When considering system 
models, it is likely that the majority will also support inductive argument, as the models will 
be abstractions of the system under consideration where the abstractions are themselves 
determined through analogical reasoning. Indeed, systems models may also contain 
stochastic elements; therefore likelihood is associated with the model output, which 
supports an inductive, rather than deductive, argument. 
Hesse (1963) also makes the distinction between formal and material analogies; a formal 
analogy occurs when there is a direct correspondence between interpretations of the same 
formal theory. A material analogy describes “pre-theoretic analogies between observables” 
such as pitch (property of sound) and light (property of light), where similarities are 
observed before derivation of a theory, and is necessary when a theory is required to have: 
1. Strong falsifiability or predictive power (i.e. identifies relations between new 
observation predicates) 
2. Justification in terms of choice criteria for selecting theories, which depend on 
models in (1). 
 
Therefore, from the discussion above it can be concluded that a model is essential where a 
theory is based upon a material analogy; the model is necessary in order to provide the 
necessary “falsifiability or predictive power”.  
Three kinds of theories (and hence models) are identified: 
1. Formal theories (mathematical models) which are weakly predictive and describe a 
set of observations but does not predict unobserved behaviour or correlations 
between them, an example of this is a mathematical model, that describes a 
hypothesis designed to fit a set of experimental data. 
2. Conceptual models which are strongly predictive but not justified by further choice 
criteria. A conceptual model suggests interactions and correlations between 
observations, which are the result of neutral analogies, however the model is 
“imaginary” as the predictions are not based upon current theory. 
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3. Material analogue-models which are strongly predictive and justified by further 
choice criteria, namely similarity (horizontally) and causality (vertically), as 
illustrated in the example below: 
Sound waves  - Light waves 
Loudness  - Intensity 
Pitch   - Colour 
Although the discussion above relates to scientific modelling, parallels can be drawn with 
system modelling. For example a static model representing a SoS using MODAF viewpoints 
(MOD, 2012) could be described as a “formal model” in that it is not predictive and describes 
currently held knowledge (or data set). 
An agent-based model could be considered as a conceptual model, in the sense of the 
description above; it predicts emergent behaviour but the causal interactions between the 
agents are not necessarily understood. This is in contrast with a Discrete Event Simulation; in 
which all interactions between elements within the model have to be understood in order 
for the model to be implemented and could therefore be likened to a material analogue 
model. These viewpoints provide an alternative approach to model classification, through 
the consideration of potential predictability and the level of understanding of causality. 
Box (Box, 1954) discussed the use of scientific models from a different perspective, arguing 
that “parsimony” is a critical attribute. A model will be comprised of a set of parameters, 
where the number of these is small the model is said to be parsimonious. This is desirable 
because unnecessary complexity can obscure the “truth”, greater precision generally results 
and “indiscriminate elaboration” can become never ending. Box argued that parsimonious 
models are necessary approximations and could therefore be considered “wrong”, hence his 
widely quoted statement “All models are wrong but some are useful”. Sterman (Sterman, 
2002) extends this stating, “All decisions are based on models, and all models are wrong”, 
and in the context of mental models, is arguing that human perception is based upon mental 
models which are simplifications, abstractions and therefore incomplete and incorrect. In 
order to become less reliant upon mental models, more sophisticated externally constructed 
models are necessary providing a common reference, rather than a collection, of perhaps 
contradictory perceptions, thereby providing a general justification for the use of models. 
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3.3.3 Why model? 
As discussed above the primary perceived use of models is to predict behaviour, however 
there are many other potential uses as identified by Epstein (2008): 
1. Explain (very distinct from predict) 
2. Guide data collection 
3. Illuminate core dynamics 
4. Suggest dynamical analogies 
5. Discover new questions 
6. Promote a scientific habit of mind 
7. Bound (bracket) outcomes to plausible ranges 
8. Illuminate core uncertainties. 
9. Offer crisis options in near-real time 
10. Demonstrate tradeoffs / suggest efficiencies 
11. Challenge the robustness of prevailing theory through perturbations 
12. Expose prevailing wisdom as incompatible with available data 
13. Train practitioners 
14. Discipline the policy dialogue 
15. Educate the general public 
16. Reveal the apparently simple (complex) to be complex (simple) 
 
Although Epstein discusses the use of models from a social science perspective the uses he 
identifies above are equally applicable in the engineering, and hence SoSE, domain. One of 
his key points is the differentiation of explanation from prediction; from a SoS perspective a 
model may provide understanding of the interactions between component systems rather 
than predict a timeline of events, which could be dependent upon availability of these 
systems and other factors which may be unknown.  “Explanation” can also be viewed as 
“characterising an existing system” (INCOSE, 2015) whereby a potentially poorly 
documented system is modelled, providing a clear baseline understanding thereby enabling 
modifications to be undertaken more effectively. Models are also effective throughout all 
phases of the system development lifecycle including requirements, architecture and design 
definition as well as verification, validation and operational support (INCOSE, 2015). 
Another essential use of models, particularly within engineering, is to provide a medium of 
communication between all stakeholders associated with a project. For example, a highly 
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technical or mathematical concept may require discussion however the stakeholders will 
likely include non-technical end users, hence a model providing a visual element provides 
common understanding at all levels and thereby facilitates meaningful dialogue. 
Models also provide technical and management metrics, within the SE (and SoSE) these may 
provide the following support (SEBoK, 2017): 
• Assess progress; 
• Estimate effort and cost; 
• Assess technical quality and risk;  
• Assess model quality. 
 
3.3.4 Review of Modelling Techniques 
A substantial part of the literature review for this theme involved the survey of a range of 
modelling techniques in the context of their applicability to SoS modelling. The result of this 
review was published in the International Journal of SoSE (Kinder et al., 2014) and is 
included in its entirety within Annex B of this thesis. 
A key output from this survey was a matrix which identified specific M&S techniques and 
identified their suitability (low or high) in relation to a set of SoS System of Interest 
“dimensions” as proposed by Kinder et al (2012); this forms the basis of a technique 
selection approach and is elaborated further in chapter 6. 
Included, for reference, is the summary table and explanatory text from this paper: 
Table 7 summarises the suitability of the assessed M&S techniques to more general SoS 
modelling, considering all SoS classifications and all phases of the lifecycle. This 
demonstrates that some bottom up techniques, such as DEVS, Petri Nets and ABMS, whilst 
being highly applicable to the case study, which was concerned with the operation (or 
execution) phase, are less appropriate throughout the lifecycle. These techniques are also 
less suited to SoS with higher variability. This is because individual component systems are 
modelled; as a result if these systems change in the SoS lifetime then the model becomes 
redundant, exhibiting low resilience to variability. However, top down techniques, such as 
System Dynamics are generally used to model more strategic dimensions rather than 
individual component systems and hence are more resilient to variability. 
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Compon-
ent 
Systems 
Inter- 
actions 
Lifecycle  Variab-
ility 
Classifi
-cation 
Func-
tions 
System 
Owners & 
Operationss 
Concept 
of Oper-
ation 
Relation-
ship 
Discrete Event 
Simulation 
HIGH HIGH LOW LOW LOW HIGH LOW LOW HIGH 
Petri Nets HIGH HIGH LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW HIGH 
Agent Based Model HIGH HIGH LOW LOW LOW HIGH LOW LOW LOW 
System Dynamics LOW LOW HIGH HIGH HIGH LOW HIGH HIGH LOW 
Surrogate Models HIGH LOW HIGH LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW 
Artifical Neural 
Network 
LOW LOW HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH LOW LOW LOW 
Bayesian Belief 
Network 
LOW LOW HIGH HIGH HIGH LOW HIGH HIGH LOW 
Markov Models LOW LOW HIGH HIGH HIGH LOW HIGH HIGH LOW 
Game Theory LOW LOW HIGH HIGH HIGH LOW HIGH HIGH LOW 
Decision Trees LOW LOW HIGH HIGH HIGH LOW LOW LOW LOW 
Network Models LOW HIGH LOW LOW HIGH LOW LOW LOW HIGH 
Enterprise 
Architecture 
Framework 
HIGH HIGH HIGH LOW HIGH LOW HIGH HIGH HIGH 
Modelling 
Languages 
HIGH HIGH LOW LOW LOW HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH 
 
Table 7 - SoS M&S Technique Suitability 
It should be noted that this M&S review did not take a traditional approach, instead a 
framework enabling the comparison of techniques and their applicability to SoS was 
developed. Hence, the framework itself, as well as the survey results, is considered to be an 
additional research output. 
3.3.5 Hybrid Modelling Approaches 
Hybrid modelling involves the combination of a least two modelling techniques or 
methodologies within a single model. The appropriate M&S technique, or combination 
thereof, is driven by the context and the problem space (Kinder et al., 2014), however even 
though a wide range of potential techniques are available, most hybrid approaches only 
combine two or three different techniques as illustrated in the following examples.  
Teose et al (2007) propose embedding System Dynamics (SD) within Agent Based Models 
(ABM) to model Complex Adaptive Systems, the rationale for this approach being; 
“heterogeneity allows for the simulation of novel, complex intervention strategies at the 
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level of agents that might otherwise be difficult or impossible to express succinctly in system 
dynamics terminology”. 
Ross et al (2014) define three SoS views, Social, Physical and Social-Physical. For the social 
view “the modeller is interested in individual attributes and because the interactivities at a 
given time within the social level are unknown” ABM is the suggested approach. The 
physical view concerns “engineered systems with known interactions”, for which Discrete 
Event Simulation (DES) is appropriate, and for the Social-Physical “known system-level 
interactions between the physical and social constituents” are modelled which is suitable for 
SD modelling. The combination of these views provides a holistic SoS modelling approach. 
DES and SD have also been integrated within a hybrid business simulation approach (Rabelo 
et al., 2005) intended to support policymaking and control. It is recognised that business 
enterprise modelling requires support for both long-term strategic decision-making and 
short-term detailed analysis. The proposed approach utilises SD for the strategic modelling, 
e.g. corporate growth, and DES for short-term analysis, e.g. plant operations. 
Lynch et al (2014) describe a “multi-paradigm modelling framework” which defines three 
levels of granularity, macro, meso, and micro. These levels relate to the knowledge of the 
problem domain and what assumptions are made, the framework uses these levels to 
indicate the whether SD, DES or ABM is to be used for specific parts of the model. 
A different approach is taken by Macharis (2000) who proposes a framework that “blends” 
SD modelling with Multi-Criteria Decision Aid (MCDA). MCDA enables complex decision rules 
to be implemented, which are dependent on specific variables; Macharis suggests that these 
rules are embedded within the SD models, thereby enabling development of dynamic multi-
criteria analysis models. 
Whilst the approaches described above enable hybrid modelling approaches through the 
combination of a limited number of techniques Kinder et al (2014) propose a modelling 
approach, initially intended to support SoS Risk Management, which enables a wide range of 
heterogeneous techniques to be combined into a single model through integration into a 
central Bayesian Belief Network; this approach is described fully in section 7.4. This 
technique moves away from the “one size fits all” approach often suggested and allows 
appropriate techniques to be utilised for the specific context and problem space, which is 
necessary to fully support SoS modelling. 
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3.3.6 Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) 
Although traditional SE approaches will generally make use of models throughout the 
lifecycle to some extent, MBSE “is the formalized application of modelling to support system 
requirements, design, analysis, verification and validation activities beginning in the 
conceptual design phase and continuing throughout development and later life cycle 
phases” (INCOSE, 2007). MBSE ensures that project models are coordinated between 
lifecycle phases and disciplines, promoting the use of models rather than traditional 
documentation where appropriate, for example requirements definition. SysML (Object 
Management Group, 2016a) is the modelling language, which is promoted for use within the 
process, with MoDAF or DoDAF used to provide a SoS modelling capability (Lochow, 2016). 
MBSE could be applied to support the engineering of directed SoS however, without a 
dynamic capability the prediction of emergent behaviour is limited. MoDAF and DoDAF are 
widely used throughout the defence industry to support SoSE activities, but again the lack of 
dynamism is restrictive. As MBSE does not provide a hybrid modelling approach or a 
mechanism to select and implement heterogeneous models it’s application to SoSE must be 
considered limited.  
3.3.7 Review of SoS Modelling Techniques 
As discussed above (section 3.3.6), MBSE does not provide a capability to fully support all 
SoSE activities; the COMPASS and DANSE methodologies were developed to overcome this 
shortcoming and are discussed below. 
The COMPASS project (COMPASS Consortium, 2014a) goal was to provide an approach to 
SoS modelling, which could be utilised throughout a SoS, overcoming the inherent 
managerial and operational dependence. As part of this approach the COMPASS Modelling 
Language (CML) was developed, specifically for use in the context of SoS, enabling 
representation of both constituent systems and the architecture composing the SoS. 
Although CML is based upon several current languages, Vienna Development Method, 
Communication Sequential Processes and Circus (a concurrent language for refinement-
based reasoning for modern systems) it is an entirely new language. Whilst a language 
entirely focussed upon SoS modelling does provide obvious advantages, the fact that it is 
new, and hence unknown, may limit its uptake with practitioners tending to rely on more 
familiar, proven approaches. Although CML enables very detailed models of SoS to be 
created, the amount of information required in order to provide this detail implies that CML 
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will tend to be restricted to modelling directed and acknowledged SoS where there are less 
associated unknowns. 
The DANSE methodology (DANSE Consortium, 2015) takes a different approach to 
COMPASS, generally utilising available modelling techniques and tools, providing extensions 
and plug-ins where necessary, although a goal contracts specification language (GCSL) is 
developed. The Unified Profile for DoDAF and MoDAF (Object Management Group, 2016b) is 
used at the architectural level with SysML modelling the constituent systems. Joint 
modelling allows different models and simulations to be combined, allowing the 
incorporation of dynamic models (e.g. Modelica, Simulink) into the overall model. GCSL 
enables automatic statistical checking of the joint model. Overall DANSE provides a 
comprehensive SoS modelling capability although it is explicitly stated that the methodology 
is only applicable to Directed, Acknowledged, and Collaborative SoS types, which is 
necessary because a SoS “controller” is required to co-ordinate the DANSE process. 
However, as is the case with COMPASS, extensive knowledge of the component system 
interactions is required to enable the detailed modelling required. 
3.3.8 Validation and Verification of Models 
General definitions of Validation and Verification are first provided in order to avoid any 
misunderstanding, as these terms are not always used consistently.  
Validation “ensures a system is able to accomplish its intended use, goals and objectives 
(i.e., meet stakeholder requirements) in the intended operational environment. The right 
system is built” (British Standards, 2011). 
Verification is “a set of activities that compares a system or system element against the 
required characteristics. This includes, but is not limited to, specified requirements, design 
description and the system itself. The system is built right” (British Standards, 2011). 
As discussed in section 3.3.2, it is widely accepted that “all models are wrong but some are 
useful” (Box, 1954). This appears to result in a dichotomy, how can an entity be validated 
and verified to determine “correctness” when it is intrinsically wrong? However, “wrong” 
could be interpreted as “inaccurate” which then infers a model will possess a level of 
accuracy, in which case the aim of V&V is to ensure a model is sufficiently accurate, or 
provides sufficient fidelity and resolution, in relation to its purpose (Robinson, 1997).  
The understanding and definition of a models’ purpose is critical in determining the level of 
accuracy required and hence this will bound the necessary V&V activities. As shown below in 
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Figure 8 (Sargent, 2015) the value of a model is related to the confidence a user has in it, 
which is provided through V&V, however there is a trade-off between the level of 
confidence and associated cost, which should be considered. Indeed, the outcome of model 
V&V should not result in a model deemed as absolutely incorrect or correct, but rather as a 
degree of credibility (e.g. on a 0 to 100 scale) (Balci, 1995). 
 
Figure 8 – Confidence in Models (Sargent, 2015) 
The approach generally taken when undertaking model V&V is through the formulation of a 
simulation study, “which starts by developing an understanding of the real world and the 
problem to be tackled. Following this a model is developed, first as a conceptual model and 
then as a computer model” (Robinson, 1997). Figure 9 (Robinson, 1997) illustrates model 
V&V activities and their relationship to the modelling process, noting that the following 
differing types of validation are undertaken: 
• Conceptual Model Validation: determine the scope and level of detail that supports 
the model purpose and ensure assumptions are correct. 
• Data Validation: data required for model implementation, validation and 
experimentation are sufficiently accurate. 
• White-box Validation: a “micro” check, ensuring the constituent parts of the 
computer model represent the real world with sufficient accuracy, in relation to the 
purpose. 
• Black-box Validation: a “macro” check ensuring the model as a whole represents 
the real world with sufficient accuracy, in relation to the purpose. 
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Figure 9 - Model V&V in the Modelling Process (Robinson, 1997) 
Although the activities described above are intended to enable model V&V, there are 
several difficulties that require consideration. One approach to V&V is the comparison of a 
model with the real world system it represents, however it is often the case that the actual 
system does not yet exist (Robinson, 1997). A further complication is the differing 
perceptions of reality held by different individuals, and which may be dependent upon their 
role or personal bias; hence a model may be valid to one individual and not another (Law, 
2009; Robinson, 1997). Where a real system or data is available it cannot always be assumed 
it is valid, for example a small sample size may reduce its legitimacy (Law, 2009; Robinson, 
1997), it must also be borne in mind that model prediction based on historical data does not 
necessarily guarantee accuracy, and may in fact be misleading (Taleb, 2007). 
Validation of the conceptual model involves determination that the underlying assumptions 
and theories are correct and that the structure, causal relationships and representation of 
the problem entity is reasonable (Sargent, 2015). Mathematical and statistical analysis, e.g. 
fitting distributions to data, may be used to validate the theories and assumptions whereas 
determination of a reasonable representation will generally be through expert analysis 
(Sargent, 2015). 
Model verification will generally require a static or dynamic testing approach (Sargent, 
2015); static testing involves walk through checking of implementation code whereas 
dynamic testing involves executing the model with a range of input values and confirming 
the output is as expected, or at least appears reasonable. The key objective of model 
verification is the confirmation that the implemented model is “true” to the conceptual 
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model (Robinson, 1997). White box testing is subtly different in that it confirms the model is 
“true to the real world” (Robinson, 1997). 
Black box testing considers the overall model behaviour and will employ a dynamic testing 
approach whereby, with specific input conditions, the model output is compared with real 
system outputs, or if this is not available, with either expected output as determined from 
expert matter input or other models (Robinson, 1997). 
These methods of model V&V illustrate that an accepted approach is the use of expert 
opinion to assess model accuracy and hence value, throughout all stages of model 
development. This raises an important point; although models will provide quantitative 
output it should be understood that the underlying implementation is likely to be 
underpinned by a subjective element, i.e. subject matter expert opinion. 
3.3.9 Summary 
Section 3.3 established a set of basic definitions for a model, which is a representation of a 
system or process and a simulation is a model, which executes over time. 
The following set of model characteristics were identified and are used within the SoS M&S 
technique selection framework as described in the journal paper (Kinder et al., 2014) 
attached in Annex B: 
• Continuous 
• Discrete 
• Deterministic 
• Stochastic (Probabilistic) 
• Static 
• Dynamic 
 
The philosophy of modelling was discussed, providing a theoretical foundation to the M&S 
aspects of this research, in particular positive, neutral, negative analogies (Hesse, 1963) are 
used to classify characteristics of models that are relevant to the theory (or question) a 
model supports. The following types of model are identified: Formal theories (mathematical 
models), Conceptual models and Material analogue-models which are classified in 
accordance with their predictive capabilities and their ability to be derived from a similar 
model (or theory). 
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Many uses of modelling are identified however, key are prediction and explanation, which 
are both required in support of Risk Management. 
A survey of M&S technique applicability to SoS was undertaken, the results of which were 
published in the International Journal of SoSE (Kinder et al., 2014) and is attached in Annex 
A, and which also proposed a M&S method selection framework. 
Modelling SoS requires the use of appropriate M&S techniques, which are suitable for the 
problem space under investigation. Hybrid modelling uses a combination of techniques, 
hence a survey was undertaken to ascertain the suitability of current approaches to SoS. It 
was found that all approaches are constrained to a small (up to three) set of M&S 
techniques rather than allowing the selection of any appropriate technique, which justified 
the development of the SoS Risk Management M&S process as described in this research 
(section 7.4). 
Finally, model Validation and Verification was discussed which is an essential element of the 
model driven approach proposed in this thesis, a key point was that subject matter expert 
assessment is deemed a valid approach to model V&V and which is the approach generally 
taken for models implemented for this research project. 
3.4 Theme 3: Risk  
Theme 3 examines the basic definition of risk and considers its relationship to uncertainty. 
Traditional risk management is surveyed in order to provide an understanding of current 
processes, enabling comparison with specific SoS risk management approaches.  
3.4.1 What is Risk? 
The ISO Guide relating to risk management vocabulary (International Organization for 
Standardization, 2009b) defines risk simply as the, 
“effect of uncertainty on objectives”. 
Where “effect” is defined as, 
“An effect is a deviation from the expected — positive and/or negative” 
And “uncertainty” is defined as, 
“Uncertainty is the state, even partial, of deficiency of information related to, understanding 
or knowledge of an event, its consequence, or likelihood”. 
This implies risk is uncertainty, although an explanatory note does state, 
A Model Based Approach to System of Systems Risk Management 
68 
“Risk is often expressed in terms of a combination of the consequences of an event (including 
changes in circumstances) and the associated likelihood of occurrence”. 
Whilst this definition may capture current practice, whereby risks are often identified on a 
subjective basis often without quantification, it also highlights a common pitfall, the 
confusion of risk and uncertainty.  
A key point that this definition does raise is that risk encompasses both detrimental and 
beneficial effects. However, risk management frequently only focuses on negative effects 
(Hillson, 2003), although this research will consider both positive and negative effects, i.e. 
threats and opportunities. 
In common with most definitions of risk, the Risk Management Guide for DoD Acquisition 
definition does directly link risk to probability (DASDSE, 2015), although noting that it only 
focuses on negative risk: 
“Risks are future events or conditions that may have a negative effect on achieving program 
objectives for cost, schedule, and performance. Risks are defined by (1) the probability 
(greater than 0, less than 1) of an undesired event or condition and (2) the consequences, 
impact, or severity of the undesired event, were it to occur.” 
An important aspect described in the definition above is that risk is associated with 
probability, thereby distinguishing risk from uncertainty. 
Combining the definitions above the following general definition of risk is proposed: 
“Risks are future events or conditions that may have a positive or negative effect on 
achieving objectives. Risks are defined by likelihood of an event or condition and the 
consequences, impact, or severity of the event, were it to occur.” 
To illustrate the difference between uncertainly and risk, consider tossing a coin (assumed 
to be unbiased).  The probability of heads is 0.5, as is the probability of tails. In this case all 
outcomes are known (heads, tails), as are the associated probabilities, this is therefore 
classified as risk.  
In contrast, for the financial markets, all outcomes cannot be identified and therefore all 
probabilities cannot be determined, this is classified as uncertainty. 
However, the distinction is frequently not as clear cut: for example, the weather forecast will 
attempt to identify outcomes and assigned probabilities, such as a 70% likelihood of rain 
tomorrow.  The percentage in this case is typically derived from the product of the 
confidence that precipitation will occur somewhere within the forecast area and the 
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percentage of the area the will receive measurable precipitation, for example “the 
forecaster is only 50% sure that precipitation will occur, and expects that, if it does occur, it 
will produce measurable rain over about 80% of the area, the chance of rain is 40%” 
(National Weather Service, 2017).  Hence, the overall probability in this instance is a best 
estimate6 based upon an inherent confidence; therefore there is an element of uncertainty 
associated with the probability. 
This is an important point - it is exceptionally unlikely that absolute probabilities will be 
known, or derivable, indeed Taleb (2007) states, “…”computable” risks are largely absent 
from real life. They are laboratory contraptions!” 
If risk models are to provide quantified risk, then that quantification must be honest, as 
indicated by an associated confidence.  If a risk model is perceived as honest then decision 
makers will trust and utilise the model’s output.  
3.4.2 Types of Risk 
Risk tends to be categorized into logical groupings allowing risk analysis to be undertaken 
within the appropriate context. For example, the ISO/IEC Risk Management standard 
(ISO/IEC, 2006) identifies the following types of risk: 
• Technical 
• Legal 
• Organizational 
• Safety 
• Economic 
• Engineering 
• Cost 
• Schedule 
Ganguly et al (2010) describe a risk assessment framework for analyzing risks associated 
with a SE Process which identifies the following types of risk based on a literature survey and 
SME interview. 
• Economic/Financial 
• Time/Schedule Risks 
                                                          
6 “When we issue a forecast we usually give our best estimate of what will happen, but often we 
know more about the confidence or uncertainty surrounding that forecast.” (Met Office, 
http://research.metoffice.gov.uk/research/nwp/ensemble/uncertainty.html) 
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• Organizational Risks 
• Technology & Design Risks 
• Socio-political & Legal Risks 
• Quality Risks 
These are broadly similar to those listed the ISO/IEC standard (ISO/IEC, 2006), although it is 
noted ‘Safety’ is not explicitly differentiated and is not discussed as part of the framework, 
however it must be considered a key area and is a specialized element of risk management.   
Hopkin (2002) takes a more holistic view of risk and suggests the following broader 
categories: 
• Hazard Risks (e.g. Threat and perils) 
• Control Risks (e.g. Doubt about mission achievement, project management control) 
• Opportunity Risks (Opportunity to enhance or inhibit mission achievement) 
The categories proposed by Hopkin are essentially a way of classifying specific risks types, as 
identified above, providing a useful perspective above the individual component system 
viewpoint and therefore appears suitable at the SoS level. 
In addition to risk categories, sources of risk need to be considered, for example the DoD 
SoSE guide (US Department of Defense, 2008b) identifies following potential sources of risk 
from a SoS perspective; 
• SoS scalability 
• Quality of service 
• Technology maturity 
• Coordination of SoS risk management activities across the individual systems 
• Ability of constituent systems to provide needed SoS functions on time 
However, the SoSE Guide is very acquisition focused hence further work is required to 
identify a wider range of SoS risk types, particularly relating to operational SoS requiring 
dynamic risk management. An approach that is explored in this thesis is to use the SoS 
System of Interest model (Kinder et al., 2012)7, to identify risk types through the 
consideration of each dimension and is described further in section 6.1, i.e. 
• Component Systems 
• Classification 
                                                          
7 This paper is included in Annex A 
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• Interactions 
• Nature of Relationships 
• Lifecycle 
• Variability 
• Functions 
• System Owners and Operations 
• Concept of Operation/Use/Employment 
3.4.3 Risk Management 
The INCOSE SE Guide (INCOSE, 2015) describes Risk Management as: 
“a disciplined approach to dealing with the uncertainty that is present throughout the entire 
system lifecycle.” 
The Risk, Issue, and Opportunity Management Guide for Defense Acquisition Programs 
(DASDSE, 2015) defines the following key activities; 
• Risk Planning: What is the program’s risk management process? 
• Risk Identification: What can go wrong? 
• Risk Analysis: What are the likelihood and consequence of the risk? 
• Risk Handling: Should the risk be accepted, avoided, transferred, or mitigated? 
• Risk Monitoring: How has the risk changed? 
 
Risk planning is the development and documentation of the Risk Management process. The 
process is typically documented in a formal risk management plan, which defines a risk 
register providing a common medium for all stakeholders to record risk. The program 
manager may establish a Risk Management Board, which comprises members from different 
stakeholder groups. 
Risk identification is undertaken by all stakeholders and considers risks in accordance with 
the risk categories defined in the risk management plan, e.g. schedule, cost or performance. 
The central risk manager will assess each identified risk and update the risk register 
accordingly. Risks may be identified informally through individual subjective assessment or 
through more formal approaches such as brainstorming, expert interview, Delphi method, 
technical review, failure mode and effects analysis and fault tree analysis. It is noted that 
ISO/IEC 31010 (International Organization for Standardization, 2009a) identifies and 
assesses numerous techniques applicable to risk management activities. 
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Risk analysis provides an estimate of the likelihood and consequence of a risk and will 
typically consist of a combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches. The 
consequence of a risk is measured in the context of its category, for example a financial risk 
will be quantified in either additional costs or potential savings. However, the INCOSE SE 
guide states; “Risk generally needs to be analysed subjectively because adequate statistical 
data are rarely available” (INCOSE, 2015) identifying interviews and models as suitable 
approaches. Probabilistic models (discussed in chapter 5) such as Monte Carlo simulations 
and Bayesian Belief Networks may be used (DASDSE, 2015; International Organization for 
Standardization, 2009a) to reflect uncertainty in potential outcomes. The output of the 
analysis will be documented in the risk register, however all stakeholders, enabling 
comparison of risks regardless of the source, should use a common framework. 
Risk Handling requires the acceptance, avoidance, transfer, or mitigation of risk. Acceptance 
allows a risk to be realised although it will still be necessary to monitor it and the effect of 
the consequences. Avoidance requires the project to take an alternative path whereby the 
associated costs do not exceed that of accepting the risk. Transfer may result in a different 
program assuming ownership of a risk, or from customer to contractor or between 
subsystems. Risk mitigation will reduce the likelihood or the impact of consequence through 
approaches such as early prototyping, incremental development, demonstrations, test and 
review. 
Risk Monitoring will typically require the central program authority and associated 
contractors meeting regularly and assessing all risks currently defined in the project risk 
register and updating as required. 
These activities are performed on a continuous basis, Figure 10 (DASDSE, 2015) is included 
from the guide visualising this process. 
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Figure 10 - DoD Risk Management Process (DASDSE, 2015) 
The Risk management ISO 31000 standard (International Organization for Standardization, 
2009c) outlines the following activities in the Risk Management process and align closely 
with the process described above: 
• Communication and Consultation 
• Establish the context 
• Risk identification 
• Risk analysis 
• Risk evaluation 
• Risk treatment 
• Monitoring and Review 
This short analysis highlights two key points. 
1. Risk Management is an iterative process, with risk monitoring a continuous activity. 
2. Risk identification and assessment are part of the Risk Management process. Note, 
this is not always consistent; Risk Management and Risk Assessment are on occasion 
defined as separate processes. For the purposes of this research Risk management 
shall include assessment. 
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The Risk Management process can be generically applied, however the implementation of 
each activity differs dramatically between disciplines, e.g. engineering, finance, insurance, or 
indeed within disciplines themselves. This research is primarily concerned with the Risk 
analysis and evaluation stages, where both qualitative and quantitative approaches are 
taken.  
When developing systems, risks are often analysed and assessed through subjective scoring 
techniques, rather than rigorous and scientific techniques, which as (Hubbard, 2009) 
comments, are still not widespread. This results in the use of subjective (as opposed to 
objective) probabilities when engineering systems (Garvey, 2004). However, the 
requirement for more rigorous techniques is dependent upon the complexity of the system 
and risk context under consideration. 
Statistical modelling approaches typically used for the quantification of risk include Monte 
Carlo simulation, Bayesian Belief Networks, Markov analysis and Decision trees 
(International Organization for Standardization, 2009a). 
3.4.4 Enterprise Risk Management  
Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) is defined as: 
“The culture, capabilities, and practices, integrated with strategy-setting and its execution, 
that organizations rely on to manage risk in creating, preserving, and realizing value” (COSO, 
2016). 
Where ERM differs from traditional Risk Management is its focus on culture, which aims to 
ensure that people within an enterprise respond appropriately to risk and understand risk in 
the context of overall objectives and strategy.  
The holistic view of risk, coupled with its attention to culture, identifies ERM as applicable to 
the SoS domain, particularly where the human element requires consideration. 
A further distinguishing factor of ERM is the relationship of risk to value, which determines 
an organisation’s appetite for risk, hence “managing risk within risk appetite enhances an 
organization’s ability to create, preserve, and realize value” (COSO, 2016). 
However, ERM does assume central managerial control through an independent board of 
directors, hence risk strategy is determined and flowed “top down” within an enterprise. 
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3.4.5 Perception of Risk 
Risk is frequently determined as a subjective estimate of likelihood utilising experience of an 
individual or team, which is subject to intuitive biases and emotion (Kinder et al., 2015). The 
“affect heuristic”, relates the assessment of risk to the perceived “goodness” or “badness” 
of an activity (Slovic & Peters, 2006), whereby if an activity is regarded negatively, then the 
benefits are perceived to be low and the risk high; conversely an activity regarded positively 
will elicit a perception of high benefit and low risk. The resulting implication is that there is 
often an emotional aspect to risk assessment. 
The “conspiracy of optimism” (Flyvbjerg et al., 2009) is another situation where the 
perception of risk is influenced by emotion or subconscious peer pressure, and where the 
likelihood or impact of risk is underestimated due to financial, managerial or political 
pressures through bias in favour of the desired outcome. 
Prospect Theory (Kahneman, & Tversky, 2016) illustrates a further perceptive bypass 
whereby the rationality of decision making is influenced by the presentation of the possible 
choices and their relationship to risk. 
These potential emotional biases provide a strong justification for the use of modelling to 
support risk management, allowing risk to be assessed from a more objective perspective. 
Indeed Haimes (2012) states “in the context of risk management, no effective risk 
management policy options can be developed; nor can the associated tradeoffs among all 
critical costs, benefits, and risks be evaluated; and neither can the impacts of current 
decisions on future options be assessed, without having constructed a model, or a set of 
interdependent models, that represent the essence of the system”. 
3.4.6 SoS and Risk 
Most literature and guidance regarding Risk Management is focussed upon individual 
systems (Conrow, 2005), however when managing SoS risk a holistic view of the interactions 
between risk components and consequences is required (Gandhi et al., 2012a). 
Although the DoD SoSE guide  (US Department of Defense, 2008b) is acquisition focussed, it 
does succinctly describe the subtle distinction between system and SoS risk management; 
“Risk management for a SoS begins with the identification of SoS objectives and the 
identification of the risks that threaten the achievement of those objectives. While it is true 
that minor individual program risks could be major risks to the SoS, it is also true that 
significant system risks may have little or no impact on the SoS functionality. Furthermore 
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there may be risk to a set of SoS objectives which are not risks to the constituent systems 
(e.g., unwanted emergent behaviour, infrastructure, integration risks, cost risk).” 
A common perception is that if all SoS component system risks are managed, then any SoS 
risks will be managed without further intervention. The quote above demonstrates that SoS 
risk may be decoupled from individual system risk and should be managed separately.  
The DoD SoSE guide (US Department of Defense, 2008b) states SoS Risks are managed by 
the “SoSE SE team” and an integrated Risk Management board, implying managerial control 
and hence limiting the applicability of the guidance to directed and, to some extent, 
acknowledged SoS, although this is appropriate as most DoD programmes conform with 
these classifications. However, of relevance to all types of SoS is the guide’s assertion that 
SoS Risk Management is dependent on the determination of SoS objectives; SoS risks are 
those which may prohibit the fulfilment of those objectives. 
Conrow (Conrow, 2005) identified the following seven issues associated with the 
management of risk within SoS, he also provided suggested mitigation: 
1. Multiple stakeholders: may have heterogeneous behaviour and objectives, a central 
RM process will help alleviate these issues. 
2. Multiple RM processes: incompatibilities could exist between processes, e.g. risk 
levels may not align, perception and tolerance of risk may differ. A proposed 
solution is the definition of a “Rosetta Stone” allowing comparison of the different 
outputs. 
3. Long life cycles: these can extend from years to decades, component systems may 
have differing levels of maturity, hence managing risk will need to simultaneously 
consider risk at different points in the individual development lifecycles requiring 
the process to evolve in parallel with the SoS. 
4. Common technical risk classes: e.g. design, functional performance, integration, 
resource availability, support, and technology. Technical risks are frequently 
managed separately, however through grouping of the technical classes, risk 
planning, identification, analysis and handling may be more co-ordinated. 
5. Integration risk: this is exacerbated due to the inherent complexity but may be 
alleviated by consideration of integration issues throughout the lifecycle. 
6. Functional performance risk: requires demonstration that functional performance 
requirements have been met, however use of M&S and demonstrations can be used 
throughout development and integration. 
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7. Interface complexity: it is suggested that the probability of risk arising is directly 
related to the complexity, which is inherently high. Mapping the interface risks to 
technical risk classes may assist with their evaluation. 
 
Although these issues are valid, they appear more applicable to directed SoS and could 
equally be considered relevant to complex systems. This approach is rooted in traditional 
RM thinking, however Gandhi et al (2012a) suggest a more innovative approach through a 
framework utilising SoS characteristics (Boardman & Sauser, 2006), as discussed in section 
3.2.4, which considers systemic risk and, in the context of SoS, “is a risk that could be greater 
than the sum of its individual constituent risks”. A number of constituent risks are identified: 
“Schedule Risk, Technical Risks, Financial Risks, Vendor Risk, Culture Risk, Reputation Risk, 
Intellectual Property Risk, Flexibility Risk, Compliance Risk, and Quality Risk”.  The systemic 
risk approach is described in context of the following SoS characteristics (Gandhi et al., 
2012a): 
• Autonomy: attempt to understand the effect of all known risks affecting the 
autonomy of all systems within a SoS  
• Belonging: attempt to understand the holistic effect of all the known risks on all the 
systems within the SoS 
• Connectivity: look at a network and attempt to consider the effects of all known 
risks on the network of systems as part of a SoS 
• Diversity: the diversity associated with the risks is taken into consideration and the 
varying effects they have on the different constituents of the SoS are taken into 
consideration 
• Emergence: consider multiple risks and the dynamics between the various systems in 
the SoS 
 
However, this approach does not appear to have been developed further, but it does 
suggest there is merit in viewing SoS risk through a more holistic framework. The quantity of 
research undertaken which relates to SoS risk is limited but examples of note include, an 
approach for SoS RM of extreme events (Bristow et al., 2012) which utilises modelling to 
“help to foster pluralistic understanding of a system with multiple models”. Both cascading 
and collective failures are considered and risk is treated as dynamic whereby risk “depends 
not only on changing surroundings, but also on changing perceptions of multiple participants 
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based on how they set their systems’ boundaries”. A qualitative model is produced initially, 
capturing the different Risk Management outcomes effect on severity and probability of 
consequences from the participants’ perspective. The most likely outcomes in the context of 
the associated risk problem are then identified using a Graph Model for Conflict Resolution 
(GMCR) approach which draws upon Game Theory but “incorporates some plausible 
restrictions on knowledge and rationality, making it appropriate for advising individuals in a 
multi- decision-maker context” (Kilgour & Hipel, 2005). 
Game Theory is also used, in conjunction with the Viable System Model (VSM) approach, to 
manage risk related to SoS cyber security (Spyridopoulos et al., 2014). VSM “models the 
organisational structure of viable and autonomous systems. The model initially divides the 
enterprise in three fundamental parts (Operations, Management and Environment), which 
are connected to each other in order to maintain the viability of the whole system.” Each 
system component is assessed through the effect of interactions being disrupted, with Agent 
Based Modelling used to enable this.  
A SoS approach is taken to the analysis of risk associated with safety critical plants (Zio & 
Ferrario, 2013) which utilises Muir Web and Monte Carlo simulation. Muir Web “is a system 
analysis technique to model a complex system and the relationships among its elements” 
and enables the representation of dependencies between component systems or system 
elements. Monte Carlo simulation is used to determine the probability that a safety critical 
plant (e.g. a nuclear plant) enters an unsafe state, taking into account internal safety 
systems and external infrastructure. 
Risk management in supply chains is another area where it is acknowledged that systemic 
risks occur hence a SoS approach is appropriate (Ghadge et al., 2013), whereby 
interrelations between component systems are represented within a multiple domain 
matrix (MDM) with ABM used “to validate the assumptions drawn from the structure of the 
supply chain network as well as to comprehend the system’s emergent behaviour under 
uncertainty”. 
In the context of SoS safety a risk modelling approach is proposed which utilises fault tree 
models based upon information derived from associated MODAF architectural models 
(Aitken et al., 2011) providing a capability to determine the probability of specified events 
occurring. 
A more general, and somewhat esoteric, method involves the use of a Conditional Value-at-
Risk (CVaR) approach to SoS RM (Shah et al., 2015). CVaR is a “portfolio management 
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approach developed in financial engineering” which “limits worst cases losses in 
performance of cost” and is intended to support the selection of component systems which 
provide optimum SoS capability whilst minimising the risk of cascading failure. However, this 
technique does require the quantification of component system performance and an overall 
SoS performance index, which may be problematic and difficult to interpret, for example if 
SoS performance is predicted to be 70% vice 60% what does this actually mean? A SoS 
engineer would generally require a model to provide an understanding of the specific 
problem space and not just an abstracted output value, although an aggregated measure 
may be of value when used in conjunction with other approaches. 
3.4.7 Summary 
In common with the previous literature review themes, theme 3 first established 
fundamental definitions related to risk management. 
The following definition of risk was derived from several sources and encompasses the key 
aspects of positive and negative effects and the linkage of an event to likelihood: 
Risks are future events or conditions that may have a positive or negative effect on achieving 
objectives. Risks are defined by likelihood of an event or condition and the consequences, 
impact, or severity of the event, were it to occur. 
This definition, through the association of risk with likelihood, differentiates uncertainty 
where the likelihood of an event is unknown. 
Types of risk were discussed, for example the ISO/IEC Risk Management standard (ISO/IEC, 
2006) identifies the following types of risk: 
• Technical 
• Legal 
• Organizational 
• Safety 
• Economic 
• Engineering 
• Cost 
• Schedule 
The following broader categories (Hopkin, 2002) were also identified which allows risk to be 
classified from a holistic viewpoint which is appropriate when considering SoS risk: 
• Hazard Risks  
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• Control Risks  
• Opportunity Risks  
Current Risk Management approaches were reviewed with the conclusion that it is an 
iterative process; with risk monitoring a continuous activity and that risk identification and 
assessment are part of the Risk Management process. However, Risk is frequently 
determined through subjective techniques, which are influenced by human bias and 
perception, it was therefore argued that this provides a strong justification for the use of 
modelling to support risk management, allowing risk to be assessed from a more objective 
perspective. 
When considering SoS risk a holistic approach is desirable (Gandhi et al., 2012b); risk cannot 
just be considered at the component system level with the assumption that if risk at this 
level is mitigated then SoS risk will also (US Department of Defense, 2008b). It is noted that, 
although ERM is not explicitly applied within the SoS domain it does advocate a holistic 
approach, hence there is potentially some synergy between ERM and SoS Risk Management 
approaches. 
Few Risk Management approaches were discovered which were specifically intended for SoS 
use, although the DoD SoSE SE Guide (US Department of Defense, 2008b) does provide 
some basic guidance relevant to directed SoS, however most of those found were limited to 
narrow problem spaces. Gandhi et al (2012a) proposed an interesting approach which 
considered risk in the context of SoS characteristics (Boardman & Sauser, 2006), however 
this does not appear to have been developed further, although the use of a framework is 
comparable to the approach proposed by this research, as described in section 7.3. Other 
approaches utilised modelling techniques including game theory (Spyridopoulos et al., 
2014), agent based modelling (Ghadge et al., 2013), MODAF architectural models (Aitken et 
al., 2011) and a Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) approach (Shah et al., 2015). It is of note 
that these approaches all utilised modelling to some extent, which is driven by the inherent 
complexity associated with SoS. 
This review has revealed a gap in current knowledge regarding the management of SoS risk 
and thereby a lack of appropriate methods, resulting in the use of traditional approaches 
which do not provide the necessary holistic perspective. 
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3.5 Conclusions 
Theme 1 of the literature provided insight into the activities comprising SoSE and its 
difference from traditional SE with risk management identified as a key activity.  
The second theme discussed the application of M&S to SoS, providing an output, which 
supported the identification of appropriate techniques and concluding that, the inherent 
complexity of a SoS required the use of M&S in order to support SoSE activities.  
Current risk management approaches were reviewed in theme 3 as well as the management 
of SoS risk. Although some specific examples of the management of SoS risk were found, no 
mature general approach was identified, indicating a gap in current knowledge. However, it 
was noted most of these examples were underpinned by M&S approaches. 
It was therefore concluded a general approach SoS risk management utilising M&S methods 
would be of benefit. 
The selection of appropriate models to represent the essence of the system’s multiple 
perspectives determines the effectiveness of the entire risk assessment, management, and 
ultimately communication process. (Haimes, 2015) 
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4 Chapter 4: Approaches to the research 
 
This chapter provides general background information and terminology definitions regarding 
the research philosophy and approaches adopted in this thesis, examines approaches that 
are suitable in the Systems and SoS Engineering domain before describing and justifying the 
specific research design constructed to enable the research questions, defined in section 
1.2, to be answered. 
4.1 Background and Terminology 
Academic research in the System Engineering and SoSE domains has extended beyond the 
realms of physical science into human and social science as well as business schools (Brown, 
2009).  Brown (2009) argues that research in these areas is not always methodologically 
sound and that one reason for this is the lack of understanding, and inconsistent use, of 
terminology regarding research methodology. Therefore, in order to establish a consistent 
and unambiguous understanding of key terminology within this thesis, definitions and 
descriptions are provided below. 
Ontology: the study of the nature of reality, which can be divided into objective and 
subjective perspectives. 
Epistemology: the study of knowledge, or how knowledge is obtained from the perspective 
of a particular ontology.  
Worldview: combine both philosophical perspectives, ontology and epistemology, and are 
described as “a basic set of beliefs that guide action” (Guba, 1990). The research herein 
refers to worldviews, as opposed to paradigms (Lincoln et al., 2011; Mertens, 2010); 
epistemologies and ontologies (Crotty, 2012), or broadly conceived research methodologies 
(Neuman, 2003). The worldview is the fundamental viewpoint from which the research 
approach is determined. 
Postpositivist Worldview: most commonly associated with the ‘traditional’ empirical 
scientific approach whereby a quantitative approach is used to observe and measure 
objective reality. This is a deterministic philosophy where causes are identified which 
influence outcomes, usually measured through appropriate experimentation. This approach 
is also reductionist; a research question may be broken down into a set of discrete variables, 
which may then be quantitatively tested. This approach is essentially positivist where 
independence of the worldview is assumed; postpositivism acknowledges that theories and 
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experiments are not independent of the researchers worldview where a key assumption is 
that a hypothesis cannot be proved, only falsified, which is an empirical falsification 
approach (Popper, 2002). It should be noted that the Postpositivist Worldview, as proposed 
by Creswell (2014), also encompasses the positivist view. 
Constructivist Worldview: a subjective perspective and is more typically associated with 
social science research. Individuals subject views are collected, the context and 
environment, which influence an individual’s subjectivity, is considered and understanding 
of the data is developed through induction (Crotty, 2012). A basic differentiation between 
Postpositivism and Constructivism is that the former is generally rooted in mathematics and 
numbers, while the latter is expressed linguistically. 
Transformative Worldview: a subjective, politically orientated perspective. The starting 
point for transformative research is usually a key current political issue and requires a 
collaborative approach with a group of individuals whom are affected by the issue under 
consideration. The research considers inequalities within these groups and resulting 
asymmetric power relationships, political action is then linked to the inequalities (Mertens, 
2010). 
Pragmatist Worldview: not limited to a specific ontology, where both quantitative and 
qualitative assumptions may be made. Cresswell (2014) states that this ontological position 
(or worldview) “arises out of actions, situations, and consequences rather than antecedent 
conditions” and is concerned with applications and solutions to problems (Patton, 1990). 
This allows research investigators to utilise both qualitative and quantitative data as 
appropriate in order to understand the research problem, and hence allows the most 
suitable research techniques and procedures to be selected.  
Research Methodology: Having considered the research from an epistemological viewpoint, 
and an appropriate worldview determined, a suitable research methodology is required. 
Research methodology is the process of research; it not only defines the type of research 
design but also includes the approach to collecting and analysing data (DeForge, 2010). It is 
important to distinguish between ‘Methodology’ and ‘Methods’; there is a tendency in 
Systems Engineering research to directly describe methods and techniques when discussing 
research methodology, rather than through the appropriate worldview which considers 
fundamental philosophical viewpoint of the research, thereby providing the necessary 
methodological rigour (Brown, 2009).  
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Research Design: Having considered the research approach from epistemological and 
ontological viewpoints, i.e. through the appropriate worldview, a suitable Research Design is 
constructed which will take a Qualitative, Quantitative or Mixed Method approach, in line 
with the applicable methodology. The Research Design can be described as the general plan 
for answering the research question (Saunders et al., 2009), identifying the required 
activities, suitable methods, the order of activities and the dependencies between them, it 
provides a logical structure enabling the research questions to be answered (DeForge, 2010). 
The Research Design approach is effectively an instantiation of the chosen Research 
Methodology, which determines the appropriate Research Methods, dependent on its 
qualitative, quantitative or mixed nature. 
4.2 General Research Design Approaches 
The three alternative research design approaches; quantitative, qualitative and mixed 
method are described below. 
4.2.1 Quantitative Research Design 
The postpositivist worldview necessitates a quantitative research approach, whereby 
relationships are investigated between a discrete set of variables through empirical 
measurement and observation to test a proposed theory. Typically, quantitative data will be 
obtained either through experimentation or survey methods.  
Cresswell (2014) describes a survey design as “a quantitative or numeric description of 
trends, attitudes, or opinions of a population by studying a sample of that population”. The 
purpose of a survey design is to generalize characteristics, attitude or behaviour (Creswell, 
2014) from a population sample and infer these across the general population. The survey 
will either be a cross section or longitudinal, i.e. data collected at one point in time or over a 
period of time respectively. The design will also determine the medium over which data is 
collected, for example, mail, telephone, the Internet, personal interviews, or group 
administration (Fowler, 2009). 
The sampling design may be single or multistage (clustering). Where individuals or elements 
can be identified within a population the single-stage sampling approach is appropriate. The 
multistage approach is typically used where individuals cannot be directly identified within a 
population, in this case organisations or groups are first identified, individuals are then 
identified from within these. Individuals may either be selected randomly or on a non-
probabilistic basis (convenience sample), which is determined by their convenience and 
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availability (Creswell, 2014). Although the random selection is generally preferred in social 
science research, the selection of specific individuals selected by their expertise within a 
particular discipline may be appropriate when eliciting responses within a specialist field, 
such as Systems Engineering. 
The questionnaire should elicit values for variables, which relate directly to research 
questions and which in turn map to elements in the questionnaire. This mapping should be 
documented, providing full traceability from the research question and survey output, 
thereby ensuring full coverage. 
Analysis of the returned questionnaires requires the compilation of basic statistics such as 
the number of returns, the ample size, mean, standard deviations and range of responses. 
Response bias requires consideration of the effect of non-responses on the outcome; one 
approach is direct contact with non-respondents to determine if their answers would have 
differed substantially from those received to the extent that they would be statistically 
significant. 
Experimentation generates numerical data through rigorous data collection, the classical 
design is the pre-post test control group (DeForge, 2010); individuals are randomly assigned 
to control or experimental groups and compared to an outcome variable, this is also 
referred to as a “true experiment” (Creswell, 2014). The key feature of this approach is the 
random assignment of individuals to the experimental and control groups, which reduces 
the likelihood of bias and threat to the research validity. However, like survey design, 
participants may also be chosen on a non-random basis, where participants of a pre-existing 
group may determine the sample; this is referred to as a quasi-experiment. The sample size 
of groups is determined by a power analysis (Lipsey, 1990), which takes into account the 
level of statistical significance of the experiment, the amount of power for the statistical test 
of the null hypothesis and the effect size (the difference in means of the control and test 
groups). The variables to be measured consist of independent variables, which influence the 
outcome, dependent variables and intervening variables, which mediate the effect of the 
independent variable upon the dependent variable. Moderating variables affect the strength 
of the relationship between dependent and independent variables and control variables  
Other types of experimental designs, beyond the classic pre–post test control group, include 
the following: post-test only control group, alternate treatments, multiple treatments and 
controls, Solomon four group, Latin square, crossover, factorial, block, and repeated 
measures (longitudinal, nested (hierarchical), mixed) (DeForge, 2010). 
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Data is collected in accordance with a pre-defined procedure and appropriate statistical 
analysis performed. The final stage of the experiment is the interpretation of the data in the 
context of the research question and hypothesis to determine if they are supported or 
refuted. 
4.2.2 Qualitative Research Design 
Qualitative research utilises textual and image data rather numerical data. The following are 
key characteristics of this type of research (Creswell, 2014): 
• Natural Setting: less laboratory based, information collected from participants in the 
field 
• Researcher as key instrument: researcher tends to be the data collection instrument 
• Multiple sources of data: several techniques are often use, such as interview, 
questionnaire, observation or document 
• Inductive and deductive data analysis: themes are built bottom up, from the data. 
When themes are established they are examined deductively to determine if further 
evidence is required to support them 
• Participants’ meanings: focus on the meaning of the problem from the participants’ 
perspective rather than the researchers’ or current literature. 
• Emergent design: the initial plan is likely to change, as the field is explored and data 
is collected the plan evolves accordingly 
• Reflexivity: the research reflects on their own experiences and how these influence 
the direction of the research 
• Holistic account: a complex picture of the problem is developed requiring multiple 
viewpoints 
Another key difference from quantitative research is that participants or artefacts are 
purposefully selected, as opposed to the random selection of large sample groups. The 
sample size is related to the chosen research approach, demonstrated in Table 8 below: 
Qualitative Research Approach Typical Sample Size 
Phenomenology 3-10 individuals 
Grounded theory 20-30 individuals 
Ethnography 1 single culture-sharing group 
Case study 4-5 case studies 
Narrative 1-2 individuals 
Table 8: Research Approach Sample Size 
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Data is collected either through observation of behaviour, whereby notes are recorded in an 
unstructured or semi-structured way, or through interviews involving unstructured or open-
ended questions. Data may also include qualitative documents (e.g. newspaper articles, 
private journals, etc.) and audio or visual material (e.g. photographs, film, audio recordings, 
artwork, etc.). The data recording procedures require development of observational or 
interview protocols, which describe the structure of the data to be recorded, pragmatic 
details to be recorded such as time and location information and outline questions. 
However, this is less prescriptive than the quantitative approach. 
Data analysis will typically be undertaken in parallel with subsequent data collection and will 
be used to inform it, for example it may result in a change in the interview questions in 
order to explore an issue exposed by the analysis. Depending on the complexity of the data 
recorded, it may be analysed either manually or using a software application, such as a 
spreadsheet or data analysis program. It is of note that, at this point, the qualitative data is 
being analysed from a quantitative perspective. It is anticipated that several themes and 
patterns will emerge from the data as a result of the analysis; again this is a key distinction 
from quantitative research design as in this case a bottom up approach is taken whereby 
theories are developed from the data as opposed to data corroborating a theory. Essential 
to the provision of credible output from qualitative research is validation of the findings, 
typically through application of a validity strategy; key strategies are identified below: 
• Triangulation using data from different sources or perspectives which converge to 
provide justification for emerging themes 
• Member checking by returning to participants with research findings for validation 
• Rich, thick descriptions providing detailed descriptions of context or themes can 
provide further validity of the findings 
• Bias of the researcher should be clearly and honestly provided 
• Negative or discrepant information which provides contradictory evidence should 
be discussed, providing realism to the outcome 
• Time in the field provides a deeper understanding, through prolonged close 
association of the study domain. 
• Peer debriefing through the review of study providing an additional viewpoint of an 
individual familiar with the project 
• External auditor to review the entire project but does not have immediate 
knowledge of it; the aim is to provide an objective view. 
A Model Based Approach to System of Systems Risk Management 
88 
4.2.3 Mixed Method Research Design 
As the name suggests mixed method research design combines both quantitative and 
qualitative approaches, the argument being that this results in a stronger understanding of 
the problem and a minimising of the weaknesses of the individual approaches (Pinto, 2010). 
Cresswell (2014) identifies the following basic mixed method designs: 
• Convergent Parallel Mixed Methods Design 
• Explanatory Sequential Mixed Methods Design 
• Exploratory Sequential Mixed Methods Design 
 
The convergent parallel mixed methods approach performs quantitative and qualitative 
data collection in parallel, the results of which are compared to determine if they support or 
conflict with each other. The key element of this approach is that the same variables or 
constructs are used to collect both types of data; however combining the quantitative and 
qualitative data is perhaps the most challenging aspect. Data combination generally takes a 
“side by side” approach whereby one set of data is analysed and the other is then compared 
as each finding is discussed, another approach is transformation, where the qualitative data 
is first converted to a quantitative format, or vice-versa, and direct combination is then 
possible. 
The explanatory sequential mixed methods approach begins with a quantitative study, the 
results of which are analysed in order to inform the design of the following qualitative stage. 
For example, the second stage may comprise interviews to discuss the results of the initial 
quantitative study. The intent of this approach is to use the qualitative results to explain and 
expand upon the qualitative results rather than to combine them. 
The exploratory sequential mixed methods approach is the reverse of the explanatory 
sequential mixed methods, whereby an initial qualitative study is built upon by a successive 
quantitative study. For example, a qualitative grounded theory approach will generate a 
theory that may then be tested quantitatively. 
However, research often requires more flexibility of the design allowing further complex 
combinations quantitative and qualitative phases, Cresswell (2014) identifies the following 
more advanced mixed method designs: 
• Embedded mixed methods: qualitative data is embedded within a larger 
quantitative study, or vice versa 
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• Transformative mixed methods: a social justice theory (e.g. feminism) as a 
framework for the study 
• Multiphase mixed methods: several mixed method, qualitative or quantitative 
studies carried out within a larger research project over a sustained period 
4.3 Taking a Systems Engineering Approach to Research 
SE is an iterative process used to develop a system, which provides a solution to address an 
identified problem; i.e. “an iterative process of top-down synthesis, development, and 
operation of real-world system that satisfies, in a near optimal manner, the full range of 
requirements for the system” (Eisner, 2008). 
The SE approach is “an interdisciplinary approach and means to enable the realisation of 
successful systems. It focuses on defining customer needs and required functionality early in 
the development cycle, documenting requirements, and then proceeding with design 
synthesis and system validation while considering the complete problem: operations, cost 
and schedule, performance, training and support, test, manufacturing, and disposal.” 
(INCOSE, 2015). 
Although the SE process is not a research methodology, elements of the process align with 
typical research activities, for example determining the research questions is similar to 
requirements elicitation. The SE lifecycle was defined in ISO/IEC 15288 (British Standards, 
2011) as: Concept stage - Development stage - Production stage - Utilization stage - Support 
stage - Retirement stage. 
However, it is the concept and development stages which are relevant to the research 
process, later stages are perhaps more relevant to any future exploitation of the research 
output.  
The concept stage defines the problem space, characterizes the solution space, explores 
ideas, refines stakeholder needs and explores concepts (INCOSE, 2015). This broadly equates 
to the definition of the research question, the literature review and the refinement of the 
original research question. 
The development stage defines the system requirements, creates a solution description, 
implements the system and then verifies and validates it (INCOSE, 2015). This stage equates 
to the definition of the research objectives and then the definition of the tool8 (or tools) to 
collect and analyse data, which in the case of this research is both questionnaires and 
                                                          
8 Or more generally referred to as the “instrument”. 
A Model Based Approach to System of Systems Risk Management 
90 
models. The research conclusion validates and verifies the research output against the 
research questions and objectives. 
The SE concept and development stages are visualised alongside the research process in 
Figure 11 below. 
 
Figure 11 - SE and Research Processes 
4.4 Researching Systems Engineering and SoSE 
Much of the background material described above concerning research design originates in 
the social science domain, particularly qualitative and mixed method research, with 
quantitative designs typically used in more “traditional” scientific research. However 
Systems Engineering is a discipline that requires both subjective and objective viewpoints; 
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for example a project may be planned and monitored using quantitative key performance 
indicators but it will also need to consider organisations and the individuals that comprise 
them, hence research in this domain will similarly need to encompass both views. The 
inherent complexity of a SoS also impacts the research approach; SoS behaviour needs to be 
considered holistically although causal factors may be at a low level within individual 
component systems, hence the suitability of a reductionist approach is reduced (Henshaw et 
al., 2013). 
SE and SoSE are relatively immature research areas, with few specific methodologies 
currently identified; this is evidenced by the low number of published papers which discus 
this topic (Brown, 2009; Ferris, 2009). SoSE methods are generally derived through 
ontological studies with little attention being paid to epistemological and methodological 
approaches (Sousa-Poza et al., 2008). With a lack of defined methodology there is a 
tendency for SE and SoSE research to confuse the identification of methods with the 
foundational methodology; this results in research designs merely describing a set of 
methods without reference to a worldview. However, if the appropriate methodology is 
identified at the outset then the basic research approach can be justified, producing more 
credible output through the demonstration of an understanding of research philosophy, 
whereby the methodology properly aligns with the research questions; the methods used 
will then be driven by the chosen methodology. 
SE research that has identified a methodology has taken a qualitative case study approach 
where the researcher has no control over events and the research questions are of the form 
“How?” and “Why?” (Martin & Davidz, 2007). Other SE research has utilised a grounded 
theory approach, which collects data in a systematic manner and then derives theory from it 
(Valerdi & Davidz, 2008).  Sousa-Poza et al (2008) argue that for SoSE research the empirical 
deductive approach is not appropriate due to the SoS inherent complexity, instead a 
Rationalist Inductive approach is suggested. Figure 12 (Sousa-Poza et al., 2008) visualises the 
mapping between the proposed methodology and the research method. 
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Figure 12 - Approach for the Development of the Rational Inductive Methodology (Sousa-Poza et 
al., 2008) 
4.5 The Finalised Research Design 
Having established appropriate research design terminology and potential approaches, the 
first step in determining a research design tailored to this study is to consider the research 
questions, as defined in section 1.2. These questions either involve an assessment of risk 
management approaches, for which the Constructivist Worldview is appropriate, or the 
development of a modelling approach for which Pragmatist Worldview is suitable; Table 9 
provides a mapping of research question to worldview and hence methodology, a mapping 
to research objective is also provided. 
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Research Questions Worldview Methodology Objective 
(QL = Qualitative QN 
= Quantitative) 
1 How is this management of 
SoS risk different from 
managing risk at the 
system level? 
Constructivist Qualitative 2(QL), 3(QL), 8(QL) 
2 How is a model-based 
approach beneficial? 
Pragmatist Mixed Method 1(QL), 4(QL), 
5(QL,QN), 6(QL,QN) 
3 How can a model-based 
approach be developed 
and how can it quantify 
risk? 
Pragmatist Mixed Method 1(QL), 4(QL), 
5(QL,QN), 6(QL,QN) 
4 What are the types of risk 
associated with SoS? 
Constructivist Qualitative 2(QL), 3(QL) 
5 How do the types of risk 
relate to the SoS ‘lifecycle’? 
Constructivist Qualitative 3(QL) 
6 How is risk transferred 
within a SoS? 
Pragmatist Mixed Method 5(QL,QN), 7(QL) 
7 How is risk perceived 
differently from both 
within and outside the SoS 
boundary? 
Constructivist Qualitative 3(QL) 
 
Table 9 - Research Design Methodology Mapping 
Each research objective can be associated to an activity for which an appropriate research 
method should be selected. Having identified an appropriate research methodology for each 
objective, a research method is selected which is consistent with the methodology, as 
provided in Table 10 below. It is noted that the Embedded Mixed Method approach was 
specifically selected as the development of the case study tools required qualitative input 
but was verified through quantitative test cases, however the validation required a more 
subjective assessment from purposefully selected subject matter experts. 
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Objective Methodology Method 
1 Review of a wide range of modelling 
techniques applicability to SoS 
Qualitative Literature Review, 
Assess using case 
study 
2 Review current risk management 
approaches 
Qualitative Literature Review 
3 Identify differences between system and 
SoS risk management 
Qualitative Literature Review, 
Case Study, 
Modelling 
4 Identify an application for which a risk 
management model based tool will 
provide benefit 
Qualitative Pragmatic selection 
5 Identify appropriate modelling 
techniques and implement and test tool 
Embedded Mixed 
Method 
Modelling, SE 
approach to tool 
development, Case 
Study 
6 Identify a case study and determine the 
adaptability of the tool 
Embedded Mixed 
Method 
Pragmatic selection, 
SE approach to tool 
development, Case 
Study 
7 Define a SoS risk management 
methodology 
Qualitative Triangulation from 
case study results 
Table 10 - Research Design Method Mapping 
The complete research design is described in Figure 13, showing how the key studies in the 
research map to objectives, methods and methodologies. The Rationalist Inductive approach 
(Figure 12) was also shown above as it is does align with the overall approach taken in this 
research. 
As described in section 4.3, a Systems Engineering approach was taken throughout this 
research, both at a high level when performing the research activities and also at a low level 
when developing the prototype tools for each case study. 
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Figure 13 - Research Design 
4.6 Critical Assessment of Research Methods 
4.6.1 Literature Review 
The state-of-the-art literature review approach was based on the three-stage review process 
(Levy & Ellis, 2006) and is described in section 3.1, it was divided into the following three 
themes;  (1) General definitions and differences between System and SOSE, (2) Modelling 
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and (3) Simulation and its applicability to SoS and Risk Management and its application in 
the SoS domain. The results of the review provided a sound basis for the development of the 
model based risk management process enabling identification of knowledge gaps and areas 
of alignment with current approaches. 
4.6.2 Questionnaires 
A questionnaire was used to identify the SoS SoI dimensions, which is described in section 
6.1, with the results attached in Appendix A and Annex D. For each proposed dimension the 
following question was asked; “This dimension is relevant to the SoI of a SoS?” Participants 
were required to respond in accordance with the following scale, 1=Strongly Disagree, 
2=Disagree, 3=Neutral, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly Agree. Following analysis of the results a 
workshop was held with a sub-group of participants, which further refined the proposed 
dimensions. 
Questionnaires were also used in conjunction with semi-structured interviews in order to 
support the validation of case study outputs by SMEs, as described in chapters 8 and 9. This 
approach ensured that key points required for adequate validation were covered and 
consistent between case studies. 
4.6.3 Validation 
Validation of the case study outputs was required in order to demonstrate the efficacy of 
the proposed risk management process. Creswell (2014) identifies the following terms 
relating to the validity of qualitative research; trustworthiness, authenticity, and credibility 
which may be provided through the strategies described in section 4.2.2. These strategies 
are listed below but in this instance a description of the action taken to fulfil them is 
provided. 
• Triangulation - data was used from different case studies, which in turn were 
validated by different SMEs. The case studies were chosen to ensure a wide 
difference in application. 
• Member checking - this was in part also provided by SME validation and also by 
peer review and citation of published research output, in particular the SoS SoI 
model. 
• Rich, thick descriptions - detailed descriptions of the case study and associated 
outputs are provided in chapters 8 and 9. 
• Bias of the researcher is addressed through the selection of the second case study. 
Whilst the researcher was very familiar with the problem space addressed by the 
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close air support case study (chapter 8), the second case study was completely 
unfamiliar (chapter 9). This ensured that, with respect to domain familiarity, the risk 
management process was applied without bias, demonstrating that risks were 
identified and mitigated as a result of the process rather than through knowledge of 
the domain. 
• Negative or discrepant information – chapter 10 provides a critical analysis of the 
proposed risk management approach, identifying areas which require further 
development. 
• Time in the field – the researcher leveraged substantial experience of SoSE, 
specifically relating to interoperability issues in the military domain, which also 
informed the first case study (chapter 8). 
• Peer debriefing, External auditor – it is suggested that this was provided by the 
research supervisors, examiners, SMEs and publication reviewers. 
4.6.4 Case Studies 
Section 2.1 outlines several case studies, providing examples of all SoS type within the 
context of the research question. 
A further two heterogeneous case studies; Close Air Support and UK National Food Security 
– Wheat Supply Chain were selected for application of the risk management process and are 
described in chapters 8 and 9 respectively. 
4.7 Summary 
A SoS is inherently complex, therefore a reductionist research approach, whereby a problem 
is distilled down to a set of discrete variables which can then be quantitatively measured, is 
not appropriate. Typically, SoS research will require a combination of both quantitative and 
qualitative elements, utilising a mixed method approach (Creswell, 2014). 
The research approach to the development of a model-based approach to SoS Risk 
Management, utilises a mixed method approach, specifically an exploratory sequential 
mixed method approach (Creswell, 2014). 
Research was conducted through the analysis of appropriate case studies, the building of 
models and SME interviews. The analysis of case studies and SME interview provides 
qualitative data, which enabled the definition of the Risk Management model requirements. 
The models provide a set of quantitative data, which is validated against the model 
requirements and further SME input. A SoS System of Interest model, as described in section 
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6.1, was developed through the canvasing of subject matter experts using questionnaires 
and a follow up workshop, the report of which is included in Annex D.  
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5 Chapter 5: Probabilistic Modelling 
Although there are numerous probabilistic modelling techniques, such as Markov Chains and 
Decision Trees, the proposed model-based approach to SoS Risk Management specifically 
utilises Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) and Monte Carlo simulation as key elements within 
the model architecture, hence this chapter is intended to provide an understanding of both 
techniques, describing the theoretical underpinning, practical use and current use within 
traditional Risk Management processes.  
Figure 14 illustrates how probabilistic modelling relates to other research output 
components providing context for the information provided in this chapter. It should be 
noted that this chapter does not define the probabilistic modelling approach (as described in 
section 7.4) per se, but does provide a basic theoretical background in support of it. 
 
Figure 14 - Probabilistic Modelling Approach Context 
5.1 Conditional Probability 
Where the probability of event B is dependent upon that of event A occurring, the 
probabilities are said to be conditional. This is illustrated in Figure 15; inside the blue 
rectangle all worlds in which A is true are represented, outside the blue rectangle all worlds 
in which A is false are represented. The same logic applies for B, i.e. inside the red rectangle, 
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all worlds in which B is true are represented, outside the red rectangle all worlds in which B 
is false are represented. 
Hence   0 <= P(A) <= 1 
  P(true) = 1 and  P(false) = 0 
The intersection of A and B, P(A ^ B), represents the probability of both A and B being true, 
therefore the probability of A or B being true is: 
  P(A v B) = P(A) + P(B) – P(A ^ B) 
 
Figure 15 - Conditional Probability 
The conditional probability is defined as: 
P(A|B)  =  Fraction of worlds in which B is true that also have A true 
 
For example, if P(A) represents the probability of having a stomach-ache and P(B) represents 
the probability of having food poisoning then it follows that if one has food poisoning then 
the probability of having a stomach ache will be increased, hence: 
P(A|B)   =  worlds with food poisoning and stomach-ache 
    worlds with food poisoning 
 
   = Area of A and B region 
    Area of B region 
 
   = P(A ∧ B) 
    P(B) 
Therefore: 
P(A ∧ B)  =  P(A|B) P(B) 
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It follows that: 
P(A ∧ B)  =  P(B|A) P(A) 
Hence 
P(B|A)   =  P(A ∧ B)  
    P(A) 
P(B|A)  = P(A|B) P(B) 
    P(A)  ……(1) 
 
Equation (1) is Bayes Theorem. 
Bayes Theorem was initially derived by the Reverend Thomas Bayes and presented 
posthumously to the Royal Academy two years after his death, in 1763. Although simple, 
this theorem is extremely powerful, describing the relationship of conditional and prior 
probabilities of two events. This characteristic enables either prior estimates of probability, 
based on contextual knowledge, or actual evidence to be used, which provides predictive 
and diagnostic support for the determination of probability (Pearl, 1986). For example, the 
probability of the ground being wet will be very high if it is known that it has rained 
previously, however the theorem also allows for the weather forecast to be taken into 
account if rain has not yet fallen. 
5.2 Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN) 
A BBN is a graphical representation of the probabilistic relationships between a set of 
random variables using a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) and is underpinned by Bayes 
Theorem. A network consists of a set of interconnected variables with each interconnection 
representing the causal relationship between variables and with each variable having 
multiple states. The probabilities relate to the likelihood of a particular state occurring in 
relation to the states of the connected nodes. A particular advantage of representing 
conditional probabilities in a graphical format is that it may be intuitively interpreted and 
does not require a deep understanding of the underlying theory. 
The network of variables can be considered a causal network; it is the representation of the 
causal links as conditional probabilities that differentiate the BBN from the basic causal 
network (Jensen & Nielsen, 2007). 
The BBN is therefore fundamentally different to the Markov Network which is an undirected 
graph whose links represent symmetrical probabilistic dependencies (Pearl, 2014), rather 
than causal links. The modelling of causal linkages is a key requirement of the model-based 
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approach for SoS Risk Management (as described in section 7.4), hence BBNs are utilised in 
preference to Markov Networks, for this reason Markov Networks are not described further 
in this chapter. 
5.2.1 Theoretical Background 
Jensen and Nielsen (Finn V. Jensen; Thomas Dyhre Nielsen, 2007) identify the BBN 
components as follows: 
• A set of variables and a set of directed edges between the variables 
• Each variable has a finite set of mutually exclusive states 
• The variables together with the directed edges form a Directed Acyclic Graph 
• To each variable A with parents B1,….,Bn there is attached a conditional probability 
table P(A| B1,….,Bn) 
 
A key strength of BBNs is propagation, whereby probability distributions are calculated and 
the network updated in response to entry of evidence, learning or adjustment of probability 
distribution within a single node. The updated probabilities are calculated through the 
application of the chain rule, which is derived below. 
The formula for conditional probability (section 5.1) can be re-arranged to give the product 
rule: 
P(A,B)   = p(A|B) p(B) 
Expanding this for three variables gives: 
P(A,B,C)  = P(A| B,C) P(B,C)  
= P(A|B,C) P(B|C) P(C) 
Generalizing for n variables gives the chain rule: 
P(A1, A2, ..., An) = P(A1| A2, ..., An) P(A2| A3, ..., An) P(An-1|An) P(An) …(2) 
Consider a BBN with a joint distribution P(X1,X2,X3,…,Xn) over the associated set of variables 
{X1,X2,X3,…Xn} which is defined as a probability table P(X1 ∧ X2 ∧ X3, ∧…∧ ,Xn) for all values that 
the set of variables can assume. 
For simple case with two binary variables the joint distribution would be defined by the 
following probability tables; P(!1 ∧ !2), P(!"1 ∧ !2), P(!1 ∧ !2) and P(!"1 ∧ !2) (Lampis, 2010). 
Applying the chain rule (2) to the variables {X1, X2 ,X3, …, Xn} gives the joint distribution: 
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#$!%,… , !() =+#, $!,	|	#/,) 
where #/, are the parents of !,  (Finn V. Jensen; Thomas Dyhre Nielsen, 2007) 
As stated previously the property of propagation is extremely powerful, supporting 
experimentation within the network, however propagation in general has been proved to be 
a NP hard (non-deterministic polynomial time hard) problem (Cooper, 1990). This has 
necessitated the development of propagation algorithms (Lauritzen & Spiegelhalter, 1988; 
Pearl, 1986) supporting efficient belief and evidence updates throughout a network. Several 
software applications are currently available which support the creation of BBNs and 
implement these algorithms allowing propagation within them. NETICA is one such tool and 
implements “message passing in a junction tree (or “join tree”) of cliques”, a full description 
of this algorithm can be found in Lauritzen & Spiegelhalter (1988). 
5.2.2 A Simple Example 
In order to illustrate the definition and use of a BBN a simple, often cited, example is used; 
this involves a lawn with two states; wet or dry. The state of the lawn will obviously be 
dependant on the weather. However, the lawn has a sprinkler, which will also determine if 
the lawn is wet or dry. In addition, the state of the sprinkler will be dependant on the 
weather. From this scenario the variables and the causal relationships in the network can be 
derived, as illustrated below in Figure 16, where “Weather” is termed the parent of the child 
variables “Sprinkler” and “Lawn”. 
 
Figure 16 - Sprinkler Example 
With the causal links established the next stage is to populate the probability tables 
associated with each node, either using probability values derived from evidence or, more 
subjectively, from expert opinion. Each state is assigned a probability, the summation of 
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which must always be 1.0 since a variable must be in one of its possible states at any time 
and each state is mutually exclusive. An example probability table for Weather is defined in 
Table 11, for Sprinkler in Table 12 and for Lawn in Table 13. 
 
Weather 
Sunny 0.3 
Cloudy 0.4 
Rainy 0.3 
 
Table 11 - Weather 
 Sprinkler 
Weather On Off 
Sunny 0.7 0.3 
Cloudy 0.5 0.5 
Rainy 0.05 0.95 
 
Table 12 – Sprinkler 
 
  Lawn 
Weather Sprinkler Wet Dry 
Sunny On 0.99 0.01 
Sunny Off 0.1 0.9 
Cloudy On 0.999 0.001 
Cloudy Off 0.2 0.8 
Rainy On 1.0 0.0 
Rainy Off 0.99 0.01 
 
Table 13 - Lawn 
The network is now populated and can be used to answer questions such as; ”what is the 
probability of the grass being wet if the weather is sunny?”  
With the nodes, arcs and probabilities entered, the software determines the conditional 
probabilities, as shown below in Figure 17. 
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Figure 17 - Sprinkler (NETICA) 
It is now possible to answer the question we posed above. We know that day must be 
sunny, so that ‘evidence’ is entered into the network. It can now be seen that the probability 
of the lawn being wet is now 72.3% and that the probability of the sprinkler being on has 
risen from 42.5% to 70.0%. Intuitively this result appears correct, as on a sunny day the 
probability of the sprinkler being on should increase. 
 
Figure 18 – Weather - Sunny 
As a further test of the network we pose the question; what is the probability of the grass 
being wet when it is raining? The weather node evidence is changed to reflect this and the 
probability of the lawn being wet rises to 99%, with the probability of the sprinkler being off 
rising to 95%, as demonstrated below in Figure 19. Again, this result appears reasonable. It 
could be argued that the probability of the lawn being wet should be higher; this could 
either be rectified by altering the lawn probability table or by refining the network. For 
example, if the rain is very light and the temperature is high it may evaporate before 
reaching the ground; in this case the network could be refined through the addition of rain 
density and air temperature variables. 
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Figure 19 – Weather – Rainy 
5.2.3 BBN Simplification Methods 
The example described above in section 5.2.2 is an extremely simple example; typically a 
BBN will contain far more variables, this leads to the number of entries contained in 
probability tables increasing with the number of parents, hence for a variable with x states 
and y parents the number of entries will be xy. 
However, there are a number of simplification approaches, which may be applied, thereby 
reducing the probability tables to a manageable size. 
Noisy-OR  
The Noisy-OR technique limits the growth in the number of probabilities to a linear 
relationship with the number of parents.  
 
Figure 20 - Noisy OR BBN Example 
If the BBN depicted in Figure 20 comprises variables {X1, X2, … , Xn} which are all two-state, 
then a Noisy-OR model assumes that the parent causes of Y are independent. In this case 
the probability that none of them caused Y is the product of all probabilities that each did 
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not cause Y, it then follows that the probability of any parents causing Y is this value 
subtracted from 1. The probability table now contains n entries as opposed to xn, which 
would be the case without application of the Noisy-OR model. 
Divorcing 
Another simplification technique is “divorcing” which utilises the addition of mediating 
variables, for example variable Y, shown in Figure 21, has four parents, if each parent is a 
three state variable then the variable Y probability table will contain 34 entries. Figure 22 
introduces the mediating three-state variable Z where the associated probability table will 
contain 32 entries; this results in the variable Y probability table reduced to 33 entries. 
Further simplification could be undertaken through the addition of an additional mediating 
variable between {X3, X4} and Y, which would reduce the size of the probability table for Y to 
32. 
 
Figure 21 - BBN before divorcing 
 
 
Figure 22 - BBN after divorcing 
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5.3 Monte Carlo Simulation  
Monte Carlo9 simulation requires a model to either accept a range or distribution of inputs, 
or internally represent distributions and when executed over multiple iterations the output 
is in the form of a distribution. Scientists at the nuclear research laboratory in Los Alamos, 
New Mexico first used this approach in the 1940’s (Metropolis & Ulam, 1949), and it is now 
an established statistical modelling technique being used in financial planning, business, 
reliability engineering, and safety engineering for quantitative risk analysis and control 
(Taylor & Ranganathan, 2013). 
Typically a model that is run within a Monte Carlo simulation will have the same structure as 
a single point, deterministic model, it is the replacement of certain single value variables 
with distributions or random numbers that is the key differentiator. 
The strong law of large numbers states that the larger the sample size the closer the 
distribution is to the theoretical distribution (Day, 2008). This is manifested through the 
running of a model over multiple iterations, as the number of iterations increases then the 
randomness in the output reduces and the outliers become less relevant.  
The central limit theory states that a mean set of variables drawn independently from an 
arbitrary distribution will have an approximately normal distribution. 
Consider an example, whereby the rolling of two dice is modelled and the sum of the 
outcome is output. For a very low number of iterations (e.g. 50) the set of results will form a 
random distribution, however as the number of iterations is increased substantially (at least 
5000) the output distribution resembles a normal bell curve (Day, 2008), in accordance with 
the central limit theory.  
Day (2008) proposed the following stages for Monte Carlo simulation development in the 
context of developing a model of profit margins for rental properties: 
1) Define an initial single point model. 
2) Decide on appropriate probability distributions, their attributes and inter-
relationships, possibly through historical data and update the model if required. 
3) Use random numbers to generate large numbers of potential scenarios, these may 
be inputs to the model or internalized variables within the model. 
4) Plot the output data on a scatter chart. 
                                                          
9 The name Monte Carlo is sometimes attributed to the famous casino, although some sources state 
that is taken from the codename of the classified project on which it was first used. 
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5) Count results in ranges. 
6) Calculate the descriptive statistics of the distribution. 
7) Plot a histogram of the results. 
 
Whilst the procedure outlined above was applied in a specific case it does demonstrate the 
key attributes of a Monte Carlo simulation, inherent randomness, multiple iterations and 
interpretation of the output distribution and outlines typical development steps, which may 
be generally applied. 
5.4 Probabilistic Modelling and Risk 
The international standard which identifies Risk assessment techniques (International 
Organization for Standardization, 2009a), lists Bayesian and Monte Carlo analysis as suitable 
statistical methods. It should be noted that Markov techniques are also identified but, as 
stated in section 5.2, BBNs are used in preference to Markov techniques for the application 
described within this thesis. 
The use of BBNs to support the risk analysis of complex systems has increased substantially 
over the last twenty years with applications including military installations, fire protection 
systems, banking organisations, the nuclear power industry and human reliability (Weber et 
al., 2012). In these examples BBNs were used to represent human, technical and 
organizational barriers and quantify low probability but high impact risks, as well as enabling 
the input of both historical data and information elicited from subject matter experts. 
Monte Carlo is perhaps the most widely used statistical modelling technique in support of 
quantitative risk analysis, being applied in numerous domains including the nuclear industry, 
the construction industry, public health, financial markets, insurance, meteorology and 
ecology.  
5.5 Summary 
This chapter has provided basic theoretical underpinning and a guide to the application of 
BBNs and Monte Carlo Simulations, both of which are identified as fundamental 
components of the model based approach to SoS Risk Management as proposed in this 
thesis.  
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6 Chapter 6: A Method for the Selection of Appropriate SoS M&S 
Techniques 
The proposed model based approach to SoS Risk Management, by definition, requires the 
use of a range of modelling techniques. However, critical to the success of this approach is 
the selection of techniques appropriate for the problem space being explored. Whilst it is 
accepted that in some cases the appropriate technique may be an obvious fit, there will 
typically be circumstances where the practitioner may be only familiar with a limited range 
of modelling techniques and hence the selection will be constrained to this knowledge base.  
This chapter describes the development of a SoS System of Interest model (Kinder et al., 
2012) which was utilised as a framework supporting a model technique selection matrix 
(Kinder et al., 2014). From the matrix, a tool was developed in Microsoft Excel, allowing the 
practitioner to define SoS modelling requirements and from which appropriate techniques 
are automatically identified. 
Figure 23 provides context for the research output components described in this chapter, 
illustrating their relationship to each other and to components described outside this 
chapter. 
 
Figure 23 - M&S Technique Selection Context 
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6.1 Model of SoS SoI 
“A distinguishing feature between Systems Engineering and System of Systems Engineering is 
the difficulty of defining the System of Interest (SoI). But failure to properly identify the SoI is 
one of the causes of unpredicted emergent behaviour, which usually arises from the 
combined actions, and interactions of the constituents of a SoS” (Kinder et al., 2012). 
As stated in section 3.2.2, in order to undertake SE the SoI must be established, this is 
equally applicable to SoSE. However, the literature review undertaken for Theme 1 – SoSE 
did not reveal any approaches, which currently support the determination of a SoS SoI. 
The definition of a set of “dimensions” which could be used to represent the SoS SoI was 
first suggested at the ESoS academic retreat held in 2011. Under this research, the concept 
was developed further using a qualitative research approach. A questionnaire designed to 
elicit an agreed set of dimensions was circulated to 11 purposefully selected participants 
with deep knowledge of the subject under consideration, the results of which are attached 
in Appendix A. The majority of participants were from an academic background (ranging 
from PhD candidate to professor), specialising in SE and SoSE, although one contributor was 
industry based being the chief scientist within a multinational defence company. Specifically 
the group consisted of one professor, three senior lecturers, one visiting fellow, an industrial 
chief scientist and five PhD researchers who as a whole had specific experience of M&S, 
human behaviour, culture, enterprise architecture, interoperability and engineering 
approaches in the context of SoS. Selection of participants with both SE and SoS knowledge 
was required to minimise bias towards a traditional SE approach in the responses whilst also 
allowing suitable elements of SE to be identified. A workshop was subsequently held where 
a subgroup of 5 participants discussed the survey results and agreed a final set of 
dimensions; a report containing the results analysis and workshop discussion is attached in 
Annex D and summarised below. For each proposed dimension the following question was 
asked; “This dimension is relevant to the SoI of a SoS?” Participants were required to 
respond in accordance with the following scale; 1=Strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neutral, 
4=Agree, 5=Strongly Agree. 
Whilst it is acknowledged the sample size was relatively low, the results of the research 
were subsequently published in a peer reviewed conference paper (Kinder et al., 2012) as 
attached in Annex A, was re-iterated in a peer reviewed journal paper (Kinder et al., 2014), 
attached in Annex B, and also published in a second conference paper (Kinder et al., 2015) 
attached in Annex C. In addition the SoI SoS model was presented at INCOSE SoS Working 
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Group and the SoSCIE, webinars which had over 50 and over 80 attendees respectively, who 
were highly knowledgeable of the SoS domain. Throughout these reviews and presentations 
the SoS SoI model was positively supported, providing further validation of the approach. 
Figure 24 illustrates the questionnaire responses; the overall score was determined by 
simply adding all response values.  
 
Figure 24 - SoS SoI Questionnaire Responses 
In order to determine the level of consensus across the responses a graph of the variance of 
each set of responses was produced, as shown in Figure 25.  
 
Figure 25 - SoS SoI Questionnaire Response Variance 
A low variance indicates a high level of agreement between participants. This analysis 
provided the basis for discussion at the subsequent workshop, whereby dimensions with 
high scores and low variance were generally accepted, low scores with low variance were 
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rejected and those with higher scores but higher variance were the targets of more 
discussion. 
Although Geographic Distribution scored relatively highly, workshop discussions identified 
that, although relevant, this dimension is subsumed by the Interactions dimension rather 
than requiring a specific dimension. This aligns with Maier’s classification of SoS (Maier, 
1998), as discussed in section 3.2.3 which acknowledges geographic distribution as a typical, 
rather than a defining,  characteristic. 
Enterprise Participants was accepted as a valid dimension, however the workshop reached 
the conclusion that it was more related to organisations and management; hence it was 
renamed to Systems Owners and Operations. 
Functions/Services was also accepted as a valid dimension, however the workshop agreed 
that the term “Services” should not be taken forward as services potentially imply Service 
Oriented Architecture, which was not the intention. It was also agreed that the Functions 
dimension adequately covered Capability. 
Whilst it was agreed Emergence is a critical issue with regards to a SoS it was decided that is 
a characteristic rather than a separate SoI dimension and is a result of the relationships 
between the other dimensions. 
Latency is directly related to the SoS interactions, therefore this dimension was deemed 
superfluous. 
Each component system comprises a number of disciplines, hence it was agreed that the 
Disciplines dimension was unnecessary as the component systems dimension already 
encompassed the SoS attribute. 
The agreed set of dimensions, as listed below, were presented at the 7th International 
Conference on System of Systems Engineering in 2012, the accompanying paper (Kinder et 
al., 2012) is attached in Annex A: 
• Component Systems (including specific and general system types) 
• Classification 
• Interactions  
• Nature of Relationships 
• Lifecycle 
• Variability 
• Functions 
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• Systems Owners and Operations 
• Concept of Operation / Use / Employment 
 
Hence the definition of a SoS SoI was proposed: The system of systems whose life cycle is 
under consideration described by all dimensions that contribute to the resultant emergent 
behaviour. 
Descriptions of each dimension are provided in the Annex A paper (Kinder et al., 2012), 
elements of which are quoted from in the summary below. 
Component Systems (including specific and general system types) 
Component systems (also known as constituent systems) comprise the SoS and will 
generally be identified for the directed SoS and to some extent the acknowledged SoS, 
although early in the development lifecycle specific systems may not yet be identified. The 
same situation also arises for SoS classified as collaborative and virtual, however in this case, 
it is possible that generic system types may be identified before it is possible to instantiate 
them with specific systems.  
Classification 
The SoS classifications (Dahmann & Baldwin, 2008); directed, acknowledged, collaborative 
and virtual, may populate this dimension, although any suitable alternative may be used. 
However, it is noted that a particular SoS may simultaneously exhibit the behaviours of more 
than one classification, depending on the make-up of component systems and the current 
point in the lifecycle. 
Interactions (including types)  
A SoS exists only because of interactions between constituent systems. With no interaction 
the SoS merely becomes a set of independent systems exhibiting no overall emergent 
behaviour, so the interactions must provide some definition of the SoS SoI.  The ability of the 
SoS to fulfil its purpose is dependent upon the effectiveness and availability of these 
interactions.  
Interactions may be defined generically or specifically allowing SoS development to be 
supported from initial high-level information exchange requirements through to detailed 
interaction contents, protocol and media definitions. 
The availability of interactions is important and related to performance and agility, i.e. a SoS 
may be formed or reconfigured relatively quickly if component systems share a common 
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means to interact. For two component systems to interact there must be at least one 
homogeneous interaction medium, if there is none then an intermediate system must act as 
a “translator” or gateway. Interactions can also be constrained by geographical dispersion, 
therefore this should be considered. 
Nature of Relationships 
This dimension is used to define the category of relationship between component systems, 
such as 'peer-to-peer’, hierarchical control or distributed control. 
Lifecycle 
This dimension considers the lifecycle of the SoS as a whole as well as the respective 
timelines of the component systems, providing an insight into dynamism within the SOI. For 
some SoS, it may not be possible to define a cycle, as such, but rather an evolution in which 
the SoS passes through identifiable phases, as discussed in section 3.2.5, where it may be 
appropriate to use an alternative lifecycle model such as that proposed by the DANSE 
project (DANSE Consortium, 2015). 
It was also suggested that there is a link between the point in the lifecycle and the ability to 
populate a dimension, for example, until the execution phase of a SoS the actual component 
systems may not be known but the generic types should be. It is argued that the lifecycle is 
an overarching dimension, affecting all other dimensions. As the SoS passes through the 
lifecycle phases the dimensions evolve both in relation to each other and to external 
influences. 
Variability  
Variability is the frequency of change of a SoS and is related to time in the sense that it may 
reveal some sort of characteristic frequency representing change in the SoS. Stability is 
linked to the behaviours of the SoI such as “Stable over time”, “Unstable, rapidly grows” and 
“Boundary changes”. Factors such as an evolving purpose or a response to environmental 
factors will influence the variability.  
Functions  
A SoS performs a combination of functions in order to accomplish its purpose. Functions 
may be performed by individual component systems, by subsets of component systems or 
by the entire SoS. The Function dimension defines both specific functions and more generic 
function types. The aggregate effect of the functions gives the SoS emergent behaviour; it is 
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this behaviour that should fulfil the SoS purpose. Analysis of these functions may enable 
unexpected behaviour to be anticipated. 
Systems Owners and Operations  
This dimension is closely related to organisations, management and enterprise (multi-
organisational) relationships. It is dependent on the classification type, for example within a 
directed SoS the owners and operations will be well defined but for a more ad-hoc SoS this 
dimension will not be so well defined. However, the definition of System Owners and 
Operations includes generic types enabling the dimension to be defined to a certain extent 
for less rigidly defined systems. 
Concept of Operation / Use / Employment 
Given that the individual systems can perform operations independently the use/mission of 
the SoS is critical for defining the SoI for the SoS as opposed to the individual constituent 
systems. This dimension is potentially the starting point for populating the SOI dimensions. 
Having established the SoS SoI dimensions, the relationships between them were defined, as 
illustrated in Figure 26 (Kinder et al., 2012) below. 
 
Figure 26 – Representation of SoS SoI (Kinder et al., 2012) 
Descriptions of, and the rationale behind each relationship are provided in Table 14. 
Source 
Dimension 
Connecting 
Dimension 
Relationship Description 
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Source 
Dimension 
Connecting 
Dimension 
Relationship Description 
Component 
Systems 
Interactions require A SoS exists only because of 
interactions between 
constituent systems (Kinder 
et al., 2012). Hence 
Component Systems require 
interactions in order to form 
a SoS. 
Component 
Systems 
Functions provides Component systems provide 
both individual functions in 
support of the SoS purpose 
and functions, which arise 
through interaction of the 
component systems. 
Component 
Systems 
Classification influences The identification and 
maturity of the component 
systems influences the SoS 
classification. Where all 
component systems are 
known and “built and 
managed to fulfil specific 
purposes” (Dahmann & 
Baldwin, 2008) 
Interactions Component 
Systems 
connect As stated above, connection 
of component systems 
provides SoS capability; 
therefore interactions are 
required to connect them. 
Interactions Variability impact The availability and stability 
of the interactions between 
the component systems 
impacts the variability, i.e. if 
the interactions are unstable 
and subject to frequent 
change then the variability 
will increase. 
Lifecycle Component 
Systems 
determines 
availability of 
It is assumed that at points 
later in the lifecycle, the 
identification and availability 
of component systems will 
increase, as discussed in 
section 3.2.5, hence the 
point in the lifecycle 
determines availability of 
component systems. 
Lifecycle Interactions determines As above, it is assumed that 
at points later in the 
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Source 
Dimension 
Connecting 
Dimension 
Relationship Description 
lifecycle, the identification 
and availability of 
component systems will 
increase. 
Lifecycle System Owners 
and Operations 
determines Throughout the SoS lifecycle 
the System Owners and 
Operations may change, for 
example for a directed SoS 
the implementers may be 
considered system owners, 
when the SoS enters service 
the end users will take 
ownership. 
Lifecycle Variability induces This relationship assumes 
that earlier in the lifecycle 
the SoS will be more likely to 
change, thereby increasing 
variability, as the SoS 
matures the rate of change 
(i.e. variability) will decrease. 
Variability Classification influences Variability is an indication of 
the rate of change within a 
SoS, this relationship 
suggests that SoS which are 
more closely managed 
(directed and acknowledged) 
are more likely to exhibit a 
low level of variability 
whereas this is more likely to 
increase for collaborative 
and virtual SoS. 
Nature of 
Relationships 
Interactions determine The Nature of Relationships 
may, at least to some extent, 
determine the interactions 
between the component 
systems. 
System Owners 
and Operations 
Concept of 
Operation/Use/ 
Employment 
define The system owners and 
operations will directly 
define the SoS Concept of 
Operation/Use/Employment, 
although these may also 
emerge and evolve through 
the use of the SoS. 
Concept of 
Operation/Use/ 
Employment 
Functions requires The SoS Concept of 
Operation/ Use/Employment 
requires a set of functions in 
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Source 
Dimension 
Connecting 
Dimension 
Relationship Description 
order to support them. 
Table 14 - SoS SoI Dimension Relationships 
The SoS SoI representation was tested against two cases studies (as documented in the 
paper provided in Annex A): 
• a typical example of a military Counter Air Mission 
• National Programme for IT in the NHS (NPfIT), as discussed in section 2.1.2. 
Table 15 (Kinder et al., 2012) illustrates how elements of the case studies were mapped to 
the dimensions, indicating that, at least in these cases, the model of SoS SoI does fulfil its 
intended purpose. Further discussion of the mapping activity is provided in the paper 
attached in Annex A. 
 
Dimensions 
Case Studies 
 
Counter Air Mission 
 
National Programme for IT in the 
NHS (NPfIT) 
 
Component 
Systems 
Counter Air Aircraft (Typhoons) 
Command and Control Unit (E3-D, 
TACC) 
JRE Gateway (KC-135)  
TDL gateway (Type 45) 
Air Defence Artillery (Type 45) 
ISR (E3-D)  
CVS Aircraft Carrier 
Satellite (Skynet 5) 
Choose and Book  
Electronic Prescription Service (EPS) 
National Network for the NHS (N3) 
NHS Mail 
Picture Archiving and 
Communication System (PACS) 
The Spine 
Interactions Digital Communications (Link 11/16, 
Satellite) 
Voice Communications 
Track Data 
Command and Control  
Imagery 
N3 Network 
eMAIL 
Appointment Data 
Image Processing 
Patient records 
Prescriptions (electronic)  
Lifecycle Requirement, Planning, Assembly, 
Execution 
Dispersion  
Concept, Design and Development , 
Operation, Reconfigure/Upgrade, 
Disposal 
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Variability Assets may change during mission. 
The purpose may evolve as the 
mission progresses. This SoS may 
exhibit a high level of variability. 
Intuitively one assumes variability is 
low because of the directed nature 
of this SoS. However, due to the 
poor definition of requirements 
component systems were frequently 
changed which resulted in a higher 
level of variability than would 
perhaps be expected. 
Classification Collaborative/Acknowledged. 
Directed elements, e.g. Link 11/16 
networks 
Originally Directed but later moved 
towards Acknowledged. 
Functions Surveillance, Reconnaissance, 
Targeting, Detect, Identify, Intercept, 
Destroy, Aircraft Control, Battle 
Management. 
Choose and Book appointment, 
Change appointment, Produce 
prescription, Picture Archiving 
Systems 
Owners and 
Operations 
Nations (Governments), Services (Air 
force, Navy, Army), Overarching 
control, e.g. NATO. 
Project Team, NHS Connecting for 
Health 
Local Authority / Strategic Health 
Authority 
Project Board, Board of Directors / 
PCT 
Executive Group 
Concept of 
Operation  
The SoS provides protection from air 
and missile threats.  
Provide a single, centrally mandated 
electronic care record for patients 
and to connect 30,000 GPs to 300 
hospitals. 
Nature of 
Relationships 
Hierarchical  (military C2) Plural system of procurement. 
Client-Server. 
Table 15 - Case Study Applicability to SoS SoI Dimensions (Kinder et al., 2012) 
Regarding the Counter Air Mission case study, the proposed framework showed the 
relationship between component systems and interactions, emphasising the need for 
interoperability. Whilst this in itself can already be determined with current frameworks 
(e.g. MODAF (Ministry of Defence Architecture Framework)), the proposed framework 
allows further elaboration of each system, in accordance with the life cycle and the SoS 
purpose and shows the relationships to other aspects of the SoS (Kinder et al., 2012). 
The model of SoS SoI may have enabled the identification of several issues that resulted in 
failure of the National IT Programme for the NHS. Those closest to the healthcare delivery 
were not able to provide adequate input into the SoS requirements definition, resulting in 
specific local requirements not being met. The SoS SoI representation links Lifecycle, System 
Owners and Operations, Concept of Operation/Use/Employment and Functions. This 
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relationship illustrated that system owners indirectly influence the functions provided by the 
SoS. By definition all health trusts (System Owners) are part of the SOI and, therefore, in 
accordance with the proposed model, would be provided with input into the definition of 
Lifecycle, System Owners and Operations, Concept of Operation / Use / Employment (Kinder 
et al., 2012).  
Incompatibility between systems was a major issue. The SoS SoI representation links 
Component Systems, Interactions and Lifecycle, allowing component system types and 
interaction types to be defined early in the lifecycle and, if correctly modelled, enabling any 
incompatibilities to be detected and prevented. The relationship of Lifecycle in this case was 
intended to enable component systems at different phases of development to form part of 
the SoI (Kinder et al., 2012).  
Application of the model of SoS SoI for these case studies demonstrated the potential utility 
through the identification of issues and desired behaviour as discussed above. However, the 
SoS SoI identifies dimensions from a generic viewpoint, thereby enabling each to be 
instantiated appropriately in accordance with the maturity of the SoS under consideration, 
e.g. component systems may be identified at an abstract level or as specific systems. It 
should also be noted that use of all dimensions is not mandated when defining a particular 
SoI, only those applicable need be instantiated, which also supports the generic approach. 
Of relevance to this research is the use of the SoS SoI model in support of key research 
outputs, specifically the SoS M&S technique selection matrix and associated tool, described 
in sections 6.2 and 6.3 respectively as well as providing the basis for a SoS risk identification 
framework, described in section 7.3.2. 
6.2 Selection Matrix 
The survey of M&S techniques and their applicability to the SoS domain, as discussed in 
section 3.3.4, is documented in the journal paper (Kinder et al., 2014) attached in Annex C. 
The output of the survey produced a matrix (reproduced in Table 7, section 3.3.4), which 
cross references M&S technique to SoS SoI dimension, indicating the level of applicability. 
The following general process for M&S method selection was proposed (Kinder et al., 2014):  
1) Determine the model requirements, through the identification of the basic functions. 
2) Cross-reference the model functions to the SoI dimensions and determine the 
applicable dimensions. 
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3) From the applicability matrix (Table 7, section 3.3.4), select M&S techniques, which are 
applicable across dimensions.  
4) From the model requirements determine if dynamic behaviour is required; re-assess 
the list of selected models using Table 16 information.  
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 Dynamic Ease of 
creation 
Verifiable 
DES/DEVS 
HIGH LOW HIGH 
Petri Nets 
HIGH LOW HIGH 
ABMS 
HIGH LOW HIGH 
System 
Dynamics HIGH LOW HIGH 
Surrogate 
Models HIGH LOW HIGH 
ANN 
HIGH HIGH HIGH 
BNN 
LOW HIGH HIGH 
Markov 
Models LOW HIGH HIGH 
Game 
Theory LOW LOW LOW 
Decision 
Trees LOW HIGH HIGH 
Network 
Models LOW HIGH HIGH 
EAF 
LOW HIGH LOW 
Modelling 
Languages LOW HIGH LOW 
Table 16 - General M&S attributes (Kinder et al., 2014) 
6.3 Selection Tool 
Following the definition of the selection matrix and the associated process for M&S method 
selection it became apparent that development of a spreadsheet based tool based on the 
framework would be straightforward, and which could offer a basic level of automation as 
well as enabling documentation of the process in a standard format. 
The tool fulfilled the following requirements: 
1) Allow the user to identify the model functions and manually identify which SoS SoI 
dimensions (section 6.1) and General M&S attributes (Table 16) are applicable. 
2) Automatically identify appropriate M&S techniques. 
3) Automatically generate a ranking, indicating the suitability of the selected 
techniques. 
An example of an instantiated spreadsheet is provided in Table 17 - SoS M&S Technique selection 
tool 
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The first column, titled ‘Model’, allows the user to define the model name, in this case “Kill 
Chain” (which is fully described in Chapter 8). 
The second column entitled “Model Components” allows the main functions of the model to be 
entered; in this example seven are identified. This forms a matrix with the SoS SoI dimensions, 
which is manually populated by the user, thereby fulfilling the first requirement. During 
development of the CAS tool prototype models (described in chapter 8) additional characteristics of 
“stochastic” and “uncertainty” were added, which are shown in Table 17 - SoS M&S Technique 
selection tool 
The “stochastic” characteristic was necessary to support model functions requiring an 
element of randomness, for example a Gaussian distribution may represent the accuracy of 
a sensor. The “uncertainty” characteristic is used to indicate the model function requires 
probabilistic modelling, where the output of the model provides an indication of probability 
or likelihood, such as risk. 
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Table 17 - SoS M&S Technique selection tool 
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Below the list of model components, the list of potential M&S methods is defined and a 
matrix cross referencing SoS SoI dimensions and M&S characteristics inserted, as described 
in Table 7 and Table 16. This matrix also includes the “stochastic” and “uncertainty” 
characteristics, with the mapping to M&S methods shown in Table 18. 
 Stochastic Uncertainty 
DEVS !  
Petri Nets !  
ABMS !  
System 
Dynamics 
!  
Surrogate 
Models 
!  
ANN   
BNN  ! 
Markov 
Models 
 ! 
Game 
Theory 
 ! 
Decision 
Trees 
  
Network 
Models 
  
EAF   
Modelling 
Languages 
  
Table 18 - M&S Method Stochastic and Uncertainty characteristics (Kinder et al., 2014) 
Conditional formatting is used to indicate which elements in the matrix are relevant, i.e. for 
a each column if at least one model component is applicable to a dimension or characteristic 
then all instances in the matrix and in the same column which are defined as ‘HIGH’ are 
coloured amber, providing an overview of the model applicability to dimensions and 
characteristics.  
Conditional formatting is also used to highlight appropriate M&S methods green, fulfilling 
the second requirement. The rule for highlighting is as follows: 
Highlight method cell green if: 
• Any element in model technique row is amber and dynamic, stochastic or 
uncertainty capability is required 
• Any SoS SoI dimension is amber, no dynamic or stochastic capability is required and 
method does not support dynamic or stochastic capability 
 
The suitability ranking is calculated by summing the number of relevant M&S characteristics 
and SoS SoI dimension supported by the modelling technique, fulfilling the third 
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requirement. If the highest ranked technique does not support all required attributes this 
indicates that a hybrid modelling approach is required (reference section 3.3.5) or 
alternatively the modelling requirements should be decomposed further. 
The tool was used in the development of prototype models which are described in chapter 
8. 
6.4 Future Development of the Spreadsheet based tool 
It is acknowledged that the application of just two case studies does not provide strong 
evidence of the generalizability of model of SoS SoI (Kinder et al., 2012), hence future 
development should consider the application of additional exemplars, however this has 
been undertaken to some extent by the development of prototype models, as described in 
chapter 8. 
The model selection framework could be expanded through the addition of further M&S 
techniques, beyond those listed in Table 7.  
The tool is currently spreadsheet based, however providing it as a web service would be 
possible thereby providing a widely available SoSE support capability. 
6.5 Summary 
This chapter introduced a unique approach to the determination of the SoS SoI through 
definition of the following dimensions (Kinder et al., 2012)10: 
• Component Systems (including specific and general system types) 
• Classification 
• Interactions  
• Nature of Relationships 
• Lifecycle 
• Variability 
• Functions 
• Systems Owners and Operations 
• Concept of Operation / Use / Employment 
 
                                                          
10 This paper is attached in Annex A. 
A Model Based Approach to System of Systems Risk Management 
128 
A model illustrating the relationships between the SoS SoI dimensions (Kinder et al., 2012) 
was developed, as shown in Figure 26, with descriptions of the relationships provided in 
Table 14. 
The model of SoS SoI provides a basis for a SoS M&S technique selection framework in 
combination with the survey described in section 3.3.4. The selection framework supports 
the selection of appropriate M&S techniques appropriate for SoS within a particular context. 
This framework was further developed into a spreadsheet-based tool, which provides a basic 
level of automation and a common format for populating the framework. 
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7 Chapter 7: SoS Risk Management 
Whereas section 3.4.6 discussed current approaches to SoS Risk Management, finding very 
limited application11, this chapter describes a proposed model based approach to SoS Risk 
Management, discusses how it may be integrated into SoSE activities and who within the 
SoS has responsibility for this task. A published paper summarising the model based 
approach to SoS Risk Management (Kinder et al., 2015) is attached in Annex B. 
Analysis of the case studies in section 2.1 and Theme 1 (section 3.2.5) of the literature 
review identified Risk Management as a key component of SoSE, being referred to in the 
DoD SE Guide for SoS (US Department of Defense, 2008b), the Systems and software 
engineering standard, ISO 15288 (British Standards, 2011) and the SoSOMM approach 
(Gorod et al., 2007). 
Figure 27 provides context for the research output components described in this chapter, 
illustrating their relationship to each other and to components described outside this 
chapter. 
 
Figure 27 – SoS Risk Management Context 
                                                          
11 Although the DoD SE Guide for SoS (US Department of Defense, 2008b) does provide some basic 
guidance applicable to acknowledged SoS 
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7.1 Where does Risk Management fit in SoSE? 
The literature review established that Risk Management, in the context of SE, is defined as: 
“a disciplined approach to dealing with the uncertainty that is present throughout the entire 
system lifecycle” (INCOSE, 2015). 
This definition of Risk Management could be equally applied to SoS, in that risk throughout 
the entire SoS lifecycle must be considered, however a key difference between SE and SoSE 
is the lifecycle definition (section 3.2.5). Development of a single system will typically 
comprise a linear series of activities undertaken within specific lifecycle phases; concept, 
development, production, utilization, support, and retirement (British Standards, 2011) and 
where Risk Management is undertaken as a continuous activity within each phase.  
A SoS can be defined as “A SoS is a system which results from the coupling of a number of 
constituent systems at some point in their life cycles” (Brook, 2016). 
This definition succinctly illustrates that a SoS consists of a number of component systems, 
where each may be at different phases within its development lifecycle and where there 
may be limited influence over these systems at the SoS level; hence Risk Management of SoS 
does not directly align with the traditional SE lifecycle. A more appropriate lifecycle 
approach is the DANSE model, comprising the phases, initiation, creation and operations 
(section 3.2.5) and which accounts for asynchronous development of the component 
systems, although it does not encompass virtual SoS where there is no central managerial 
control. 
How Risk Management integrates into the SoSE approach is largely driven by the SoS 
classification; directed, acknowledged, collaborative and virtual (Dahmann & Baldwin, 2008) 
(section 3.2.3). 
During its Initiation phase the SoS comes into existence through the connection of a group 
of component systems enabling the sharing of information and resources, resulting in 
emergent behaviour at the SoS level. Risk Management at this point will attempt to identify 
associated risks, which may result in undesired emergent behaviour, thereby preventing the 
SoS fulfilling its purpose. However, risk encompasses both detrimental and beneficial effects 
(section 3.4.1), therefore risks that result in unexpected, but beneficial, emergent behaviour 
need to be identified and potential exploitation of this behaviour considered. 
The creation phase is optional, only being required when the initial SoS emergent behaviour 
is severely deficient, this may be a pre-emptive activity as a result of risks identified within 
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the initiation phase, however the same risk management process will be undertaken as for 
the creation phase. 
In the Operational Phase the SoS provides the desired emergent behaviour, with the 
“manager” monitoring for additional potential needs and influencing the component 
systems where modification emergent behaviour is required. Risk Management will be 
continuously undertaken in these phase to both assess risks which may impact the new SoS 
objectives and those which may impact current objectives, such as changes to component 
systems. 
7.2 Who performs SoS Risk Management? 
A directed SoS is centrally managed and an acknowledged SoS has a designated manager 
(Dahmann & Baldwin, 2008), which enables a single body to perform Risk Management, the 
DoD SE Guide for SoS (US Department of Defense, 2008b) recommends the creation of an 
integrated Risk Management Board, encouraging participation of members from component 
systems. Having overall control of the SoS, the board will generally take a top down 
approach to Risk Management. 
In a Collaborative SoS “component systems interact more or less voluntarily to fulfil agreed 
upon central purposes” (Dahmann & Baldwin, 2008), hence no single controlling authority 
exists. In this case an advisory body may perform Risk Management but has no authority 
over the component systems, alternatively it may be performed using a bottom up approach 
through collaboration of the component systems.  
For SoS that are rapidly created in response to an immediate need, risk management may be 
undertaken by those responsible for planning in the creation phase, an example of this is a 
Close Air Support mission, which is described in chapter 8.  
Virtual SoS “lack a central management authority and a centrally agreed upon purpose for 
the system-of-systems” (Dahmann & Baldwin, 2008), hence it is not possible to identify 
associated risks in the traditional sense. The SoS purpose emerges from the resulting 
behaviour, therefore risks cannot be anticipated although it could be argued that once a 
purpose is established the SoS may evolve to minimise risk, or alternatively if a risk 
materialises the SoS may evolve to fulfil a different purpose. It is therefore suggested that 
Risk Management cannot be undertaken for a virtual SoS, where the materialisation of both 
positive and negative risks will result in the evolution of the SoS and any risk mitigation will 
be undertaken by individual users or elements. 
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However, it is noted that a SoS may simultaneously exhibit different classifications where 
component systems form sub-groups; for example a SoS supporting disaster relief 
(Hurricane Katrina, discussed in section 2.1.6) will typically consist of component systems 
under the control of a single agency which are classified as directed, working with similarly 
classified groups but as a whole the SoS may be working collaboratively until overall control 
of all agencies is established. 
Considering the case studies discussed in section 2.1, within the FCS program risk was 
managed by a combination of individual integrated product teams, the Risk Working Group, 
and the Risk Review Board, which this resulted in a “single-system focus rather than SoS 
approach” (Axelband et al., 2012) as a result of identifying risks at the component system 
level rather than holistically at the SoS level. 
The US Coastguard Deepwater program attempted to manage risk through a traditional 
approach, where the prime contractor assumed that if risks associated with component 
systems were managed then those at the SoS level would not arise, a misconception 
addressed by the DoD SE Guide for SoS (US Department of Defense, 2008b), as discussed in 
section 3.4.3. 
Project managers were the focal point for Risk Management on the NPfIT (section 2.1.2) in 
the NHS, although it appears likelihood or probability were not determined for identified 
risks (Qinetiq, 2005) and it is assumed an overarching view of SoS risk was not considered, 
which could have been accomplished through the formation of an integrated Risk 
Management Board, as discussed above. 
Poor Risk Management was identified as a major contributor to the failure of the C-NOMIS 
project (section 2.1.4), where identified risks were not managed and the governance 
structure did not encourage accurate reporting of issues (National Audit Office, 2009); again 
there appeared to be no specific SoS risk approach and the creation of an integrated Risk 
Management Board would have been appropriate. 
The Close Air support (CAS) mission fratricide, as described in section 2.1.5, arose as a result 
of unidentified risks. In this case traditional project based risk management was not 
appropriate, instead the planning phase should have incorporated appropriate risk 
identification activities. The management of CAS risk, using the proposed SoS modelling 
approach, is described in chapter 8. 
The disaster relief effort in response to Hurricane Katrina required agencies to co-ordinate 
collaboratively, however there were initially many obstacles to achieving this, particularly 
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communication issues, with risks being mitigated as they materialised. Eventually a central 
command structure was established but there did not appear to be a coherent risk 
management strategy. However, in light of the lessons learnt the US Department of 
Homeland Security produced a set of fifteen National Planning Scenarios (Townsend, 2006), 
enabling risk management to be performed pre-emptively for future disaster relief. 
The Arizona and Southern California Power Grid blackout (section 2.1.7) was the result of a 
cascading failure, risk management was undertaken by individual authorities which together 
formed an acknowledged SoS, however each area is intended to operate in accordance with 
the North American Electric Reliability Corporation’s (NERC) mandatory Reliability Standards 
(FERC & NERC, 2014). 
The Friendster social networking website (section 2.1.8) provided the infrastructure, through 
enabling interactions, for users to form virtual SoS. The website itself could be regarded as 
an acknowledged SoS; hence a level of control existed. Although documentation is not 
available, it is assumed that management of the website included an element of Risk 
Management which identified functionality required to maintain its popularity, however 
eventually the change in users behaviour resulted in an unsustainable drop in use and the 
associated virtual SoS dissipated, hence the website was shut down. This illustrated that 
where elements of a SoS are classified as virtual, risk management can only be applied to 
those elements that form directed, acknowledged or collaborative SoS groups, where 
influence of the component systems is possible. 
In summary, the answer to the question “who should perform SoS risk management?” is 
anyone with the authority and/or power to implement mitigation.  This could be one role, or 
many roles that are distributed across the SoS, depending on the nature of the SoS 
concerned.  So individual system owners may also have a, possibly, unrecognised 
responsibility to consider SoS risks as well as system-level risks. 
7.3 Proposed SoS Risk Management Process 
The SoS Risk Management process comprise the same basic activities as those required 
when engineering individual systems12, (section 3.4.3) and is recapped below: 
• Risk Planning 
• Risk Identification 
                                                          
12 The DoD SoSE guide  (US Department of Defense, 2008b) directly references the Risk, Issue, and 
Opportunity Management Guide for Defense Acquisition Programs (DASDSE, 2015) 
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• Risk Analysis 
• Risk Handling 
• Risk Monitoring 
 
It is the approach taken for each of these activities, the tempo of the process and the level 
of influence over component systems that differentiates SoS risk management from that 
required within traditional SE.  
The tempo of the Risk Management process is driven by the required timeliness. For 
example, a ‘traditional’ system will typically be developed over an extended period of time, 
typically months or years, a SoS may be formed rapidly in response to an urgent need such 
as disaster relief. In this case risk management may be required to become a near real-time, 
decision support activity (Kinder et al., 2015), integrated into the SoS lifecycle (Haimes, 
2012). 
The following sections consider each Risk Management activity and describe the approach 
required from a SoS perspective. 
7.3.1 SoS Risk Planning 
Directed and Acknowledged SoS both have a designated manager, enabling central control 
of SoS risk activities, including planning activities. This aligns with the traditional Risk 
Management approach, which allows roles to be identified, definition of process and 
procedures, allocation of resources and establishes traceability of risk to SoS objectives. A 
directed SoS will generally be developed over a relatively long period of time, following a 
similar lifecycle to traditional system development (section 3.2.5), however an 
acknowledged SoS may be formed in short order, for example a Close Air Support (CAS) 
mission as described in chapter 8. In this case risk management should be incorporated into 
the planning phase and established in pre-defined procedures, for CAS missions they are 
defined in “Tactics, Techniques And Procedures For Close Air Support Operations” (NATO, 
2005). 
Another example of a pre-defined procedure is the UK Police Services, Gold, Silver, Bronze 
(GSB) command and control model (National Police Improvement Agency, 2009) which 
provides “a framework for delivering a strategic, tactical and operational response to an 
incident or operation”, particularly where a multi-agency response is required. The Gold, 
Silver and Bronze hierarchy is related to role rather than rank and enables a command and 
control structure to be quickly established for complex situations requiring rapid response 
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through its generic and adaptable approach. The publication of GSB guidance has provided 
awareness amongst potential partner agencies enabling them to work collaboratively with 
the Police Service in situations where specific pre-planning is precluded, thereby reducing 
risks associated with poorly defined lines of command, communications and 
interoperability. 
Within a collaborative SoS, component systems work together on a voluntary basis in order 
to fulfil a central purpose (Dahmann & Baldwin, 2008), hence the traditional risk planning 
approach is not necessarily applicable. In this situation a voluntary body may be established 
to undertake this task, and will have to achieve agreement before roles are assigned. Ideally 
a procedure is established which defines the SoS risk management process, however 
without any central control it will be the responsibility of component systems to follow the 
process and co-ordinate throughout it. For collaborative SoS formed rapidly in response to 
an unpredicted need, it is likely risks will be addressed as they arise until the SoS develops a 
more acknowledged structure. It is suggested that any lessons learnt are captured in order 
to either update any existing procedures or to create one if required, however this would 
require co-operation between the component systems and the identification or creation of a 
group or authority to hold the procedure. 
Risk planning for virtual SoS is by definition not possible as there is no control and no agreed 
purpose. 
7.3.2 SoS Risk Identification 
Types of risk are discussed in section 3.4.2, where it was concluded that current risk 
categories are not necessarily always applicable in the SoS domain, although this is 
dependent upon SoS classification. For a directed SoS, risk types such as Technical, 
Programmatic, Schedule and Cost are likely to be applicable, however when considering an 
acknowledged SoS, which may be formed in short order to fulfill a specific aim, only the 
Technical and Schedule risk apply and these will have different interpretations to the usual 
project based approach. For example, in this context technical risks may be more related to 
interoperability and schedule related to time sensitive aspects of a mission. 
Therefore an alternative approach is suggested whereby, rather than using the traditional SE 
risk types as a basis for the identification of risk, a framework is used which incorporates the 
SoS SoI dimensions (Kinder et al., 2012), described in section 6.1 and Annex A, and the 
holistic risk types; hazard, control and opportunity (Hopkin, 2002) which were identified as 
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suitable for SoS application in theme 3 of the literature review (section 3.4.2). The 
framework is illustrated below in Table 19, which contains examples of potential risks. 
 
 
Hazard Risks (Threat 
and perils) 
Control Risks (Doubt 
about mission 
achievement, project 
management control) 
Opportunity Risks 
(Opportunity to 
enhance or inhibit 
mission 
achievement) 
Component 
Systems  
Emergent behaviour 
inhibits purpose 
System immaturity 
System unavailability 
Emergent behaviour 
enhances purpose 
Classification N/A Misclassification N/A 
Interactions  Poor interoperability 
Bandwidth insufficient 
Poor interoperability 
interrupts command and 
control 
Bandwidth can 
support additional 
interaction medium 
Nature of 
Relationships 
Failure dependent on 
a single node 
Hierarchical command 
structure inhibits agility 
Agility increased 
Lifecycle Immaturity of 
component systems 
Lack of coordination  Lifecycles of 
component systems 
align 
Variability SoS instability Instability inhibits 
control 
High agility 
Functions Functions not 
available 
Ownership of function 
not defined 
Additional 
functionality exists 
Systems 
Owners and 
Operations 
Lack of co-operation Lack of management 
authority 
High level of co-
operation 
Concept of 
Operation / 
Use / 
Employment 
Concept of operation 
not supported 
No clear concept of 
operation 
Adaptable for 
changing concept of 
operation 
Table 19 - SoS Risk Identification Matrix 
It is emphasized that this is not intended to be prescriptive approach to SoS risk 
identification, the framework is intended to provide a starting point for the identification 
process and could utilize techniques, such as brainstorming or the Delphi method (section 
3.4.3) as appropriate. It should be noted that, as well as identifying potential risks, the 
factors contributing to them would also be identified at this stage. However, the risk analysis 
modeling activities (section 7.3.3) may reveal additional risks and contributing factors which 
may than be analysed further. 
Having identified risks in the context of the SoS dimensions, the ownership of each risk can 
now be considered. The key criterion for determining ownership is the ability of an entity to 
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affect influence over the risk. This will be dependent upon the SoS classification, for example 
the identification of a risk owner within a directed SoS will be relatively straightforward as 
lines of responsibility should be well defined, whereas within a collaborative SoS a level of 
consensus may have to be reached in order to agree ownership. 
7.3.3 SoS Risk Analysis 
The key objectives of risk analysis are to estimate the likelihood that a risk will occur, 
estimate the consequences and determine the risk level (US Department of Defense, 2006) 
(section 3.4.3). 
These objectives are equally relevant for both SoS and system risk analysis. In the 
engineering of systems risks are typically quantified through, subjective expert opinion and 
derived from a mental model. However, human processing of problems involving four 
variables “showed a significant decline in accuracy and speed of solution” from those 
involving three variables, whilst, problem solving involving five variables was at “chance 
level” (Halford et al., 2011). A SoS is inherently complex, hence when analysing SoS risk, it is 
assumed many variables will require consideration thereby exceeding the limits of human 
processing and breaking the law of requisite parsimony. Perception of risk is influenced by 
emotional response and bias, which also may impair the objective assessment of risk, as 
discussed in section 3.4.4 (Kinder et al., 2015).  
It is therefore proposed that, in order to provide, rigorous and trustworthy quantified SoS risk 
assessment, a modelling approach must be taken, removing the reliance on subjective 
judgement and mental models of complex causal relationships between risk factors (Kinder 
et al., 2015). 
The model based approach is elaborated further in section 7.4. 
7.3.4 SoS Risk Handling 
Following identification, analysis and quantification of a risk, it must be determined if the 
risk is to be accepted, avoided, transferred, or mitigated. This decision process is equally 
applicable to risk handling within single systems and SoS. 
A risk will be accepted if the cost of mitigation outweighs the cost incurred if the risk 
materialises, in the context of SoS “cost” may be financial or temporal. As discussed, a 
directed SoS may be developed over a relatively long period, with many parallels to 
traditional SE, in this case the managerial structure will exhibit a level of financial control, 
hence cost may be assessed and decisions taken based on this. For SoS created rapidly, short 
A Model Based Approach to System of Systems Risk Management 
138 
term financial concerns are less relevant; it is the ability of the SoS to meet its objectives 
within the required timescales that are key. For example, a SoS undertaking a search and 
rescue mission will be extremely time sensitive, hence if the mitigation of a risk is excessively 
time consuming then the risk may be accepted in the interests of achieving the objective. 
However, the long term financial impact of short term risk mitigation should be considered 
where possible. It is proposed that the models created in support of the risk analysis 
activities may enable the impact of accepting risk to be more accurately quantified, 
particularly where temporal aspects require quantification. 
Transfer of risk may occur within the SoS itself or risk may be transferred to an external 
entity. For example, when considering a disaster relief scenario, responsibility for a specific 
task may be re-allocated to a different agency (or component system) with greater capability 
in a specific area, such as thermal location of earthquake survivors. In this case, where the 
risk is transferred outside the SoI, then from the SoS perspective it is mitigated, in contrast 
to an internal transfer where the risk not mitigated. An advantage provided by a model 
based approach is the ability to compare potential risk transfer strategies, enabling the most 
suitable to be identified; this is explored further through the case studies in chapter 8. As 
discussed previously, the SoS classification determines the options available for risk transfer, 
which is itself dependent upon the ability to influence component systems or the level of 
cooperation between them. 
7.3.5 SoS Risk Monitoring 
As with traditional risk management, identified risks require monitoring, involving re-
assessment of likelihood and severity. Where a high level of control is available over the 
component system development, monitoring will be undertaken in the same way as 
traditional risk monitoring (section 3.4.3), however where a SoS is formed rapidly in a 
collaborative environment this approach does not provide the necessary agility. In this case 
a potential solution would be the provision of a decision support capability providing 
automated monitoring of risks; the proposed modelling approach could potentially provide 
the basis for this. Again, this is explored further through the case study applications 
described in chapter 8. 
7.4 Proposed Model Based Approach 
Several modeling approaches to SoS Risk Management were discussed under theme 3 of the 
literature review, in section 3.4.6, however these were found to be tightly coupled to their 
associated problem space, without scope for wider generalisation within the SoS domain. 
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Hence, the following model-based approach was developed, utilizing the model selection 
technique described in chapter 6 providing a generic approach which can be tailored for 
each problem space allowing the integration of appropriate models, rather than 
constraining the approach to a single or small set of techniques (a constraint encountered in 
hybrid modeling approaches, as discussed in section 3.3.5). However, BBNs and Monte Carlo 
Simulation were identified as an appropriate technique for modelling risk and therefore 
form a key element of the model-based approach. 
The approach comprises the following steps and is described further in the following 
subsections: 
• Create causal network incorporating all identified risks and the contributing factors 
• Create a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) for each risk, including all linked 
contributing factors 
• Create supporting models of contributing factors where required  
• Run supporting models in a Monte Carlo simulation, use model output to update 
BBN 
• Create Risk confidence model 
7.4.1 Causal Network 
The risk identification activity (section 7.3.2) by definition will determine risks applicable to 
the SoS, however it will also identify factors that impact the likelihood of a risk materialising. 
Within the model based approach, the risks and their relationship to the contributing factors 
are captured in a causal network, which are one aspect of BBNs and are described in section 
5.2. At this stage no probabilities are assigned, the model purely identifies causal effects, 
providing a qualitative perspective. A simplified generic example is provided in Figure 28, it 
should be noted that contributing factors may be layered and one factor may influence one 
or many other factors or risks. However, the number of contributing factors and risks will 
generally be higher, as demonstrated in the case studies described in chapter 8. 
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Figure 28 - SoS Risk Causal Network 
7.4.2 Central Bayesian Risk Model 
Having created the causal network capturing the complete risk picture, BBNs are 
constructed enabling risk to be quantified. However, creation of a single BBN derived 
directly from the causal network may be overly cumbersome, hence an alternative approach 
is the creation of a separate BBN for each individual risk. Focussing on single risks 
dramatically simplifies each BBN requiring only the relevant contributing factors to be 
included. Considering “Risk A” shown in Figure 28, the structure of the associated BBN now 
only includes connected contributing factors, as shown in Figure 29. It is emphasised that 
the effectiveness of the BBNs risk analysis capability is reliant on the identification of all 
relevant contributing factors, as described in section 7.3.2.  
 
Figure 29 - Single Risk BBN 
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However, before determining the final structure of the selected risk BBN each contributing 
factor, or groups of factors need to be assessed using the model technique selection criteria 
as described in section 6.2. This process may allow further simplification of the BBN whereby 
some contributing factors are combined into a single supporting model (described in section 
7.4.3), reducing the number of nodes in the BBN. However, all contributing factors, which 
are directly connected to the risk node, must also be represented with the BBN by an 
equivalent node, otherwise no mechanism will exist to influence the risk probability. Figure 
30 illustrates how contributing factors could be grouped and supporting models identified. 
In order to identify appropriate groupings the following procedure should be followed. 
1. Identify top level modelling requirements for contributing factor directly connected 
to risk. 
2. Insert model requirements into model selection matrix tool (section 6.3) and select 
relevant SoS SoI dimensions (section 6.1); the tool will identify appropriate 
modelling technique(s). 
3. For each parent contributing factor, assess if the factor could be represented as a 
model variable, if this is not the case then perform step 2. 
4. If the same modelling technique is identified for both parent and child then group as 
a single supporting model. 
 
Figure 30 – Model Architecture 
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Having determined the grouping of the contributing factors the model architecture can be 
defined, as shown in Figure 31. 
 
Figure 31 – Simplified BBN 
As illustrated in Figure 31, the model architecture is now simplified to a five variable BBN 
and three supporting models. The mediating variable is introduced, through the divorcing 
method (section 5.2.3), in order to reduce the size of the Risk A probability table. 
For each node in the BBN a set of appropriate values is determined. For the ‘Risk A’ node 
potential values could simply be Low, Medium and High. The values for the remaining nodes 
are dependent on the context, for example a binary true, false or a set of range values 
(actual examples are provided in the prototype models described in chapter 8). However, it 
is essential that clear definitions be provided for all state values otherwise the BBN cannot 
be meaningfully interpreted. 
Having established the values for each node, probabilities are assigned for each value. The 
nodes linked to supporting models will be updated by ‘learning’ from the model outputs, as 
described in section 7.4.3. For the remaining nodes, the probability tables (section 5.2) are 
manually populated requiring domain subject matter expertise input. 
7.4.3 Supporting Models 
The risk model architecture identifies the central BBN and a set of supporting models. The 
advantage of this approach lies in the ability to support a truly heterogeneous modelling 
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approach utilising combinations of techniques that are appropriate to specific “contributing 
factors”. The key is the integration of these techniques with the central BBN, which is 
achieved through the alignment of the model output with the BBN variable values and the 
execution of the models within a Monte Carlo simulation. 
The generic example shown in Figure 32 includes a BBN variable, which has three values: 
Low, Medium and High. However, in order to provide the required range of outputs, the 
supporting model must incorporate a stochastic element, for example this may be a 
Gaussian distribution reflecting the error bounds for a sensor. For each model an explicit 
definition of the variable and the associated variables should be provided, this ensures the 
risk model output is interpreted correctly and the supporting model output updates the BBN 
probabilities accurately. For example, the values may relate to a range where low is less 
then 10, medium is between 10 and 20 and high is greater than 20. In this case there are 
two possible approaches, the supporting model could output enumerate values of low, 
medium or high when executed or it could output a raw value. Where the tool13 used to 
generate the BBN supports both options, the input of the raw value is preferable, decoupling 
the model output from the BBN value definition to a greater extent. In this situation the BBN 
application will enable the input range for each value to be defined and when reading, or 
learning from, the supporting model output it will automatically determine which BBN value 
is applicable, as illustrated in Figure 33. 
 
Figure 32 - Supporting Model – Formatted Output 
 
                                                          
13 Netica® is the application used throughout this research project and supports both options. 
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Figure 33 - Supporting Model - Unformatted Output 
In order to learn from the supporting model output an adequately sized data sample is 
required. On each execution of the supporting model a single output value is generated, 
hence the model must be executed repeatedly which is achieved by running it as a Monte 
Carlo simulation (section 5.3). The Netica® application requires model output data to be 
stored in an external text file and enables learning for single or multiple BBN nodes. 
It should also be noted that this approach also allows the central BBN to learn from 
historical data, although the data requires appropriate formatting. 
7.4.4 Risk Confidence 
Probabilities associated with risk are generally “best estimates”, however stakeholders will 
not act upon these values unless there is an element of trust in them, which is best 
conveyed through an associated confidence value. For the proposed model based approach 
it is accuracy of the supporting models and the evidence, which determine the confidence of 
the risk estimates.  However, as stated in the literature review, the outcome of model V&V 
should not result in a model deemed as absolutely incorrect or correct, but rather as a 
degree of credibility (Balci, 1995). Although a 0 to 100 scale is suggested for the 
representation of model credibility (or confidence), this may present difficulties with 
consistent grading of different models. It is therefore proposed that a more pragmatic and 
simplistic approach is taken, whereby model confidence is graded as low, medium or high 
and is defined as follows:  
• Low confidence: the model is based upon unsubstantiated or undocumented 
assumptions; evidence of validation and verification is insufficient, lack of subject 
matter expert matter input. 
• Medium confidence: key assumptions are substantiated, although less critical 
assumptions are unsubstantiated but are documented; evidence of validation and 
verification is provided although coverage may not be complete, subject matter 
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expert input evident but may not be comprehensive or level of expertise not 
authoritative. 
• High confidence: all assumptions are substantiated; comprehensive evidence of 
validation and verification is provided with full coverage; authoritative subject 
matter expert input evident throughout model development. 
 
As stated above the risk confidence is also dependent on the confidence of the evidence 
entered into the BBN, for which the following levels are proposed: 
• Low confidence: the evidence is based upon unsubstantiated or undocumented 
assumptions and is purely subjective. 
• Medium confidence: evidence is derived from subject matter expert input evident 
or historical data but may not be comprehensive or level of expertise not 
authoritative. 
• High confidence: evidence is provided directly from current known information. 
 
With a model and evidence confidence classifications defined, a method is required to 
combine the classifications of each supporting model such that a confidence of the overall 
risk assessment is provided; a BBN approach is proposed to enable this. Taking the original 
risk BBN, a “mirror” BBN can be created, where each variable will now represent confidence, 
i.e. low, medium and high and is illustrated in Figure 34, which is derived from the risk BBN 
shown in Figure 31. 
 
Figure 34 - Risk Confidence BBN 
This approach should be undertaken for each risk BBN, thereby providing a confidence 
indicator for each assessed risk. 
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7.5 Summary and concluding remarks 
This chapter discussed the relationship of Risk Management to SoSE, concluding that it 
should be undertaken continuously within each lifecycle phase and that the DANSE lifecycle 
model (DANSE Consortium, 2015) provides the most suitable basis for this. The responsibility 
for SoS Risk Management was related to the overall SoS classification whereby directed and 
acknowledged SoS allow a single body to perform Risk Management but a collaborative SoS 
would require an advisory body or alternatively a bottom up cooperative approach. Of note, 
was the conclusion that in acknowledged and collaborative SoS Risk Management could be 
incorporated into planning activities, which is explored in the CAS case study described in 
chapter 8. It was also concluded that Risk Management could not be applied to virtual SoS 
due to the “lack a central management authority and a centrally agreed upon purpose for 
the system-of-systems” (Dahmann & Baldwin, 2008). A series of case studies, described in 
section 2.1, were analysed in the context of SoS Risk Management which illustrated the 
necessity for a specific approach rather than applying the traditional SE approach. 
The activities associated with Risk Management process were discussed, it was concluded 
that although the same process applied to SoSE Risk Management the approach to each 
activity differs from that traditionally undertaken, the key differences are summarised in 
Table 20, although it should be noted that Virtual SoS is not included as it was concluded 
that Risk Management is not applicable to this type of SoS. 
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Activity System Directed SoS Acknowledged SoS Collaborative SoS 
Planning 
 
Risk Management Plan 
and Strategy 
Risk Management Plan  Risk Management Plan or 
Operating Procedure 
Operating Procedure or ad-hoc 
organisation 
Program manager Centrally Managed Designated Manager Collective agreement 
Protracted timescales Protracted timescales Timescales are variable; 
protracted or short  
Timescales are variable; protracted 
or short 
Identification 
 
By all stakeholders SoS risk identified by Component 
System stakeholders and board 
SoS risk identified by 
Component System 
stakeholders and board 
SoS risk identified by Component 
System stakeholders 
Common framework 
required 
Common framework required 
SoS SoI framework proposed 
Common framework 
required 
SoS SoI framework proposed 
Common framework may not exist 
SoS SoI framework proposed 
Risk register Risk register Risk register or mission 
planning process 
Risks recorded by each component 
system 
Central co-ordination Central co-ordination  Central co-ordination but 
risks at component system 
level may take priority 
Co-ordination through collaboration, 
not central 
Analysis 
 
Common framework 
required 
Common framework required 
SoS SoI framework proposed 
Common framework 
required 
SoS SoI framework proposed 
Common framework may not exist 
SoS SoI framework proposed 
Output updates single 
risk register 
Output updates single risk 
register 
Output updates single risk 
register or used to inform 
mission planning 
Output held at Component System 
level and shared 
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Activity System Directed SoS Acknowledged SoS Collaborative SoS 
Probabilistic models may 
be used 
Probabilistic and supporting 
model approach proposed 
Probabilistic and supporting 
model approach proposed; a 
decision support capability 
may be required 
Probabilistic and supporting model 
approach proposed; a decision 
support capability may be required 
Handling - 
Acceptance 
Central authority to 
accept risk 
Central authority to accept risk 
with influence over component 
systems 
Central authority to asses 
risk but limited influence 
over component systems 
No central authority, risk acceptance 
though consensus 
Handling - 
Avoidance 
 
Project takes alternative 
path 
Project takes alternative path bit 
requires coordination of 
component systems 
Project takes alternative 
path but requires 
cooperation of component 
systems but individual 
objectives may override 
Component systems agree an 
alternative approach but individual 
objectives may override 
Cost of alternative path 
assessed 
Cost of alternative path assessed Cost of alternative path may 
be difficult to assess. Cost 
may be temporal rather than 
financial. 
Cost of alternative approach may be 
determined and agreed by 
component. Cost may be temporal 
rather than financial. 
Handling - 
Transfer 
 
Between programs Between SoS but influence to 
effect this may be limited 
Between SoS but influence 
to effect this may be limited 
Between SoS but influence to effect 
this would be undertaken by an 
external body 
Between customer and 
contractor 
Between customer and prime 
contractor 
Between customer and 
prime contractor, although 
this may be resisted due to 
lack of influence over 
component systems. 
Between missions. 
Customer and contractor 
relationship does not exist. 
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Activity System Directed SoS Acknowledged SoS Collaborative SoS 
Between subsystems Between component systems – 
managerial influence 
Between component 
systems – through 
cooperation, SoS manager 
has less influence 
Between component systems – 
through collaboration 
Handling - 
Mitigation 
 
Prototyping, modelling at 
system level 
Prototyping, modelling at SoS 
level. 
Model based approach required 
Prototyping, modelling at 
SoS level 
Model based approach 
required 
Decision support tool may be 
required 
Prototyping, modelling at SoS level, 
would need to be undertaken 
through collaboration 
Model based approach required 
Test and review Test and review at SoS level Test and review at SoS level Errors may emerge rather than be 
detected through formal testing 
Monitoring Regular meeting 
between program 
authority and 
contractors 
Regular meeting between SoS 
authority and component system 
contractors 
Regular meeting between 
SoS authority and 
component system 
authorities 
Regular meeting between 
component system stakeholders 
 
Table 20 - System and SoS Risk Management Comparison 
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Specific approaches to each SoS Risk Management activity were discussed and summarised 
as follows: 
• Planning: directed SoS may adopt traditional approach, acknowledged SoS may 
incorporate this activity within mission planning and collaborative SoS may utilise 
pre-defined procedures. 
• Identification: utilises a framework cross referencing SoS SoI dimension (Kinder et 
al., 2012) with hazard, control and opportunity risk categories (Hopkin, 2002). Both 
risks and contributing factors are identified and are captured in a causal network. 
• Analysis: it was argued that, due to the inherent complexity of a SoS, the use of 
modelling and simulation is necessary rather than subject matter expert mental 
models which may be influenced by perception and bias. The model-based approach 
allows a level of quantification and reduces the subjectivity of the risk analysis. 
• Handling: risks are accepted, avoided, transferred, or mitigated. Acceptance occurs 
if cost of mitigation outweighs the cost incurred if the risk materialises, the model-
based approach can be used to evaluate this impact and can also be used to 
determine the effect of risk transfer.  
• Monitoring: the model-based approach could enable the implementation of a 
automated risk monitoring capability where rapid decision making is required, 
where a SoS is centrally controlled a more traditional approach may be taken. 
 
A model-based approach was described which captures all risks and contributing factors 
within a causal network. BBNs are defined for each risk, derived from the initial causal 
network. Contributing factors are identified which can be modelled using appropriate 
techniques using the model selection matrix tool (section 6.3). The supporting models are 
run iteratively in Monte Carlo simulations generating output data from which the associated 
BBN may learn. An associated risk confidence model provides a confidence level for each 
estimated risk. 
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8 Chapter 8: Application 1: Close Air Support Mission Planning Risk 
Management 
Having described the proposed model based approach to SoS Risk Management in chapter 
7, two very different case study applications were identified; Close Air Support and UK Food 
Security – Wheat Supply Chain, through which the process was exercised, thereby assessing 
its efficacy and adaptability. The Close Air Support application case study is described in this 
chapter and the UK Food Security – Wheat Supply Chain case study in chapter 9. 
Close Air Support was selected as an appropriate example of a SoS requiring Risk 
Management to be undertaken within a short planning cycle where component systems 
could not be influenced, hence the traditional approaches were not suitable. It was also a 
subject area where the author has technical knowledge and access to operational subject 
matter expertise.  
Figure 35 provides the context for these application case studies within this research, which 
in addition to exercising the proposed process, also provide further validation of the SoS SoI 
model (described in section 6.1) through its use in determining the SoI for further examples 
of SoS. 
 
Figure 35 - Case Study Application Context 
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8.1 Close Air Support  
The NATO publication; Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Close Air Support Operations 
(NATO, 2005) defines Close Air Support as; 
“..air action against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and 
requires detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces.”  
CAS missions are differentiated between ‘immediate’ and ‘pre-planned’. An immediate CAS 
mission will require an urgent response in a situation where it is probable troops are under 
fire. In this situation the planning phase will typically involve assigning the closest available 
assets with less constraints placed on their mission suitability, e.g. accuracy of munitions. 
With minimal planning time available, the mission risk increases. Pre-planned missions fit 
into the typical planning cycle, usually in the order of 24-72 hours, where the suitability of 
platforms and munitions may be tailored to match the mission requirements. However the 
planning time is still limited and it not always possible to reduce risk to optimal levels. 
It was therefore proposed that application of the model based Risk Management process 
would provide a set of models which could provide a capability, potentially integrated into a 
single tool, that mission planners could utilise in order to undertake rapid risk assessment 
and analysis, indeed the following quote emphasises the need for rapid decision making in 
these circumstances; 
 “Four minutes can seem like an eternity to a soldier in the middle of a complex ambush. 
Aircraft arriving even a few seconds earlier can make the difference between life and death” 
(Schaefer III, 2012). 
Several subject matter experts with current or previous CAS planning experience were 
informally interviewed at the case study initiation. Those with planning experience felt the 
proposed tool would be beneficial, stating that current planning is typically “based on 
judgement calls but has to account for many variables.” In addition, it was also pointed out 
“personnel burn out when on station for long periods hence the ability to exercise clear 
judgement in high pressure situations can be compromised.” 
Figure 36 illustrates a typical CAS scenario, where blue (friendly) land forces require air 
support, provided by Tornado GR4 aircraft. The Forward Air Controller (FAC),  also referred 
to as Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC), guides the fighter into the target with 
coordinates provided from a sensor, such as a laser rangefinder. Planning and control of the 
mission is undertaken at the brigade HQ Tactical Air Control Centre (TACC), receiving higher 
level orders from the battalion HQ. Intelligence, Surveillance and Intelligence (ISR) 
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information is provided by assets such as the E3-D surveillance aircraft and unmanned air 
vehicles (UAV). Tactical information, which includes blue (friendly) force and target position 
is exchanged using digital communication systems, in this case Link 16, Variable Message 
Format (VMF) and Bowman, where data is exchanged in fixed format messages using radio 
frequency transmissions. Communication between HQs utilises Falcon, an IP based system 
providing secure voice, instant messaging and email capability. Additionally, traditional radio 
based voice communications are utilised throughout. It should also be noted that the UAV 
provides a “forwarding” capability, which allows data flow between heterogeneous 
networks through the translation of data formats. 
 
Figure 36 – Typical Close Air Support Scenario 
Initial discussions regarding the CAS process were undertaken on an informal basis with a 
subject matter expert (SME) with current knowledge as well as experience of CAS planning. 
The SME confirmed that CAS planning and the subsequent compilation of the Air Tasking 
Order (ATO) is a complex task, and which requires a support system, providing the following 
overview: 
• Pre-planned CAS, ATO process is on a 24-72 hours cycle. 
• Local commanders submit requests, e.g.; 
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o “Destroy bridge” 
o “Take snipers out” 
• Requests are Joint Force Air Component (JFAC) approved  
• High priority requests go into ATO 
• For immediate or responsive CAS;  
o Tasking is communicated by 9 line brief or radio 
o Aircraft on holding patterns or high alert 
• Video is used for visual confirmation of target 
• Fratricide risk is reduced by forwarding of blue force information on Link 16 
• Misses tend to be short or long, rather than to the side 
• Pre-planned CAS uses Intelligence data. 
 
A more specific hypothetical scenario was defined as a basis for the risk management 
activities, a description is provided in Appendix D. 
8.2 Application of SoS Risk Management Process 
The process described in section 7.3 was applied in the context of this case study. Although 
this research is principally focussed upon risk identification and analysis, all risk 
management activities were considered in order to determine applicability of the model-
based approach throughout.  
8.3 SoS Risk Planning 
A CAS mission is fulfilled by a SoS, which may be primarily classified as acknowledged 
(discussed in section 8.4). Centralised control of the SoS is provided by the CAS mission 
planning role, which utilises standard operating procedures, for example the NATO Tactics, 
Techniques and Procedures for Close Air Support Operations (NATO, 2005), although 
typically national procedures take precedence which identify risks and mitigation strategies. 
As stated previously, CAS planning is undertaken within relatively short timescales and, in 
some circumstances requires an almost immediate response, it is therefore unrealistic to 
expect a full model based risk analysis to be undertaken requiring the associated models to 
be specified, implemented and validated. Hence, in this case, the model-based approach 
should be used to undertake analysis in “slow time” outside the operational environment, 
thereby allowing models to be implemented within appropriate timescales and which may 
be subsequently integrated into a decision support tool, supporting rapid risk assessment. 
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8.4 SoS Risk Identification 
The risk identification matrix, as shown in Table 19, provides a framework for the 
identification activity enabling risk to be considered from a SoS perspective. However, as a 
precursor it was found that population of the SoI SoS dimension table provided valuable 
context, where the dimensions could be instantiated either generically or specifically. 
8.4.1 SoS SoI dimensions 
For the purposes of this case study the SoS SoI dimensions are populated in accordance with 
the scenario illustrated in Figure 36 and described in Appendix D, where generic assets and 
systems are identified with examples of specific instances. 
Dimensions Instantiation 
Component 
Systems 
Fighter Aircraft (e.g. Tornado GR4) 
Command and Control Unit (e.g. E3-D, TACC) 
Tactical Data Link (TDL) gateway (e.g. UAV) 
ISR (e.g. E3-D)  
Forward Air Controller (FAC) using sensor to track target, e.g. Laser Range 
Finder 
Brigade HQ (TACC) 
Battalion HQ 
Satellite 
Weapon (may be regarded as a component system if a “smart” missile as 
opposed to a “dumb” ballistic bomb) 
Interactions TDLs (e.g. Link 16, VMF, Bowman) 
Voice Communications 
Track Data 
Command and Control  
Imagery 
Lifecycle Initiation (planning), Creation, Operations (mission execution) 
Variability Assets may change during mission. 
The purpose may evolve as the mission progresses. This SoS may exhibit a 
high level of variability. 
Classification Collaborative/Acknowledged. 
Directed elements, e.g. Link 11/16 networks 
Functions Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Targeting, Detect, Identify, Intercept, 
Destroy, Aircraft Control, Battle Management. 
Systems 
Owners and 
Nations (Governments), Services (Air force, Navy, Army), Overarching 
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Dimensions Instantiation 
Operations control, e.g. NATO. 
Concept of 
Operation  
The SoS provides protection of blue forces through elimination of hostile 
threat whilst avoiding collateral damage.  
Nature of 
Relationships 
Hierarchical  (military C2) 
Table 21 – SoS SoI Dimensions CAS 
8.4.2 Identification of Key Risks 
Having established the SoS SoI, the SoS risk matrix was populated using SME knowledge, 
elicited through informal interview. The identified risks can be classified in two categories; 
key risks (coloured red) and contributing factors. A key risk is a potential outcome that 
directly affects the SoS purpose, either negatively or positively. A contributing factor is an 
event or condition that influences the likelihood of a key risk occurring. The outcome of the 
risk identification exercise is documented below in Table 22. 
 
 
Hazard Risks (Threat 
and perils) 
Control Risks (Doubt 
about mission 
achievement, project 
management control) 
Opportunity Risks 
(Opportunity to 
enhance or inhibit 
mission 
achievement) 
Component 
Systems  
Loss of CAS Fighter 
Aircraft 
Loss of FAC or Blue 
Forces (Fratricide) 
Blue forces in close 
proximity to the 
weapon blast 
zone/target. 
Fighter aircraft on low 
altitude flight path. 
Required component 
systems are not 
available. 
 
Classification  SoS incorrectly classified 
resulting in 
inappropriate control 
approach. 
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Hazard Risks (Threat 
and perils) 
Control Risks (Doubt 
about mission 
achievement, project 
management control) 
Opportunity Risks 
(Opportunity to 
enhance or inhibit 
mission 
achievement) 
Interactions  Poor interoperability 
due to; lack or 
incompatibility of 
digital data links, 
spoken language 
barrier or degraded 
voice 
communications.  
Poor visibility due to 
weather and light 
conditions. 
Kill chain error 
accumulation caused 
by inherent system 
inaccuracies and 
latency. 
Loss of 
communications 
through jamming. 
Loss of GPS through 
jamming. 
Different geodetic co-
ordinate systems 
resulting in positional 
translation errors. 
Poor interoperability 
interrupts command and 
control. 
Terrain has a 
detrimental on 
communications, where 
line of sight required. 
Coalitions of different 
nations may result in 
interoperability issues 
due to system and 
operating procedure 
incompatibility. 
Bandwidth can 
support additional 
interaction medium. 
Disruption of hostile 
system 
communications 
providing tactical 
advantage. 
Common digital 
communication 
system enhance SA 
picture. 
Nature of 
Relationships 
Breakdown of 
command, possibly 
through national or 
political tension. 
  
Lifecycle  Component systems 
unavailable when 
required. 
 
Variability  SoS cannot adapt to 
respond to an 
unexpected threat. 
Availability for quick 
response to urgent 
arising need. 
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Hazard Risks (Threat 
and perils) 
Control Risks (Doubt 
about mission 
achievement, project 
management control) 
Opportunity Risks 
(Opportunity to 
enhance or inhibit 
mission 
achievement) 
Functions Inaccurate targeting 
(Misses tend to be 
short or long, rather 
than to the side) 
Incorrect target 
identification, e.g. 
identifying friendly 
asset as hostile. 
Target marking, 
provided by smoke, 
phosphorous or laser, 
is ineffective due to 
environmental 
conditions, e.g. light 
level, dust or 
cloud/fog. 
Hostile defensive 
capability endangers 
CAS aircraft 
Degraded surveillance 
capability resulting in 
poor Situational 
Awareness 
Inaccurate intelligence 
regarding hostile force 
capabilities. 
Poor intelligence 
providing incorrect or 
incomplete information. 
 
Advanced sensor 
capability enabling 
attack in poor 
visibility conditions. 
Defensive capability 
enabling attack 
through hostile fire 
Data fusion 
capability provides 
clear SA picture 
Systems 
Owners and 
Operations 
Excessive operator 
workload may occur in 
very active 
environments. 
Conflict between 
national tactics and 
procedures. 
Where different nations 
are involved the 
language barrier may 
cause communication 
problems. 
 
Concept of 
Operation / 
Use / 
Employment 
Collateral Damage 
Target Destruction 
Failure 
Civilians in close 
proximity to target. 
 Additional target 
opportunity 
 
Table 22 - SoS Risk matrix: CAS 
In Table 22 the key (hazard and opportunity) risks were identified (highlighted in red), these 
are summarised below and the risk owner and criticality are also indicated: 
• Loss of CAS Fighter Aircraft where the impact is catastrophic and the owner is the 
aircraft itself 
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• Loss Blue Forces (Fratricide) from friendly fire, the impact is catastrophic with the 
blue land forces the risk owner 
• Collateral Damage, i.e. civilian casualties, the impact is also catastrophic in this case. 
Although civilians are directly impacted by this risk they do not own it because they 
have no influence over it, the risk ownership may in fact move as the mission 
progresses, for example in the planning stage the mission planner will influence the 
risk but at the point of weapons release the aircraft pilot may abort the attack if 
civilians are sighted with the blast range. From a SoS perspective the risk ownership 
could be regarded as relating to the SoS lifecycle 
• Target Destruction Failure; the primary target was not destroyed; the impact is 
dependent on the blue force situation therefore range from mission critical to 
catastrophic. Again, the ownership of this risk will be related to the point in the 
mission (or SoS lifecycle) 
• Additional target opportunity; the CAS Fighter aircraft is able to respond rapidly to 
identification of a further target in close vicinity, to the primary target. The risk 
impact could be regarded as “beneficial”. The mission commander, responsible for 
retargeting aircraft, would own the risk. 
8.4.3 Identification of contributing factors  
Each of these risks were analysed in the context of the contributing factors that directly 
influence them, which was the first step in defining the causal network (section 7.3.2) 
representing the relationships between risks and contributing factors and is described 
below. 
The loss of the CAS aircraft is directly influenced by the following contributing factors: 
• Situational Awareness (SA) Picture Quality: if SA is poor then location of hostile 
forces may be inaccurate or unknown thereby exposing the aircraft to unexpected 
attack. 
• Enemy Capability: if the hostile weapon and defensive systems are highly capable 
this may increase the risk of loss of the CAS aircraft. 
• Flight Path Altitude: the mission may require a low altitude flight path, potentially 
through mountainous terrain; this increases the risk of anti-aircraft weapon or 
ground impact. 
• Defensive Capability: defensive aids, such as chaff and flare, and a jamming 
capability may reduce the risk of hostile detection and interception. 
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The loss of FAC or Blue Forces (Fratricide) is directly influenced by the following contributing 
factors: 
• Blue Force Proximity to blast zone: the distance of the blue forces from the target, 
and hence blast zone, directly relates to the risk of fratricide. 
• Kill Chain Accuracy: target co-ordinates may be passed from the FAC, over TDLs, via 
forwarding systems to the CAS aircraft. Errors and latency (particularly if the target 
is moving) will introduce errors into the target position, potential increasing the risk 
of fratricide due to the weapon impact being closer to the blue force position than 
expected. 
• SA Picture Quality: if SA is poor then location of blue and red forces may be 
inaccurate or unknown thereby exposing blue force to increased risk of friendly fire. 
• Blue Force Visibility: visual observation of blue forces may be required, if this is 
impaired due to weather or environmental conditions, or lack of capability to 
indicate position then risk of fratricide will increase. 
 
The risk of collateral damage is influenced by the following contributing factors: 
• Kill Chain Accuracy: as stated above, target co-ordinates may be passed through a 
series of systems which each introduce errors, thereby increasing the risk of 
collateral damage due to the weapon impact being closer to civilian locations than 
expected. 
• SA Picture Quality: if SA is poor then the location of civilians may be inaccurate or 
unknown thereby increasing the risk of friendly fire. 
• Civilian Proximity to blast zone: the distance of civilians from the target, and hence 
blast zone, directly relates to the risk of collateral damage. 
• Civilian Visibility: visual observation of blue forces may be required, if this is 
impaired due to weather or environmental conditions, or lack of capability to 
indicate position then risk of fratricide will increase. 
 
The risk of failure to destroy the primary target is influenced by the following contributing 
factors: 
• Kill Chain Accuracy: as stated above, if errors are introduced into the target co-
ordinates used at the point of weapon launch, the likelihood of successful 
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destruction of the risk will be diminished, the extent of which relates to the 
magnitude of these errors. 
• SA Picture Quality: if SA is poor then the target location may be inaccurate thereby 
reducing the likelihood of destruction. 
• Target Visibility: if visual identification of the target is required by the fighter 
aircraft to ensure accurate weapon aiming then the visibility of the target will 
influence the likelihood of a successful outcome.  
 
The (opportunity) risk of successfully prosecuting an additional target is influenced by the 
following contributing factors: 
• Kill Chain Accuracy: if the kill chain allows propagation of accurate and timely target 
information then the likelihood of rapidly prosecuting a secondary target will be 
enhanced. 
• SA Picture Quality: with a high quality picture the position of secondary targets will 
be known throughout the SoS. 
• Target Visibility: the likelihood of prosecuting a secondary target will be increased 
where it is highly visible.  
 
8.4.4 Definition of causal network 
The analysis above enabled an initial causal network to be defined, illustrating the 
relationships between the risks (highlighted in yellow) and the primary contributing factors 
(which are indicated by clear boxes), as shown in Figure 37. 
Having established the initial causal relationships, analysis was undertaken to determine the 
relationships between the primary contributing factors and the remaining influencing 
factors, and is described below. This is further elaborated in the detailed causal network 
described in Section 8.4.5 below. 
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Figure 37 - Initial Causal Network - CAS 
 
8.4.4.1 SA quality 
SA picture quality is influenced by a variety of factors; interoperability is key in distributing 
the SA picture, enabling information to be exchanged between component systems. The 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capability is the source of the SA 
information, therefore to maintain a high quality picture, trusted and accurate information 
is required. The scenario density, i.e. the number of objects comprising the SA picture, may 
also impact the quality; where the density is high, component systems ability to fuse and 
filter large quantities of data will affect the clarity of the picture, this situation may also 
impose a high operator workload where manual maintenance of the picture is required, 
leading to potential errors in the identification and classification of information. 
Interoperability includes the dissemination of information through voice communications, 
over digital TDL communications systems and using IP based networks, in some cases line of 
sight may be required. The compatibility of different TDL systems throughout the SoS is 
required to ensure effective interoperability in addition to the data capacity of each TDL, 
which should support the scenario density. Voice communications not only require 
technical connectivity, e.g. transmission frequencies are agreed within the SoS, but also will 
be affected by any natural language barriers where coalition operations are undertaken. 
Compatibility of geodetic reference systems is also necessary, with appropriate translations 
performed, to ensure positional information can be exchanged between component 
systems. 
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8.4.4.2 Kill chain accuracy 
Where a ground target is moving, latency has a major impact upon kill chain accuracy, for 
example a delay of 5 seconds could result in an error of approximately 65 metres, potentially 
placing the blue force on the edge of the weapon blast radius. Kill chain accuracy is also 
affected by the granularity of the position information represented in the TDL fixed format 
messages and is dependent on the TDL type. The capability of the sensor used to detect the 
target is fundamental to kill chain accuracy, it is clear that errors introduced at the start of 
the chain will be propagated, and potentially exacerbated throughout it. 
8.4.4.3 Target visibility 
Where a target is not camouflaged, situated in open terrain with clear atmospheric 
conditions and of reasonable size it will be highly visible. However, this is not a typical 
situation, generally a target will require “marking” as an aid to the incoming CAS aircraft. 
Target marking may be achieved through a number a methods including; smoke, laser or 
phosphorous. Laser marking requires compatible technology on the CAS aircraft and/or the 
weapon; smoke and phosphorous provide an entirely visual guide. Environmental conditions 
such as cloud, dust and light level will constrain visual marking effectiveness. Civilian 
visibility and blue force visibility is also dependent upon these environmental factors. 
8.4.4.4 Enemy capability 
Enemy capability is provided by weapon sophistication, e.g. guided ground to air missile and 
the effectiveness of targeting and tracking capability which may range from basic visual 
targeting to complex sensor, e.g. Radar systems.  
8.4.5 Detailed causal network 
Having established the causal relationships between the risks and all contributing factors, a 
more detailed causal network was produced which reflected this analysis and is shown 
below in Figure 38. 
A Model Based Approach to System of Systems Risk Management 
164 
 
 
Figure 38 - Causal Network: CAS
A Model Based Approach to System of Systems Risk Management 
165 
8.5 SoS Risk Analysis and Handling 
Having established the causal risk network (Figure 38), each risk and the associated 
contributing factors were considered in accordance with the process defined in section 7.4. 
It should be noted that a comprehensive description of the Fratricide Risk analysis and 
handling is included within the main body of this document, however the remaining risk 
analysis is summarised with further detail appended within Appendix E. This approach was 
taken to avoid unnecessary repetition and duplication of information, which would 
otherwise arise though the application of the same process for each risk and does not 
provide further understanding of the process, although it would be of benefit in a future 
study requiring these research outputs as starting point.  
8.6 SoS Risk Analysis and Handling - Fratricide Risk 
The causal network relating to fratricide risk was extracted from the complete network 
(Figure 38) and is shown below in Figure 39, where Blue Force Proximity, Kill Chain Accuracy, 
SA Quality and Blue Force Visibility are the primary contributing factors. 
 
Figure 39 - Fratricide Risk Causal Network 
Blue Force Proximity 
Blue force proximity was influenced by three contributing factors; blue force movement, red 
force movement and target movement. The model selection matrix tool (section 6.3) was 
populated accordingly; with a screen shot provided in Appendix B. The tool indicated that, in 
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this case, the most suitable M&S technique would be DES/DEVS, ABMS or System Dynamics. 
ABMS allows individual agents to be encoded with a simple set of rules, which can relate to 
movement, therefore it was decided to utilise this technique in this instance as it appeared 
to enable relatively straightforward implementation of the desired functionality, with the 
additional benefit of providing visualisation of the agent movements. As all contributing 
factors could be represented using ABMS, it was possible to combine them into a single 
“Blue force Proximity” model (in accordance with the rules defined in section 7.4.2). 
Kill Chain Accuracy 
Kill chain accuracy was influenced by the following contributing factors; latency, TDL 
characteristics, sensors, target speed, target position and ISR capability. However, ISR 
capability was interpreted as sensor accuracy and was therefore combined with the 
“Sensor” contributing factor for the purposes of model selection matrix tool population; the 
output of which is provided in Appendix B, and which indicated DES/DEVS as the most 
appropriate technique. A kill chain is effectively a sequence of transmissions, 
transformations and translations hence it was appropriate to produce a single model 
incorporating all contributing factors, thereby modelling the entire chain. 
SA Quality 
SA Quality was influenced by three factors, Interoperability, Workload and ISR Capability. 
Initial population of the M&S technique selection tool produced an output, which identified 
an overly broad range of potential techniques to be of use and is included in Appendix B. 
Examining this output revealed that removing Interoperability, to be analysed separately, 
would narrow the number of suitable techniques, and was confirmed by application of the 
selection tool, the output of which is located in Appendix B, identifying BBN, Markov Chain 
or Game Theory as appropriate techniques. Hence, as a BBN was used to represent the 
central risk model it was decided to incorporate workload and ISR capability into this, 
eliminating the necessity for an additional model. 
Interoperability 
Interoperability was influenced by the following contributing factors, Geodetic Datum, 
Nationalities, Common Language, Common Digital Communications and Common Voice 
Communications. The M&S selection tool was populated and indicated that System 
Dynamics was a suitable approach for modelling Interoperability and all contributing factors; 
the tool output is included in Appendix B. In the context of this case study the 
Interoperability model was intended to represent overall capability and concept of 
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operation, requiring the use of aggregated information rather than detailed representation 
of individual component systems, which resulted in the identification of System Dynamics 
rather than a technique such as DES or ABMS. Of note, was the selection of the ‘Stochastic’ 
requirement rather than ‘Uncertainty’ for the contributing factors, the rationale being that 
knowledge relating to these factors would be available but potentially with a margin of 
error, for example the digital communications capability within the SoS may have been 
known but the estimated data capacity would have an associated error.  
Blue Force Visibility 
The final contributing factor under consideration, relating to Fratricide, was Blue Force 
Visibility. In this case the contributing factors were environmental; although they could not 
be considered to be inside the SoI SoS boundary they were key factors determining the 
visibility. It was expected that cloud and dust predictions would be obtained from 
meteorological forecast information, with light levels directly determined from the expected 
mission time in conjunction with meteorological conditions. The populated selection tool 
spreadsheet, included in Appendix B, indicated that a BBN approach was suitable, hence it 
was decided to incorporate Blue Force Visibility and the associated contributing factors 
directly into the central BBN. 
8.6.1 Fratricide Risk Model Architecture 
Having established the appropriate modelling approach for each contributing factor, the 
overall fratricide risk model architecture was defined and is shown below in Figure 40. The 
red containers indicate the boundary of the supporting models with the blue container 
indicating the BBN boundary, although it should be noted that any factor directly connected 
to the BBN were also be replicated within the BBN itself, e.g. Interoperability. 
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Figure 40 - Fratricide Risk - Model Architecture 
Of note, is the inclusion of ISR capability in both the central BBN and the Kill Chain Accuracy 
supporting model. This demonstrates the ability of the proposed approach to consider 
contributing factors in different contexts; in this case ISR capability related to the sensor 
capability and also has a more general impact on SA quality. 
The analysis above enabled the causal network to be simplified, as shown below in Figure 
41, in accordance with the process defined in section 7.4.2, where a red box indicates a 
node is informed by the following associated supporting models: 
• Blue Force Proximity – ABMS 
• Kill Chain Accuracy – DES 
• Interoperability – System Dynamics 
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Figure 41 - Fratricide Risk - Simplified Causal Network 
8.6.2 Fratricide Risk BBN 
Having established the model architecture, the Fratricide Risk BBN was implemented in 
accordance with the Causal Network and is shown below in Figure 42. The BBN variables and 
their associated states are described in Table 23; definition of the nodes and their states is 
an essential part of the analysis process; without supporting descriptions the variables 
within the BBN may not be interpreted correctly, generic states, e.g. low, medium and high, 
are meaningless without specific definitions. 
It should be noted that Table 23 describes the variables derived directly from the causal 
network shown in Figure 41, however additional mediating variables are also included, as 
discussed in section 5.2.3, reducing the size and complexity of the variable probability tables 
and are listed below: 
• Surveillance Capability 
• Intelligence Capability 
• ISR Capability 
• SoS Capability 
• Information Quality 
• Atmospheric Visibility 
• Blue Force Risk 
 
The probability tables associated with parent variables are contained in Appendix C and 
were populated using SME input where it was found that the addition of the mediating 
variables, listed above, greatly reduced the complexity of estimating these values, thereby 
providing the necessary requisite parsimony (described in section 3.2.1). 
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Figure 42 - Fratricide Risk BBN 
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Variable Description States 
ScenarioDensity An assessment of the 
number of tracks likely to 
be present within a 
mission 
Low: Less than 20 tracks  
Medium: Less than 50 tracks    
High: 50 or more tracks 
C2SystemCapability An assessment of the 
Command and Control 
system capability, 
specifically the level of 
automation 
Low: manual track picture 
management required 
Medium: basic level of 
automation and track filtering 
High: high level of automation 
WorkLoad Overall workload derived 
from scenario density and 
C2 system capability 
Low: overall workload has no 
detrimental impact upon 
system performance 
Medium: workload impacts 
system performance to a 
limited extent 
High: workload has a 
detrimental affect upon 
system performance 
UAVCapability Unmanned Air Vehicle 
capability 
Low: no UAV capability 
Medium: basic video feed 
from UAV 
High: video and sensor 
information sourced from UAV 
ASTORCapability Airborne Stand-off Radar 
capability 
Low: no ASTOR capability 
Medium: basic short range 
Radar capability 
High: medium/long range, 
high definition Radar 
capability 
SIGINTCapability Signal Intelligence; 
intelligence gather 
through the interception 
of signals capability 
Low: no SIGINT capability 
Medium: basic signal 
interception 
High: all signals monitored and 
associated intelligence 
gathered 
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Variable Description States 
VisualCapability Intelligence provided from 
direct sightings 
Low: no visual reports 
Medium: Non-current visual 
information 
High: Real time visual 
information 
ISRCapability Overall combined 
Intelligence, Surveillance, 
Reconnaissance capability  
Low: Minimal ISR information 
provided  
Medium: Basic ISR information 
provided  
High: Comprehensive ISR 
information provided 
CloudLevel Cloud cover Less than 2 Oktas 
Between 2 and 6 Oktas 
Greater than 6 Oktas 
DustLevel Atmospheric dust level Low: No dust 
Medium: Dust present with 
impact on visibility 
High: Dust present having a 
major detrimental effect on 
visibility 
Light Light level related to the 
time of day 
Daytime 
Night 
Twilight 
BlueForceVisibility Overall blue (friendly) 
force visibility 
Low: Blue Force heavily 
visually obscured 
Medium: Blue Force visible 
with some obscuration 
High: Clear view of Blue Forces 
BlueForceProximity Distance of Blue Force 
from target 
Less than 500m 
Between 500m and 1 Km 
Greater than 1 Km 
KillChainAccuracy Total positional error 
introduced by the kill 
chain 
Less than 100m 
Between 100 and 200m 
Greater than 200m 
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Variable Description States 
Interoperability Overall level of 
interoperability 
Low: poor interoperability 
throughout SoS 
Medium: limited 
interoperability between SoS 
components 
High: unhindered exchange of 
information possible 
throughout SoS 
SAQuality Overall measure of the SA 
quality, reflecting the 
accuracy, completeness 
and timeliness of the 
tactical information 
Low: information not 
complete, accurate or current 
Medium: information mostly 
complete, accuracy and 
latency is reflected in “honest” 
confidence indications 
High: information is complete 
with high associated 
confidence  
Fratricide The risk of Fratricide as a 
result of the CAS mission 
Low: Fratricide is extremely 
unlikely to occur, no further 
risk mitigation is required 
Medium: There is a potential 
for Fratricide, approaches for 
risk mitigation should be sort 
and applied if possible or risk 
should be accepted prior to 
mission execution 
High: There is a significant 
potential for Fratricide, risk 
mitigation is necessary before 
mission commencement 
Table 23 - Fratricide Risk BBN Variables 
8.6.3 Interpretation of Results 
 The BBN was next updated with evidence derived from a hypothetical scenario and the 
outputs from the supporting models, which are described in section 8.13. The hypothetical 
scenario description and assumptions are provided in Appendix D. 
The updated BBN is shown below in Figure 43, indicating High Risk probability of 12.1%, 
Medium Risk of 43.7% and Low Risk of 44.3%. However, the question arose, “what does this 
mean?” 
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Figure 43 - Fratricide Risk BBN - Post Learning and Evidence Entry 
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Figure 44 - Fratricide Risk BBN Worst Case
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Figure 45 - Fratricide Risk BBN Best Case 
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In order to meaningfully interpret this output an approach was taken which enabled a 
relative comparison of the results with best and worst-case scenarios, hence two further 
sets of evidence were entered as shown in Figure 44 and Figure 45.  
The worst-case scenario evidence indicated low system capability, poor visibility or close 
vicinity to the target.  Conversely, the best-case scenario evidence indicated high system 
capability, high visibility and large distance from the target.  
The process of entering worst and best case evidence also proved to be valuable verification 
activity, with several errors in the probability tables discovered as a result and subsequently 
corrected, as well as providing scenarios that were easily validated by SMEs. 
Figure 46 provides a side-by-side comparison of the results and enabling an assessment of 
the risk profile, used to describe the low, medium and high risk probability levels, where the 
question is posed, “is the profile closer to best or worst case?” 
In this case it was observed that the risk profile was a closer match to the best-case profile, 
with the overall conclusion that the likelihood of high risk was small, however the increased 
potential of medium risk did suggest some further risk mitigation would be beneficial but 
should not prohibit mission execution. The interpretation of these results was judgement 
based, requiring further SME input and would be dependent on the risk appetite, which in a 
CAS mission, could be influenced by operational or political needs. 
 
Figure 46 - Fratricide Risk Comparison 
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Examining the updated BBN (Figure 43) it was observed that the likelihood of blue force 
proximity to the target being less than 500m was relatively high whereas the kill chain 
accuracy was more likely to be poor (>200m). An advantage of a BBN representation is the 
ability to test “what if” scenarios, in this case the KillChainAccuracy variable state of “Less 
Than 100m” was set to 100%, indicating a low error level throughout the kill chain and 
resulted in the desired increase in the likelihood of low risk of fratricide, as shown below in 
Figure 47.  
 
Figure 47 - Fratricide BBN with High Accuracy Kill Chain 
Although this was a crude check, it did indicate that an increase in accuracy throughout the 
kill chain would reduce the risk of fratricide in this case14 but would require more detailed 
analysis within the kill chain model to identify specific elements that could be influenced. 
8.6.4 Establishing confidence estimates 
Having determined the Fratricide risk level, the final stage in the analysis process was the 
derivation of the associated confidence, requiring the construction of an equivalent 
confidence BBN as shown in Figure 48, with the rationale for the BBN variable confidence 
estimates provided in Table 24. 
  
                                                          
14 This was validated by the SME who stated kill chain accuracy was deliberately reduced during a CAS 
exercise in order to reduce risk 
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Variable Input Type Confidence Estimate 
ScenarioDensity Estimate Medium: input based on current scenario 
density levels, with the assumption that this 
will not significantly change 
C2SystemCapability Evidence High: Available C2 system capability is known 
UAVCapability Evidence High: Available UAV system capability is known 
ASTORCapability Evidence High: Available ASTOR system capability is 
known 
SIGINTCapability Evidence High: Current SIGINT capability is known 
VisualCapability Estimate Low: estimate of visual report availability is 
uncertain 
CloudLevel Meteorological 
forecast 
High: forecast has a high confidence level 
DustLevel Meteorological 
forecast 
High: forecast, which directly impacts dust 
levels, has a high confidence level 
Light Evidence (derived 
from planned 
mission time) 
High: light level is derived from the planned 
mission execution time of day 
BlueForceProximity Supporting Model Low: model is simplistic 
KillChainAccuracy Supporting Model Low: model is simplistic 
Interoperability Supporting Model Low: model is simplistic 
Table 24 - Fratricide Risk Confidence 
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Figure 48 - Fratricide Risk Confidence BBN
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8.7 Analysis and Handling - Target Destruction Risk 
Having determined the BBN and supporting models relating to Fratricide, target destruction 
risk was considered, the detailed analysis can be found in Appendix E. The results of the 
analysis are shown below in Figure 49, indicating that although the risk profile was more 
aligned to the best-case results the probability of a low chance of target destruction failure 
was 30% lower than the optimum value. It was therefore concluded that the level of risk was 
acceptable but any potential mitigation should be explored. The associated risk analysis 
confidence was determined as “medium”. 
 
Figure 49 - Target Destruction Risk Comparison 
Examining the Target Destruction Risk BBN (Appendix E) it was noted that the inaccuracy 
associated with the kill chain was contributing to the reduced probability of low risk of 
target destruction failure, as it also similarly had for fratricide risk. Using the same approach 
as taken previously, the BBN was updated by setting the probability for minimum kill chain 
error to 100%, improving the overall risk level, which was now closely comparable with the 
best case values, as shown in Figure 50, implying that further analysis of the kill chain 
component systems with an aim to reducing error growth would be beneficial.  
 
Figure 50 - Target Destruction BBN with High Accuracy Kill Chain 
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8.8 Analysis and Handling - Collateral Damage Risk 
Detailed Collateral Damage Risk analysis is provided in Appendix E. 
The resultant side-by-side comparison of the actual, best-case and worst-case results are 
shown below in Figure 51, revealing that although the actual results were more closely 
aligned to the best-case values, the probability of low risk was approximately 20% under the 
optimum value, indicating risk mitigation would be beneficial but the risk level would not 
prohibit a mission execution attempt if no improvement was possible. However, the risk 
confidence was determined as “low” in this case. 
 
Figure 51 - Collateral Damage Risk Comparison 
8.9 Analysis and Handling - Additional Target Opportunity 
Detailed Additional Target Opportunity Risk analysis is provided in Appendix E. 
The resultant side-by-side comparison is shown below in Figure 52, which revealed a 
relatively close correlation between the actual and best-case results, although further 
experimentation was undertaken in order to identify potential approaches to improvement 
in the actual risk profile. In this case the risk confidence was determined to be “medium”. 
 
Figure 52 - Additional Target Opportunity Comparison 
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8.10 Analysis and Handling - Loss of Aircraft Risk 
Detailed Loss of Aircraft Risk analysis is provided in Appendix E. 
The final side-by-side comparison is shown below in Figure 53 revealing that, although the 
analysis results aligned more closely to the best case risk profile, the probability of low risk 
was approximately 30% lower than the optimum level, indicating that further risk mitigation 
was desirable, although the risk confidence was determined to be “low”. 
 
Figure 53 - Loss of Aircraft Risk Comparison 
A potentially straightforward risk mitigation approach in this case was to raise the mission 
flight altitude of over 1000ft, resulting in an improved risk profile, reducing the gap between 
best-case and actual low risk level to 15%.  
8.11 SoS Risk Analysis and Handling - Summary 
Table 25 below, summarises the risk analysis and handling outcome for each of the risks 
under consideration. 
Risk Assessment Impact Confidence Handling 
Fratricide Medium/Low 
Risk  
Catastrophic Low Mitigation Required 
Failure to 
Destroy Target 
Low Risk  Mission 
Critical/ 
Catastrophic 
Medium Accept Risk, Mitigation 
Beneficial but not 
essential 
Collateral 
Damage 
Low Risk Catastrophic Low Accept Risk, Mitigation 
Beneficial but not 
essential 
Loss of Aircraft Medium/Low 
Risk  
Catastrophic Low Mitigation Required 
Additional 
Target 
Opportunity 
High likelihood 
of additional 
target 
opportunity 
Beneficial Medium Accept (Opportunity) 
Risk 
Table 25 - CAS Risk Summary 
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8.12 SoS Risk Monitoring 
The monitoring of risk associated with CAS mission planning requires rapid analysis and 
assessment of risks, hence the implementation and testing of BBNs with associated 
supporting models from scratch is not a practical approach due to these time constraints. 
However, using the model-based approach as a basis for a decision support tool, which 
could be updated with appropriate information and parameters, is a feasible future 
exploitation of this research. 
8.13 Supporting Models 
The risk analysis activity identified a requirement for four supporting models; Kill Chain 
Accuracy, Interoperability, Blue Force Proximity and Civilian Proximity. However, during 
implementation Blue Force Proximity and Civilian Proximity were combined into a single 
model, which was found to be a more efficient approach. 
A brief description of each model is provided below, with greater detail provided in 
Appendix F. 
8.13.1 Kill Chain Accuracy Model 
The Kill Chain Accuracy model was designed to simulate the accumulation of spatial and 
temporal error from “sensor” to “shooter”. A target position may be determined from a 
land-based sensor, such a laser range finder, which is then transmitted through a series of 
systems via interconnecting data links to the weapon delivery aircraft and potentially to the 
weapon itself, depending on its capability. The model allowed a fixed position to be defined 
which was input into a sensor model module, introducing typical sensor errors. Each 
successive system was represented by a separate module, with each adding further errors 
either assumed or derived from available unclassified specifications. The model was 
implemented as a discrete event simulation using Simulink. The top-level view of the 
Simulink model is shown below in Figure 54. The model was executed over 5000 iterations 
(i.e. a Monte Carlo simulation), where the output consisting of x, y co-ordinates and latency 
was written to the Simulink/MATLAB® workspace allowing it to be manually copied into an 
Excel spreadsheet, and where the distance of the position from target “truth” was calculated 
for each. Finally, the results were copied to a text file and formatted such that the Netica 
BBN application could “learn” from it. 
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Figure 54 - Kill Chain Error Simulink Model 
8.13.2 Interoperability Model 
The Interoperability System Dynamics model represented overall levels of IO throughout the 
SoS from a generalised perspective, considering aggregated behaviour rather than modelling 
individual information exchanges, the model itself is shown below in Figure 55 and was 
implemented using the Vensim® application. System Dynamics normally models causal 
effect over a period of time, however in this case a more unconventional approach was 
taken, where each time step was used to generate a different IO “level” as a result of the 
randomness defined for the model variables. The model was run over 5000 time steps, 
thereby generating a suitably sized result set which was reformatted into textual format and 
then input, i.e. learned, by the BBNs. 
 
Figure 55 - Interoperability Model 
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8.13.3 Blue Force Proximity and Civilian Proximity Model 
The agent based proximity model enabled the movement of a target, blue forces and 
civilians to be simulated. Based on intelligence data, the model could be initialised with 
predicted positions within areas of uncertainty for forces and civilians, the motion of which 
could then be simulated if appropriate and with an element of randomness. The model was 
written in ReLogo, an ABMS language, using the Repast Simphony toolset; a screen shot of 
the initialised state is shown below in Figure 56. The model was run 1000 times with the 
output data exported into text files for BBN learning. It should be noted that the number of 
model iteration was limited to 1000 because higher numbers appeared to inhibit the 
creation of output data files.  
 
 
Figure 56 - Blue Force and Civilian Proximity Model 
8.14 Verification and Validation  
The application case study was broken down into the following components in order to 
logically structure Verification and Validation activities; Risk Identification, Causal Network, 
BBNs, Supporting Models, Confidence BBNs and Risk Assessment Output. The researcher 
undertook all verification activities, whilst validation was based upon elicitation of SME 
input. 
8.14.1 Verification Procedures 
The procedure for verification of each element of the application case study is provided 
below in tabular form. It should be noted that the level of verification was in accordance 
with the “demonstration of concept” approach, it is acknowledged that a fully developed 
solution would require substantially greater verification effort. 
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Verification Procedure - Risk Identification 
Step Action Result 
1 Manually check risks identified in Table 22 include those 
discussed with SME. 
Confirmed, all included 
2 Manually check risks identified in Table 22 include those 
derived from NATO Tactics, Techniques and Procedures 
for Close Air Support Operations  (NATO, 2005). 
Confirmed, all included 
3 Manually check Table 22 and confirm any risks not 
identified in steps 1 and 2 are valid. 
Interoperability 
risks/contributing factors 
are additional and valid 
4 Manually check Table 22 and confirm all SoS dimensions 
(as defined in section 6.1) are included. 
Confirmed, all included 
5 Manually check Table 22 and confirm risks align 
correctly with SoS SoI dimensions. 
Confirmed, aligns with 
dimensions 
Table 26 - Verification Procedure – Fratricide Risk Identification 
 
Verification Procedure - Causal Network 
Step Action Result 
1 Manually check all risks and contributing factors are 
included in the causal network as defined in Table 22. 
Factors relating to 
Lifecycle, Classification 
and Nature of 
Relationships are not 
included. Justified 
because of their generic 
nature. 
2 Manually check the causal network as defined in Figure 
38 to identify risks or contributing factors that are not 
defined in Table 22. 
Confirmed that network 
reflects risks and 
contributing factors 
identified 
3 Check that there are no unconnected nodes in the 
causal network, as shown in Figure 38. 
Confirmed that all nodes 
are connected 
4 Confirm that connections within the causal network are 
appropriate and logically correct. 
Confirmed all connections 
correct 
5 Manually check the Fratricide causal network, as 
defined in Figure 41 and confirm it includes the 
Fratricide Risk and all contributing factors connected to 
it, as defined in Figure 38. 
Confirmed network is 
complete 
Table 27 - Verification Procedure – Fratricide Causal Network 
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Verification Procedure – Fratricide BBN 
Step Action Result 
1 Using the Netica application, open the Fratricide BBN 
(as shown in Figure 38). 
Fratricide BBN displayed 
2 Manually check the Fratricide BBN and confirm all 
nodes defined in the causal network (Figure 38) are 
included. 
Confirmed all nodes are 
present 
3 Manually check the Fratricide BBN and confirm that 
additional nodes (not defined in Figure 38) are valid 
divorcing nodes. 
Confirmed all additional 
nodes are valid  
4 Manually check each variable within the Fratricide 
BBN and confirm that the states match those defined 
in Table 23. 
Kill chain did not match. 
Table corrected. Confirmed 
all correct 
5 Check all parent nodes in the Fratricide BBN have 
correctly defined conditional probability tables. 
Confirmed tables correct 
6 For all “edge” variables enter evidence, setting each 
state in turn to 100% probability and confirming 
probability changes are propagated throughout the 
network as expected. 
Errors found were 
corrected and step re-run, 
confirming correct 
propagation 
7 Enter the “worst case” scenario evidence as shown in 
Figure 44, confirming probability changes are 
propagated throughout the network as expected. 
Worst case BBN results as 
expected 
8 Enter the “best case” scenario evidence as shown in 
Figure 45, confirming probability changes are 
propagated throughout the network as expected. 
Best case BBN results as 
expected 
9 Select the “Learn” option, then select the Kill Chain 
Accuracy Model Output file; ensure the Kill Chain 
Accuracy variable in the BBN is updated accordingly. 
BBN updated as expected 
10 Select the “Learn” option, then select the 
Interoperability Model Output file; ensure the 
Interoperability variable in the BBN is updated 
accordingly. 
BBN updated as expected 
11 Select the “Learn” option, then select the Proximity 
Model, Blue Force Proximity Output file; ensure the 
Blue Force Proximity variable in the BBN is updated 
accordingly. 
BBN updated as expected 
Table 28 - Verification Procedure – Fratricide BBN 
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Verification Procedure – Supporting Models: Kill Chain Accuracy 
Step Action Result 
1 Open the Kill Chain Accuracy model using the MATLAB 
application. 
Kill chain model opened 
2 View the Simulink model and confirm all related 
elements identified in the causal network (Figure 38) 
are represented. 
Kill chain Simulink model 
displayed 
3 Perform a visual inspection of the code within each 
Simulink element to confirm logical correctness.  
Errors rectified; final 
version of code correct 
4 Run the model with inputs between 0 and 100000 and 
check output from each element is in accordance with 
expected output. 
Outputs as expected 
5 Run the model, with input range set to 2000, over 5000 
iterations and confirm data is output into result matrix. 
Output dataset 
successfully created 
6 Confirm result matrix contains 5000 entries. 5000 entries confirmed 
7 Export result matrix into Excel and confirm spread of 
results around target position is as expected. 
Spread of results as 
expected 
Table 29 - Verification Procedure – Supporting Models: Kill Chain Accuracy 
 
Verification Procedure – Supporting Models: Interoperability 
Step Action Result 
1 Open the Interoperability model using the Vensim 
application. 
Model displayed 
2 View the System Dynamics model and confirm all related 
elements identified in the causal network (Figure 38) are 
represented. 
Confirmed, all 
represented 
3 Perform a visual inspection of the code within each 
variable to confirm logical correctness.  
Model refined, final 
version confirmed to be 
accepted 
4 Perform a visual inspection of the causal links in the 
model to confirm logical correctness. 
Model refined, final 
version confirmed to be 
accepted 
5 Enter “worst case” values, which would result in poor 
interoperability and confirm model output reflects this. 
Initial test resulted in 
further refinement, 
verification tests re-run, 
final version confirmed 
to be correct 
6 Enter “best case” values, which would result in poor 
interoperability and confirm model output reflects this. 
Results as expected 
Table 30 - Verification Procedure – Supporting Models: Interoperability 
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Verification Procedure – Supporting Models: Blue Force and Civilian Proximity 
Step Action Result 
1 Open the Proximity model using the Repast Symphony 
application. 
Proximity mode 
components displayed 
2 Ensure agents are defined which represent blue forces, 
civilians, target and weapon positions. 
Agent classes are 
defined 
3 Perform a visual inspection of the code within each agent 
to confirm logical correctness. 
Code appears correct 
4 Perform a visual inspection of the UserObserver Class and 
confirm all agents are correctly created and initialized. 
Code appears correct 
5 Initialise the model for a single run, ensure all agents are 
displayed and can be distinguished from one another. 
All agents displayed, 
differentiated by colour 
6 Run the model and confirm that the agents movement is 
as expected. 
Movement as expected 
7 Confirm that when the weapon “hits” the target the 
agent movement is frozen. 
Model initially 
corrected, and re-
verified as correct 
8 Initialise and perform a single run of the model, confirm 
the agent start positions and movement have changed 
within the defined ranges. 
Start positions different 
for each run 
9 Initialise the model in batch mode and configure it for 
5000 runs. 
Model set up as 
required 
10 Run the model and confirm 5000 output data sets are 
created. 
Model completes run, 
no data set created. 
Reset to run 1000 times, 
data set successfully 
created. Accepted as 
limitation of Repast. 
11 Export the data sets into Excel and confirm that blue 
force and civilian distances from the target are 
distributed as expected. 
Distribution as expected 
 
Table 31 - Verification Procedure – Supporting Models: Blue Force and Civilian Proximity 
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Verification Procedure – Fratricide Risk Confidence BBN 
Step Action Result 
1 Using the Netica application, open the Fratricide Risk 
Confidence BBN (as shown in Figure 48). 
Fratricide BBN displayed 
2 Manually check the Fratricide Confidence BBN and 
confirm all nodes defined Fratricide BBN (Figure 38) are 
included. 
Confirmed all nodes are 
present 
4 Manually check each variable within the Fratricide 
Confidence BBN and confirm that the states for all are 
Low, Medium and High 
Confirmed all states are 
correct 
5 Check all parent nodes in the Fratricide Confidence BBN 
have correctly defined conditional probability tables. 
Confirmed tables correct 
6 For all “edge” variables enter evidence, setting each state 
in turn to 100% probability and confirming probability 
changes are propagated throughout the network as 
expected. 
BBN updated as 
expected 
7 Enter the “worst case” evidence, where all edge variables 
are set Low = 100%, confirming probability changes are 
propagated throughout the network as expected. 
Worst case results as 
expected 
8 Enter the “best case” scenario evidence, where all edge 
variables are set High = 100%, confirming probability 
changes are propagated throughout the network as 
expected. 
Best case BBN results as 
expected 
Table 32 - Verification Procedure – Fratricide Risk Confidence BBN 
8.14.2 Validation 
The approach taken to validate the application case study components was to elicit subject 
matter expertise through a semi-structured interview, which established the realism of the 
case study and the risks identified as well as the value of the proposed risk management 
approach within the SMEs domain. 
The interview questions and responses were as follows: 
1. Describe your experience and knowledge relating to Close Air Support mission planning 
and how this may be applicable to risk management.  
Response: The SME stated that he is currently in a Navy reservist role seconded to the 
Joint Force Air Component, which is responsible for command and control of the planning 
of air missions including CAS. He has been involved with several live exercises involving a 
CAS element, one of which involved investigations into reducing kill chain length in order 
to increase accuracy and reduce latency. 
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2. In the provided Close Air Support risk matrix, are all major risks and contributing factors 
identified? If not, which risks and factors are missing and is their consequence greater or 
less than those already identified? 
Response: The SME agreed all identified were valid, although he stated that the risk of 
Aircraft Loss would exist at medium altitude if enemy air defences were highly capable. 
The researcher stated that the BBN does cater for this, but the risk identification should 
be aligned accordingly. Regarding the risk of inaccurate targeting the SME stated that the 
run-in direction has to be planned such that any friendlies are not likely to be down the 
bearing, thereby mitigating the risk. The SME noted the time to identify hostile elements 
and convey this information to the incoming aircraft would impact risk, although the 
researcher explained that the interoperability model was intended to reflect this, at least 
implicitly. 
The “footprint” of the forces on the ground, both blue and red, was a factor influencing 
risk; the researcher agreed that future enhancements of the BBNs and proximity models 
should reflect this.  
Night vision goggle illumination states were also identified as a possible future model 
enhancement, relating to target visibility. 
The SME queried why target opportunity was identified as a key risk, interpreting “risk” as 
always having a detrimental impact. The researcher explained that risk could be 
interpreted as opportunity, which was accepted by the SME but did not find the concept 
intuitive. 
3. In the provided causal network, are the links between contributing factors and risks 
reasonable and correct from your experience?  
Response: The SME agreed that the causal network was reasonable and correct from his 
experience. 
4. Do the risk matrix and causal network positively support the identification of risks within 
CAS planning? If not, why do they not support this task? 
Response: The SME stated “yes” he regarded them as providing positive support. 
5. Does the Fratricide BBN update as expected when evidence is entered? 
Response: the researcher demonstrated propagation using the Fratricide BBN, the SME 
thought this was an effective way of modelling and demonstrating risk and that the 
results were appropriate and reasonable. 
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6. Are the Kill Chain Accuracy, Interoperability and Proximity models sufficiently realistic, 
bearing mind they are intended to demonstrate a concept at this stage? 
Response: the researcher described each supporting model; the SME agreed that these 
were appropriate and sufficiently realistic. 
7. Is the Fratricide Risk analysis output provided in an understandable, meaningful and 
usable format?  
Response: the SME required further explanation of the best and worst case output and 
was satisfied that the output made sense, however it was agreed this output would 
require presenting in a more intuitive format in any exploited solution, e.g. a “traffic light” 
visual display. 
8. Do you think the SoS Risk Management process and its outputs could provide benefit to 
CAS mission planning activities? If so, how and where?  
Response: The SME stated, “yes” provided the risk level and consequence were accurate. 
The researcher explained that the associated confidence level should support 
interpretation of the results, the SME agreed. 
9. Bearing in mind that this approach is currently a concept, do you see any limitations of 
the approach? 
Response: The SME stated that time to perform the analysis would be a limitation in the 
CAS context. The researcher agreed and stated that the outputs could be used as the basis 
for decision support tool enabling rapid risk assessment. The SME thought this would be 
of great benefit, particularly if integrated into a hand-held device enabling near real tine 
risk assessment in operational environments. 
8.15 Discussion 
The SoS SoI dimensions provided an effective framework, enabling the CAS mission to be 
viewed from a SoS perspective. Extending this framework into a risk identification matrix 
encouraged risks to be considered in the context of the SoS rather than at the individual 
system level.  Although some risks could be identified without need for the SoS framework, 
it was still found to be of benefit in determining risk relationship to the SoS and 
distinguishing between SoS and systems risks. 
The model technique selection tool, was key in identifying appropriate methods, however 
the population of the spreadsheet was not a purely mechanistic activity requiring a decision 
to determine general modelling approach required to support the risk analysis activity. 
Model choice was also driven by practitioner knowledge and potential re-use, which could 
reduce development effort. 
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The causal network was the foundation for all subsequent analysis. Extracting a subset of 
the causal network for each risk was initially effective, simplifying the required modelling 
and thought processes. However, this approach ultimately resulted in duplication of effort 
when producing BBNs, where risks were linked to common elements within the causal 
network. 
The descriptions of BBN variables were essential in eliciting SME input, providing context for 
the population of the conditional probability tables, evidence input and supporting model 
learning. The worst, best case risk comparison provided context for the analysis results, 
without which it was difficult to meaningfully interpret them. Hence the interpretation was 
based on comparison of the extreme values but still required subjective judgement. 
Finally, the use of an equivalent BBN proved to be an effective method to determine risk 
confidence. Although the population of it was based on subjective input, it allowed 
elicitation of practitioner input and allowed both the evidence and supporting model output 
to be assessed.  
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9 Chapter 9: Application 2: UK National Food Security – Wheat Supply 
Chain 
 
This chapter applies the model-based SoS Risk Management process in the context of UK 
National food security and specifically the supply of wheat based food products, with the 
intention of demonstrating the adaptability of process within a domain, which is markedly 
different from the first application case study. 
In contrast to the CAS case study, UK Food security provided a more enterprise SoS based 
example, allowing the flexibility of the approach to be tested, the UK Met Office and a 
supply chain specialist provided subject matter expertise. 
9.1 Background 
Food security exists “when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to 
sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an 
active and healthy life” (FAO, 1996). 
Although there are several levels of food security: household, regional, national and global 
(DEFRA, 2006), this case study focused on national food security and specifically the supply 
of wheat based foodstuffs; expert advice was provided by the UK Met Office. The 
concentration on wheat supply enabled the scope of this case study to be maintained at a 
manageable level whilst still demonstrating the adaptability of the model based approach. 
The Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) identified several key 
themes, which influence food security (DEFRA, 2006): 
• Availability 
• Access 
• Affordability 
• Nutrition and quality 
• Safety 
• Resilience 
• Confidence 
 
Although the UK’s food security level is generally high, global pressures on food production, 
such as population growth and climate change, are increasing, leading the Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs Committee to state “Ensuring that all UK citizens have access to 
sufficient healthy and safe food at an affordable price is therefore a challenge which is likely 
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to become more acute in the future unless action is taken” (Environment Food and Rural 
Affairs Committee, 2015). Hence, an alternative approach providing the ability to manage 
risk related to food security could potentially be of great benefit.   
Food is delivered through a supply chain, which can be defined as “a sequence of  (decision-
making and execution) processes and (material, information and money) flows that aim to 
meet final customer requirements, that take place within and between different stages along 
a continuum, from production to final consumption” and is illustrated below in Figure 57 
(Van Der Vorst et al., 2007). 
 
Figure 57 - Supply Chain (Van Der Vorst et al., 2007) 
Hipel et al (2010) state that “agriculture is essentially the management of a secure food 
supply” and may be viewed as a SoS which “exploits environmental systems, but also utilizes 
large-scale industrial systems and international trade systems”, they illustrate the 
relationship between these systems in Figure 58. The argument that a SoS perspective is 
appropriate is supported by both Maiers (1998) definition, identifying managerial and 
operational independence of the component systems and Brooks (2016) wider definition 
citing coupling of the component systems as some point in their lifecycle. 
 
Figure 58 - Global Food System of Systems (Hipel et al., 2010) 
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Initial discussions with the Met Office highlighted the following issues that were considered 
pertinent in the context of this case study: 
• Storage of grain from previous years would impact the stock levels, not just current 
yearly yield. 
• Disease is related to climate; hence weather patterns will affect this although not 
necessarily extreme weather. However extreme weather should be considered as 
opposed to unusual variations in the weather. 
• Stock information is an issue; in the West the market drives this but figures are not 
exact, estimate 10-20% held as stock. In contrast China, for example, the 
government has control of stocks where up to 80% of the yield is stored to protect 
against economic fluctuations. 
• Long term modelling considers mean production output; contributing factors include 
the adoption of enhancing productivity technology and population level. 
• Rather than climate data, production data may be more pertinent, specifically 
consider the following: 
o Yield is weather related. 
o The Area harvested is related to previous prices, whereby farmers will sow 
less if less return is expected. 
o Yield gaps will have a dramatic effect on production. 
• The Met Office were specifically interested in determining key factors influencing 
wheat price, for example climate change and its actual impact as opposed to general 
perception. It was stated that determining orders of magnitude of factors would be 
of great benefit. 
• It was stated that climate models currently exist and could potentially be referenced 
as supporting models. This highlighted a key point relating to the model based 
process, whereby re-use of available models should always be considered when 
identifying necessary supporting models. 
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Specifically considering risk in agriculture, Musser and Patrick (2002) identified the following 
sources: 
• Production risk: variations in crop yields due to weather, disease and pests. 
Potential mitigation includes diversification of crop type, irrigation, pesticide, 
fertilizer, soil testing and crop insurance. 
• Marketing risk: variations in commodity prices and demand which may be mitigated 
by marketing contracts (fixing price and quantity), direct sales or forwarding 
marketing techniques (e.g. futures, options). 
• Financial risk: cash flow enabling bill payment, funds to cover day to day farming 
costs and bankruptcy, with mitigations including financial record keeping, cash flow 
planning, maintaining financial reserves and investments. 
• Legal and environmental risk: lawsuits initiated by companies or individuals, 
contractual disputes, changes in government regulations, which may be mitigated 
by liability insurance, legal representation and machinery maintenance. 
• Human Resources risk: the threat that owners, family or employees will not be 
available for labour and management activities which may be mitigated by business 
and succession planning, health and disability insurance and sound human resource 
management. 
Considering risk more generically across entire food supply chain the following were 
identified below in Table 33 (Diabat et al., 2012). 
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Table 33 - Food Supply Chain Risk Summary (Diabat et al., 2012) 
9.2 Application of Process 
Having established that the UK wheat supply chain could legitimately be viewed as a SoS, 
the process described in section 7.3 was applied in the context of this case study. The first 
case study was intended to demonstrate detailed application of the process with the second 
study showing the adaptability of the process. Hence, the scope of this second application 
was reduced accordingly, not including support model implementation and with only one 
risk fully analysed, although all were identified. In accordance with the reduction in scope 
the description of the analysis is also restricted to key points, whereas the first case study 
included sufficient detail to demonstrate the risk management process. It should also be 
noted that the risk confidence analysis was also omitted from this second application having 
been sufficiently demonstrated under the CAS case study. 
9.3 Planning 
In this case risk planning at the SoS level would typically be undertaken by government 
agencies, such as DEFRA, through policy and incentive initiatives and, to some extent, 
through contractual agreement between component systems within the supply chain. 
Planning would also need to consider both long and short-term risk management. 
A Model Based Approach to System of Systems Risk Management 
200 
9.4 Identification 
The risk identification matrix, as shown below in  Table 34, was populated through SME consultation and consultation of the material referenced above in 
section 9.  
SoS Dimension Instantiation Hazard  Control Opportunity 
Component Systems  Supplier (seed, fertilizer) Business failure 
High Cost 
Low supply 
Planned supply does not 
meet demand 
Reliance on small number of 
suppliers 
 
GM seed development, 
increases yield 
Agri-chemical advance 
improves effectiveness 
 Farm Business failure, bankruptcy 
impact if supply base not 
broad 
Government regulation 
increases costs 
Labour availability related to 
national workforce and 
immigration level 
 
Increased demand 
New technology increases 
efficiency 
Diversification 
Government regulation 
reduces costs 
 Distributor Fuel supply interruption 
Industrial action 
 
Fuel costs increase (oil price 
and tax) 
Fuel costs decrease (oil price 
and tax) 
 Manufacturer (industrial bakery) Industrial action 
Business failure 
 
Labour cost increase 
Over production 
Drop in demand 
Raw materials cost increase 
Labour cost decrease, 
possibly through technology  
Demand increase 
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SoS Dimension Instantiation Hazard  Control Opportunity 
 Processor (milling) Industrial action 
 
Labour cost increase 
Over production 
Drop in demand 
Raw materials cost increase 
Poor quality 
Labour cost decrease, 
possibly through technology  
Demand increase 
 Storage Stock level exhausted Stock level does not 
compensate for low yield 
Excess stock level supplies 
additional market 
 Retailer (supermarket chains which 
are SoS and individual small scale 
retailers) 
Business failure  Competition reduces cost of 
end product 
 Water Supply (national which is a 
SoS and local irrigation systems) 
Drought 
Supply contamination 
Flooding 
Water Storage capacity  
 Energy Supply (national grid (SoS) 
and local e.g. wind turbine)) 
Power grid failure 
Cyber attack effecting power 
grid 
Terrorist attack 
High energy prices increases 
costs 
High oil price increases 
energy costs 
Low price reduces costs 
Local green power source 
provides additional energy 
Interactions  Currency (flow of payments 
between food chain components) 
 
Business cash flow problem 
Cyber attack 
 
Unfavourable exchange rate 
increases costs 
Government introduces or 
increases tax/levy on 
transactions 
Economic downturn 
Favourable exchange rate 
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SoS Dimension Instantiation Hazard  Control Opportunity 
 Transport (Wheat, Feed) – although 
this is a SoS itself 
Industrial action 
Fuel shortage 
High oil price increases costs Low oil price reduces costs 
 Order (purchase agreements or 
contracts between food chain 
components) 
 Administration error  
Failure to communicate 
between producers, suppliers 
and retailers in terms of 
planning 
 
 Internet – supports 
communications between 
component systems 
Cyber attack Interoperability between 
component systems poor 
Increased networking 
improves efficiency 
 Raw materials – wheat, flour Supply failure Increased costs Reduced costs 
 End Product e.g. bread Supply failure Increased costs Reduced costs 
Lifecycle SoS Operations Phase (DANSE)  SoS is well established and 
operational hence changes 
must be made which do not 
perturb it 
 
Variability Low (the supply chain is relatively 
stable over time, not subject to 
frequent rapid changes) 
Sudden change may disrupt 
supply chain SoS 
 Stable SoS allows efficiencies 
to be maximised, reducing 
costs 
Classification Generally Collaborative, with 
acknowledged and directed 
elements. Some component 
systems are SoS their own right 
 Incorrect classification of 
entire SoS and/or subgroups 
of component systems 
leading to incorrect 
management/engineering 
approach 
 
Functions Seed production Disease Seed supply does not meet Surplus seed supply reduces 
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SoS Dimension Instantiation Hazard  Control Opportunity 
demand 
Seed cost increase 
costs 
 Sow Extreme weather delays or 
prevents sowing 
 
Co-ordinating of sowing does 
not provide an even supply 
 
 Grow Disease 
Pest 
Agro-chemical shortage 
Extreme weather 
Atypical weather pattern 
(increasing disease) 
Reduced yield 
Increased agro-chemical 
costs 
Increased yield 
Low agro-chemical costs 
GM crops increase yield 
 
 Harvest Extreme weather delays 
harvest 
Extreme weather results in 
crop failure 
Weather allows a small 
window for harvesting 
resulting in lack of availability 
of resources (e.g. mechanical 
harvesters) 
Favourable weather during 
harvesting maximises yield 
Export if excess yield 
 Process (wheat) Wheat supply failure Demand cannot be met 
Overproduction 
Technical advance in process 
improves efficiency 
 Produce (end product) Supply failure Change in consumer taste Technical advance in process 
improves efficiency 
 Sell (end product) Product supply failure Change in consumer taste 
Price war reduces consumer 
choice (through failure of 
smaller retailers) 
Competition reduces price 
Reduced costs allows lower 
price 
A Model Based Approach to System of Systems Risk Management 
204 
SoS Dimension Instantiation Hazard  Control Opportunity 
Systems Owners and 
Operations 
Distributor Business failure 
 
  
 Processor Business failure   
 Retailer Business failure 
 
Monopoly results in price 
increases 
Influence public taste to 
healthier diet 
 Consumer GM crops reduces demand 
Affordability results in low 
quality food purchases 
affecting general health 
 
Change in customer tastes  
 Government Average wage drop makes 
products unaffordable 
Inflation increases prices 
Increases taxes/levies adding 
to costs 
Introduces policy which 
reduces costs 
Introduces subsidies 
Concept of Operation / 
Use / Employment  
Ensure all people, at all times, have 
physical and economic access to 
sufficient, safe and nutritious wheat 
based food to meet their dietary 
needs and food preferences 
(adapted from the FAO food 
security definition (FAO, 1996)). 
Food (wheat based) shortage 
Low economic access 
Poor health 
 
 
Poor planning resulting in 
uneven food supply 
Change in customer tastes 
High economic access 
 
Relationships Distributed, market driven  Monopoly, increases costs Competition, reduces costs 
 
 Table 34 - Wheat Supply Chain Risk Matrix
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From  Table 34 it can be seen that the key (hazard and opportunity) risks, highlighted in red, 
were identified as: 
• Food (Wheat Based) Shortage: consumers have no or reduced access to wheat 
based food products. 
• Low Economic Access: the price of food-based products reduces consumer access. 
• High Economic Access: the price of food-based products enhances consumer access. 
• Poor Health: the general quality of food-based products is reduced resulting in an 
adverse effect on general population health. 
 
9.4.1 Identification of contributing factors 
As undertaken for the previous case study, each risk was analysed in the context of the 
contributing factors that directly influence it, in order to begin definition of the causal 
network (described in section 7.3.2). 
Food (Wheat Based) Shortage risk is influenced by the following contributing factors: 
• Retail Supply: a reduction or break of foodstuff supply to retail outlets directly 
equates to food shortage. 
• Power Grid Failure: power failures may result in short term food shortages due to 
disruption of the supply chain. 
• Banking Systems Failure: any disruption of payment systems may cause short-term 
disruption of the supply chain. More systemic failure of the banking system will have 
a detrimental long-term impact on the supply chain. 
• Transport Availability: disruption on transport systems will have a short term, 
detrimental impact upon the supplier chain. 
 
Low and High15 economic access to wheat based food risks are influenced by the following 
contributing factors: 
• Retail Supply: in this context the geographic availability of retail supplies is a factor, 
whereby consumer costs incurred in obtaining foodstuffs, e.g. travel costs will 
impact the overall affordability. 
                                                          
15 Economic access is separated into two risks in order to distinguish between the hazard and 
opportunity risks 
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• Retail Cost: the cost of products in stores is directly related to the economic access, 
i.e. affordability to the consumer. It should be noted that Retail Cost is the result of 
cumulative costs throughout the supply chain. 
• State of Economy: where average wages are relatively high, a larger proportion of 
the population will have economic access to products. 
 
The Poor Quality Diet risk is influenced by the following contributing factors: 
• Retail Supply: in this context the type of foodstuff being produced will impact 
national health. 
• State of Economy: a weak economy may reduce average consuming spending 
power, which in turn may result in the lowering of retail costs through the 
production of lower quality products. 
 
9.4.2 Development of Causal network 
The initial causal network was constructed based on the analysis above and is shown below 
in Figure 59. 
 
Figure 59 - Food (Wheat Based) Supply Chain - Initial Causal Network 
With the initial causal relationships established, further analysis was undertaken to 
determine the relationships between the primary contributing factors and the remaining 
influencing factors, as described below. 
Power Grid Failure was influenced by the supply level (i.e. demand is met) and disrupting 
factors such as industrial action or cyber or terrorist attack. Banking systems failure, from an 
infrastructure perspective, is most likely to be induced by a cyber attack. Transport 
availability may be affected by industrial action or fuel shortages. Retail Supply risk is more 
complex and, although directly affected by supply to retail outlets and the stability of 
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business (particularly large supermarket chains), it is also affected by risks throughout the 
supply chain, similarly retail costs are accumulated through the entire supply chain. The 
state of the economy is potentially an extremely complex indicator, however in the context 
of this case study key factors were considered to be inflation and the average wage. The 
results of the complete analysis are shown in the causal network shown below in Figure 60. 
 
 
Figure 60 - Wheat Supply Chain Causal Network 
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9.5 Analysis and Handling - Food (Wheat Based) Supply Shortage 
The causal network relating to wheat based food shortage was extracted from the complete 
network (Figure 60) and is provided below in Figure 61; enabling all relevant contributing 
factors to be more easily identified. 
 
Figure 61 - Food (Wheat Based) Shortage Causal Network 
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In accordance with the model based SoS Risk Management process the selection tool 
(section 6.3) was populated for each group of contributing factors, resulting in the model 
architecture shown below in Figure 62. The red boxes indicate single or groupings of factors 
and are annotated with the proposed modelling technique. For this case study a single 
example of the tool output is included, in Figure 64, showing the Yield factor analysis. 
 
Figure 62 - Food (Wheat Based) Shortage - Model Architecture 
Having determined the model architecture a simplified causal network could be derived, as 
shown below in Figure 63. It should be noted that the following additional nodes were 
introduced in order to allow integration of supporting models: Transport Risk, Wheat 
Foodstuff Production Risk, Wheat Processing Efficiency and Wheat Supply Risk. The nodes in 
the network outlined in red represent those linked to supporting models and are annotated 
to indicate the model technique required. 
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Figure 63 - Food (Wheat Based) Shortage - Simplified Causal Network 
 
9.5.1 Creation of BBN 
The next stage in the model based SoS Risk Management process required the creation of a 
BBN based upon the simplified causal network, the resultant BBN is shown in Figure 65 with 
descriptions of the variables provided in Table 35. 
As stated previously, with the reduced scope of this study, supporting models were not 
implemented, however the BBN (Figure 65) was created with representative data.  
 
A Model Based Approach to System of Systems Risk Management 
211 
 
 
Figure 64 - Yield Model Technique Selection 
A Model Based Approach to System of Systems Risk Management 
212 
 
Figure 65 - Food (Wheat Based) Shortage Risk BBN Post Evidence Entry 
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Figure 66 - Food (Wheat Based) Shortage Risk BBN – Worst Case 
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Figure 67 - Food (Wheat Based) Shortage Risk BBN – Best Case 
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Figure 68 - Food Shortage Risk - Mitigated
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Table 35 below provides a description of each variable, and their associated states, comprising the Food Shortage Risk BBN. 
 
Variable Description States 
WheatSupply An assessment of the 
wheat supply level 
based on supporting 
model output 
No Supply: Break in supply, less than 10% of demand 
Major Shortfall: Substantial reduction in output, between 70% and 90% of demand 
Minor Shortfall: Substantial reduction in output, between 70% and 90% of demand 
Meets Demand: greater than 90% of demand 
FarmBusinessFailure An assessment of the 
national rate of farm 
business failure 
Low: Farming Industry stable, low rate of business failure offset by new business 
Medium: Increased level of farm failure not fully offset by new business, localised impact 
on food production 
High: Severe level of farm business failure with national impact on food production 
WheatSupplyRisk The level of risk relating 
to wheat supply. 
Low: Wheat supply is uninterrupted and at demanded levels 
Medium: Wheat supply is restricted and is below demanded level 
High: Wheat supply is severely restricted and is substantially below demanded level 
ProcessedWheatDemand An assessment of the 
demand for process 
wheat, e.g. flour 
Low: Demand is less lower than average 
Medium: Demand equates to average levels 
High: Demand is higher than average 
ProcessingTechnology An assessment of the 
impact technology has 
on wheat processing 
efficiency 
 
Low Impact: No likely technological advances 
Medium Impact: Technological advances are expected to provide limited efficiency 
improvement 
High Impact: A technological advance is expected to provide a major efficiency 
improvement 
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Variable Description States 
WheatProcessingEfficiency Divorcing Variable  Low: Wheat processing is inefficient 
Medium: Wheat processing requires optimization 
High: Wheat processing is close to optimum efficiency 
WheatProcessingRisk The risk associated with 
the supply of processed 
wheat (e.g. flour) 
Low: Processed wheat supply is uninterrupted and at demanded levels 
Medium: Processed wheat supply is restricted and is below demanded level 
High: Processed wheat supply is severely restricted and is substantially below demanded 
level 
FoodProductionSupply The level of risk relating 
to processed wheat 
supply. 
No Supply: Break in supply, less than 10% of demand 
Major Shortfall: Substantial reduction in output, between 70% and 90% of demand 
Minor Shortfall: Substantial reduction in output, between 70% and 90% of demand 
Meets Demand: greater than 90% of demand 
FoodProductionTechnology An assessment of the 
impact technology has 
on food production 
efficiency 
 
Low Impact: No likely technological advances 
Medium Impact: Technological advances are expected to provide limited efficiency 
improvement 
High Impact: A technological advance is expected to provide a major efficiency 
improvement 
FoodProduction Divorcing Variable Low: Food production is substantially below demand 
Medium: Food production is close to demand 
High: Food production is meeting or exceeding demand 
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Variable Description States 
FoodProductionRisk The risk associated with 
the supply of wheat 
based foodstuff 
Low: Wheat based foodstuff supply is uninterrupted and at demanded levels 
Medium: Wheat based foodstuff supply is restricted and is below demanded level 
High: Wheat based foodstuff supply is severely restricted and is substantially below 
demanded level 
ManufacturerBusinessFailure An assessment of the 
national rate of wheat 
based foodstuff 
manufacturing business 
failure 
Low: Foodstuff manufacturing Industry stable, low rate of business failure offset by new 
business 
Medium: Increased level of foodstuff manufacturing business failure not fully offset by 
new business, localised impact on food production 
High: Severe level of foodstuff manufacturing business failure with national impact on 
food supply 
WholesaleSupplyRisk The risk associated with 
the wholesale supply of 
wheat based foodstuff 
Low: Wholesale foodstuff supply is uninterrupted and at demanded levels 
Medium: Wholesale foodstuff supply is restricted and is below demanded level 
High: Wholesale foodstuff supply is severely restricted and is substantially below 
demanded level 
RetailBusinessFailure An assessment of the 
national rate of 
foodstuff retail business 
failure 
Low: Foodstuff retail Industry stable, low rate of business failure offset by new business 
Medium: Increased level of foodstuff retail business failure not fully offset by new 
business, localised impact on food production 
High: Severe level of foodstuff retail business failure with national impact on food supply 
RetailSupplyRisk The risk associated with 
the retail supply of 
wheat based foodstuff 
(i.e. supply to 
consumer) 
Low: Retail foodstuff supply is uninterrupted and at demanded levels 
Medium: Retail foodstuff supply is restricted and is below demanded level 
High: Retail foodstuff supply is severely restricted and is substantially below demanded 
level 
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Variable Description States 
CyberAttack Assessment of the 
likelihood of a cyber 
attack 
Low: Attack is unlikely 
Moderate: Attack is possible but not likely 
Substantial: Attack is a strong possibility 
Severe: Attack is highly likely 
Critical: Attack is expected imminently 
(Security Service MI5, 2017) 
BankingSystem Basic assessment of the 
national banking 
system stability 
Stable: Banking system is operating normally 
Unstable: Banking system is unstable, major national bank(s) are threatened with 
collapse 
BankingSystemsFailureRisk Assessment of the 
likelihood of banking 
system failure 
restricting payment 
flow through supply 
chain 
Low: Banking system fully supporting payment flow though supply chain 
Medium: Infrastructure problems delaying or prohibiting payments within the supply 
chain 
High: National bank(s) likely to require government intervention to prevent collapse 
and/or serious infrastructure problems prohibiting payments 
TerroristAttack Assessment of the 
likelihood of a terrorist 
attack 
Low: Attack is unlikely 
Moderate: Attack is possible but not likely 
Substantial: Attack is a strong possibility 
Severe: Attack is highly likely 
Critical: Attack is expected imminently 
(Security Service MI5, 2017) 
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Variable Description States 
AttackRisk Divorcing variable Low: Low risk of a cyber or terrorist attack 
Medium: Possibility of a cyber or terrorist attack 
High: Cyber or terrorist attack is probable 
PowerGrid Basic assessment of the 
power grid state, 
supporting power 
supply 
Stable: Power grid is supplying power in line with demand 
Unstable: Power grid is not meeting demand through reduced output  
PowerSupplyRisk Divorcing variable Low: Low risk of power supply disruption 
Medium: Possibility of power supply disruption 
High: Probability of power supply disruption 
IndustrialAction Likelihood of industrial 
action 
Low: Industrial action unlikely 
Medium: Possibility of industrial action 
High: Industrial action is highly likely 
PowerGridFailureRisk Assessment of the risk 
of reduced or 
interrupted power 
supply 
Low: Power supply is likely to be maintained, meeting demand 
Medium: Possibility of brief power interruption  
High: Extended power supply reduced output or break in supply is highly likely 
TransportDisruptionRisk Divorcing variable Low: Low risk of transport disruption 
Medium: Possibility of transport disruption 
High: Probability of transport disruption 
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Variable Description States 
TransportAvailability Assessment of the state 
of the transport 
network 
Low: Transport network is operating normally 
Medium: Transport network is likely to interrupt the supply chain for short periods 
High: Transport network is likely to experience major problems, severely disrupting the 
supply chain 
TransportRisk The risk associated with 
transport network 
failure supporting the 
supply chain 
Low: Transport network is fully supporting the supply chain 
Medium: Transport network is likely to interrupt the supply chain 
High: Transport network is likely to severely disrupt the supply chain 
InfrastructureRisk The risk associated with 
the infrastructure 
(banking, transport, IT) 
supporting the supply 
chain 
Low: The supply chain support infrastructure is fully operational 
Medium: The supply chain support infrastructure is likely to interrupt the supply chain 
High: The supply chain support infrastructure is likely to severely disrupt the supply chain 
FoodShortageRisk The risk of consumer 
wheat based food 
shortages 
Low: Wheat based food supply is available, meeting demand 
Medium: Wheat based food is available but not fully meeting consumer demand 
High: Wheat based food is unavailable or at available at extremely low levels 
Table 35 - Wheat Based Food Supply Risk BBN Variables
A Model Based Approach to System of Systems Risk Management 
222 
As undertaken for the previous application case study, in order to provide context for the 
interpretation of the risk analysis results, the Wheat Based Food Supply Risk BBN was 
updated with worst and best case inputs, as shown in Figure 66 and Figure 67 respectively. 
The combination of the best and worst outputs with the results obtained from the original 
BBN (Figure 65) is presented below in Figure 69, indicating that although the actual results 
are more closely aligned to the best case profile the probability of “low” risk is substantially 
lower than the optimum, i.e. approximately 30%. However, it is emphasised that the 
interpretation of these results is judgement based, utilising SME input. 
 
Figure 69 - Wheat Based Food Supply Risk 
Using the BBN to investigate potential risk mitigation, one approach considered reducing risk 
relating to the infrastructure supporting the supply chain. The BBN was therefore updated, 
as shown in Figure 68 to reflect this through entering evidence indicating certainty of low 
cyber attack and transportation risk, resulting in a noticeable improvement in the risk 
profile, as shown below in Figure 70, thereby illustrating the model based approach 
capability allowing differing scenarios and mitigation approaches to be explored. 
 
Figure 70 - Wheat Based Food Supply Risk with Infrastructure Mitigation 
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9.6 Monitoring 
On-going monitoring of wheat supply chain risk could be undertaken using the models 
created within the analysis activity, updated with current data as it became available. 
Additional supporting models could be defined and refinements of those already 
implemented would also be possible, enabled by the longer timescales associated with risk 
management in this context, which considers risks in the medium to long term. 
9.7 Verification and Validation  
The application case study was broken down into the following components in order to 
logically structure Verification and Validation activities; Risk Identification, Causal Network, 
BBNs, and Risk Assessment Output. The researcher undertook all verification activities, 
whilst validation was based upon elicitation of SME input. 
9.7.1 Verification Procedures 
The procedure for verifying each element of the application case study is described below in 
tabular form.  
Verification Procedure - Risk Identification 
Step Action Result 
1 Manually check risks identified in  Table 34 include 
those discussed with SME and Met Office. 
Confirmed, all included 
2 Manually check  Table 34 and confirm any risks not 
identified in step 1 are valid. 
Additional risks appear 
valid; confirmed they 
were derived from peer 
reviewed sources 
3 Manually check  Table 34 and confirm all SoS 
dimensions (as defined in section 6.1) are included. 
Confirmed, all included 
4 Manually check  Table 34 and confirm risks align 
correctly with SoS dimensions. 
Confirmed, all dimensions 
included 
Table 36 - Verification Procedure – Food Shortage Risk Identification 
 
Verification Procedure - Causal Network 
Step Action Result 
1 Manually check all risks and contributing factors are 
included in the causal network as defined in  Table 34. 
Factors relating to 
Lifecycle and Classification 
are not included. Justified 
because of their generic 
nature. 
2 Manually check the causal network as defined in Figure 
60 to identify risks or contributing factors that are not 
Confirmed that network 
reflects risks and 
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defined in  Table 34. contributing factors 
identified 
3 Check that there are no unconnected nodes in the 
causal network, as shown in Figure 60. 
Confirmed that all nodes 
are connected 
4 Confirm that connections within the causal network are 
appropriate and logically correct. 
Confirmed all connections 
correct 
5 Manually check the Food Shortage causal network, as 
defined in Figure 61 and confirm it includes the 
Fratricide Risk and all contributing factors connected to 
it, as defined in Figure 60. 
Confirmed network is 
complete 
Table 37 - Verification Procedure –Food Supply Risk Causal Network 
 
Verification Procedure – Food Shortage BBN 
Step Action Result 
1 Using the Netica application, open the Food Shortage 
BBN (as shown in Figure 65). 
Food Shortage BBN display 
2 Manually check the Food Shortage BBN and confirm 
all nodes defined in the causal network (Figure 61) are 
included. 
Confirmed all nodes are 
present 
3 Manually check the Food Shortage BBN and confirm 
that additional nodes (not defined in Figure 61) are 
valid divorcing nodes. 
Confirmed all additional 
nodes are valid 
4 Manually check each variable within the Food 
Shortage BBN and confirm that the states match those 
defined in Table 35 - Wheat Based Food Supply Risk 
BBN Variables. 
Confirmed that all match 
5 Check all parent nodes in the Food Shortage BBN have 
correctly defined conditional probability tables. 
Confirmed tables correct 
6 For all “edge” variables enter evidence, setting each 
state in turn to 100% probability and confirming 
probability changes are propagated throughout the 
network as expected. 
Errors found were 
corrected and step re-run, 
confirming correct 
propagation 
7 Enter the “worst case” scenario evidence as shown in 
Figure 66, confirming probability changes are 
propagated throughout the network as expected. 
Worst case BBN results as 
expected 
8 Enter the “best case” scenario evidence as shown in 
Figure 67, confirming probability changes are 
propagated throughout the network as expected. 
Best case BBN results as 
expected 
Table 38 - Verification Procedure – Food Shortage BBN 
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9.7.2 Validation 
The approach taken to validate the application of the model based approach in this case 
study components was to elicit subject matter expertise through semi-structured interviews, 
which established the realism of the case study and the risks identified as well as the value 
of the proposed risk management approach within the SMEs domain. 
The interview questions were as follows: 
1. Describe your experience and knowledge relating to supply chains in the agricultural 
domain and how this may be applicable to risk management.  
Response: Supply chain and forecasting manager in a large UK agricultural supply 
company with experience of the food supply chain 
 
2. In the provided Wheat Supply Chain Risk Matrix risk matrix, are all major risks and 
contributing factors identified? If not, which risks and factors are missing and is their 
consequence greater or less than those already identified? 
Response: All major risks are captured. However, day to day issues with the wheat 
supply chain are congestion in stores as farmers who hold out for better prices for 
un-contracted wheat and imbalance in the type of wheat, i.e. a lot of UK wheat is 
exported for animal feed and bread/beer wheat is imported and most importantly 
the global price affected by global weather and futures trading. 
 
3. In the provided causal network, are the links between contributing factors and risks 
are reasonable and correct from your experience?  
Response: The causal network was regarded as accurate and a very useful artefact, 
providing understanding of the supply chain. 
 
4. Do the risk matrix and causal network positively support the identification of risks 
within Wheat Supply Chain and Food Security planning? If not, why do they not 
support this task? 
Response: Yes, they enabled all risks to be identified. 
 
5. Does the Food (Wheat Based) Shortage Risk BBN update as expected when evidence 
is entered? 
Response: Yes, the updated values appeared reasonable. 
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6. Is the Food (Wheat Based) Shortage Risk analysis output provided in an 
understandable, meaningful and usable format?  
Response: It was agreed the format was acceptable. 
 
7. Do you think the SoS Risk Management process and its outputs could provide 
benefit to Wheat Supply Chain and Food Security or planning activities? If so, how 
and where?  
Response: It could be valuable in testing “what if” scenarios and mitigation 
approaches. However, accurate prediction of future events would not be possible 
due to the complexity and inherent uncertainty of the many interrelating factors. 
“The complexity of forecasting worldwide short/med/long term weather as well as 
commodity prices which can also be political (China, India, Russia, North Africa & 
Baltics) makes it difficult enough, but there is also the sentiment of commodity 
traders, merchants and farmers all second guessing the market.” 
 
8. Bearing in mind that this approach is currently a concept, do you see any limitations 
of the approach? 
Response: As stated above, due to the complexity of the contributing factors it would 
not be possible to produce accurate predictive models. 
9.8 Discussion 
The risk identification matrix based upon the SoS SoI dimensions proved to be an effective 
approach to identifying food security and supply chain risk. However, it was necessary to 
take a relatively high level perspective in comparison to the CAS application case study and 
would require development of potentially highly complex supporting models. 
The factors influencing wheat supply chain risk are highly complex, it would not therefore be 
practical or possible to implement accurate predictive models but the BBNs and supporting 
models would provide an effective tool to understanding risks and the causes which in turn 
would support the development of mitigation strategies. 
Whereas the CAS analysis considered risk over a short period, i.e. mission length in the order 
of hours, in this case risk was applicable to the medium and long term, potentially over 
several years. To accommodate the view of risk development over time, the risk 
management approach would require extending to create a set of risk results rather than a 
single output; this could be achieved through the use of dynamic BBNs. 
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10 Chapter 10: Analysis of SoS Risk Management Approach 
This chapter provides an overall summary of the approach, having been refined as a result of 
both application case studies, followed by a description of the underlying theoretical basis. 
Although each application case study provided a critical assessment of the approach in 
specific contexts a more general assessment is provided in this chapter, followed by a 
critique of the research itself and discussion of its benefits and limitations.  
10.1 Summary of Approach 
Figure 71 below summarises the entire model based risk management process and 
illustrates the relationship to the traditional activities namely, planning, identification, 
analysis, handling and monitoring where each is distinguished by colour and linked to a box 
enclosing the related part of the process. 
 
Figure 71 - Model Based SoS Risk Management Summary 
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Risk Planning 
Risk planning will primarily decide on the management approach and potentially identify the 
proposed model based approach, at this stage it will also need to establish the SoI. 
Risk Identification 
The initial part of the process is intended to support risk identification through the 
framework comprised of the SoS SoI dimensions (Kinder et al., 2015), as described in section 
6.1, and the holistic risk categories, hazard, control and opportunity (Hopkin, 2002). The 
framework allows each SoI element to be assessed in the context of the holistic risk types, 
ensuring full analysis coverage and the SoS perspective is maintained. Having established all 
risks, and factors that influence them, a causal network is constructed, establishing the 
relationship between them. 
Risk Analysis 
The bulk of the process addresses risk analysis. Initially a “subset” of the overall causal 
network is extracted relating to the specific risk under analysis. However, where multiple 
risks relate to common sections of the causal network they may be analysed simultaneously 
in order to minimise duplication of effort. The risk specific causal network is then analysed 
to determine where nodes, or groups of nodes, may be represented in separate 
“supporting” models, which enables the causal network to be simplified through the 
reduction in the quantity of nodes. A BBN is then created representing the simplified causal 
network, ensuring each variable and state is clearly defined which is critical to providing 
unambiguous context when populating the BBN conditional probability tables.  
Supporting Models 
In parallel, the supporting models are developed and assessed according to the confidence 
in the assumptions, expert input and V&V effort. The models are executed over multiple 
iterations (in the order of 5000) producing a set of output data, which may be “learned” by 
the BBN.  
Interpretation of Analysis Results 
The BBN is also updated though the direct input of available evidence. In order to provide 
context for the interpretation of the BBN risk output, risk levels are established for worst 
and best case scenarios. The decision to mitigate risk based on the analysis results in 
comparison with the worst/case values is judgement based using expert input.  
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Risk Confidence 
Confidence in the risk analysis output is determined through the creation of a BBN that 
mirrors the risk BBN but each variable represents the confidence of the evidence or 
supporting model.  
Risk Handling 
Representing the risks and contributing factors in BBNs and supporting models allow 
alternative risk handling and mitigation approaches to be assessed in order to determine the 
most effective.  
Risk Monitoring 
Risk monitoring may be undertaken by continuous observation of the BBN output, providing 
the BBN is frequently updated with current information. 
10.2 Theoretical Basis for Approach 
This section brings together the theoretical basis for the proposed SoS RM approach, 
through the definition of a set of principles and the identification of the theory underpinning 
these. 
The core principles of the SoS Risk Management process are as follows: 
1) The process should establish the SoS SoI 
2) It should view risk from a holistic perspective 
3) It should support risk management for SoS types with a defined purpose 
4) It should represent the relationship between risks and contributing factors 
5) It should use Bayesian methods to assess the probability of risk 
6) It should represent risks using suitable modelling techniques 
7) It should support the integration of heterogeneous modelling techniques 
 
Principle 1 is fundamentally underpinned by General Systems Theory, specifically Holism, 
Open/Closed Systems, Boundaries, Single/Multiple Outcomes, Entropy, Hierarchies and 
Interrelated Components (Von Bertalanffy, 1968). Holism is also directly related to principle 
2. 
The following SoS SoI dimensions (Kinder et al., 2012), are discussed in section 6.1 and 
support principles 1 and 2: 
• Component Systems (including specific and general system types) 
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• Classification 
• Interactions  
• Nature of Relationships 
• Lifecycle 
• Variability 
• Functions 
• Systems Owners and Operations 
• Concept of Operation / Use / Employment 
 
The following risk types (Hopkin, 2002) underpin principle 2, in combination with the SoS SoI 
dimensions listed above, enabling the definition of a SoS risk identification framework: 
• Hazard Risks (e.g. Threat and perils) 
• Control Risks (e.g. Doubt about mission achievement, project management control) 
• Opportunity Risks (Opportunity to enhance or inhibit mission achievement) 
Principle 3 specifically relates to the SoS types directed, acknowledged and collaborative 
(Dahmann & Baldwin, 2008). 
Principles 4 and 5 are supported by Bayesian Network theory (Pearl, 2014), which 
encompasses the definition of causal networks and the propagation of probabilities within a 
BBN. This also partially supports principle 7 through the theory of Bayesian learning.  
Several theories support principle 6. The philosophy of models and analogies (Hesse, 1963) 
defines the fundamentals of modelling theory and is discussed in section 3.3.2. The 
justification for this principle is the law of requisite parsimony (Miller, 1956) whereby the 
use of models enables risks to be analysed through the consideration of suitable sized 
groups of variables or observations, and requisite variety which requires models to provide a 
level of variety of at least the same level as the system represented. The set of potential 
modelling techniques is described in the paper (Kinder et al., 2014) attached in Annex A 
which provides a summary of basic underlying principles. 
Principle 7 utilises Monte Carlo simulation which is itself underpinned by the strong law of 
large numbers (Day, 2008). 
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10.3 Critical Assessment of Risk Management Approach 
10.3.1 Risk Identification 
SoS Risk identification utilises a framework defined by SoS SoI dimensions (Kinder et al., 
2012) cross referenced to risk types, hazard, control and opportunity (Hopkin, 2002). Whilst 
this was generally found to be a successful method for the identification of risks and their 
contributing factors, the dimensions classification and lifecycle did not map particularly well 
to risks, which could be regarded as SoS characteristics derived from the other dimensions. 
The scope of the “Interactions” dimension was somewhat unclear; it could be interpreted as 
including the information exchanged by component systems or the connection itself. For the 
purposes of the case studies, both interpretations were used, although in some cases the 
connection could also be considered a component system in itself, e.g. the Internet which is 
in fact a SoS in its own right, leading to a further conclusion that the “component system” 
dimension should encompass both component systems and component SoS. A possible 
clarification of the “Interactions” dimension is by defining “what” is transferred, the 
direction and an associated quality parameter. 
Whilst many of the risks and contributing factors were not dependent upon the framework 
for identification it did provide a structured method of documenting the risk identification 
output and ensured risks were considered from a SoS perspective. 
As is the case with traditional risk management approaches, the identification of risks was 
dependent upon expert input elicited through techniques such as brainstorming, interview 
or the Delphi method. 
Construction of the causal network also required expert knowledge to determine the 
relationship between the risks and contributing factors. Whilst this was found to improve 
understanding of the interdependencies contributing to risk, the complexity of the resultant 
network could potentially become unmanageable where a large number of risks and factors 
were identified, requiring careful management of the scope of the identification activity. 
10.3.2 Risk Analysis 
Risk analysis was performed for each risk separately requiring the elements of the causal 
network to be extracted relevant to the risk under consideration, enabling analysis to be 
performed on a smaller scale sub-network. Whilst this approach was successful in reducing 
complexity it did result in duplication of effort where risks were closely related, with large 
sections of the causal network having common elements. In these cases, the risk 
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management process should be refined to permit analysis of multiple risks simultaneously 
where duplicated effort would otherwise occur. 
Analysis of each individual risk causal network utilised the model selection tool (described in 
section 6.3) in order to determine where supporting models could be utilised and simplify 
the causal network. The approach was effective in identifying appropriate modelling 
techniques, although population of the tool was influenced to some extent by the 
perspective required by the practitioner. For example, Interoperability (section 8.13) was 
modelled from a top down perspective using System Dynamics but could have used a 
Discrete Event Simulation, bottom up approach instead. However, the Discrete Event 
technique would have resulted in a model of far greater complexity, requiring detailed 
representation of all component systems and interactions. In this case the risk analysis 
required a general, high-level assessment of interoperability making the System Dynamics 
the most suitable option. This illustrates that, although the tool provided benefit as a 
decision support tool, practitioner knowledge was required in order provide input and 
interpret the output. The selection tool was designed specifically to identify modelling 
techniques appropriate to SoS, however many factors influencing risk were environmental, 
e.g. meteorological or economic, and therefore not directly suitable for analysis by the tool. 
In these cases modelling approaches or currently available models required identification 
through expert knowledge. 
Using BBNs to represent risks and contributing factors was found to be extremely effective, 
in particular the propagation of probabilities throughout the BBN allowed different 
mitigation strategies to be tested. Key in defining an effective BBN was the provision of clear 
and unambiguous definitions for each variable and the associated states. As well as enabling 
meaningful interpretation of the BBN it also provided context for the elicitation of SME 
information required for the BBN population, which included input evidence and definition 
of the conditional probability tables. The use of expert knowledge was a pragmatic approach 
to fully defining the BBN with each table requiring assessment in order to determine the 
most appropriate distribution. However, it did result in the quantitative representation of 
subjective information, which emphasised that although the approach does reduce 
subjectivity in the risk assessment it does not eliminate it. A common misconception in this 
situation is that quantitative representation is based upon quantitative data and hence high 
accuracy is assumed, however the introduction of the confidence assessment provided a 
means to prevent this incorrect interpretation, although the confidence assessment was 
itself based on subjective assessment. 
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When the first application case study (chapter 8) analysis results were initially reported, it 
was found that interpretation of them was problematic with no context to determine if the 
output presented an acceptable level of risk. This lack of context was overcome by 
producing risk analysis results for worst and best case scenarios, which then enabled a 
relative comparison of the actual analysis output. This solution was successful in providing a 
more meaningful output. However; it did still require an expert based judgement to 
determine if mitigation was required. 
A key difference between the application of the process in the two case studies was that the 
smaller scope of the CAS SoI enabled the derivation of predictive results whereas the 
complexity and uncertainty which was inherent in the food supply chain case study limited 
the predictive capability of the models. 
10.3.3 Supporting Models 
The method proposed to support the integration of supporting models with the central risk 
BBN was demonstrated successfully within application case study 1, providing a source of 
quantitative data thereby reducing subjectivity. The most flexible approach proved to be the 
creation of “continuous” variables with the BBN where the associated states defined bands 
of input values; the BBN could then learn from a set of raw values output from a supporting 
model and thereby decoupling the BBN and model. 
However, producing a set of outputs over a distribution required the models to contain 
some stochastic variables and output the data in a specific format. Whilst this was 
achievable when producing bespoke models under case study 1, in some cases it would be 
desirable to reuse pre-existing models, however a method would be required to ensure 
these could be adapted to produce the required output, or alternatively the existing output 
could be adapted. This is particularly relevant to case study 2 which required input from 
climate and economic models which are in existence and highly complex therefore 
developing these as part of the risk analysis activity would be unnecessary and impractical. 
Indeed, the complexity and inherent uncertainty of these supporting models was an area of 
concern raised by the SME validating the case study 2. 
Verification and validation (V&V) of the models was undertaken in order to determine the 
associated confidence, and which relied on definitions provided in section 7.4.4. Unlike V&V 
of an engineered system, whereby the performance and behaviour are specified and can 
therefore be tested, a predictive model by definition produces outputs that are not 
predefined and hence validation is more subjective, typically requiring expert input to 
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confirm that model behaviour appears reasonable, according to their knowledge and 
experience. This method is an accepted approach (as discussed in section 3.3.8) and proved 
to be effective and pragmatic when applied in case study 1. 
10.3.4 Risk Confidence 
An indication of confidence in the risk assessment result is essential if stakeholders are to 
have trust in it; therefore it was necessary to provide an overall confidence value and a 
method to derive it. Hence, the method described in section 7.4.4 was proposed which 
required the creation of a BBN, which mirrored the risk BBN under consideration, enabling 
risk confidence estimates for evidence and supporting models to be combined into a single 
overall risk confidence level. Although this method supported the requirement to derive a 
risk confidence indication there was a level of subjectivity associated with assigning the 
supporting model and evidence confidence levels and defining the conditional probability 
tables, which determined how child variable confidence values were combined by the 
parent variable.  
10.3.5 Required Development Effort 
Naturally, the level of effort required for the risk identification and analysis activities is 
directly related to the scope and complexity of the SoS under consideration as well as the 
number and fidelity of the supporting models. The identification activity would potentially 
require several workshop sessions in order to elicit sufficient SME information in order to 
fully populate the risk matrix and define the causal network. 
Definition of the BBNs is a labour intensive task requiring SME input requiring the definition 
of the variable states and the population of the conditional probability tables: again the 
effort required is driven by the BBN complexity.  
Development of the supporting models may be undertaken in parallel with the BBNs and 
potentially requires the most effort of all activities, although this is also dependent on the 
number of models and their required fidelity. 
When considering the case studies, the first one required risk analysis to be performed 
within a short time period and potentially in real time. In this instance it is not possible or 
practical to follow the process, however the process could be undertaken outside an 
operational situation in order to develop the BBNs and models, which could then be 
integrated into a tool providing rapid decision supporting CAS risk management (the SME 
validating application case study 1 identified this as a potential exploitation path for this 
research). 
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The second case was concerned with the assessment of risk over medium and long-term 
periods hence an extended model development period would be practical. However, as 
previously discussed, existing model re-use would be essential in this case; it would 
completely unrealistic to expect a risk management activity to implement models predicting 
climate change and economic behaviour. 
However, the activity of modelling risk in a particular class of complex SoS is educative, so 
that the modeller may understand better the relationship of causes and outcomes in terms 
of risk in the system. Hence, the knowledge gained through these activities, which may be 
undertaken over a relatively long period, can enhance knowledge with which to make 
decisions in the short-term when similar situations arise in the future.  
10.4 Benefits of Approach 
This section summarises the overall benefits of the proposed SoS risk management 
approach, which were touched on above in section 10.3. 
The process was applied to two application cases studies, which although they could both 
legitimately be viewed as SoS, were fundamentally different; the CAS case study was an 
example of an operational, rapidly formed and relatively easily bounded SoS whereas the 
wheat supply chain study was a relatively stable and large-scale enterprise SoS. 
The SoS SoI dimensions (Kinder et al., 2012) were found to be an effective method in 
establishing the SoI for both case studies, providing further validation of them, beyond that 
originally provided, as described in the paper attached in Annex A.  
The holistic risk categories; hazard, control, opportunity (Hopkin, 2002) were also suitably 
generic, allowing the proposed risk identification framework to be utilised for both case 
studies, whilst ensuring risk identification was undertaken through a SoS perspective. 
The causal network allowed the relationships between risks and contributing factors to be 
established, with the network providing a visual representation which afforded an 
understanding of a complex set of relationships and which enabled this to be effectively 
communicated to stakeholders. 
Modelling the risks and contributing factors using a set of BBNs enabled different mitigation 
approaches to be assessed, including system enhancements and risk transfer and was 
extremely effective in demonstrating the effects to stakeholders who could observe changes 
in probability propagated through the BBN. 
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Use of supporting models reduced the level of subjectivity and increased the credibility of 
the risk analysis process, with the model selection tool identifying techniques that may not 
have initially been familiar to the practitioner. 
The determination of an honest risk confidence was essential in order to establish trust in 
the analysis results, with the proposed approach allowing all aspects of the analysis to be 
allocated a confidence level which could then be combined into a single overall assessment, 
and which also allowed strategies to improve the confidence level to be assessed. 
The overall benefit of the approach was the ability to identify and analyse risk in inherently 
complex situations which, if analysed through entirely subjective, judgement based 
assessment, would be prone to bias and error and beyond the capability of mental models, 
thereby breaking the law of requisite parsimony (Miller, 1956). 
10.5 Limitations of Approach 
Whilst section 10.3, provided a detailed critical analysis of the proposed SoS risk 
management approach, this section highlights the more general limitations. 
As previously discussed, one of the proposed approach aims was to reduce the general level 
of subjectivity within the risk management process. Whilst this was achieved through the 
introduction of supporting models and the ability to enter known evidence into the BBNs, 
risk identification, definition of the BBN states and conditional probability tables still relied 
on subjective judgement. Indeed, the supporting models could also potentially be derived 
from subjective assumptions. However, this is an accepted limitation of model development 
in general and is acceptable if assumptions are clearly defined, enabling “honest” validation 
and confidence assessment.  
A limitation of the approach, which became apparent under application case study two, is 
that risk analysis results are effectively a snapshot of risk likelihood over a short period. 
Whilst this was acceptable for the CAS study, which considered risks related to a mission 
undertaken over a short period, the second case study was concerned with risk over 
medium and long periods, potentially up to several years. In this case, the trend in risk 
would be more appropriate than a single output. 
Case study 2 also illustrated that the complexity of the supporting models may be 
prohibitive and would require re-use of existing models, or the available output data. 
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10.6 Critique of Research 
Overall, the research was regarded as successful, with several outputs peer reviewed and 
published, with other outputs identified by SMEs as having real potential future application, 
for example the CAS SME saw real benefit if the models could be refined and then 
incorporated into a, potentially handheld, decision support tool, indicating immediate risk 
such as Fratricide.  
A key foundation of the research was the SoS SoI model which introduced the associated 
dimensions (Kinder et al., 2012) and was published in the conference paper attached in 
Annex A. The development of the SoS SoI took a qualitative research approach, with a 
questionnaire to eleven purposefully selected participants. Whilst it is acknowledged that 
this is a relatively small group the participants possessed current, state of the art knowledge 
of the SoSE domain and the subsequent workshop allowed further in depth discussion of key 
issues. Use of the dimension in support of the application studies provided further validation 
of them. Indeed, their use appears to be gaining traction with reference made from the 
Systems Engineering Body of Knowledge (SEBoK) online resource (SEBoK, 2017) and various 
published papers. In addition the SoS SoI dimensions provided a framework for the 
description of case studies referenced by the T-Area SoS research project (Barot et al., 
2013). 
However, further work refining the SoS SoI dimensions through the application of additional 
case studies would be beneficial if undertaken as future research. Indeed, within this thesis 
it was necessary to provide descriptions of the relationships between the SoI dimensions 
(section 6.1), as although they were identified in the original paper (Annex A) they were not 
elaborated upon. 
The literature review required three themes to be researched, SoSE, Modelling and 
Simulation and Risk. The Modelling and Simulation theme included a survey of a wide range 
of modelling techniques, assessing their applicability to the SoS domain. The results were 
published in a peer reviewed journal (attached in Annex C), however it was based upon 
expert judgement and would benefit from a survey of a wide range of participants, 
specifically when determining relevance to applicability to aspects of SoS. The framework 
devised to support this survey utilised the SoI SoS dimensions, where each technique was 
assessed against each dimension thereby providing more structured context in determining 
their applicability to SoS modelling. Further work could also include an expansion in the 
number of techniques surveyed. 
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The demonstration of the proposed SoS risk management approach was achieved using a 
mixed method approach through SME consultation and development of models. The first 
case study was chosen because of the researchers familiarity with the subject matter and 
the access to a suitable SME with current and detailed knowledge of the military planning 
and CAS domain. This proved to be a good decision, allowing the research to focus on the 
proposed process, rather than an unfamiliar domain. The second case study arose through 
serendipity, as a result of a conference discussion with the UK Met Office who showed 
interest in the approach and mentioned its applicability to UK Food Security. Whilst this was 
an unfamiliar area to the researcher, it enabled the process, which was now more mature, 
to be applied to a radically different case. The second study was successful in highlighting 
areas where the process could be expanded and provided a worthwhile contrast to the first.  
For both case studies input from the SME was initially elicited through unstructured 
interviews, in order to establish initial requirements. While this was successful it can be said 
with hindsight that semi-structured interviews may have been more successful in 
maintaining the discussion focus. However, this lesson was learnt for the application case 
study validation, resulting in shorter interviews providing results in a comparable format and 
which captured all required information. 
10.7 Summary of Chapter 
This chapter provided a summary flowchart illustrating the proposed SoS risk management 
process and showing its relationship to risk management activities. The theoretical basis for 
the approach is described through a set of principles and identification of underlying 
theories. The proposed process was critically assessed, where both positive and negative 
aspects were identified, more general limitations and benefits were also highlighted. A 
critique of the research approach was also undertaken, which although overall regarded as 
successful did suggest future improvements and discussed lessons learnt.  
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11 Chapter 11: Conclusions 
This chapter reviews achievement of this research against the original research questions 
and objectives. 
11.1 Assessment of Objectives 
Each research objective is discussed below with a brief description of the action taken to 
address it and an assessment of the achievement. 
Objective 1: Review of a wide range of modelling techniques applicability to SoS 
Objective 1 was addressed by theme 2 of the literature review, where thirteen modelling 
and simulation techniques were reviewed and assessed within a framework based the upon 
the SoI dimensions (Kinder et al., 2012). The results of this survey were published in a peer 
reviewed journal (Kinder et al., 2014), the paper is attached in Annex C. 
The author considers that this objective is met, with the caveat that future research could 
expand the scope and survey additional techniques using the established framework. 
Objective 2: Review current risk management approaches. 
Theme 3 of the literature review surveyed traditional risks management approaches and the 
limited material available relating to SoS and risk. 
 The author considers that this objective is met. 
Objective 3: Identify differences between system and SoS risk management 
SoS Risk Management was identified as an essential element of SoSE in chapter 2 where 
several case studies were discussed and it was found that incorrect application may have 
contributed towards some notable failures. Theme 1 of the literature review compared SE 
with SoSE, discussing where risk management was appropriate whilst theme 3 surveyed 
current approaches. Chapter 7 discussed the application of risk management within SoSE, 
proposed new approaches and defined a model based SoS risk management process. 
The author considers that this objective is met. 
Objective 4: Identify an initial SoS application to explore whether a risk management 
model based approach would provide benefit. 
Chapter 8 proposed risk management within Close Air Support mission planning as an 
application case study, consultation with an SME confirmed the validity of this choice. 
The author considers that this objective is met. 
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Objective 5: Apply the SoS Risk Management process to the initial SoS application, 
developing models using appropriate identified modelling techniques.  
The model based risk management process was applied to the Close Air Support mission 
planning application case study, as described in chapter 8, where BBNs and supporting 
models were developed. The results of the process were validated using SME input. 
The author considers that this objective is met. 
Objective 6: Identify a second application (case study) in order to determine the 
adaptability of using the overall approach in a different domain. 
The second application was identified as UK National Food Security and the Wheat Supply 
Chain, the application of the SoS risk management process is documented in chapter 9. The 
scope of the application was reduced in scope, in comparison to the first case study, 
however it was sufficient to demonstrate the adaptability of the proposed approach. A key 
finding resulting from the second case study application was that, where the SoS under 
consideration is subject to high levels of uncertainty the modelling approach is limited in its 
predictive capability. However, it does provide benefit through greater understanding of the 
risks and contributing factors, allowing “what if” scenarios to be developed and hence, risk 
mitigation strategies. 
Objective 7: Use model to assess transfer of risk within a SoS. 
The BBNs developed for both application case studies enabled different mitigation options 
to be evaluated and would enable the impact on other risks to be assessed. However, 
transfer of risk was not explicitly discussed. 
The author considers that this objective is partially met. 
Objective 8: Define a SoS risk management methodology in which the above approach can 
be encapsulated. 
A SoS risk management process was proposed in chapter 7 which was refined through 
application cases studies in chapters 8 and 9 and summarised in chapter 10. 
Accepting this process was developed at a Concept level the author considers that this 
objective is met. 
11.2 Addressing the Research Questions 
This section considers each research question and assesses the extent to which they were 
addressed by this research. Although it is implicit that the questions were adequately 
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addressed through the research objectives, they are assessed separately in this section in 
order to provide another viewpoint from which to validate the research. 
The top-level question “How can risk be managed using a model based approach for a 
physical System of Systems in an operational environment?” was addressed through 
application of the proposed approach and is elaborated through the responses to the lower 
level questions below. 
How is the management of SoS risk different from managing risk at the system level? 
Risk Management of SoS requires a holistic view of the interactions between risk 
components and consequences, it cannot be assumed that if risk is “traditionally” managed 
for each component system then the aggregated affect will be to mitigate risk at the SoS 
level. SoS risk management is concerned with the likelihood of the fulfilment of the SoS 
purpose, which may be prevented through detrimental emergent behaviour, or conversely 
achievement is enhanced through beneficial emergent behaviour. Whilst a directed, and to 
some extent acknowledged, SoS (Dahmann & Baldwin, 2008) will be controlled centrally, 
collaborative SoS requires a more cooperative approach to risk management. 
How is a model based approach beneficial? 
A SoS is inherently complex, the law of requisite parsimony states human beings can only 
deal simultaneously with between five and nine observations at one time (Miller, 1956), 
therefore attempting to manage SoS risk from a purely subjective, judgement based 
approach is likely to exceed the capacity of mental models. A mathematical model is not 
constrained in the same way, therefore enabling analysis of complex problems whilst 
providing understanding and prediction.  
How can a model based approach be developed and how can it quantify risk? 
A model based approach was developed utilising SoS SoI dimensions (Kinder et al., 2012) 
and a set of holistic risk types to create a risk identification framework, a causal network was 
used to represent the relationships between the risks and contributing factors. BBNs were 
used to model the causal network allowing probabilities to be propagated, thereby 
quantifying risk levels, with an associated confidence also provided. Supporting models 
could also be integrated into the BBNs using a Monte Carlo approach, with the choice of 
modelling technique appropriate to the subject under consideration. 
What are the types of risk associated with SoS? 
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The generic holistic risk types, hazard, control and opportunity (Hopkin, 2002) were used in 
support of the model based approach, more specific risk types will be related to the SoS 
purpose and type. 
How does the application of risk management relate to the SoS ‘lifecycle’? 
How Risk Management integrates into the SoSE approach is driven by the SoS classification; 
directed, acknowledged, collaborative and virtual (Dahmann & Baldwin, 2008). Risk 
Management of SoS does not directly align with the traditional SE lifecycle, a more 
appropriate lifecycle approach is the DANSE model, comprising the phases, initiation, 
creation and operations (DANSE Consortium, 2015). During its Initiation phase the SoS 
comes into existence - risk management at this point will attempt to identify associated 
risks, which may result in undesired emergent behaviour, thereby preventing the SoS 
fulfilling its purpose. The creation phase is only applicable when the initial SoS emergent 
behaviour is severely deficient, this may be a pre-emptive activity as a result of risks 
identified within the initiation phase. In the Operational Phase the SoS provides the desired 
emergent behaviour, with risk management continuously undertaken to assess risks, which 
may impact the new SoS objectives and those that may impact current objectives. 
How can the impact of risk transfer be assessed within a SoS? 
The model based approach requires the creation of BBNs and supporting models enabling 
experimentation to be undertaken whereby different scenarios and mitigation strategies 
may be assessed. Risks may be owned by different components or dimensions within a SoS 
hence a mitigation strategy may result in one risk decreasing at the expense of another 
increasing. 
11.3 Summary of Research Contribution 
Although, this research provided insight into managing risk within a SoS through the 
development of a model based approach it also defined a novel method for the 
identification of the SoS SoI and an assessment of the applicability of modelling and 
techniques to SoS, which formed the basis of a technique selection tool. The key research 
contributions are summarised below: 
• A model based SoS risk management process was defined, with a summary of initial 
research presented at 10th IEEE International Conference on System of Systems 
Engineering in 2015, the associated paper is attached in Annex C 
• The SoS SoI model defined a set of dimensions and the relationships between them 
and is described in the paper attached in Annex A, which was presented at the 7th 
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IEEE International Conference on System of Systems Engineering in 2012. This is a 
key element of the SoS risk management process, underpinning the risk 
identification activity and the selection of appropriate M&S methods. 
• A method was defined which supported the integration of heterogeneous model 
ouputs into a central BBN using a Monte Carlo approach producing an estimate of 
risk. This is a novel technique which is essential to the modelling of SoS risk. 
 
The following contributions may be regarded as supplementary, each contributing to 
elements of the model based SoS risk management process: 
• The modelling and simulation survey assessed a range of techniques using a 
framework based upon the SoS SoI dimensions, the results of which were published 
in the International Journal of Systems of Systems Engineering Vol. 5, No. 2, 2014 
with the paper attached in Annex C. 
• A spreadsheet-based tool was implemented based on the contribution above, which 
enabled model requirements to be input and a subset of appropriate techniques 
identified. 
• A framework to support the identification of SoS risks was defined, utilising the SoS 
SoI and a set of holistic risk types. 
• A method to present and interpret quantified SoS risk results was introduced, which 
allowed risk analysis results to be assessed relatively against best and worst case 
values. 
• A method to determine confidence associated with risk analysis results was defined. 
 
In addition, the following outputs were produced as a result of the case study application: 
• A set of causal networks, BBNs and supporting models were produced which 
supported analysis of SoS risk associated with CAS missions. 
• An initial causal network and BBN was produced which supported the analysis of SoS 
risk associated with food security and the wheat food supply chain. 
 
Key insights gained from the research were: 
• Risk Management of SoS requires a different approach to that currently taken for 
individual systems, if risk is managed for each component system then it cannot be 
assumed that the aggregated affect will be to mitigate risk at the SoS level. 
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• Establishing the SoS SoI is essential for effective SoS risk identification, providing a 
clear context when eliciting subject matter expertise. The SoS SoI enables risk 
transfer to be distinguished from mitigation, which is transfer to outside the SoS 
boundary. 
• Due to the complex and heterogeneous nature of SoS, effective modelling requires a 
range of techniques where suitability is determined by the problem context. A 
Bayesian modelling approach was found to be suitable for representing and 
analysing SoS risk.  
• The responsibility for SoS Risk Management is related to the overall SoS 
classification whereby directed and acknowledged SoS allow a single body to 
perform Risk Management but a collaborative SoS requires an advisory body or a 
bottom up cooperative approach. However, Risk Management cannot be applied to 
virtual SoS due to the “lack a central management authority and a centrally agreed 
upon purpose for the system-of-systems” 
 
This research was also presented at webinars to the INCOSE SoS Working Group and 
Systems of Systems Engineering Collaborators Info Exchange (SoSCIE). 
11.4 Future Work and Exploitation 
This section identifies future work, taking the outputs from this research as starting points 
and developing them further. It also identifies potential industrial exploitation paths. 
Although the SoS SoI dimensions were found to be an effective approach to establishing a 
specific SoI, future research could apply further case studies and further refine the 
underlying definitions, which in some cases were somewhat unclear. 
The survey of modelling and simulation techniques covered a reasonable range but further 
research could extend the scope whilst using the same assessment framework. This could 
potentially be developed into an online resource, which could also encompass the selection 
tool. 
The first application case study could be further refined. The conditional probability tables 
would require detailed SME input and the fidelity of the supporting models would require 
enhancement. The enhanced solution could be exploited further through the development 
of a handheld tool, which could provide real-time, or near real-time, CAS risk assessments 
for use in operational situations. 
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The scope of the second case study was necessarily reduced because its purpose was purely 
intended to demonstrate the adaptability of the SoS risk management process. Further 
research could fully apply the process in the context of the food supply chain and the 
creation of appropriate supporting models.  
It is suggested that further development of this research beyond the concept stage should 
first revisit and refine the SoS SoI model, and then expand the model technique selection 
tool to incorporate a wider range of techniques, the case studies could then be developed 
further in parallel. 
Exploitation of the SoS risk management approach could be achieved through further 
conference presentation and introduction into SoSE guides, for example those produced by 
INCOSE. 
The SoS risk management process is generic and is intended to be applicable to all directed, 
acknowledged and collaborative (Dahmann & Baldwin, 2008) SoS. Figure 71 in Section 10.1 
provides a flowchart indicating the activities and their sequence comprising the process, 
which may therefore be followed when applying it to SoS beyond those examined in the two 
case studies. 
11.5 Concluding Remarks 
The case studies discussed in chapter 2 clearly identified a need for a more effective 
approach to the management of risk within SoS, with examples of SoS failure resulting in 
human and financial loss cited where risks were not identified and mitigated. 
This research has furthered the understanding of risk management application to SoS and 
developed a pragmatic model based approach that was demonstrated to be adaptable to 
different types of SoS. As part of the process, a novel approach enabling the integration of 
heterogeneous models was developed which has application beyond the bounds of SoS risk 
management. 
Within our highly networked world, SoS are now pervasive, therefore an improved 
understanding of risk in this context and a practical approach to managing it will hopefully 
be of great benefit. 
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Appendix	A	-	SoS	SoI	Questionnaires	
This appendix provides evidence of the methodology applied in determining the SoS SoI 
dimensions through the provision of questionnaire results completed by purposefully 
selected participants. It should be noted that the responses included are as completed and 
have not been subsequently paraphrased, amended or reformatted. 
PARTICIPANT 1 
What are the Dimensions of the System of Interest for a SoS? 
 
Proposed Dimension This 
dimension is 
relevant to 
the SOI of a 
SoS?1 
Comment 
Component Systems 4  
 
Interactions 4  
 
Time 
• Lifecycle 
• Latency 
•   
  
3 
3 
 
Classification2 
 
3  
Functions / Services 
 
3  
Enterprise Participants 
 
3  
Capabilities 
 
4  
Disciplines 
 
2  
Concept of Operation / Use / 
Employment  
 
4  
Geographic Distribution 
 
2  
Emergence 
 
4  
  
SoS M&S Outputs 
 
SoS M&S Output Dimensions3 Which M&S techniques enable 
measurement of this output? 
How reliable is this 
measurement?4 
Emergent Behaviour    
Connectivity   
Interoperability   
Agility   
Cost/ Balance of Investment   
Effectiveness  (ability to achieve purpose)   
Sustainability (deliver level of performance 
despite interference) 
  
                                                          
1 1=Strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neutral, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly Agree 
2 Assume Directed, Acknowledged, Collaborative and Virtual, until something better comes along 
3 Some are re-used from Evaluating SoS Against Mission Requirements, P Johnson 2009, PhD Thesis 
4 1=Extremely Unreliable, 2=Unreliable, 3=Neutral, 4=Reliable, 5=Extremely Reliable 
A-2 
Survivability (to function during and after 
environment disturbance) 
  
Risk   
Performance    
Safety (Hazard Analysis)   
Evolution   
Autonomy   
Reliability   
Mission Planning 
 
  
Robustness (to environmental factors) 
 
  
Capability Planning 
 
  
 
PARTICIPANT 2 
What are the Dimensions of the System of Interest for a SoS? 
 
Proposed Dimension This 
dimension is 
relevant to 
the SOI of a 
SoS? 
Comment 
Component Systems 5 May need to think about groups vs. components/subsystems.  
Interactions 5 Need to consider close/loose coupling, where decisions are 
made, control, overriding, etc. 
 
Time 
• Lifecycle 
• Latency 
•   
  
3 
5 
 
Classification5 
 
2  
Functions / Services 
 
4  
Enterprise Participants 
 
4  
Capabilities 
 
5 What’s the difference between function and capability? There 
seems at least some overlap. 
Disciplines 
 
3  
Concept of Operation / Use / 
Employment  
3  
Geographic Distribution 
 
3  
Emergence 
 
5 As automation increases, unwanted emergent properties will 
become a big issue due to the loss of smart human ‘dampers’.  
For example, planned automation developments relating to 
flight control around airports could result in multiple fuel-
based disasters as increasing numbers of aircraft are 
restacked. 
 
 SoS M&S Outputs 
SoS M&S Output Dimensions Which M&S techniques enable 
measurement of this output? 
How reliable is this 
measurement?6 
Emergent Behaviour  DEVS, surrogate models, systems 
dynamics, agent-based M&S 
4, 4, 3, 2 
Connectivity Petri Nets 3 
Interoperability Mdlg language, enterpr arch frwrk 3, 3 
Agility DEVS, agent-based M&S 3, 3 
Cost/ Balance of Investment DEVS will give you the 4 
                                                          
5 Assume Directed, Acknowledged, Collaborative and Virtual, until something better comes along 
6 1=Extremely Unreliable, 2=Unreliable, 3=Neutral, 4=Reliable, 5=Extremely Reliable 
A-3 
OVERcapacity req’ts to achieve the 
required effectiveness, perf, sust & 
surv 
Effectiveness  (ability to achieve purpose) DEVS, surrogate models, agent-
based M&S 
4, 3, 3 
Sustainability (deliver level of performance 
despite interference) & DAMAGE – LOSS OF 
UNITS 
DEVS, surrogate models, agent-
based M&S 
4,  4, 4 
Survivability (to function during and after 
environment disturbance) 
DEVS, surrogate models, agent-
based M&S 
5, 4, 4 
Risk DEVS, surrogate models, BBN or 
stats mdls, SystemD, Gen Markov 
chains 
5, 4, 3, 3 
Performance  DEVS, surrogate models 5, 4 
Safety (Hazard Analysis) DEVS, surrogate models 4, 3 
Evolution Mdlg language, enterpr arch frwrk 3, 3 
Autonomy ??  
Reliability DEVS, surrogate models, BBN (if 
you have the data) 
5, 4, 3 
Mission Planning  DEVS, surrogate models  
Robustness (to environmental factors) DEVS, surrogate models, agent-
based M&S 
5, 4, 3 
Capability Planning 
 
Mdlg language, enterpr arch frwrk, 
DEVS, surrogate models, agent-
based M&S 
4, 4, 3, 3, 2 
Potential M&S methods 
These are methods that are either currently, or may be, used to model and/or simulate SoS.  Any further suggestions are 
welcome. 
• Modelling Language (UML, SySML) 
• Enterprise Architecture Framework (e.g. MODAF) 
• System Dynamics 
• Discrete Event Simulation/DEVS 
• Agent Based M&S 
• Bayesian Belief Network 
• Artificial Neural Network (ANN) 
• Petri Nets 
• Cellular Automata 
• Generalized Markov Chains 
• Surrogate Models 
•   
•  
It is possible that some of the techniques above may be combined, e.g. intelligent Agents, where an ANN is embedded in an 
Agent giving it a learning capability. 
Some further comments  
The reason that I have put DEVS down so many times is that it can do all these things, by-and-large far better than any other 
tools … IF you have the data, and if you have the right DEVS software; this is where the bad news comes in …  
… Highly complex scenarios can only be simulated using the activity-based form of DEVS – I have programmed in both activity-
based and the alternative event- and process-based forms – the latter two are extremely difficult to write and debug, as their 
complexity rises approximately as the square of the number of activities.  Worse still, to make these alternative (event & 
process-based) forms handle certain conditions, the programmer must use non-simulation botches which make it impossible to 
maintain and modify the resulting model … I am speaking from both personal experience of these problems and from 
conversations with experts.   
So, what about the activity-based simulation programming languages?  Unfortunately, they were mostly UK-based and, when 
the US developed ‘pretty-picture’ simulation modellers and took over most of the simulation markets, the activity-based 
languages were were lost.  There are (as far as I know) no activity-based programming languages currently available.  The only 
one that I managed to locate was developed and used by a US consultancy company.  I talked to one of the company’s senior 
managers over the phone several years ago.  He said that the simulation program gave them such a large advantage over their 
competitors that they would not consider releasing it, even as a commercial product.  
Most of the discrete simulators currently available are parameter-driven models, not programming languages.  Inevitably, these 
models only have very limited flexibility, and you cannot make them do anything that the model creator did not anticipate.  
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PARTICIPANT 3 
What are the Dimensions of the System of Interest for a SoS? 
Proposed Dimension This dimension is 
relevant to the SOI 
of a SoS? 
Comment 
Component Systems 5 Do not see how you can bound your SoI if you cannot 
identify the component systems within your SoI boundary 
and those with which your SoI will have key interactions or 
dependencies in the SoS environment 
 
Interactions 5 See comment above 
 
Time 
• Lifecycle 
• Latency 
•   
 Time is an important concept for an SoS (eg lifecycle phase, 
required period of operation, time available for configuration 
etc) but it is not a constant across all types of SoS 
3 
? 
 
Classification 
 
4 I get the feeling that some kind of classification system is 
important as I think there are likely similarities and 
differences that could be identified as pertaining to one 
group or another – but not sure if the current classification is 
fit for purpose – maybe we need a multidimensional one 
Functions / Services 
 
3 Yes if functions can be grouped or classified and can fit into 
some kind of overall classification as referred to above.  
Obviously functionality required and available is critical to 
configuring and controlling an SoS but is it a key dimension in 
the same sense as the others 
Enterprise Participants 
 
4 If you rephrase this to SoS participants then yes – if you 
mean the SoS environment participants then not so much.  
But again perhaps we are also looking for some kind of 
classification of participants such as controllers, users, 
maintainers etc 
Capabilities 
 
3 Same comment as functions until you start looking at 
differing overall capability depending on the particular 
configuration of an SoS.  Maybe this should tie in with 
Classification above 
Disciplines 
 
2 Not sure you could capture this in a meaning way that would 
add anything to functions/services 
Concept of Operation / Use / 
Employment  
 
4 Yes important to understand how different Conops might 
impact on the configuration or operation of an SoS 
Geographic Distribution 
 
5 Yes if it is pertinent to the operation or (re)configurability of 
an SoS  
Emergence 
 
? This is obviously important but what do we mean here.  Are 
we referring to the potential for emergence (desirable or 
undesirable), the impact, the likelihood etc.  Think we need 
to be more specific 
Levels of Control 
 
  
Maintainability 
 
  
 
SoS M&S Outputs 
 
SoS M&S Output Dimensions Which M&S techniques enable 
measurement of this output? 
How reliable is this 
measurement? 
Emergent Behaviour  • Modelling Language 
(UML, SySML) 
• Enterprise Architecture 
Framework (e.g. MODAF) 
• System Dynamics 
• Discrete Event 
Simulation/DEVS 
• Cellular Automata 
• Generalized Markov 
4 – in terms of input to decision 
support.  Some of these can be 
modelled accurately or 
quantatively 
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Chains 
• Surrogate Models 
Simulations, Enterprise System 
Modelling 
Connectivity • Modelling Language 
(UML, SySML) 
• Enterprise Architecture 
Framework (e.g. MODAF) 
• Agent Based M&S 
• Bayesian Belief Network 
• Artificial Neural Network 
(ANN) 
• Petri Nets 
• Cellular Automata 
DFDs , circuit diagrams etc 
4 for planned, 2 for ad hoc 
Interoperability UML etc 
• Modelling Language 
(UML, SySML) 
• Enterprise Architecture 
Framework (e.g. MODAF) 
• System Dynamics 
• Artificial Neural Network 
(ANN) 
• Petri Nets 
4 for planned, 2 for ad hoc 
Agility Need to define it first – from PJ 
thesis remember it was made up of a 
series of measurable secondary 
factors 
 
Cost/ Balance of Investment Standard Financial Modelling 4 in terms of straight financial cost, 
2 or 1 for overall added value 
Effectiveness  (ability to achieve purpose) Simulations, Trial runs, Post hoc 
wash ups ,  
Enterprise Architecture Models 
• Enterprise Architecture 
Framework (e.g. MODAF) 
• Discrete Event 
Simulation/DEVS 
• Agent Based M&S 
• Cellular Automata 
• Generalized Markov 
Chains 
• Surrogate Models  ? 
 
4 
 
3 – but better than nothing 
Sustainability (deliver level of performance 
despite interference) 
Simulations, Trial runs, Post hoc 
wash ups ,  
Enterprise Architecture Models 
+ as above 
4 
 
3 – but better than nothing 
Survivability (to function during and after 
environment disturbance) 
Simulations, Trial runs, Post hoc 
wash ups ,  
Enterprise Architecture Models 
+ as above 
4 
 
3 – but better than nothing 
Risk Do you model risk or identify and 
manage it with the previous 3 used 
to establish impact on performance 
 
Performance  Simulations, Trial runs, Post hoc 
wash ups ,  
Enterprise Architecture Models 
• Enterprise Architecture 
Framework (e.g. MODAF) 
• Discrete Event 
Simulation/DEVS 
• Agent Based M&S 
• Cellular Automata 
• Generalized Markov 
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Chains 
• Surrogate Models  ? 
 
Safety (Hazard Analysis)   
Evolution   
Autonomy   
Reliability   
Mission Planning 
 
  
Robustness (to environmental factors) 
 
  
Capability Planning 
 
  
 
 
PARTICIPANT 4 
What are the Dimensions of the System of Interest for a SoS? 
 
Proposed Dimension This 
dimension is 
relevant to 
the SOI of a 
SoS? 
Comment 
Component Systems 3 Not sure what this means.  
 
Interactions 4 Ditto. Nature of Interactions? 
 
Time 
• Lifecycle 
• Latency 
•   
  
5 
4 
 
Classification 
 
4  
Functions / Services 
 
4  
Enterprise Participants 
 
3 ? Meaning personnel? 
Capabilities 
 
4  
Disciplines 
 
5  
Concept of Operation / Use / 
Employment  
 
5  
Geographic Distribution 
 
4 Will have some influence 
Emergence 
 
5 This will likely determine the modelling approach 
  
SoS M&S Outputs 
 
SoS M&S Output Dimensions Which M&S techniques enable 
measurement of this output? 
How reliable is this measurement? 
Emergent Behaviour  Agent, ANN, CA 4 (unlikely to expose all emergent 
behaviours with simplified models) 
Connectivity EAF, Petri 5 (true for a snapshot) 
Interoperability EAF 5 (true for a snapshot) 
Agility Agent, ANN 4 
Cost/ Balance of Investment EAF 5 (but only good for pre-defined 
assemblies of systems) 
Effectiveness  (ability to achieve purpose) EAF 5 (if system is already defined) 
Sustainability (deliver level of performance 
despite interference) 
Agent 4 
Survivability (to function during and after Agent 4 
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environment disturbance) 
Risk DEVS 4 because it is formal in nature 
Performance   In which dimension? Needs a 
modelling tool such as matlab 
Safety (Hazard Analysis) DEVS  
Evolution Agent  
Autonomy Agent, ANN  
Reliability Bayesian Possibly – using a FMECA approach 
Mission Planning 
 
 Not sure what this means 
Robustness (to environmental factors) 
 
Agent  
Capability Planning 
 
Agent/EAF combination 4 – may need to use a combination 
of all tthe techniques 
 
PARTICIPANT 5 
What are the Dimensions of the System of Interest for a SoS? 
Proposed Dimension This 
dimension is 
relevant to 
the SOI of a 
SoS? 
Comment 
Component Systems 5 Considering the hierarchy of SoS-Systems-Subsystems, do 
component systems encapsulate Systems and also Subsystems?  
 
Interactions 4 Is there an association between interactions and also 
interoperability i.e. NCOIC framework. 
Time 
• Lifecycle 
• Latency 
5 Lifecycle of SoS - how much different is this from other lifecycles 
e.g. CADMID? 5 
4 
Classification 
 
5 The four classifications from the literature – need clear example 
to have an understanding of their meaning? Are these 
classifications mutually exclusive? 
Functions / Services 
 
4 Does Services already contain functions in addition to 
engineering and commercial processes? How is service defined 
in this context? It might be a good idea to separate these two. 
Enterprise Participants 
 
4 Enterprise and participants may also need to be separated. 
Enterprise in this context could be the organisations and the 
supply chain etc. Participants/Stakeholders/Users etc., may need 
another term and listed apart from the term Enterprise! 
Capabilities 
 
4 Does capabilities exhibit SoS or vice versa? There are different 
viewpoints associated to the term Capability. We may need a 
clear definition! Refer to Michael Henshaw paper on Capability 
Engineering Perspective Analysis. 
Disciplines 
 
4 Are these role specific disciplines? Disciplines could also be part 
o the component systems as each system may comprise a 
number of disciplines? 
Concept of Operation / Use / 
Employment  
 
4 Are these just processes associated to SoS? CONOPS may also be 
part of TEPIDOIL or Component of Capability (CoC) i.e. processes. 
Geographic Distribution 4 Yes – important. 
Emergence 4 Yes – important. 
Heterogeneity  
 
4 I introduced this as I think it is relevant to disciplines. 
Heterogeneous domain/disciplines may be they right approach!  
 
Operational and Managerial 
Independence 
 Maier’s and also Jamshidi’s characteristics of SoS can also be 
incorporated into these dimensions. It depends on what we 
mean by dimension? 
SoS M&S Outputs 
 
SoS M&S Output Dimensions Which M&S techniques enable 
measurement of this output? 
How reliable is this measurement? 
Emergent Behaviour  Prediction through BNs (Bayesian 
Networks) 
3 
Connectivity Social Network Analysis (SNAs) 
depends on what you mean by 
connectivity? 
3 
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Interoperability NCOIC framework?? 3 
Agility   
Cost/ Balance of Investment COCOMO, is COSYSMO by Boehm 
et al. 
4 
Effectiveness  (ability to achieve purpose) Key Performance Indicators 
(KPIs)??? 
3 
Sustainability (deliver level of performance 
despite interference) 
  
Survivability (to function during and after 
environment disturbance) 
  
Risk COSYSMO? 3 
Performance    
Safety (Hazard Analysis)   
Evolution   
Autonomy   
Reliability Weibull distribution, Jelinski-
Moranda (JM), Littlewood-Verall, 
Musa-Okumoto, Mills Seeding and 
Taggin, Markov, Computer-Aided 
Software Reliability Estimation 
(CASRE) system 
4 
Mission Planning 
 
  
Robustness (to environmental factors) 
 
PESTLE factors???  
Capability Planning 
 
Audits? 3 
 
PARTICIPANT 6 
What are the Dimensions of the System of Interest for a SoS? 
 
Proposed Dimension This 
dimension is 
relevant to 
the SOI of a 
SoS? 
Comment 
Component Systems 5  
 
Interactions 5 Maybe you can separate them in between and within 
component system interactions  
 
Time 
• Lifecycle 
• Latency 
•   
 Maybe more important for a whole system. For example, if 
your SOI includes a whole subsystem then the importance of 
the dimension may be greater than if the SOI includes a part 
of a subsystem.  
3 
 
 
Classification 
 
5 Although the classification that we have at this moment may 
not be hugely representative for all types of SoS, the type of 
system may inform the way someone establishes or 
represents the SOI. 
Functions / Services 
 
4 In my opinion, although they are important, functions can go 
sometimes beyond the SOI.  
Enterprise Participants 
 
5  
Capabilities 
 
 This can be covered by functions and interactions. 
I believe it should belong to another level of dimensions.  
Disciplines 
 
 This can be covered by component systems, or component 
of systems. 
The same as capability dimension 
Concept of Operation / Use / 
Employment  
 
 Functionality? 
Geographic Distribution 
 
4 Implications for logistics and additional costs. 
Emergence 
 
2 Don’t know if this would be of any help as by looking at the 
emergent behaviour of subsystem (looking at 
intercomponent linkages) you can’t predict the emergent 
behaviour of the whole SoS because of the intracomponent 
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linkages that one my miss. 
 
SoS M&S Outputs 
 
SoS M&S Output Dimensions Which M&S techniques enable 
measurement of this output? 
How reliable is this measurement? 
Emergent Behaviour  Systems Dynamics 
Agent-Based Models 
 
Connectivity   
Interoperability   
Agility   
Cost/ Balance of Investment   
Effectiveness  (ability to achieve purpose)   
Sustainability (deliver level of performance 
despite interference) 
  
Survivability (to function during and after 
environment disturbance) 
  
Risk   
Performance  Discrete event simulation  
Safety (Hazard Analysis)   
Evolution   
Autonomy   
Reliability Petri Nets Simulation  
Mission Planning 
 
  
Robustness (to environmental factors) 
 
  
Capability Planning 
 
  
 
PARTICIPANT 7 
What are the Dimensions of the System of Interest for a SoS? 
 
Proposed Dimension This 
dimension is 
relevant to 
the SOI of a 
SoS? 
Comment 
Component Systems yes Defines what is actually in the systems of interest; but the 
representation of component systems could be done at the 
actual system level or the class/type of system. 
 
Interactions Yes  
An SoS exists only because of interactions between 
constituent systems, so the interactions must provide some 
definition of the SOI.  As above, these could be at the 
individual interaction level or at the class/type of interaction 
level. 
Time 
• Lifecycle 
• Latency 
•   
 The SOI at a specific instant in time depends on what Systems 
are currently contributing.  Frequency of 
change/replenishment of systems within the SoS could be a 
useful measure (slowly or quickly changing).  Life phases, 
rather than cycle, could be relevant to indicate current status 
of the SoS which is related to SOI 
yes 
Possibly not 
 
Classification 
 
Yes But tighter definition of the types is needed 
Functions / Services 
 
yes This seems relevant but perhaps less important than others.  
The services or functions provided by individual systems 
seems to indicate something about the content of the SOI.  In 
terms of building or analysing a SoS, the question what 
services should I include in the analysis seems relevant. 
Enterprise Participants 
 
yes This may have more relevance for some types than others.  
For instance, for virtual, maybe it is a) impossible to know, b) 
not much help when you do.  However, for collaborative and 
acknowledged, there is clearly a need to understand 
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participation.  Probably also try for Directed, but may be not 
such a significant question. 
Capabilities 
 
no Probably not, though the SOI might be important information 
for deciding on the SOI for a capability. 
Disciplines 
 
moderate May be helpful, but I don’t think it defines the SOI. 
Concept of Operation / Use / 
Employment  
 
Yes Given that the individual systems can perform operations 
independently, I think the use/mission of the SoS is critical for 
defining the SOI for the SoS as opposed to the individual 
constituent systems. 
Geographic Distribution 
 
Yes May be more relevant to some situations than others 
Emergence 
 
No Although emergence is an important property, I don’t think it 
defines the SOI. 
  
SoS M&S Outputs 
 
SoS M&S Output Dimensions Which M&S techniques enable 
measurement of this output? 
How reliable is this measurement? 
Emergent Behaviour  Simulation 
Baysian belief 
Agent based 
Only as reliable as our 
understanding of the problem 
space. 
Connectivity Architecture, simulation,  Depends on complexity 
Interoperability architecture Pretty good if done properly 
Agility System dynamics 
Agent based 
 
Cost/ Balance of Investment Scenario planning 
EA 
Wisdom of the crowd simulation 
tools and calculators 
 
 
Effectiveness  (ability to achieve purpose) Agent based 
Baysian 
System dynamic 
 
Sustainability (deliver level of performance 
despite interference) 
Agent based 
DES 
 
 
Survivability (to function during and after 
environment disturbance) 
  
Risk Combination of models within 
tradespace 
Baysian 
Systems dynamics 
 
Performance    
Safety (Hazard Analysis) Architectures 
As risks 
 
Evolution Scenario planning 
architecture 
 
Autonomy Agent based  
Reliability architecture  
Mission Planning 
 
Scenario planning 
Architecture 
 
Robustness (to environmental factors) 
 
Scenario planning  
Capability Planning 
 
Scenario 
Architecture 
Cost modelling tools 
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PARTICIPANT 8 
What are the Dimensions of the System of Interest for a SoS? 
 
Proposed Dimension This 
dimension is 
relevant to 
the SOI of a 
SoS? 
Comment 
Component Systems 5 You need to know what systemsa are within the SoS (as far 
as you cann determine) 
 
Interactions 5 Need to know both the interfaces, and the behaviour at the 
interfaces, when the systems interact 
 
Time 
• Lifecycle 
• Latency 
•  Variability 
 An SoS may become unstable with large variations in event 
times.  Camn’t remember the paper that discusses this issue. 5 
5 
5 
Classification 
 
3 DoD 4 casses somewhat irrelevant – most SoS are a 
combination of these classes. 
Functions / Services 
 
4 Not sure what you mean – infrastructural support?  Tends to 
be overlooked  in the literature, but vital in practice 
Enterprise Participants 
 
5 Determines nature of control in SoS.  Note, we don’t know 
how to design the interface between organisations that  are 
a different technology/lifecycle points. 
Capabilities 
 
4 Not as importantas interactions – see above 
Disciplines 
 
5 The more that re involved in understanding what’s going on, 
the better. 
Concept of Operation / Use / 
Employment  
 
4 Useful for design; less useful for operations, due to effects of 
resilience, adaptability over life cycle 
Geographic Distribution 
 
5 Vital – cultural and legal issues 
Emergence 
 
5 Critical issue; need to know and metricate this w.r.t. 
intended emergence (that’s why you are putting the SoS 
together), and highly necessary to estimatethe unwanted 
emergence, so that you can build in resilience, adaptabilty.  
Latter will probably be insufficient, due to surprises, but may 
result in less-costly amelioration efforts. 
  
SoS M&S Outputs 
 
SoS M&S Output Dimensions Which M&S techniques enable 
measurement of this output? 
How reliable is this measurement? 
Emergent Behaviour  Most of the oens in the list below 
(see comments) will help with 
desired emergence; only some will 
provide input for 
unwanted/unexpected emergence. 
I expect 4 for desired. 2 for 
unexpected. 
Connectivity Not sure what you mean by this.  
Interoperability   
Agility None that I can think of.  Don’t think 
any I yourist really get hold of this. 
 
Cost/ Balance of Investment   
Effectiveness  (ability to achieve purpose)   
Sustainability (deliver level of performance 
despite interference) 
  
Survivability (to function during and after 
environment disturbance) 
  
Risk   
Performance    
Safety (Hazard Analysis)   
Evolution   
Autonomy   
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Reliability   
Mission Planning 
 
  
Robustness (to environmental factors) 
 
  
Capability Planning 
 
  
 
Potential M&S methods 
These are methods that are either currently, or may be, used to model and/or simulate SoS.  Any further suggestions are 
welcome. 
• Modelling Language (UML, SySML)  Need these as a lingua franca, but they may need extension to cover SoS-specific 
aspects.  Probably need templates, or something, to cater for complexity of large SoS – too much for humans to 
dif=gest without somekind of reductive tool 
• Enterprise Architecture Framework (e.g. MODAF)  OK for ITC systems; badly missing elaborations for organisational 
aspects.  Anns Bruseberg did some work on this aspect, but not enough 
• System Dynamics  Definitely need something like this;may need some ontologiv=cal extension 
• Discrete Event Simulation/DEVS  Necessary 
• Agent Based M&S  Probably a good way forwards. 
• Bayesian Belief Network  Yet to be convinced that BBNs are relevant to a resilience domain, as in SoS 
• Artificial Neural Network (ANN)  Same comment.  How do these model resilience and adaptability of the SoS 
context?  Don’t think they were designed for tis. 
• Petri Nets  Likrely to be useful, but need some good tools for this 
• Cellular Automata  Potentially useful, complementing system dynamics and agent approaches. 
• Generalized Markov Chains  I think these have a presumption about static environments; doesn’t apply to SoS 
except short-term. 
• Surrogate Models  Pass. 
•   
PARTICIPANT 9 
What are the Dimensions of the System of Interest for a SoS? 
 
Proposed Dimension This 
dimension is 
relevant to 
the SOI of a 
SoS? 
Comment 
Component Systems Yes  
 
Interactions yes  
 
Time 
• Lifecycle 
• Latency 
•   
  
May be 
May be 
 
Classification  Not sure what you mean 
Functions / Services 
 
yes I think for most of these dimensions, I think you have to 
work out first what the purpose of the model and/or 
simulation is before you can decide whether or not they are 
relevant to your SOI. 
Enterprise Participants 
 
yes 
Capabilities 
 
maybe 
Disciplines 
 
maybe 
Concept of Operation / Use / 
Employment  
 
uncertain 
Geographic Distribution 
 
Maybe 
Emergence 
 
 This one is tricky as you can include expected emergence 
but what about unexpected emergence? If it can be 
included, wouldn’t that be an output from the 
model/simulation rather than something that goes in? 
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SoS M&S Outputs 
 
SoS M&S Output Dimensions Which M&S techniques enable 
measurement of this output? 
How reliable is this measurement? 
Emergent Behaviour  I don’t have enough experience of 
the techniques to comment.  
 
Connectivity   
Interoperability   
Agility   
Cost/ Balance of Investment   
Effectiveness  (ability to achieve purpose)   
Sustainability (deliver level of performance 
despite interference) 
  
Survivability (to function during and after 
environment disturbance) 
  
Risk   
Performance    
Safety (Hazard Analysis)   
Evolution   
Autonomy   
Reliability   
Mission Planning 
 
  
Robustness (to environmental factors) 
 
  
Capability Planning 
 
  
 
PARTICIPANT 10 
What are the Dimensions of the System of Interest for a SoS? 
 
Proposed Dimension This 
dimension is 
relevant to 
the SOI of a 
SoS? 
Comment 
Component Systems 5  
 
Interactions 5  
 
Time 
• Lifecycle 
• Latency 
•   
5  
 
 
 
Classification 
 
3  
Functions / Services 
 
4  
Enterprise Participants 
 
4  
Capabilities 
 
5 The aim of SOS is to achieve some of capability 
Disciplines 
 
3  
Concept of Operation / Use / 
Employment  
 
3  
Geographic Distribution 
 
3  
Emergence 
 
5  
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SoS M&S Outputs 
 
SoS M&S Output Dimensions Which M&S techniques enable 
measurement of this output? 
How reliable is this measurement? 
Emergent Behaviour    
Connectivity   
Interoperability   
Agility   
Cost/ Balance of Investment   
Effectiveness  (ability to achieve purpose)   
Sustainability (deliver level of performance 
despite interference) 
  
Survivability (to function during and after 
environment disturbance) 
  
Risk   
Performance    
Safety (Hazard Analysis)   
Evolution   
Autonomy ALFUS (autonomy levels for 
unmanned systems) 
4 
Reliability   
Mission Planning 
 
  
Robustness (to environmental factors) 
 
  
Capability Planning 
 
  
 
PARTICIPANT 11 
What are the Dimensions of the System of Interest for a SoS? 
 
Proposed Dimension This 
dimension is 
relevant to 
the SOI of a 
SoS? 
Comment 
Component Systems 4  
 
Interactions 5  
 
Time 
• Lifecycle 
• Latency 
•   
5  
5 
4 
 
Classification 
 
3  
Functions / Services 
 
4  
Enterprise Participants 
 
5  
Capabilities 
 
4  
Disciplines 
 
3  
Concept of Operation / Use / 
Employment  
 
3  
Geographic Distribution 
 
4  
Emergence 
 
5  
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 SoS M&S Outputs 
 
 
SoS M&S Output Dimensions Which M&S techniques enable 
measurement of this output? 
How reliable is this measurement? 
Emergent Behaviour  Qualitative measurement / 
appreciation with systems 
dynamics 
 
Connectivity   
Interoperability   
Agility Surrogate modelling  
Cost/ Balance of Investment Cost Modelling  
Effectiveness  (ability to achieve purpose)   
Sustainability (deliver level of performance 
despite interference) 
  
Survivability (to function during and after 
environment disturbance) 
  
Risk Dedicated risk modelling 
approaches 
 
Performance    
Safety (Hazard Analysis)   
Evolution   
Autonomy   
Reliability   
Mission Planning 
 
  
Robustness (to environmental factors) 
 
  
Capability Planning 
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Appendix	B	–	CAS	Model	Selection	Matrix	Tool	Output	
This appendix provides evidence of the research methodology through the inclusion of screenshots from the SoS model technique selection tool as used in 
model development for the risk analysis activity in application case study 1, Close Air Support.  It also provides artefacts that provide a starting point from 
which future research may further develop the case study.
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Table B - 1 : M&S Technique Selection: Blue Force Proximity 
 B-3
 
Table B - 2 : M&S Technique Selection: Kill Chain Accuracy 
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Table B - 3 : M&S Technique Selection: SA Quality - Initial Analysis 
 B-5
 
Table B - 4 : M&S Technique Selection: SA Quality 
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Table B - 5 : M&S Technique Selection – Interoperability 
 B-7
 
Table B - 6 : M&S Technique Selection - Blue Force Visibility 
 B-8
 
Table B - 7 : M&S Technique Selection - Target Visibility 
 B-9
 
Table B - 8 : M&S Technique Selection – Civilian Proximity 
 B-10 
 
Table B - 9 : M&S Technique Selection - Civilian Visibility 
 B-11 
 
Table B - 10 : M&S Model Technique Selection: Enemy Capability 
 B-12 
 
Table B - 11 : M&S Technique Selection: Flight Path Risk 
 B-13 
 
Table B - 12 : M&S Technique Selection: Defensive Capability 
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Appendix	C	–	Application	Case	Study	1	Bayesian	Belief	Network	Probability	Tables	
This appendix contains the probability tables, which are associated with application case 
study 1 (Close Air Support) Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) conditional probability table 
variables; the following tables were generated by the Netica application, reporting facility, 
providing evidence of the research methodology through the development of models and a 
point from which future research may further develop the case study, enabling the BBNs to 
be reconstructed. 
Risk Probability Tables 
Table for "AtmosphericVisibility" 
AtmosphericVisibility CloudLevel DustLevel 
High LessThanTwoOktas Low 
High LessThanTwoOktas Medium 
Low LessThanTwoOktas High 
High BetweenTwoAndSixOktas Low 
Medium BetweenTwoAndSixOktas Medium 
Low BetweenTwoAndSixOktas High 
Medium GreatThanSixOktas Low 
Medium GreatThanSixOktas Medium 
Low GreatThanSixOktas High 
 
Table for "BlueForceVisibility" 
BlueForceVisibility AtmosphericVisibility Light 
Low Low Daytime 
Low Low Night 
Low Low Twilight 
Medium Medium Daytime 
Low Medium Night 
Medium Medium Twilight 
High High Daytime 
Low High Night 
Medium High Twilight 
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able for "BlueForceRisk" 
Lo
w 
Mediu
m 
Hig
h 
BlueForceVisibili
ty BlueForceProximity 
0.0
5 0.25 0.7 Low LessThan500m 
0.2
5 0.25 0.5 Low 
Between500mAnd100
0m 
0.5 0.3 0.2 Low GreaterThan1000m 
0.2 0.3 0.5 Medium LessThan500m 
0.2 0.5 0.3 Medium Between500mAnd1000m 
0.5 0.4 0.1 Medium GreaterThan1000m 
0.5 0.3 0.2 High LessThan500m 
0.7 0.2 0.1 High Between500mAnd1000m 
0.8 0.15 0.05 High GreaterThan1000m 
 
Table for "OperatorWorkload" 
Low Medium High ScenarioDensity C2SystemCapability 
0.6 0.3 0.1 Low Low 
0.7 0.2 0.1 Low Medium 
0.95 0.03 0.02 Low High 
0.1 0.55 0.35 Medium Low 
0.1 0.8 0.1 Medium Medium 
0.45 0.5 0.05 Medium High 
0.01 0.09 0.9 High Low 
0.01 0.39 0.6 High Medium 
0.2 0.6 0.2 High High 
Table for "SurveillanceCapability" 
Low Medium High UAVCapability ASTORCapability 
1 0 0 Low Low 
0.5 0.5 0 Low Medium 
0.2 0.6 0.2 Low High 
0.5 0.5 0 Medium Low 
0 1 0 Medium Medium 
0 0.5 0.5 Medium High 
0.2 0.6 0.2 High Low 
0 0.5 0.5 High Medium 
0 0 1 High High 
  
Table for "IntelligenceCapability" 
Low Medium High SIGINTCapability VisualCapability 
1 0 0 Low Low 
0.5 0.5 0 Low Medium 
0.2 0.6 0.2 Low High 
0.5 0.5 0 Medium Low 
0 1 0 Medium Medium 
0 0.5 0.5 Medium High 
0.2 0.6 0.2 High Low 
0 0.5 0.5 High Medium 
0 0 1 High High 
 
ble for "ISRCapability" 
Lo
w 
Mediu
m 
Hig
h 
SurveillanceCapabil
ity 
IntelligenceCapabil
ity 
1 0 0 Low Low 
0.5 0.5 0 Low Medium 
0.2 0.6 0.2 Low High 
0.5 0.5 0 Medium Low 
0 1 0 Medium Medium 
0 0.5 0.5 Medium High 
0.2 0.6 0.2 High Low 
0 0.5 0.5 High Medium 
0 0 1 High High 
Table for "SoSCapability" 
Low Medium High OperatorWorkload ISRCapability 
0.6 0.4 0 Low Low 
0 0.8 0.2 Low Medium 
0 0 1 Low High 
0.8 0.2 0 Medium Low 
0 1 0 Medium Medium 
0 0.3 0.7 Medium High 
1 0 0 High Low 
0.2 0.8 0 High Medium 
0.1 0.3 0.6 High High 
 
Table for "SAQuality" 
Low Medium High Interoperability SoSCapability 
1 0 0 Low Low 
0.5 0.5 0 Low Medium 
0.2 0.6 0.2 Low High 
0.5 0.5 0 Medium Low 
0 1 0 Medium Medium 
0 0.5 0.5 Medium High 
0.2 0.6 0.2 High Low 
0 0.5 0.5 High Medium 
0 0 1 High High 
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Table for "InformationQuality" 
Low Medium High KillChainAccuracy SAQuality 
0.2 0.6 0.2 LessThan100m Low 
0 0.5 0.5 LessThan100m Medium 
0 0.1 0.9 LessThan100m High 
0.5 0.5 0 Between100mAnd200m Low 
0.2 0.8 0 Between100mAnd200m Medium 
0.1 0.45 0.45 Between100mAnd200m High 
0.9 0.1 0 GreaterThan200m Low 
0.5 0.5 0 GreaterThan200m Medium 
0.2 0.6 0.2 GreaterThan200m High 
Table for "Fractricide" 
High Medium Low BlueForceRisk InformationQuality 
0 0.5 0.5 Low Low 
0 0.3 0.7 Low Medium 
0 0.1 0.9 Low High 
0.3 0.7 0 Medium Low 
0 1 0 Medium Medium 
0 0.5 0.5 Medium High 
0.9 0.1 0 High Low 
0.7 0.3 0 High Medium 
0.3 0.6 0.1 High High 
 
Table for "CivilianVisibility" 
CivilianVisibility AtmosphericVisibility LightLevel 
Low Low Daytime 
Low Low Night 
Low Low Twilight 
Medium Medium Daytime 
Low Medium Night 
Medium Medium Twilight 
High High Daytime 
Low High Night 
Medium High Twilight 
 
Table for "CivilianRisk" 
Low Medium High CivilianVisibility CivilianProximity 
0.1 0.2 0.7 Low LessThan1km 
0.5 0.25 0.25 Low Between1kmAnd2km 
0.7 0.25 0.05 Low GreaterThan2km 
0.1 0.3 0.6 Medium LessThan1km 
0.45 0.35 0.2 Medium Between1kmAnd2km 
0.75 0.2 0.05 Medium GreaterThan2km 
0.2 0.3 0.5 High LessThan1km 
0.6 0.25 0.15 High Between1kmAnd2km 
0.9 0.08 0.02 High GreaterThan2km 
 
Table for "CollateralDamage" 
High Medium Low CivilianRisk InformationQuality 
0 0.5 0.5 Low Low 
0 0.3 0.7 Low Medium 
0 0.1 0.9 Low High 
0.3 0.7 0 Medium Low 
0 1 0 Medium Medium 
0 0.5 0.5 Medium High 
0.9 0.1 0 High Low 
0.7 0.3 0 High Medium 
0.3 0.6 0.1 High High 
 
Table for "FlightPathRisk" 
Low Medium High Terrain Aircraftheight 
0.7 0.2 0.1 Flat Below500ft 
0.85 0.1 0.05 Flat Between500and1000ft 
0.95 0.05 0 Flat Above1000ft 
0.3 0.5 0.2 Undulating Below500ft 
0.5 0.4 0.1 Undulating Between500and1000ft 
0.7 0.25 0.05 Undulating Above1000ft 
0.1 0.2 0.7 Mountainous Below500ft 
0.15 0.25 0.6 Mountainous Between500and1000ft 
0.3 0.4 0.3 Mountainous Above1000ft 
 
Table for "EnemyCapabiity" 
Low Medium High WeaponType Targetting 
1 0 0 Low Low 
0.7 0.3 0 Low Medium 
0.25 0.5 0.25 Low High 
0.7 0.3 0 Medium Low 
0.25 0.5 0.25 Medium Medium 
0.1 0.6 0.3 Medium High 
0.25 0.5 0.25 High Low 
0.1 0.3 0.6 High Medium 
0 0 1 High High 
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Table for "DefensiveCapability" 
Low Medium High Jamming CounterMeasures 
1 0 0 Low Low 
0.7 0.3 0 Low Medium 
0.25 0.5 0.25 Low High 
0.7 0.3 0 Medium Low 
0.25 0.5 0.25 Medium Medium 
0.1 0.6 0.3 Medium High 
0.25 0.5 0.25 High Low 
0.1 0.3 0.6 High Medium 
0 0 1 High High 
Table for "PlatformDefence" 
Low Medium High EnemyCapabiity DefensiveCapability 
0 0.2 0.8 Low Low 
0 0.1 0.9 Low Medium 
0 0.01 0.99 Low High 
0.55 0.4 0.05 Medium Low 
0.1 0.8 0.1 Medium Medium 
0.05 0.25 0.7 Medium High 
0.9 0.1 0 High Low 
0.25 0.7 0.05 High Medium 
0.2 0.6 0.2 High High 
 
 
Table for "PlatformVulnerability" 
Low Medium High SAQuality PlatformDefence 
0 0.3 0.7 Low Low 
0 0.8 0.2 Low Medium 
0.4 0.4 0.2 Low High 
0 0.5 0.5 Medium Low 
0 1 0 Medium Medium 
0.5 0.5 0 Medium High 
0.2 0.5 0.3 High Low 
0.7 0.25 0.05 High Medium 
0.9 0.1 0 High High 
Table for "LossOfDeliveryAircraft" 
Low Medium High PlatformVulnerability FlightPathRisk 
1 0 0 Low Low 
0.5 0.5 0 Low Medium 
0.2 0.6 0.2 Low High 
0.5 0.5 0 Medium Low 
0 1 0 Medium Medium 
0 0.5 0.5 Medium High 
0.2 0.6 0.2 High Low 
0 0.5 0.5 High Medium 
0 0 1 High High 
 
Table for "EnvironmentalVisibility" 
EnvironmentalVisibility AtmosphericVisibility Light 
Low Low Daytime 
Low Low Night 
Low Low Twilight 
Medium Medium Daytime 
Low Medium Night 
Medium Medium Twilight 
High High Daytime 
Low High Night 
Medium High Twilight 
 
 
 
Table for "Marking" 
Marking Smoke Phosphorous Laser 
High Present Present Present 
Medium Present Present Absent 
High Present Absent Present 
Low Present Absent Absent 
High Absent Present Present 
Medium Absent Present Absent 
High Absent Absent Present 
Low Absent Absent Absent 
  
Table for "TargetVisLevel" 
Low Medium High Marking Camouflage 
0.3 0.4 0.3 Low Low 
0.6 0.4 0 Low Medium 
0.9 0.1 0 Low High 
0.1 0.6 0.3 Medium Low 
0.2 0.7 0.1 Medium Medium 
0.4 0.55 0.05 Medium High 
0.05 0.15 0.8 High Low 
0.05 0.25 0.7 High Medium 
0.1 0.4 0.5 High High 
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Table for "VisualVisibility" 
Lo
w 
Mediu
m 
Hig
h 
EnvironmentalVisibilit
y 
TargetVisLeve
l 
0.9 0.1 0 Low Low 
0.7 0.3 0 Low Medium 
0.2 0.6 0.2 Low High 
0.5 0.5 0 Medium Low 
0 1 0 Medium Medium 
0 0.5 0.5 Medium High 
0.2 0.6 0.2 High Low 
0 0.5 0.5 High Medium 
0 0 1 High High 
Table for "TargetVisibility" 
Lo
w 
Mediu
m 
Hig
h 
WeaponSensorCapabiit
y 
VisualVisibilit
y 
1 0 0 Low Low 
0 0.5 0.5 Low Medium 
0.2 0.6 0.2 Low High 
0.5 0.5 0 Medium Low 
0 1 0 Medium Medium 
0 0.5 0.5 Medium High 
0.2 0.6 0.2 High Low 
0 0.5 0.5 High Medium 
0 0 1 High High 
 
Table for "TargetDestructionRisk" 
High Medium Low TargetVisibility InformationQuality 
0.9 0.1 0 Low Low 
0.7 0.3 0 Low Medium 
0.1 0.6 0.3 Low High 
0.8 0.2 0 Medium Low 
0.1 0.7 0.2 Medium Medium 
0.05 0.15 0.8 Medium High 
0.5 0.5 0 High Low 
0.05 0.2 0.75 High Medium 
0.01 0.09 0.9 High High 
 
Table for "AdditionalTargetOpportunity" 
High Medium Low TargetVisibility SAQuality 
0 0 1 Low Low 
0 0.5 0.5 Low Medium 
0.4 0.3 0.3 Low High 
0 0.2 0.8 Medium Low 
0 1 0 Medium Medium 
0.7 0.3 0 Medium High 
0 0.3 0.7 High Low 
0.2 0.8 0 High Medium 
1 0 0 High High 
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Risk Confidence Probability Tables 
 
Table for "BlueForceVisibility" 
BlueForceVisibility CloudLevel DustLevel Light 
Low Low Low Low 
Low Low Low Medium 
Low Low Low High 
Low Low Medium Low 
Medium Low Medium Medium 
Medium Low Medium High 
Medium Low High Low 
Medium Low High Medium 
Medium Low High High 
Low Medium Low Low 
Medium Medium Low Medium 
Medium Medium Low High 
Medium Medium Medium Low 
Medium Medium Medium Medium 
Medium Medium Medium High 
Medium Medium High Low 
Medium Medium High Medium 
High Medium High High 
High High Low Low 
Medium High Low Medium 
Medium High Low High 
Medium High Medium Low 
Medium High Medium Medium 
High High Medium High 
Medium High High Low 
High High High Medium 
High High High High 
Table for "BlueForceRisk" 
BlueForceRisk BlueForceVisibility BlueForceProximity 
Low Low Low 
Low Low Medium 
Medium Low High 
Low Medium Low 
Medium Medium Medium 
Medium Medium High 
Medium High Low 
Medium High Medium 
High High High 
 
Table for "ISRCapability" 
ISRCapa
bility 
UAVCapa
bility 
ASTORCapa
bility 
SIGINTCapa
bility 
VisualCapa
bility 
Low Low Low Low Low 
Low Low Low Low Medium 
Low Low Low Low High 
Low Low Low Medium Low 
Low Low Low Medium Medium 
Medium Low Low Medium High 
Low Low Low High Low 
Medium Low Low High Medium 
Medium Low Low High High 
Low Low Medium Low Low 
Low Low Medium Low Medium 
Medium Low Medium Low High 
Low Low Medium Medium Low 
Medium Low Medium Medium Medium 
Medium Low Medium Medium High 
Medium Low Medium High Low 
Medium Low Medium High Medium 
Medium Low Medium High High 
Low Low High Low Low 
Medium Low High Low Medium 
Medium Low High Low High 
Medium Low High Medium Low 
Medium Low High Medium Medium 
Medium Low High Medium High 
Medium Low High High Low 
Medium Low High High Medium 
Medium Low High High High 
Low Medium Low Low Low 
Low Medium Low Low Medium 
Low Medium Low Low High 
Low Medium Low Medium Low 
Medium Medium Low Medium Medium 
Medium Medium Low Medium High 
Medium Medium Low High Low 
Medium Medium Low High Medium 
Medium Medium Low High High 
Low Medium Medium Low Low 
Medium Medium Medium Low Medium 
Medium Medium Medium Low High 
Medium Medium Medium Medium Low 
Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium 
Medium Medium Medium Medium High 
Medium Medium Medium High Low 
Medium Medium Medium High Medium 
Medium Medium Medium High High 
Medium Medium High Low Low 
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ISRCapa
bility 
UAVCapa
bility 
ASTORCapa
bility 
SIGINTCapa
bility 
VisualCapa
bility 
Medium Medium High Low Medium 
Medium Medium High Low High 
Medium Medium High Medium Low 
Medium Medium High Medium Medium 
Medium Medium High Medium High 
Medium Medium High High Low 
Medium Medium High High Medium 
High Medium High High High 
Low High Low Low Low 
Medium High Low Low Medium 
Medium High Low Low High 
Medium High Low Medium Low 
Medium High Low Medium Medium 
Medium High Low Medium High 
Medium High Low High Low 
Medium High Low High Medium 
Medium High Low High High 
Medium High Medium Low Low 
Medium High Medium Low Medium 
Medium High Medium Low High 
Medium High Medium Medium Low 
Medium High Medium Medium Medium 
Medium High Medium Medium High 
Medium High Medium High Low 
Medium High Medium High Medium 
High High Medium High High 
Medium High High Low Low 
Medium High High Low Medium 
Medium High High Low High 
Medium High High Medium Low 
Medium High High Medium Medium 
High High High Medium High 
Medium High High High Low 
High High High High Medium 
High High High High High 
 
Table for "OperatorWorkload" 
OperatorWorkload ScenarioDensity C2SystemCapability 
Low Low Low 
Low Low Medium 
Medium Low High 
Low Medium Low 
Medium Medium Medium 
High Medium High 
Medium High Low 
High High Medium 
High High High 
Table for "SAQuality" 
SAQualit
y 
Interoperabilit
y 
ISRCapabilit
y 
OperatorWorkloa
d 
Low Low Low Low 
Low Low Low Medium 
Low Low Low High 
Low Low Medium Low 
Low Low Medium Medium 
Low Low Medium High 
Low Low High Low 
Low Low High Medium 
Low Low High High 
Low Medium Low Low 
Medium Medium Low Medium 
Medium Medium Low High 
Medium Medium Medium Low 
Medium Medium Medium Medium 
Medium Medium Medium High 
Medium Medium High Low 
Medium Medium High Medium 
Medium Medium High High 
Low High Low Low 
Medium High Low Medium 
Medium High Low High 
Medium High Medium Low 
High High Medium Medium 
High High Medium High 
High High High Low 
High High High Medium 
High High High High 
Table for "Fractricide" 
Fractricide KillChainAccuracy SAQuality BlueForceRisk 
Low Low Low Low 
Low Low Low Medium 
Low Low Low High 
Low Low Medium Low 
Medium Low Medium Medium 
Medium Low Medium High 
Low Low High Low 
Medium Low High Medium 
Medium Low High High 
Low Medium Low Low 
Medium Medium Low Medium 
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Fractricide KillChainAccuracy SAQuality BlueForceRisk 
Medium Medium Low High 
Medium Medium Medium Low 
Medium Medium Medium Medium 
Medium Medium Medium High 
Medium Medium High Low 
Medium Medium High Medium 
High Medium High High 
Low High Low Low 
Medium High Low Medium 
Medium High Low High 
Medium High Medium Low 
Medium High Medium Medium 
High High Medium High 
Medium High High Low 
High High High Medium 
High High High High 
 
Table for "CivilianVisibility" 
CivilianVisibility CloudLevel DustLevel Light 
Low Low Low Low 
Low Low Low Medium 
Low Low Low High 
Low Low Medium Low 
Medium Low Medium Medium 
Medium Low Medium High 
Medium Low High Low 
Medium Low High Medium 
Medium Low High High 
Low Medium Low Low 
Medium Medium Low Medium 
Medium Medium Low High 
Medium Medium Medium Low 
Medium Medium Medium Medium 
Medium Medium Medium High 
Medium Medium High Low 
Medium Medium High Medium 
High Medium High High 
High High Low Low 
Medium High Low Medium 
Medium High Low High 
Medium High Medium Low 
Medium High Medium Medium 
High High Medium High 
Medium High High Low 
High High High Medium 
High High High High 
Table for "CivilianRisk" 
CivilianRisk CivilianVisibility CivilianProximity 
Low Low Low 
Low Low Medium 
Medium Low High 
Low Medium Low 
Medium Medium Medium 
Medium Medium High 
Medium High Low 
Medium High Medium 
High High High 
 
Table for "CollateralDamage" 
CollateralDamage KillChainAccuracy SAQuality CivilianRisk 
Low Low Low Low 
Low Low Low Medium 
Low Low Low High 
Low Low Medium Low 
Medium Low Medium Medium 
Medium Low Medium High 
Low Low High Low 
Medium Low High Medium 
Medium Low High High 
Low Medium Low Low 
Medium Medium Low Medium 
Medium Medium Low High 
Medium Medium Medium Low 
Medium Medium Medium Medium 
Medium Medium Medium High 
Medium Medium High Low 
Medium Medium High Medium 
High Medium High High 
Low High Low Low 
Medium High Low Medium 
Medium High Low High 
Medium High Medium Low 
Medium High Medium Medium 
High High Medium High 
Medium High High Low 
High High High Medium 
High High High High 
 
Table for "PlatformDefence" 
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PlatformDefe
nce 
WeaponTy
pe 
Targetti
ng 
Jammi
ng 
CounterMeas
ures 
Low Low Low Low Low 
Low Low Low Low Medium 
Low Low Low Low High 
Low Low Low Medium Low 
Low Low Low Medium Medium 
Medium Low Low Medium High 
Low Low Low High Low 
Medium Low Low High Medium 
Medium Low Low High High 
Low Low Medium Low Low 
Low Low Medium Low Medium 
Medium Low Medium Low High 
Low Low Medium Medium Low 
Medium Low Medium Medium Medium 
Medium Low Medium Medium High 
Medium Low Medium High Low 
Medium Low Medium High Medium 
Medium Low Medium High High 
Low Low High Low Low 
Medium Low High Low Medium 
Medium Low High Low High 
Medium Low High Medium Low 
Medium Low High Medium Medium 
Medium Low High Medium High 
Medium Low High High Low 
Medium Low High High Medium 
Medium Low High High High 
Low Medium Low Low Low 
Low Medium Low Low Medium 
Low Medium Low Low High 
Low Medium Low Medium Low 
Medium Medium Low Medium Medium 
Medium Medium Low Medium High 
Medium Medium Low High Low 
Medium Medium Low High Medium 
Medium Medium Low High High 
Low Medium Medium Low Low 
Medium Medium Medium Low Medium 
Medium Medium Medium Low High 
PlatformDefe
nce 
WeaponTy
pe 
Targetti
ng 
Jammi
ng 
CounterMeas
ures 
Medium Medium Medium Medium Low 
Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium 
Medium Medium Medium Medium High 
Medium Medium Medium High Low 
Medium Medium Medium High Medium 
Medium Medium Medium High High 
Medium Medium High Low Low 
Medium Medium High Low Medium 
Medium Medium High Low High 
Medium Medium High Medium Low 
Medium Medium High Medium Medium 
Medium Medium High Medium High 
Medium Medium High High Low 
Medium Medium High High Medium 
High Medium High High High 
Low High Low Low Low 
Medium High Low Low Medium 
Medium High Low Low High 
Medium High Low Medium Low 
Medium High Low Medium Medium 
Medium High Low Medium High 
Medium High Low High Low 
Medium High Low High Medium 
Medium High Low High High 
Medium High Medium Low Low 
Medium High Medium Low Medium 
Medium High Medium Low High 
Medium High Medium Medium Low 
Medium High Medium Medium Medium 
Medium High Medium Medium High 
Medium High Medium High Low 
Medium High Medium High Medium 
High High Medium High High 
Medium High High Low Low 
Medium High High Low Medium 
Medium High High Low High 
Medium High High Medium Low 
Medium High High Medium Medium 
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PlatformDefe
nce 
WeaponTy
pe 
Targetti
ng 
Jammi
ng 
CounterMeas
ures 
High High High Medium High 
Medium High High High Low 
High High High High Medium 
High High High High High 
 
Table for "FlightPathRisk" 
FlightPathRisk Terrain Aircraftheight 
Low Low Low 
Low Low Medium 
Medium Low High 
Low Medium Low 
Medium Medium Medium 
High Medium High 
Medium High Low 
High High Medium 
High High High 
Table for "LossOfDeliveryAircraft" 
LossOfDeliveryAircr
aft 
SAQualit
y 
PlatformDefen
ce 
FlightPathRi
sk 
Low Low Low Low 
Low Low Low Medium 
Low Low Low High 
Low Low Medium Low 
Low Low Medium Medium 
Low Low Medium High 
Low Low High Low 
Low Low High Medium 
Low Low High High 
Low Medium Low Low 
Medium Medium Low Medium 
Medium Medium Low High 
Medium Medium Medium Low 
Medium Medium Medium Medium 
Medium Medium Medium High 
Medium Medium High Low 
Medium Medium High Medium 
Medium Medium High High 
Low High Low Low 
Medium High Low Medium 
Medium High Low High 
Medium High Medium Low 
High High Medium Medium 
High High Medium High 
High High High Low 
High High High Medium 
High High High High 
 
 
 
Table for "EnvironmentalVisibility" 
EnvironmentalVisibility Light CloudLevel DustLevel 
Low Low Low Low 
Low Low Low Medium 
Low Low Low High 
Low Low Medium Low 
Medium Low Medium Medium 
Medium Low Medium High 
Low Low High Low 
Medium Low High Medium 
Medium Low High High 
Low Medium Low Low 
Medium Medium Low Medium 
Medium Medium Low High 
Medium Medium Medium Low 
Medium Medium Medium Medium 
Medium Medium Medium High 
Medium Medium High Low 
Medium Medium High Medium 
High Medium High High 
Low High Low Low 
Medium High Low Medium 
Medium High Low High 
Medium High Medium Low 
Medium High Medium Medium 
High High Medium High 
Medium High High Low 
High High High Medium 
High High High High 
 
Table for "TargetVisLevel" 
TargetVisLevel Marking Camouflage 
Low Low Low 
Low Low Medium 
Low Low High 
Medium Medium Low 
Medium Medium Medium 
Medium Medium High 
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TargetVisLevel Marking Camouflage 
Medium High Low 
High High Medium 
High High High 
Table for "VisualVisibility" 
VisualVisibility EnvironmentalVisibility TargetVisLevel 
Low Low Low 
Low Low Medium 
Medium Low High 
Low Medium Low 
Medium Medium Medium 
Medium Medium High 
Medium High Low 
Medium High Medium 
High High High 
Table for "TargetVisibility" 
TargetVisibility WeaponSensorCapabiity VisualVisibility 
Low Low Low 
Medium Low Medium 
Medium Low High 
Low Medium Low 
Medium Medium Medium 
Medium Medium High 
Medium High Low 
Medium High Medium 
High High High 
Table for "TargetDestruction" 
TargetDestructio
n 
KillChainAccurac
y 
SAQualit
y 
TargetVisibilit
y 
Low Low Low Low 
Low Low Low Medium 
Low Low Low High 
Low Low Medium Low 
Medium Low Medium Medium 
Medium Low Medium High 
Low Low High Low 
Medium Low High Medium 
Medium Low High High 
Low Medium Low Low 
Medium Medium Low Medium 
Medium Medium Low High 
Medium Medium Medium Low 
Medium Medium Medium Medium 
TargetDestructio
n 
KillChainAccurac
y 
SAQualit
y 
TargetVisibilit
y 
Medium Medium Medium High 
Medium Medium High Low 
Medium Medium High Medium 
High Medium High High 
Low High Low Low 
Medium High Low Medium 
Medium High Low High 
Medium High Medium Low 
Medium High Medium Medium 
High High Medium High 
Medium High High Low 
High High High Medium 
High High High High 
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Appendix	D	–	CAS	Hypothetical	Scenario	Description	
This appendix provides evidence of the mixed method research methodology with the 
provision a hypothetical CAS scenario description from which the BBN and models were 
derived, as used in the risk analysis activity for application case study 1.   
It also provides artefacts that provide a point from which future research may further 
develop the case study. 
The mission is a pre-planned mission, 24 hours in advance of execution, which will 
commence at 1000hrs the following day. Visibility is expected to be good with full daylight 
and no cloud or wind forecast; hence dust will not impact visibility levels. 
The scenario density is likely to be low, less than 20 tracks expected to be present. 
E3-D C2 and Sentinel aircraft will be available, providing good situational awareness and 
interoperability (via Link 16). The Sentinel provides a powerful ASTOR capability. 
It is probable that UAV support will be available although they may be diverted to other 
tasks. 
Signal Intelligence and visual capability are likely to be high, with assets placed in the target 
vicinity for visual reporting and signal analysis systems available. 
On the ground the forward air controller will utilise laser target marking which is compatible 
with the Tornado GR4 targeting system. However, it is expected the target will be well 
camouflaged. Target position will be derived from a laser rangefinder sensor and reported 
on the VMF data link. The Tornado GR4 is equipped with jamming and countermeasure 
systems. The attack weapon is planned to be a “smart” missile. The mission flight path will 
be at low level over flat terrain. 
The mission will be undertaken by a coalition of UK, US and French forces, with 
approximately half connected via tactical data links and secure voice. 
Blue forces are predicted to be 5km west of the red forces, although there is an uncertainty 
of 2km for this estimate. Civilians are initially expected to be 12km west and 2km north of 
red forces but are likely to be moving towards them, again there is a 2km uncertainty 
associated with these values.  
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Appendix	E	–	Further	CAS	Risk	Analysis	and	Handling	
This appendix provides evidence of the mixed method research methodology with the 
remaining risk analysis and handling activity descriptions undertaken in application case 
study 1.   
It also provides artefacts that provide a point from which future research may further 
develop the case study. 
E.1. Analysis and Handling - Target Destruction Risk 
The causal network relating to target destruction risk, i.e. the risk of failing to destroy the 
target, is shown below in Figure E - 1 with the primary contributing factors identified as Kill 
Chain Accuracy, SA Quality and Target Visibility.  
 
Figure E - 1 : Target Destruction Risk Causal Network 
E.1.1 Model Technique Selection 
Kill Chain Accuracy and SA Quality were discussed previously as contributing factors to 
Fratricide Risk, hence the same logic was applied for the derivation of supporting model 
types, i.e. Interoperability represented using System Dynamics and Kill Chain as a DES model, 
with SA Quality represented as a BBN. The remaining primary contributing factor, Target 
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Visibility was analysed using the selection tool spreadsheet (Appendix B, Table B - 7) with 
BBN, Markov Chain or Game Theory identified as appropriate modelling methods; of these 
BBN was selected, allowing direct incorporation into the central BBN. 
E.1.2 Simplified Causal Network 
With appropriate supporting models identified, the simplified causal network was created 
and is shown below in Figure E - 2. It was not deemed necessary to define intermediate 
model architecture in this case because both supporting models and their relationship with 
the central BBN had been determined under the Fratricide Risk analysis. 
 
Figure E - 2 : Target Destruction Risk - Simplified Causal Network 
E.1.3 Target Destruction Risk BBN 
Having established the model architecture, the Target Destruction Risk BBN was 
implemented in accordance with the Causal Network and is shown below in Figure E - 3, the 
variables that are not already defined previously in relating to the Fratricide risk BBN are 
described in Table E - 1. 
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Figure E - 3 : Target Destruction Risk BBN 
Variable Description States 
Smoke Smoke used as a target 
marker 
Present 
Absent 
Phosphorous Phosphorous used as a 
target marker 
Present 
Absent 
Laser Laser used as a target 
marker 
Present 
Absent 
Marking Combined target marking 
capability 
Low: No target marking 
available or smoke only 
Medium: Phosphorous 
marking available possibly 
augmented by smoke 
High: Laser Marking available 
possible augmented by 
Phosphorous or smoke 
Camouflage Target camouflage 
capability 
Low: Target is not 
camouflaged 
Medium: Target has 
rudimentary camouflage 
High: Target is highly 
camouflaged 
WeaponSensorCapability Friendly weapon onboard 
sensor capability 
Low: No sensor capability, a 
“dumb” weapon 
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Variable Description States 
Medium: Radar or heat 
seeking sensor, requires initial 
target co-ordinates 
High: Sophisticated sensor 
capability 
TargetVisibility Overall target position 
visibility 
Low: Poor visual and sensor 
visibility 
Medium: Limited visibility 
High: Target easily 
distinguishable 
TargetDestructionRisk The risk of failing to 
destroy the primary target 
of a CAS mission 
Low: Destruction of the target 
is highly likely 
Medium: It is possible the 
target may not be destroyed, 
options for reducing the risk 
should be considered 
High: Destruction is the target 
is unlikely, risk mitigation is 
required 
Table E - 1 : Target Destruction Risk BBN Variables 
The following additional mediating variables were required in order to simplify the internal 
probability tables: 
• TargetVisLevel 
• VisualVisibility 
• Surveillance Capability 
• Intelligence Capability 
• ISR Capability 
• SoS Capability 
• Information Quality 
• Atmospheric Visibility 
 
E.1.4 Interpretation of Results 
The BBN was updated with evidence derived from the hypothetical scenario, described in 
Appendix D, and learnt from the output of the Kill Chain and Interoperability supporting 
models. The updated BBN is shown in Figure E - 4, indicating High Risk at 15.8%, Medium 
Risk at 27.0% and Low Risk at 57.2%.  
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The BBN was then updated the worst and best case scenario evidence, as shown in Figure E - 
5 and Figure E - 6 respectively. 
The worst-case scenario relating to the failure to destroy the mission target required 
evidence to be entered reflecting a high scenario density with a low C2 system capability 
thereby resulting in a high operator workload, poor ISR capability and Interoperability 
providing a low quality SA picture, which was combined with high error growth within the 
kill chain. In addition, target marking and visibility was poor, with the weapon having no 
independent sensor capability. The resulting risk levels were; High = 84.4%, Medium = 15.0% 
and Low = 0.6%. 
The best-case scenario required low workload, high ISR capability, good Interoperability, 
providing a high quality SA picture with minimal error within the kill chain, with good target 
visibility and weapon sensor capability; the resultant risk levels were; High = 1.69%, Medium 
= 10.9% and Low = 87.5%. 
 
Figure E - 4 : Target Destruction Risk BBN Post Learning and Evidence 
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Figure E - 5 : Target Destruction Risk BBN Worst Case 
 
Figure E - 6 - Target Destruction Risk BBN Best Case 
These risk levels were compared with the best and worse case levels, as shown below in 
Figure E - 7, providing context for the meaningful interpretation of the results and indicated 
that although the results were more aligned to the best-case results the probability of a low 
chance of target destruction failure was 30% lower than the optimum value. It was therefore 
concluded that the level of risk was acceptable but any potential mitigation should be 
explored. 
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Figure E - 7 : Target Destruction Risk Comparison 
Examining the BBN it was noted that the inaccuracy associated with the kill chain was 
contributing to the reduced probability of low risk of fratricide, as it also similarly had for 
fratricide risk. Using the same approach as taken previously, the BBN was updated by setting 
the probability for minimum kill chain error to 100%, improving the overall risk level, which 
was now closely comparable with the best case values, as shown in Figure E - 8, therefore 
implying that further analysis of the kill chain component systems with an aim to reducing 
error growth would be beneficial. 
 
Figure E - 8 : Target Destruction BBN with High Accuracy Kill Chain 
E.1.5 Risk Confidence 
Again, the final stage in the analysis process was the derivation of the associated confidence, 
requiring the construction of an equivalent confidence BBN as shown in Figure E - 9, with the 
rationale, not previously provided, for the BBN variable confidence estimates provided in 
Table E - 2. 
Variable Input Type Confidence Estimate 
Marking Evidence High: Marking capability of ground systems 
is known 
Camouflage Evidence High: Current intelligence images available 
of target 
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WeaponSensorCapability Evidence High: All available weapon types have same 
sensor capability  
Table E - 2 - Target Destruction Risk Confidence 
 
Figure E - 9 : Target Destruction Risk Confidence BBN 
E.2. Analysis and Handling - Collateral Damage Risk 
The Collateral Damage Risk was extracted from the overall CAS causal network and is shown 
below in Figure E - 10. In the case the primary contributing factors were; Kill Chain Accuracy, 
SA Quality, Civilian Proximity and Civilian Visibility. 
 
Figure E - 10 : Collateral Damage Risk Causal Network 
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E.2.1 Model Technique Selection 
Kill Chain Accuracy and Interoperability were again determined as DES and System Dynamics 
supporting models respectively, with SA Quality directly modelled within the central BBN 
based on the analysis performed for the Fratricide and Target Destruction Risks. Civilian 
Proximity (to the target blast zone) was influenced by target movement and civilian position; 
the selection tool analysis identified DES and ABMS as suitable approaches (Appendix B, 
Table B - 8). It was decided to use ABMS because a very similar model, produced for Blue 
Force Proximity could be easily adapted to model Civilian Proximity, thereby reducing the 
development effort required. The final Collateral Damage contributing factor to be 
considered was Civilian Visibility, whilst it could be assumed that a probabilistic modelling 
approach would be suitable, selection tool analysis was performed for consistency, which 
confirmed the initial assumption (Appendix B, Table B - 9). As determined for the risks 
analysed previously, a Bayesian approach was utilised, providing straightforward integration 
into the central BBN. In this case, a new supporting model was identified, Civilian Proximity, 
with its context within the overall model architecture shown below in Figure E - 11. 
 
Figure E - 11 : Collateral Damage Model Architecture 
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E.2.2 Simplified Causal Network 
Removing nodes that were subsumed into the supporting models, allowed the causal 
network to be simplified, and is shown below in Figure E - 12, providing the basis of the 
central BBN. 
 
Figure E - 12 : Collateral Damage Simplified Causal Network 
E.2.3 Collateral Damage Risk BBN 
Having established the model architecture the Collateral Damage Risk BBN was 
implemented in accordance with the Causal Network and is shown in Figure E - 13. 
Definitions of BBN variables not previously described are provided below in Table E - 3. 
Variable Description States 
CivilianProximity Distance of Civilians from 
target 
Less than 1km 
Between 1km and 2Km 
Greater than 2Km 
CollateralDamage The risk of civilian injury 
or loss of life as a result of 
the CAS mission weapon 
impact 
Low: Collateral Damage is 
extremely unlikely to occur, 
no further risk mitigation is 
required 
Medium: There is a potential 
for Collateral Damage, care 
must be exercised or the risk 
mitigated 
High: There is a significant 
potential for Collateral 
Damage, risk mitigation is 
necessary before mission 
commencement 
Table E - 3 : Collateral Damage Risk BBN Variables 
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In addition to the variables identified above, the following mediating variables (beyond 
those previously identified) were required in order to simplify the internal probability tables: 
• CivilianRisk 
• CivilianVisibility 
 
 
Figure E - 13 : Collateral Damage BBN 
E.2.4 Interpretation of Results 
The BBN was then updated with evidence derived from the hypothetical scenario, described 
in Appendix D, and learnt from the output of the Kill Chain, Civilian Proximity and 
Interoperability supporting models. The updated BBN is shown in Figure E - 16, indicating 
High Risk at 4.2%, Medium Risk at 36.4% and Low Risk at 59.4%.  
In common with the previous risk analysis, the BBN was instantiated with evidence derived 
from worst-case and best-case scenarios, the results of which are provided in Figure E - 17 
and Figure E - 18 respectively. 
The side-by-side comparison the actual, best-case and worst-case results are shown below in 
Figure E - 14, revealing that although the actual results were more closely aligned to the 
best-case values, the probability of low risk was over 20% lower. 
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Figure E - 14 : Collateral Damage Risk Comparison 
As observed previously, the kill chain was contributing to the reduced probability of low risk 
of collateral damage, as it similarly had for fratricide risk. Again, the BBN was updated by 
setting the probability for minimum kill chain error to 100%, improving the overall risk levels 
to close to those of the best case values, as shown in Figure E - 15, hence implying that a 
reduction in kill chain error growth would be beneficial. 
 
Figure E - 15 : Collateral Damage Risk with High Accuracy Kill Chain 
 
Figure E - 16 : Collateral Damage Risk Post Learning and Evidence 
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Figure E - 17 : Collateral Damage Risk Worst Case 
 
Figure E - 18 : Collateral Damage Risk Best Case 
E.2.5 Risk Confidence 
In accordance with the analysis process an equivalent confidence BBN was implemented as 
shown in Figure E - 19, with the rationale, not previously provided, for the BBN variable 
confidence estimates provided in Table E - 4. 
Variable Input Type Confidence Estimate 
CivilianProximity Supporting Model Low: Model is simplistic 
Table E - 4 : Collateral Damage Risk Confidence 
 E-14
 
Figure E - 19 - Collateral Damage Risk Confidence 
E.3. Analysis and Handling - Additional Target Opportunity 
The Additional Target Opportunity Risk network was extracted from the overall CAS causal 
network and is shown below in Figure E - 20. In this case there were two primary 
contributing factors, SA Quality and Target Visibility, which were both analysed previously 
under Fratricide Risk and Target Destruction Risk respectively and resulted in the 
identification of an Interoperability System Dynamics supporting model with Bayesian 
representation of SA Quality and Target Visibility. 
 
Figure E - 20 : Additional Target Opportunity Causal Network 
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E.3.1 Simplified Causal Network 
Having determined that only an Interoperability supporting model was required, it was not 
deemed necessary to produce a model architecture diagram before production of the 
simplified causal network, shown in Figure E - 21. 
 
Figure E - 21 : Additional Target Opportunity Risk - Simplified Causal Network 
E.3.2 Additional Target Opportunity Risk BBN 
The Additional Target Opportunity Risk BBN was implemented in accordance with the Causal 
Network and is shown below in Figure E - 22. In this case only one additional BBN variable 
was introduced, AdditionalTargetOpportunity, the remaining definitions and mediating 
variables were described within the previous risk analysis. 
Definition of BBN the single variable not previously described is provided below in Table E - 
5. 
Variable Description States 
AdditionalTargetOpportunity Opportunity to prosecute 
a target in addition to the 
primary mission target 
Low: Likelihood of locating 
and prosecuting an additional 
target is low 
Medium: There is a potential 
for the location and 
prosecution of an additional 
target 
High: There is a significant 
potential the location and 
prosecution of an additional 
target 
Table E - 5 - Additional Target Opportunity BBN Variables 
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Figure E - 22 : Additional Target Opportunity BBN 
E.3.3 Interpretation of Results 
In accordance with the analysis process, the BBN first was instantiated with evidence 
derived from the hypothetical scenario, described in Appendix D, and output from the 
Interoperability supporting model; the resultant BBN is shown in Figure E - 25 and with 
worst and best case evidence, shown in Figure E - 26 and Figure E - 27 respectively. The side-
by-side comparison is shown below in Figure E - 23.  
 
Figure E - 23 : Additional Target Opportunity Comparison 
These results revealed a relatively close correlation between the actual and best-case 
results, although further experimentation was undertaken in order to identify potential 
approaches to improvement in the actual risk profile. Initially the UAV “high” capability was 
set to 100% resulting in a marginal improvement in the risk profile, as shown in Figure E - 24. 
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Figure E - 24 : Additional Target Opportunity with High UAV Capability 
 
Figure E - 25 : Additional Target Opportunity Post Learning and Evidence 
 
Figure E - 26 : Additional Target Opportunity Worst Case 
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Figure E - 27 : Additional Target Opportunity Best Case 
Setting the IO capability to “high”, in addition to the updated UAV variable, resulted in a 
more marked improvement, as shown in Figure E - 28. However, in practice more detailed 
analysis of the IO model would be necessary in order to determine how overall IO could be 
improved, whilst improvement in UAV capability was potentially more straightforward, if 
assets were available, it resulted in a minimal improvement in risk profile.  
 
Figure E - 28 : Additional Target Opportunity with High UAV Capability and Good IO 
E.3.4 Risk Confidence 
In accordance with the analysis process an equivalent confidence BBN was implemented as 
shown in Figure E - 29; in this case the rationale for the confidence levels entered into the 
network are covered within the previous risk analysis. 
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Figure E - 29 : Additional Target Opportunity Confidence 
E.4. Analysis and Handling - Loss of Aircraft Risk 
Loss of Aircraft Risk was influenced by four primary contributing factors, SA Quality, Enemy 
Capability, Flight Path Risk and Defensive Capability. As discussed previously, SA Quality 
could be represented as a BBN with an associated Interoperability supporting model, the 
remaining contributing factors were unique to Loss of Aircraft Risk and therefore analysed 
further, as follows. 
 
Figure E - 30 : Loss Of Aircraft Risk Causal Network 
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E.4.1 Model Technique Selection 
Enemy Capability and the associated contributing factors were analysed using the selection 
tool (Appendix B, Table B - 10), indicating that a probabilistic modelling approach would be 
appropriate. It was decided that, as with the previously discussed risk analysis, a BBN would 
allow direct incorporation into the central BBN.  
The same process was applied to Flight Path risk (Appendix B, Table B - 11), again indicating 
that a probabilistic modelling approach would be appropriate with a BBN selected for the 
same rationale as described above. 
Finally, the modelling requirements for defensive capability (of CAS aircraft) were 
considered (Table B - 12), in this case “Modelling Languages” (e.g. UML, SysML) was the 
most highly rated selected option followed by probabilistic techniques (BBN, Markov 
Models, Game Theory) and EAF (e.g. MODAF). However, although a technique such as 
SysML, would provide a detailed representation of jamming and counter measures capability 
it does not enable uncertainty to be modelled, which is essential where not all information is 
available and may actually provide more detail than necessary. A Bayesian approach allows 
uncertainty to be modelled and where defensive capabilities are well understood, this 
information may be entered as evidence into the BBN. It was therefore decided to model 
defensive capability with a simple BBN approach, which could be directly incorporated into 
the overall risk BBN. 
 
Figure E - 31 : Loss of Aircraft Risk Model Architecture 
 E-21
E.4.2 Simplified Causal Network 
 
Figure E - 32 : Loss of Aircraft Risk Simplified Causal Network 
E.4.3 Loss of Aircraft Risk BBN 
Having established the model architecture the Loss of Aircraft Risk BBN was implemented in 
accordance with the Causal Network and is shown below in Figure E - 33. Definitions of BBN 
variables not previously described are provided below in Table E - 6. 
Variable Description States 
WeaponType Hostile ground to air 
weapon capability 
Low: No ground to air 
capability except gunfire 
Medium: Basic ground to air 
capability, short range missile 
High: Sophisticated medium 
range ground to air capability 
Targeting Hostile target tracking 
capability 
Low: Only visual target 
tracking 
Medium: Short range radar 
tracking 
High: Medium, long range high 
fidelity tracking 
EnemyCapability Overall hostile defensive 
capability 
Low: Defensive capability 
poses very low risk 
Medium: Defensive capability 
exhibits some threat 
High: Forces defensive 
capability is significant posing 
a major threat to weapon 
delivery aircraft 
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Variable Description States 
Jamming Weapon delivery aircraft 
jamming capability 
Low: No jamming capability 
Medium: Basic, short range 
jamming 
High: High power, 
sophisticated jamming 
capability 
CounterMeasures Weapon delivery aircraft 
countermeasures (e.g. 
Chaff, Flare) capability 
Low: No countermeasures 
Medium: Chaff or flare 
High: Chaff and flare 
DefensiveCapability Overall weapon delivery 
aircraft defensive 
capability 
Low: No countermeasures or 
jamming capability 
Medium: Either 
countermeasures or jamming  
High: Both countermeasures 
and jamming 
Terrain Description of the terrain 
encountered in the 
mission 
Flat 
Undulating 
Mountainous 
AircraftHeight Weapon delivery aircraft 
altitude throughout attack 
run in 
Below 500ft 
Between500and100ft 
Above1000ft 
FlightPathRisk Overall risk of 
combination of terrain 
type and aircraft altitude 
Low: Likelihood of aircraft loss 
due to terrain and altitude is 
very low, no risk mitigation 
required 
Medium: Potential for aircraft 
loss, change of flight path 
should be considered if 
possible 
High: Increased likelihood of 
aircraft loss, risk mitigation or 
re-assessment of the model is 
required 
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Variable Description States 
LossofDeliveryAircraft Risk of loss of weapon 
delivery aircraft as a result 
of the CAS mission 
Low: Risk of loss of aircraft is 
low, no risk mitigation 
required 
Medium: Potential of aircraft 
loss, risk mitigation is 
recommended 
High: Significant risk of aircraft 
loss, risk mitigation is essential 
Table E - 6 : Loss of Aircraft Risk BBN Variables 
 
 
 
Figure E - 33 - Loss of Aircraft Risk BBN 
E.4.4 Interpretation of Results 
In accordance with the analysis process, the BBN first was instantiated with evidence 
derived from the hypothetical scenario, described in Appendix D, and output from the 
Interoperability supporting model; the resultant BBN is shown in Figure E - 36. Worst and 
best case evidence BBN instantiations are shown in Figure E - 37 and Figure E - 38 
respectively. The side-by-side comparison shown below in Figure E - 34 and revealing that, 
although the analysis results aligned more closely to the best case risk profile, the 
probability of low risk was approximately 30% lower than the optimum level, indicating that 
further risk mitigation was desirable. 
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Figure E - 34 : Loss of Aircraft Risk Comparison 
A potentially straightforward risk mitigation approach in this case was to raise the mission 
flight altitude of over 1000ft, resulting in an improved risk profile, reducing the gap between 
best-case and actual low risk level to 15%. However, the applicability of this mitigation 
would be dependent on the limitations of weapons launched from the aircraft. 
 
Figure E - 35 : Loss of Aircraft Risk  - Altitude of 1000ft 
 
 
Figure E - 36 : Loss of Aircraft Risk Post Learning and Evidence 
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Figure E - 37 : Loss of Aircraft Risk Worst Case BBN 
 
Figure E - 38 : Loss of Aircraft Risk Best Case BBN 
E.4.5 Risk Confidence 
Finally, the associated confidence was derived, through the construction of an equivalent 
confidence BBN as shown in Figure E - 39, with the rationale, not previously provided, for 
the BBN variable confidence estimates provided in Table E - 7. 
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Variable Input Type Confidence Estimate 
WeaponType Estimate Low: based on intelligence reports that are 
unconfirmed 
Targeting Estimate Low: based on intelligence reports that are 
unconfirmed 
Jamming Evidence High: all available weapon delivery aircraft 
capabilities are similar and known 
CounterMeasures Evidence High: all available weapon delivery aircraft 
capabilities are similar and known 
Terrain Evidence High: the terrain in the vicinity of the target 
area is known 
AircraftHeight Evidence High: the flight plan defines the altitude profile 
throughout the mission 
 
Table E - 7 - Loss of Aircraft Risk Confidence 
 
Figure E - 39 : Aircraft Loss Risk Confidence 
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Appendix	F	–	Supporting	Models	
This appendix provides evidence in support of the research methodology through the 
development of the supporting models and information to facilitate future development of 
the research outputs. 
It should be noted that, in order to maintain the scope of this research at a manageable 
level, the specification and development of the supporting models was deliberately basic, 
but was sufficient to exercise the model-based risk management concept. 
F.1  Kill Chain Accuracy Model 
F.1.1 Requirements 
The key requirement for the Kill Chain Accuracy model was to simulate the accumulation of 
spatial error from “sensor” to “shooter”.  
A target position may be determined from a land-based sensor, such a laser range finder, 
which is then transmitted through a series of systems via interconnecting data links to the 
weapon delivery aircraft and potentially to the weapon itself, depending on its capability.  
Specifically, the model was required to: 
a) Allow definition of a specific target position 
b) Represent a sensor whereby a target position is input and realistic positional error 
and latency distributions are introduced. 
c) Represent Tactical Data Links whereby a target position is input and realistic 
positional error (e.g. registration errors) and latency distributions are introduced. 
d) Represent a Command and Control whereby a target position is input and realistic 
positional error and latency distributions are introduced. 
e) Represent a Weapon Delivery Platform whereby a target position is input and 
realistic positional error and latency distributions are introduced. 
f) Represent a Weapon whereby a target position is input and realistic positional error 
and latency distributions are introduced. 
g) Allow the kill chain component sub-models to be connected serially. 
h) Allow the kill chain model to run for a set number of iterations. 
F.1.2 Model Assumptions 
The assumptions made when developing the Kill Chain Model were as follows: 
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1. Sensor was assumed to have an average 0.02% range error and a 1° azimuth error, 
providing generally realistic performance. 
2. Data link A was assumed to introduce an average 100m registration error 
(introduced by differences in GPS and sensor co-ordinate systems) and an average 
latency of 6 seconds. 
3. The command and control system was assumed to introduce an average 20m 
position error (caused by internal co-ordinate transformations) and a latency of 6 
seconds. 
4. Data link B was assumed to introduce an average 50m registration error and an 
average latency of 3 seconds. 
5. The weapon delivery platform was assumed to introduce an average 5m position 
error (caused by internal co-ordinate transformations) and a latency of 1 second. 
6. The weapon was assumed not to be a “smart” weapon introducing an average 100m 
positional error and a latency of 5 seconds. 
F.1.3 Design and Implementation 
The model was implemented using Simulink, a graphical programming language, the top-
level view of the Simulink model is shown below in Figure F - 1.  
 
Figure F - 1 : Kill Chain Error Simulink Model 
The code contained within each model block is provided below. 
Sensor Block 
function [x_out,y_out, t_out] = fcn(slantrange) 
%#codegen 
  
%slant range metres 
range_error = 0.02; %2% 
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azimuth_error = 1; %degree 
  
range_error   = range_error*randn; 
azimuth_error = azimuth_error*randn; 
slantrange  = slantrange + slantrange*range_error; 
  
x_out = slantrange*cosd(azimuth_error); 
y_out = slantrange*sind(azimuth_error); 
t_out = 0; 
 
DataLink A Format 
function [x_out,y_out,t_out] = fcn(x_in,y_in, t_in) 
%#codegen 
registration_error = 100; %metres 
registration_error_x = registration_error*randn; 
registration_error_y = registration_error*randn; 
latency = 6*rand; 
  
%y = u+abs(randn*200); 
x_out = x_in + registration_error_x; 
y_out = y_in + registration_error_y; 
t_out = t_in+latency;%seconds 
 
Command and Control 
function [x_out,y_out,t_out] = fcn(x_in,y_in, t_in) 
%#codegen 
trans_error = 20; %metres 
trans_error_x = trans_error*randn; 
trans_error_y = trans_error*randn; 
latency = 6*rand; 
  
%y = u+abs(randn*200); 
x_out = x_in + trans_error_x; 
y_out = y_in + trans_error_y; 
t_out = t_in+latency;%seconds 
 
 
DataLink B Format 
function [x_out,y_out,t_out] = fcn(x_in,y_in, t_in) 
%#codegen 
registration_error = 50; %metres 
registration_error_x = registration_error*randn; 
registration_error_y = registration_error*randn; 
latency = 3*rand; 
  
%y = u+abs(randn*200); 
x_out = x_in + registration_error_x; 
y_out = y_in + registration_error_y; 
t_out = t_in+latency;%seconds 
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Weapon Delivery Platform 
function [x_out,y_out,t_out] = fcn(x_in,y_in, t_in) 
%#codegen 
trans_error = 5; %metres 
trans_error_x = trans_error*randn; 
trans_error_y = trans_error*randn; 
latency = 1*rand; 
  
%y = u+abs(randn*200); 
x_out = x_in + trans_error_x; 
y_out = y_in + trans_error_y; 
t_out = t_in+latency;%seconds 
 
Weapon Type 
function [x_out,y_out,t_out] = fcn(x_in,y_in, t_in) 
%#codegen 
accuracy_error = 100; %metres, dependent on weapon type 
accuracy_error_x = accuracy_error*randn; 
accuracy_error_y = accuracy_error*randn; 
latency = 5*rand; 
  
x_out = x_in + accuracy_error_x; 
y_out = y_in + accuracy_error_y; 
t_out = t_in+latency;%seconds, depends on weapon flight time and if dumb/smart wpn 
 
F.1.4 Validation and Verification 
Initial verification was performed through code inspection followed by running the model 
over a single iteration. Initial basic errors were identified and the model corrected, with 
confidence in the model it was subsequently run over a limited (100) iterations, the results 
of which were exported to a spreadsheet enabling a visual check of the output to be 
performed. 
F.1.5 Model Output 
The model was executed over 5000 iterations (i.e. a Monte Carlo simulation), where the 
output consisting of x, y co-ordinates and latency was written to the Simulink/MATLAB® 
workspace allowing it to be manually copied into an Excel spreadsheet (Figure F - 2), where 
the distance of the position from target “truth” (indicated in red) was calculated for each. 
Finally, the distance results were copied to a text file, formatted such that the Netica BBN 
application could “learn” from it. 
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Figure F - 2 : Kill Chain Model Output 
F.2  Interoperability Model 
F.2.1 Requirements 
The Interoperability System Dynamics model key requirement was to represent overall 
levels of IO throughout the SoS from a generalised perspective, considering aggregated 
behaviour rather than modelling individual information exchanges. 
The model was required to represent the following factors, their relationships and the 
impact upon IO: 
a) Voice Communications 
b) Tactical Data Link Communications 
c) Language 
d) Nationality 
e) Geodetic Datum 
f) Line of Sight 
A further requirement was to allow the model to run over multiple iterations and to enable 
the modelling of uncertainty associated with the identified IO factors. 
F.2.2 Model Assumptions 
The assumptions made when developing the Interoperability Model were as follows: 
1. Between 70% and 100% of participants have a common spoken language. 
2. Between 10% and 60% of participants operate using common procedures. 
3. Tactical data link (TDL) average range is 500km. 
4. The average number of tactical data link networks is 3. 
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5. Between 50 and 100% of participants utilise TDLs. 
6. Between 50 and 100% of participants utilise secure voice communications. 
7. In determining an overall interoperability score all aspects are equally weighted. 
F.2.3 Sensor Design and Implementation  
The causal model is shown below in Figure F - 3 and was implemented using the Vensim® 
application.  
 
Figure F - 3 : Interoperability Model 
The Vensim tool also allowed the export of all variables, including the equations defined for 
each and is included below. 
(01) Air Domain= ABS(RANDOM UNIFORM(0, 1 , 6 )) 
 Units: **undefined** [0,1] 
  
(02) Enemy Jamming Capability= RANDOM UNIFORM(0, 0.5, 31 ) 
 Units: **undefined** 
 0 - low 1 - high 
 
(03) FINAL TIME  = 5000 
 Units: Month 
 The final time for the simulation. 
 
(04) INITIAL TIME  = 0 
 Units: Month 
 The initial time for the simulation. 
Interoperability
Number of
Platform Types
Number of
Gateways
Total Number
of Nations
Percentage
with TDL
Percentage with
same language
Percentage with
common
procedures
Jamming
Resilience
Enemy
Jamming
Capability
Number of
Networks
Air Domain
Maritime Domain
Land
Domain
MaxRange
Percentage with
common Geo
Datum
Line of Sight
Terrain
National Compatability
Network Connectivity
TDL Interoperability
Secure Voice
Platform IO
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(05) Interoperability= Jamming Resilience+National Compatability+Network 
Connectivity+Percentage with common Geo Datum+TDL Interoperability+Platform IO 
 Units: **undefined** 
  
(06) Jamming Resilience= MIN((Percentage with TDL+Secure Voice)*(1-Enemy 
Jamming Capability),1) 
 Units: **undefined** 
 0 - low 1 - high Limit output to a max of 1 
 
(07) Land Domain= 
  ABS(RANDOM UNIFORM(0, 1 , 4 )) 
 Units: **undefined** [0,1,1] 
  
(08) Line of Sight= (Air Domain+Maritime Domain+(Land Domain*Terrain))/3 
 Units: **undefined** 
 0 - NO LINE OF SIGHT 1 - FULL LOS 
 
(09) Maritime Domain= ABS(RANDOM UNIFORM(0, 1 , 5 )) 
 Units: **undefined** [0,1] 
  
(10) MaxRange= RANDOM NORMAL(300, 1000, 500 , 100 , 1 ) 
 Units: **undefined** 
  
(11) National Compatability= IF THEN ELSE( Total Number of Nations<5 , (Percentage 
with common procedures +Percentage with same language)/2 , (Percentage with common 
procedures+Percentage with same language)/4 ) 
 Units: **undefined** 
 Assume that IO is not degraded if less than 5 nations, if more then assume IO 
problems will occur 
 
(12) Network Connectivity=IF THEN ELSE(Number of Gateways>=(Number of 
Networks-1), 1 , Number of Gateways 
 /Number of Networks ) 
 Units: **undefined** 
 1 = GOOD CONNECTIVITY 0 = BAD CONNECTIVITY 
 
(13) Number of Gateways=(RANDOM UNIFORM(0, Number of Networks+1 , 28 )) 
 Units: **undefined** 
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(14) Number of Networks=ABS((MaxRange/300))*(Air Domain+Land 
Domain+Maritime Domain) 
 Units: **undefined** 
  
(15) Number of Platform Types=Total Number of Nations*(Air Domain+Land 
Domain+Maritime Domain)*RANDOM UNIFORM 
 (1, 5 , 4 ) 
 Units: **undefined** 
  
(16) Percentage with common Geo Datum=RANDOM UNIFORM(0, 1 , 14 ) 
 Units: **undefined** 
  
(17) Percentage with common procedures=RANDOM UNIFORM(0.1, 0.6 , 17 ) 
 Units: **undefined** 
  
(18) Percentage with same language=RANDOM UNIFORM(0.7, 1 , 15) 
 Units: **undefined** 
  
(19) Percentage with TDL=RANDOM UNIFORM(0.5, 1, 1 ) 
 Units: **undefined** 
  
(20) Platform IO=1-(MIN((Number of Platform Types-1)/20,1)) 
 Units: **undefined** 
 Assumes IO degrades with more platform types, over 20 IO = 0 
 
(21) SAVEPER  = TIME STEP 
 Units: Month [0,?] 
 The frequency with which output is stored. 
 
(22) Secure Voice=RANDOM UNIFORM(0.5, 1 , 27 ) 
 Units: **undefined** 
 0 - low 1 - high 
 
(23) TDL Interoperability=Line of Sight*Percentage with TDL 
 Units: **undefined** 
  
(24) Terrain=1 
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 Units: **undefined** 
 0 = Mountainous 1 = Relatively Flat 
 
(25) TIME STEP  = 1 
 Units: Month [0,?] 
 The time step for the simulation. 
 
(26) Total Number of Nations=ABS(RANDOM UNIFORM(1, 5 , 4 )) 
 Units: **undefined** [1,5,1] 
F.2.4 Validation and Verification 
Initial verification was performed through code inspection followed by running the model 
and examining the state of each variable. The value of each variable was assessed in the 
context of its inputs with several errors identified and corrected as a result. The model was 
updated to allow the generation of outputs for best and worst case scenarios, this activity 
also proved to be a useful approach in the validation of the model, again identifying several 
errors which were corrected. 
F.2.5 Model Output 
A System Dynamics normally models causal effect over a period of time, however in this 
case a more unconventional approach was taken, where each time step was used to 
generate a different IO “level” as a result of the randomness defined for the model 
variables. The model was run over 5000 time steps, thereby generating a suitable sized 
result set which was reformatted into textual format and then input, i.e. learned, by the 
BBNs. 
 
Figure F - 4 : Interoperability Model Output 
Interoperability
6
4.5
3
1.5
0
0 750 1500 2250 3000 3750 4500
Time (Month)
Interoperability : Current
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F.3  Blue Force Proximity and Civilian Proximity Model 
F.3.1 Requirements 
The key requirement of the Blue Force Proximity and Civilian Proximity model was to 
simulate the movement of a target, blue forces and civilians, based on intelligence data. 
Specifically, the model was required to: 
a) Allow the initial position of a target to be defined, randomised within an area of 
probability. 
b) Move the target in accordance with predicted behaviour if available with an element 
of randomness as applicable. 
c) Allow the initial position of blue forces to be defined, randomised within an area of 
probability. 
d) Move the blue forces in accordance with predicted behaviour if available with an 
element of randomness as applicable. 
e) Allow the initial position of civilians to be defined, randomised within an area of 
probability. 
f) Move the civilians in accordance with predicted behaviour if available with an 
element of randomness as applicable. 
F.3.2 Model Assumptions 
The assumptions made when developing the Proximity Model were as follows: 
1. Initial position of the blue forces was (-10,0) with an uncertainty of 2km and a 
heading of 45°. 
2. Initial position of the red forces was (-10,5) with an uncertainty of 2km. 
3. Initial civilian position was (-12,12). 
4. Blue forces move towards red forces. 
5. Civilians move towards blue forces. 
F.3.3 Design and Implementation 
The model was written in ReLogo, an ABMS language, using the Repast Simphony toolset; a 
screen shot of the initialised state is shown below in Figure F - 5. 
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Figure F - 5 : Blue Force and Civilian Proximity Model 
The ReLogo code for the control and movement of the model agents is included below. 
class UserObserver extends ReLogoObserver{ 
 
 @Setup 
 def setup(){ 
  clearAll() 
  setDefaultShape(Blueforce,"circle") 
  createBlueforces(1){ 
   setxy(-10+random(2),random(2)) 
   setHeading(45) 
   setColor(blue()) 
  } 
  setDefaultShape(Redforce,"square") 
  createRedforces(1){ 
   setxy(-(10+random(2)),5+random(2)) 
   setColor(red()) 
  } 
  setDefaultShape(Weapon,"arrow") 
  createWeapons(1){ 
   setxy(-32,0) 
   setHeading(random(90)) 
   setColor(white()) 
   size = 2 
  } 
  setDefaultShape(Weapon2,"arrow") 
  createWeapon2s(1){ 
   setxy(-32,0) 
   setHeading(random(90)) 
   setColor(white()) 
   size = 2 
  }  
  setDefaultShape(Civilian,"circle") 
  createCivilians(1){ 
   setxy(-12,12) 
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   setHeading(random(90)) 
   setColor(green()) 
   size = 2 
  }    
 } 
  
 @Go 
 def go(){  
  ask (redforces()){ 
   step() 
  } 
   
  ask (blueforces()){ 
   step() 
  } 
  ask (weapons()){ 
   step() 
  } 
  ask (civilians()){ 
   step() 
  } 
 
  if (ticks()==1000){ 
   stop() 
  } 
   
  tick()  
 } 
} 
 
package friendlyforceproximity.relogo 
 
import repast.simphony.relogo.factories.AbstractReLogoGlobalsAndPanelFactory 
 
public class UserGlobalsAndPanelFactory extends AbstractReLogoGlobalsAndPanelFactory{ 
 public void addGlobalsAndPanelComponents(){ 
   
  addSliderWL("numRedforces", "Number of RedForces", 1, 1, 10, 5) 
  addSliderWL("numBlueforces", "Number of BlueForces", 1, 1, 10, 5) 
  addSliderWL("numTargets", "Number of Targets", 1, 1, 10, 1) 
  addSliderWL("numCiviians", "Number of Civilians", 1, 1, 10, 1) 
  addGlobal("redalive",1) 
  addGlobal("tgtalive",1) 
 
 } 
} 
package friendlyforceproximity.relogo 
import static repast.simphony.relogo.Utility.*; 
import static repast.simphony.relogo.UtilityG.*; 
import repast.simphony.relogo.Plural; 
 F-13
import repast.simphony.relogo.Stop; 
import repast.simphony.relogo.Utility; 
import repast.simphony.relogo.UtilityG; 
import repast.simphony.relogo.schedule.Go; 
import repast.simphony.relogo.schedule.Setup; 
import friendlyforceproximity.ReLogoTurtle; 
 
class Blueforce extends ReLogoTurtle { 
 def step(){  
  if (redalive==1){ 
   face(turtle(1)) 
   fd(0.005) 
  } 
 } 
} 
 
package friendlyforceproximity.relogo 
import static repast.simphony.relogo.Utility.*; 
import static repast.simphony.relogo.UtilityG.*; 
import repast.simphony.relogo.Plural; 
import repast.simphony.relogo.Stop; 
import repast.simphony.relogo.Utility; 
import repast.simphony.relogo.UtilityG; 
import repast.simphony.relogo.schedule.Go; 
import repast.simphony.relogo.schedule.Setup; 
import friendlyforceproximity.ReLogoTurtle; 
 
class Civilian extends ReLogoTurtle { 
 def step(){ 
  if (redalive==1){ 
   face(turtle(0)) 
   fd(0.005) 
  } 
 } 
} 
 
 F-14
package friendlyforceproximity.relogo 
import static repast.simphony.relogo.Utility.*; 
import static repast.simphony.relogo.UtilityG.*; 
import repast.simphony.relogo.Plural; 
import repast.simphony.relogo.Stop; 
import repast.simphony.relogo.Utility; 
import repast.simphony.relogo.UtilityG; 
import repast.simphony.relogo.schedule.Go; 
import repast.simphony.relogo.schedule.Setup; 
import friendlyforceproximity.ReLogoTurtle; 
class Weapon extends ReLogoTurtle { 
 def step(){ 
  if (ticks() > 200){ 
   if (redalive==1){ 
    face(turtle(1)) 
    fd(0.5) 
   } 
   else{ 
    //die() 
   } 
  } 
 } 
} 
F.3.4 Validation and Verification 
Initial verification was performed through code inspection followed by individual simulation 
runs where movement was observed visually. The true accuracy of the model is more 
dependent on the availability of accurate intelligence data. Further validation of the model 
was performed using “batch” processing, enabling the model to be executed over multiple 
iterations and checking the output data in an excel data format. 
F.3.5 Model Output 
The model was run 1000 times with the output data exported into text files for BBN 
learning. It should be noted that the number of model iteration was limited to 1000 because 
higher numbers appeared to inhibit the creation of output data files. 
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Abstract: System of systems (SoS) engineering is an emerging sub-discipline, 
within which modelling and simulation is a key area. The failure of many SoS 
endeavours can be attributed to the inappropriate application of systems 
engineering processes, including modelling approaches. Selection of suitable 
modelling approaches is critical to ensuring representative models are created, 
ensuring reliable SoS analysis and prediction of emergent behaviour is 
possible. Essential to SoS modelling is the dynamic element, enabling the 
generation of emergent behaviour, appropriate approaches including; discrete 
event system specification, Petri nets, agent-based modelling and system 
dynamics. Bayesian belief networks, Markov models and game theory provide 
a static probabilistic approach, suitable for strategic, decision and risk models. 
Enterprise architecture frameworks and modelling languages are typically used 
for static modelling of SoS. A combination of static and dynamic approaches 
should be utilised, providing a range of perspectives, giving an insight into the 
complexity inherent in all SoS. 
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1 Introduction 
System of systems (SoS) engineering (SoSE) is an emerging sub-discipline, within which 
modelling and simulation (M&S) is a key area. The failure of many SoS endeavours can 
be attributed to the inappropriate application of systems engineering processes, including 
modelling approaches, within the SoS domain because of the mistaken belief that a SoS 
can always be regarded as a single large, or complex, system. 
Examples of high profile and high cost SoS, which are generally regarded  
as unsuccessful for these reasons, include the U.S. Future Combat Systems (FCS) 
programme, the U.K. National Programme for IT (NPfIT) in the National Health Service 
(NHS), the U.S. Coastguard Integrated Deepwater System Program and U.K. National 
Offender Management System (NOMIS). 
A RAND lessons learnt review (Pernin et al., 2012) examining the FCS programme 
found that M&S demonstrations focussed on the system rather than the SoS. Engineers 
and analysts used different M&S tools along with processes with different timescales that 
inhibited the use of one to support the other, M&S support for decision makers was often 
untimely and tended to lag decisions. 
Regarding the NPfIT project the UK House of Commons Committee of Public 
Accounts (2011) noted “a multiplicity of failure factors” including a failure to use and 
populate the correct project models; improperly populated project models, along with 
suitably skilled staff. The NHS lacked “a patient-oriented, informatics-driven health and 
social care information architecture”. with the proposed information architecture design 
described as poor. Further issues were raised in an earlier review (QinetiQ, 2005), which 
stated that “we found no documented process setting out a systematic approach for 
selecting the most beneficial course of action where alternatives existed” and “there was 
no evidence that an architectural design process had been defined, documented or 
deployed”. 
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In a report to Congress the following problems relating to M&S with the Deepwater 
programme were identified (O’Rourke, 2007); the models used to measure operational 
performance lacked the fidelity to determine whether improvements were attributable to 
Coast Guard or contractor actions, the Coast Guard incorrectly assumed “full operational 
capability of assets and communications and did not account for actual asset operating 
data” when initialising operational effectiveness models. 
Within the NOMIS programme there was an underestimation of the project 
complexity and a lack of stakeholder input to requirements (Comptroller and Auditor 
General, 2009). Also, the modelling appears to have been limited to static enterprise 
architecture approaches, which is generally typical of large scale IT projects. 
The theme running through these examples is inappropriate choice of models. It is 
now widely accepted that SoS require differing engineering approaches to those used for 
single systems (Jamshidi, 2008; Dahmann and Baldwin, 2008), and model choices may 
be one such difference. Guidance is required on how to make such choices among the 
many and varied modelling approaches. 
M&S within SoSE will provide the potential to predict and analyse emergent 
behaviour. The predicted behaviour may be as expected, however, equally it may not. 
Revealing this unexpected behaviour, will allow designers or operators to determine how 
to exploit or mitigate this ahead of SoS construction or operation. 
Depending upon the context and the question the modelling approach is required to 
answer, different M&S techniques and approaches are required. Selection of appropriate 
techniques is not a trivial exercise, because it requires comparative knowledge of a wide 
range of modelling approaches and their relationship to the different aspects of SoS. 
Consequently there is a need for a reference guide and more formalised selection 
approach of appropriate M&S techniques. 
There has been much research into individual SoS modelling techniques, e.g., the 
comprehensive modelling and analysis for advanced systems of systems (COMPASS) 
project (Coleman et al., 2012), discrete event systems specification (DEVS) (Zeigler, 
2003). 
1.1 Aim of the paper 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the applicability of a wide range of M&S methods for 
SoS in order to provide guidance to SoSE practitioners on choice of method according to 
context and decision needs. 
Whilst there is valuable research that has directly compared techniques, such as 
discrete event simulation (DES) with system dynamics (Tako and Robinson, 2009) or 
DES with agent-based simulation (Siebers et al., 2010), the survey described in this paper 
is intended to provide a broader comparison of a wide range of M&S methods, assessing 
their suitability and applicability in the SoS domain, through the use of a case study; the 
result of which is intended to aid the selection of suitable approaches. 
The survey of modelling techniques is performed within a framework, enabling 
particular modelling techniques to be assessed in relation to particular SoS aspects and 
SoS types. The framework is based upon a SoS system of interest (SoI) model (Kinder  
et al., 2012). The SoS SoI identifies a series of dimensions against which techniques can 
be assessed, providing a method for identifying appropriate techniques in relation to a 
particular problem or question. The approach taken was to initially consider how each 
technique could have been applied to the case study: the techniques were then 
 Annex B-5
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 System of systems modelling and simulation 153 
   
 
   
 
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
 
reconsidered from a more general viewpoint by assessing their applicability to each SoS 
SoI dimension. 
The M&S methods surveyed in this paper were selected through a review of current 
approaches and extant research in the systems and SoS domains. Methods were selected 
to ensure that a variety of different types were compared, including static, dynamic, 
bottom up, top down, deterministic, stochastic and probabilistic. The survey revealed a 
wide of range of methods from multiple disciplines applicable to SoS modelling. For 
example; artificial neural networks (ANNs), fall within the artificial intelligence domain, 
but when ANNs are combined with agent-based modelling, they provide an extremely 
powerful SoS modelling capability. The methods listed below are assessed. 
1 graph-based models to create structure: 
   enterprise architecture framework (EAF) 
   modelling languages 
   Petri nets 
2 inference testing for consistency, patterns, and completeness of models above 
   ANNs 
   network models (graph theory) 
3 probabilistic simulation based on directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) 
   Bayesian belief networks (BBNs) 
   Markov models 
   decision trees 
4 system simulation 
   DES 
   DEVS 
   agent-based modelling and simulation (ABMS) 
   system dynamics 
   surrogate models 
   game theory. 
The paper itself is structured as follows: the introductory section is followed by a 
description of firstly (Section 2) the methodology used for M&S assessment and secondly 
(Section 3) the case study used as a context for comparison of the various M&S methods; 
Section 4 provides a description of a range of M&S techniques, assessing their 
applicability to the case study and more general SoS modelling; Section 5 discusses the 
evaluation results followed by a summary of conclusions from this work in Section 6. 
2 Methodology 
The assessment of each M&S method is judgement-based; utilising experience gained 
through close involvement with M&S activities related to a case study and the associated 
problem domain meant it was possible to realistically consider the suitability and 
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potential application of each M&S technique. For some techniques basic models were 
constructed, however it was not possible to create models using every technique. A 
further assessment was performed regarding each technique’s suitability for more general 
SoS modelling. 
2.1 The common model 
The following SoS SoI dimensions (Kinder et al., 2012) comprise a common SoS model 
and were used as a basis for the assessments, allowing each technique’s suitability to 
specific SoS aspects to be considered: 
   Component systems: the individual, independent systems comprising the SoS. 
   Interactions: a SoS exists only because of interactions between constituent systems. 
With no interaction the SoS merely becomes a set of independent systems exhibiting 
no overall emergent behaviour. 
   Functions: a SoS performs a combination of functions in order to accomplish its 
purpose. Functions may be performed by individual component systems, by subsets 
of component systems or by the entire SoS. 
   Nature of relationships: this dimension is used to define the category of relationship 
between component systems, such as ‘peer-to-peer’, hierarchical control or 
distributed control. 
   Lifecycle: this dimension considers the lifecycle of the SoS as a whole as well as the 
respective timelines of the component systems, providing an insight into dynamism 
within the SOI. For some SoS, it may not be possible to define a cycle, as such, but 
rather an evolution in which the SoS passes through identifiable phases. 
   Classification: The SoS classifications (Dahmann and Baldwin, 2008): directed, 
acknowledged, collaborative and virtual, are used to populate this particular 
dimension. However, a particular SoS may exhibit the behaviours of more than one 
classification depending on the make-up of component systems and the current point 
in the lifecycle. 
   Variability: the frequency of change of a SoS is considered to be a critical 
dimension. This is linked to stability and also agility. Variability is related to time in 
the sense that it may reveal some sort of characteristic frequency representing change 
in the SoS. 
   System owners and operations: this dimension is closely related to organisations, 
management and enterprise (multi-organisational) relationships. It is dependent on 
the classification type, for example within a directed SoS the owners and operations 
will be well defined but for a more ad-hoc SoS this dimension will not be so well 
defined. 
   Concept of operation/use/employment: given that the individual systems can perform 
operations independently the use/mission of the SoS is critical for defining the SOI 
for the SoS as opposed to the individual constituent systems. This dimension is 
potentially the starting point for populating the SOI dimensions. 
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Although the above are described as dimensions, they are not independent. One could 
consider these to be a set of interrelated characteristics of SoS that may be used to 
distinguish a particular SoS from another. Figure 1 illustrates the SoS SOI model, which 
describes the relationships between dimensions. 
Figure 1 SoS SOI relationships (see online version for colours) 
 
Source: Kinder et al. (2012) 
2.2 Technique assessment 
Using these SoS SoI dimensions as an assessment framework, each selected  
modelling or simulation technique was initially analysed in the context of a data looping 
case study, which was limited in scope, providing partial coverage of the SoS SOI 
dimensions and is described in Section 3 below. Each M&S technique was then assessed 
by considering their suitability for all aspects of the dimensions, with the intention of 
providing a more general SoS modelling analysis. From these two considerations  
a traffic light assessment was produced that maps the techniques against the dimensions 
and then, separately, against three properties: dynamic (whether the technique produces 
time-dependent results), ease of creation (a measure of complexity and hence effort 
required to create the model), and verifiability (whether the results can be formally 
verified). 
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3 Case study: data looping 
This review of SoS M&S is based around a case study approach, namely data looping in 
network-enabled capability (NEC) environments, an acknowledged SoS problem in the 
military communications domain. 
Figure 2 illustrates a typical military scenario where tactical information is 
exchanged, in near real time, across several tactical data link (TDL) networks. TDL 
networks (in this case Link 11 and Link 16) utilise a series of fixed format messages to 
convey tactical, command and intelligence data, e.g., the position of an enemy aircraft or 
a command to intercept a specific target. Both Link 11 (NATO, 2008a) and Link 16 
(NATO, 2008b) exchange fixed format digital messages; Link 11 networks operate 
through a polling mechanism whereas Link 16 utilises a time division multiple access 
(TDMA) architecture. The purpose of a TDL is to enable the sharing of a common 
situational awareness (SA) picture amongst all participants of a network. For example, 
Fighter Aircraft A sensors will locate tracks and pass them over the TDL to Fighter 
Aircraft B and vice versa. This will result in both fighters displaying the same SA picture 
in their respective cockpits; essentially the TDL maintains synchronisation between the 
system track databases. 
Figure 2 Counter air mission data loop example 
 
The provision of a NEC typically requires multiple networks to be ‘connected’, these 
may be multiple Link 16 networks or the combination of different types such as Link 11, 
as shown in Figure 2. ‘Forwarding units’ are utilised to connect these networks, which 
translate from one message standard to another following relatively simple rules, in 
accordance with the current NATO forwarding standard (NATO, 2010). The differing  
 
 Annex B-9
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 System of systems modelling and simulation 157 
   
 
   
 
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
 
TDL types have arisen due to the stove piped development of these systems in the air, 
naval and land domains. A data loop occurs when, through network topology, a message 
is looped back onto the originating network through a series of connected networks. The 
dark arrows in Figure 2 indicate the occurrence of a data loop. This inevitably increases 
network traffic, due to the continuous recirculation of ‘stale’ data, resulting in excessive 
latency and corruption of the tactical situational awareness picture; for instance, a target 
representation on a tactical display may move erratically if a ‘current’ target report is 
received followed by ‘stale’ data which contains a previous position, causing the 
displayed track to jump backwards. The scenario depicted in Figure 2 was used as a test 
case for the M&S techniques described in this paper. 
Typically, a complete model of the data looping scenario will require a representation 
of each system, the communication links between them, representation of the targets and 
data exchanged between the systems. The model should enable the potential for data 
loops to be assessed and the quantification of the effect if they do occur. The single 
integrated air picture (SIAP) metrics (Votruba et al., 2001) are suitable for measuring the 
effects; in particular; 
   completeness (the percentage of live objects existing as track objects; 100% indicates 
all objects are reported) 
   clarity (measures the number spurious reported tracks) 
   continuity (a measure of the consistency and persistence of the track reports). 
It should be noted that a combination of simulation techniques may be required in order 
to create a complete model. Table 1 contrasts data looping M&S requirements (relating to 
the dimensions provided in Figure 1) to more general SoS requirements, providing a 
framework for the assessment of different M&S techniques in the context of both the data 
looping case study and more generic SoS modelling. This demonstrates the boundary of 
this M&S assessment, imposed by use of the data looping case study, highlighting the 
fact that it represents only part of the full SoS domain. 
4 Evaluation of M&S methods 
For each M&S technique this section: 
   provides a brief description of the technique and current application to SoS 
modelling 
   assesses the technique in the context of the data looping case study 
   assesses the technique in the context of general SoS modelling 
   provides an overall conclusion the techniques suitability. 
The assessment for each M&S technique is presented in the consistent format shown in 
Figure 3. 
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Figure 3 Technique assessment format 
 
The M&S techniques are assessed in the context of the data looping case study and 
general SoS M&S, as described in Table 1. Where a technique is determined as highly 
suited to modelling in the context of a particular dimension, it is shaded light grey, 
conversely where it is considered as of minimal suitability it is dark grey. 
Table 1 Modelling and simulation requirements 
SoS dimensions Data looping M&S requirements General SoS M&S requirements 
Component 
systems 
Define a platform type to an entity, 
where an entity is a component 
system. 
Define independent spatial 
behaviour for each entity. 
Any system; either generic or 
specific. 
Interactions Exchange information between 
simulated entity TDL formats, 
typically; 
   Link 11 
   Link 16 
   Link 22 
   variable message format (VMF) 
Any interaction; either generic or 
specific. 
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Table 1 Modelling and simulation requirements (continued) 
SoS dimensions Data looping M&S requirements General SoS M&S requirements 
Lifecycle Operational (or execution) phase 
only 
All applicable lifecycle stages, e.g., 
   planning 
   convergence 
   collaboration 
   execution 
   evolution 
   dispersion 
Variability Within each test scenario the 
component systems do not change. 
Model change in component 
systems throughout lifecycle. 
Classification Acknowledged with directed 
elements, e.g., Link 11/16 networks 
All SoS classifications. 
Functions 
   Correlation (of tracks) 
   Reporting (on allocated TDL) of 
tracks detected by sensor 
   Track forwarding between 
allocated TDLs 
All functions applicable to 
modelling requirement. 
Systems owners 
and operations 
Scenarios should be realistic but  
this dimension is not explicitly 
modelled. 
Model all relevant system owners 
and operations. 
Concept of 
operation/use/ 
employment 
Each scenario reflects a different 
concept of operation, e.g., 
   close air support 
   refuelling 
   suppression of enemy air defence 
   search and rescue 
Model relevant concept of 
operation/use/employment 
Relationships Node-less network All applicable relationship types, 
including: 
   peer-to-peer 
   hierarchical control 
   distributed control 
4.1 DES and DEVS 
DES models a system through the representation of system states and the change of these 
states at precise times. A DES does not run in real time (although activity ordered DES 
breaks time into a series of events and can give the impression of running in real time), it 
transitions between states, enabling system output and behaviour to be determined 
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rapidly. For example, a queuing system may be modelled, with the simulation stepping 
through events, which add or remove entities from the queue but not replicating the time 
spent in the queue thereby drastically reducing the simulation execution time. Nance 
(1993) defines DES as follows: 
“Discrete event simulation utilizes a mathematical/logical model of a physical 
system that portrays state changes at precise points in simulated time. Both the 
nature of the state change and the time at which the change occurs mandate 
precise description. Customers waiting for service, the management of parts 
inventory or military combat are typical domains of discrete event simulation.” 
DEVS is a mathematical formalism, which enables the hierarchical and modular 
specification of a discrete event system or simulation, since its inception a wide range of 
applications has employed DEVS concepts (Sarjoughian and Cellier, 2001), e.g., TDL 
testing and industrial control process analysis. 
The key characteristics of DEVS are: 
   it is based on mathematical formalism using system theoretic principles 
   it provides a mathematical formalism for systems and DES 
   the underlying conceptual framework separates experimental frame, source system, 
model and simulator 
   a system is modelled by a combination of atomic models, which capture system 
behaviour, and coupled models, which capture system structure. 
The concept of creating a large complex model from simpler atomic models could be 
regarded as the creation of a ‘system of models’ and it is this characteristic of DEVS that 
lends itself to SoS modelling. Current research in this area includes the DEVS unified 
process (DUNIP) which uses XML-based DEVS modelling language (DEVSXML) 
framework which enables models be defined and implemented in a variety of languages 
(Mittal et al., 2008). A service-oriented architecture (SOA) is employed to enable 
distributed and remote execution. Another area of interest is the mapping of the DoD 
architectural framework (DoDAF) to DEVS models with the aim of providing an 
‘executable architecture’ capability (Zeigler and Mittal, 2005). 
4.1.1 Application to data looping case study 
The behaviour of a forwarding unit, being event driven, is particularly suited to 
modelling using DEVS, i.e., an input message will unconditionally result in the 
generation of an output message, for a standard forwarder (NATO, 2010). When 
modelling ‘smart’ forwarding rules, the generation of an output will be conditional, 
dependent on the existence of a track on the output network. However, full 
implementation of the forwarding rules within DEVS would be extremely complex 
because of the nature of the multi-stage transactional correlation requirements, which 
retain knowledge of previous states, such as the number of correlation attempts, in order 
to determine the subsequent state and output. 
4.1.2 DEVS SoS M&S assessment 
Figure 4 provides an assessment of DEVS suitability for SoS M&S. 
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Figure 4 DEVS M&S suitability 
 
4.1.3 Application strengths and limitations of DES and DEVS 
DES and DEVS should be considered ‘core’ M&S techniques with regard to SoS. 
Discrete event modelling is applicable to the complex, detailed modelling of SoS 
components and interactions; it is less suited to the modelling of aggregate and strategic 
behaviour. Detailed information regarding the SoS under consideration is required for 
model implementation. Because DEVS is a mathematical formalism, the correctness of 
the model can be proved. 
Using the DEVS formalism to directly to define the model mathematically requires 
specialist knowledge, which could be outside the knowledge domain of many 
modellers/programmers. However, there are applications available that enable models to 
be created using a graphical interface removing the requirement to directly use the 
mathematical representation. 
DES and DEVS are limited to the execution/operational phase of a mission. This 
restricts the technique to situations where all component systems are known a priori. 
DEVS will enable implementation of a scenario but is too low level (i.e., working at too 
detailed a level) to enable definition of a concept of operations at a more abstract level. 
4.2 Petri nets 
Petri nets enable the analysis, design and modelling of discrete event systems, with the 
specific advantage that the same model may be used for the analysis of behavioural 
properties and performance evaluation. Petri nets may be described both graphically, 
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allowing designs to be communicated from engineer to customer, and mathematically, 
enabling formal analysis of a model (Zurawski and Zhou, 1994). They comprise basic 
constructs enabling the simulation of parallel and distributed systems (Murata, 1989), 
namely: 
   places (symbolising states or conditions) 
   transitions (symbolising actions) 
   arcs (connecting places to transition and vice versa). 
Places may contain tokens, which are moved to connected places, via transactions when 
‘fired’. Each arc has an associated weighting (where the weighting is not shown it should 
be assumed the value is 1). A transition is enabled if each input place contains at least as 
many as the weighting of the connection arc. On firing the number of tokens equal to the 
weighting is transferred from the input place to each output place. This is demonstrated in 
the simple example shown in Figure 5, which depicts the Petri net ‘marking’ transition 
following firing. There are various extensions to Petri nets, including: Timed Petri nets, 
stochastic Petri nets, coloured Petri nets, hybrid Petri nets, hierarchical Petri nets, agent 
Petri nets (University of Hamburg, 2014). 
Figure 5 Petri marking transition 
 
4.2.1 Application to data looping case study 
Of particular interest to the data looping case study and SoS modelling in general is the 
coloured Petri net. This extension allows each token to be assigned data values, known as 
token ‘colour’. Data types and operation may also be defined. It can be seen that tokens 
could be defined as discrete data link messages, looping within the model could be 
reproduced. The use of timed Petri nets is also applicable, allowing delays to be 
introduced in the model, which would reflect the cyclic transmission cycle of data link 
messages. 
Coloured Petri nets have been utilised in the development of executable architecture 
through an extension to DoDAF (Li et al., 2012), providing a dynamic element to the 
static models currently produced by DoDAF (and MoDAF). 
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4.2.2 Petri net SoS M&S assessment 
Figure 6 provides an assessment of Petri net suitability for SoS M&S. 
Figure 6 Petri net M&S suitability 
 
4.2.3 Application strengths and limitations of Petri nets 
Petri nets are essentially a type of discrete event model and are therefore similarly suited 
to the low level modelling of interactions between SoS component systems. Detailed 
knowledge of the component systems is required for model implementation. Petri nets are 
less well suited to the modelling of aggregate and strategic behaviour. 
In assessing ease of creation of the model, it is assumed that this is linked to the 
complexity of the model and that detailed modelling of the SoS will include greater 
complexity. 
4.3 Agent-based modelling and simulation 
ABMS is a relatively new approach to modelling systems comprising autonomous 
interacting components. Where the components are themselves independent systems then 
it follows that ABMS may also be applied to the modelling of a SoS. Examples (Macal 
and North, 2008) of the use of ABMS include the deregulation of the electric supply 
industry and the financial markets. In both of these examples individual agents make 
independent decisions, which have an effect on the over-arching system, such as an 
individual selecting an energy supplier based on the lowest price. 
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Through implementing relatively simple rules in individual agents it is possible to 
replicate and study emergent system behaviour within an ABM. Indeed it can be argued 
that as emergent behaviour is not always predictable more traditional scripted simulation 
methods are unsuitable for investigating this behaviour, because in order to simulate 
behaviour there must be knowledge of it. In effect, this is a ‘chicken and egg’ situation. 
ABMS surmounts this by taking a bottom up approach, only requiring knowledge of the 
constituent or component systems but allowing them to interact and hence generate 
emergent behaviour holistically. However, the ability to predict emergent behaviour is 
dependent on the programmed behaviour of the agents. 
It should be noted that the modeller would generally use such techniques to 
understand better the way in which behaviours emerge, than to attempt prediction of all 
emergent behaviour available to the SoS in question. 
4.3.1 The properties of an agent 
Although there does not seem to be a generally agreed definition of an agent there are a 
common set of properties and attributes, which are described below: 
   Autonomous: an agent can function independently of its environment and other 
agents. 
   Modular: an agent is an identifiable, discrete entity with a well-defined boundary. 
   Interacting: agents interact with other agents and their environment. Protocols are 
defined which enable this interaction. 
   Goal-directed: an agent has goals to achieve related to its behaviour, i.e. an agent 
will have a set of goals with which it can compare its current effectiveness against 
causing it to modify its behaviour if necessary. 
   Flexible: an agent may have the ability to learn and adapt its behaviour over time. 
   Resource attributes: agents may store the level of current ‘stock’ of a resource, e.g., 
wealth, information, etc. 
4.3.2 Application to data looping case study 
ABMS potentially allows relatively simple representations of data looping scenarios to be 
created entirely within ABMS applications, such as NetLogo©. Another benefit is 
scalability; generally an ABM will contain many agents although this is dependent on the 
complexity of the agent behaviour and the processing power available. 
4.3.3 ABMS SoS M&S assessment 
Figure 7 provides an assessment of ABMS suitability for SoS M&S. 
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Figure 7 ABMS M&S suitability 
 
4.3.4 Application strengths and limitations of ABMS 
Of all the techniques surveyed ABMS is most likely to reveal unanticipated emergent 
behaviour due to its bottom up approach. However, the behaviour observed is clearly 
dependent upon the implementation of the agents (component systems), therefore 
determining the correct level of fidelity and identifying which systems characteristics to 
model within each agent is key and is, in itself, a complex activity. 
ABMs are highly scalable and models can be constructed with simplified agent 
behaviour. Modularity of agents enables extension of behavioural complexity if required. 
Full implementation of all processing rules would increase complexity of the agents 
thereby severely increasing processing load. It is noted that within the SoS domain, 
Baldwin et al. (2012) have demonstrated the use of the Schelling model as a basis for 
validation of a SoS model. 
4.4 System dynamics 
System dynamics is founded on control theory and the theory of nonlinear dynamics and 
is currently used across a wide range of domains, including: business administration, 
engineering (numerous disciplines, including systems), biology, ecology, economics, 
education, medicine, policy design, law, psychology, sociology and defence (Sterman, 
2000). 
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It provides a ‘systems thinking’ viewpoint and a toolset enabling the analysis of 
complex systems, and by inference, analysis of SoS. System dynamics enables a holistic, 
top down, approach to analysis, with aggregation of data and information represented as 
stocks and flows between component systems and the effects of positive and negative 
feedback as a result of causal linkages modelled. The aggregation of data, rather than 
individually identifiable ‘tokens’ or ‘packets’ makes this approach suitable to more 
abstract applications, such as the effect of governance or policy on a complex system, or 
a SoS. 
Models are continuous rather than discrete event driven; the system behaviour is 
demonstrated through the dynamic nature of the model. 
4.4.1 Application to data looping case study 
Whilst not applicable to the direct modelling of TDL networks, which requires the unique 
identification of messages being passed between component systems, system dynamics 
could be suitable for modelling the effects of data looping mitigation techniques on the 
impact on the situational awareness picture, and possibly be utilised in determining the 
cost effectiveness of implementing these solutions. 
Additional applications include network planning, where the effect of network plans 
(allocations of time slots and use of forwarding units) could be assessed in the context of 
overall system effect. 
4.4.2 System dynamics M&S assessment 
Figure 8 provides an assessment of system dynamics suitability for SoS M&S. 
Figure 8 System dynamics M&S suitability 
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4.4.3 Application strengths and limitations of system dynamics 
System dynamics provides top down modelling of SoS allowing the aggregate behaviour 
to be analysed and is therefore more suited to the modelling of more strategic problems. 
This can be used to complement the bottom up, detailed modelling approaches such as 
DES or Petri nets, which are more suited to modelling operational problems. Because 
systems dynamics models aggregate behaviour; therefore changes in individual 
component systems do not necessarily affect the model. 
4.5 Surrogate models 
A surrogate model is a data driven, bottom up model that models an approximated output 
of a system rather than modelling the actual system itself (Forrester et al., 2008). Indeed, 
surrogate models are also referred to as ‘data driven models’. 
This approach enables highly efficient system models to be created, which reduce the 
processing and time burdens when running the model, which, potentially, can be 
prohibitive. This is particularly true in the SoS domain where, by definition, the SoS 
under investigation will be complex. Several common approaches, described below, are 
taken to surrogate modelling, however response surfaces and ANNs are the most popular 
for SoS analysis (Biltgen, 2008): 
   Response surface methodology (RSM): a statistical approach to exploration of the 
relationship of several explanatory variables to response variables. Experiments are 
designed to optimise a response (output) variable, which is influenced by a number 
of independent (input) variables. The dependence of the response variable on the 
independent variables is approximated using a least-squares regression approach to 
determine unknown model coefficients (Box and Draper, 1987). Response surface 
equations are easily created but may perform poorly when modelling nonlinear or 
discontinuous responses, which are typical of SoS (Biltgen, 2008). 
   ANN: see Section 4.6. 
   Kriging: the prediction of a function at a particular point by using the weighted 
average of known values at nearby points. Kriging originated in the field of 
geostatics and has become a generic term for a set of least-squares methods that 
provide best linear unbiased predictions and some nonlinear types of prediction 
(Oliver and Webster, 2013). 
   Support vector machines: a pattern recognition approach using learning algorithms, 
which output an optimal hyperplane enabling new examples to be classified  
(Cortes and Vapnik, 1995). 
Of particular interest to SoS modelling is the use of ANN’s within a surrogate model, 
several research papers have been published utilising this approach, in particular to 
perform ballistic missile defence (BMD) architecture analysis (Ender et al., 2010) and 
capability-based quantitative technology evaluation (Biltgen and Mavris, 2007). 
4.5.1 Application to data looping case study 
The effects of data looping may be quantified thorough a set of metrics (e.g., 
completeness, redundancy, quality of information, bandwidth and kinematic accuracy); 
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using surrogate models it would be possible to generate the metrics on a dynamic basis, 
thereby modelling the aggregate behaviour of the SoS. This output could potentially be 
used to assess factors such as workload and the impact of data looping on mission 
success. 
4.5.2 Surrogate model SoS M&S assessment 
Figure 9 provides an assessment of surrogate models suitability for SoS M&S. 
Figure 9 Surrogate model M&S suitability 
 
4.5.3 Application strengths and limitations of surrogate models 
Surrogate models are potentially an extremely valuable technique in SoS modelling, in 
conjunction with other techniques such as ANN (Biltgen and Mavris, 2007; Ender et al., 
2010). Surrogate models may be embedded within agent-based simulations, reducing the 
complexity that would be required for high fidelity system representations. 
Surrogate models are, by definition, simplifications of systems being modelled, 
therefore ease of creation will be greater than an equivalent detailed model using 
techniques such as DES/DEVS or ABMS. This depends on the complexity and behaviour 
of the function. 
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4.6 Artificial neural networks 
An ANN is a computer program supposedly designed to model the human brain and its 
ability to learn tasks (Haykin, 1999). Of course, it is recognised that the human brain 
functions in a completely different way to a digital computer, based on the Von Neumann 
architecture, typically partitioned as; processing unit, memory, control unit and 
input/output. An example of a typical multilayer feedforward network is shown below in 
Figure 10. 
Figure 10 Multilayer feed forward network 
 
4.6.1 Application to data looping case study 
A key part of the data looping research involved the adjustment of correlation gates in 
order to optimise the reduction in looped tracks without incurring any loss of valid data. 
This was achieved through a trial and error approach and tended to be scenario 
dependent. It is possible that the use of an ANN could have automated this process with 
the ANN dynamically altering the correlations gates until the optimum settings were 
found. 
4.6.2 ANN SoS M&S assessment 
Figure 11 provides an assessment of ANN suitability for SoS M&S. 
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Figure 11 ANN M&S suitability 
 
4.6.3 Application strengths and limitations of ANNs 
ANN modelling may be regarded as a meta-modelling approach, and is particularly 
suited to supporting surrogate models (Ender et al., 2010) enabling behaviour to be learnt 
from available data. The most significant issue with this approach is lack of availability 
of appropriate data. An ANN can model system behaviour, embedded in an agent or 
surrogate model and there is the potential for application in decision support. An ANN 
may be embedded in a dynamic model. 
4.7 Bayesian belief networks 
A BBN is a graphical representation of the probabilistic relationships between a set of 
random variables using a DAG (Charniak, 1991). A network consists of a set of 
interconnected nodes with each interconnection representing the causal relationship 
between nodes with each node having multiple states. The probabilities relate to the 
likelihood of a particular state occurring in relation to the states of the connected nodes. 
4.7.1 Application to data looping case study 
The application of BBNs to modelling is more abstract than the approach taken with 
more traditional modelling techniques (e.g., DEVS) but could provide a useful decision 
support capability. For example, a BBN could be constructed to determine the probability 
of data looping occurring in specific scenarios. BBNs have a useful practical application 
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as a network planning tool, although it was considered too abstract for application in the 
data looping case study. Within the SoS domain there has been research into the 
application of BBNs into assessing vulnerabilities in tactical data wireless networks 
(Chan et al., 2010). Another area of interest is the modelling of phased missions 
(Andrews et al, 2008) where the use dynamic Bayesian networks (DBNs) appears to be 
applicable. 
4.7.2 BBN SoS M&S assessment 
Figure 12 provides an assessment of BBN suitability for SoS M&S. 
Figure 12 BBN M&S suitability 
 
4.7.3 Application strengths and limitations of BBNs 
BBNs enable the creation of top down, probabilistic SoS models. This potentially enables 
risk to be quantitatively determined early in the SoS lifecycle, before data is available 
regarding all component systems. The identification of appropriate nodes and population 
of state probability tables within BBNs can be extremely subjective; hence reliance on 
the results of models in this situation must be tempered with caution. The general 
applicability of BBNs is enhanced because not all elements in SoS need to be known a 
priori, however, there is a subjective aspect because completion of the probability tables 
has to be the result of a qualitative assessment or derived from historical data, which 
presumes that this is a good indication of future behaviour. BBNs do not have an 
executable element and the specific functions cannot be directly verified using this 
modelling technique. 
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4.8 Markov model 
A Markov model can be used to model any situation where a system moves 
probabilistically between states (European Mathematical Society, 2012). A Markov 
model is ‘memory-free’, the probability of transitioning to an alternate state is only 
dependent on the current state. A Markov system will always reach a fixed equilibrium 
regardless of initial conditions. There are similarities to DBNs, however Markov 
processes model the overall system state whereas DBN’s model variables. 
One application of Markov models is to determine when previous states have no 
effect on a system, or SoS, when compared to a model that does take previous states into 
account. Markov models may be applicable to analysing ‘variability’ of a SoS. 
4.8.1 Application to data looping case study 
Research has been undertaken to model system component system development and the 
effect on the overall SoS, enabling the impact of using less, or more, mature systems to 
be assessed (Mane et al., 2011). This may have applications in producing a ‘dynamic’ 
TDL roadmap, for instance, for assessing the impact of the out of service date of a 
particular TDL. 
4.8.2 Markov model SoS M&S assessment 
Figure 13 provides an assessment of Markov models suitability for SoS M&S. 
Figure 13 Markov model M&S suitability 
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4.8.3 Application strengths and limitations of Markov models 
Markov models enable the creation of top down, probabilistic SoS models at the strategic 
level. As with BBN modelling, there can be a subjective element. However, previous 
research (Mane et al., 2011) has illustrated that Markov models do certainly have 
potential applications in the SoS modelling domain. 
4.9 Game theory 
Game theory enables the modelling and study of strategic situations amongst multiple 
parties, allowing analysis of payoffs and determination of the equilibrium giving 
optimum pay-off to each party (Osborne, 2003). Typical applications include analysis of 
business competition, political voting behaviour, bidders competing in an auction and in 
biology, the behaviour of predators and prey. A basic distinction is made between 
cooperative and non-cooperative games. Cooperative games require a contract or 
agreement between parties whereas in non cooperative games the parties are independent. 
Applications within the SoS, domain could potentially include assessment of design 
decisions to determine which give maximum benefit and cost-effectiveness, i.e., the 
payoffs providing most benefits to all parties. There is also potential to use this technique 
to formally assess the payoffs between industry and the customer base regarding the 
adoption of open systems. In particular, the use of game theory has been researched in the 
context of a smart energy grid SoS (Cooksey and Mavris, 2011). Also, within the SoS 
domain, game theory has been used in the identification of a SoS unification framework 
(Wojcik and Hoffman, 2006). 
4.9.1 Application to data looping case study 
This approach may have applications at the strategic level, through the determination of 
payoffs amongst parties regarding the implementation of data looping mitigation 
techniques. 
4.9.2 Game theory SoS M&S assessment 
Figure 14 provides an assessment of game theory suitability for SoS M&S. 
4.9.3 Application strengths of game theory 
Game theory will enable pay-offs and equilibrium between both component systems and 
users to be modelled, potentially enabling SoS behaviour to be analysed. However, a 
word of caution is sounded. Green (2005) found that game theorists were only equally as 
successful as a group of students in predicting the outcome of a pre-defined set of 
situations. However, the unreliability of game theory appears to be associated with 
economic forecasting. Using game theory to calculate pay-offs in the SoS domain, 
potentially enabling different SoS solutions to be compared, may be less susceptible to 
unpredictability and therefore provide more reliable results. 
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Figure 14 Game theory M&S suitability 
 
4.10 Decision trees 
Decision trees enable the modelling of complex decision-making processes potentially 
allowing the effects of specific decision alternatives to be predicted (Quinlan, 1986). 
They are typically employed in decision analysis when determining the optimum strategy 
in relation to a particular goal. 
4.10.1 Application to data loop case study? 
A potential application would be the assessment of strategy for the implementation of a 
potential data looping mitigation solution and the selection of candidate platforms for the 
introduction of this capability. 
4.10.2 Decision trees SoS M&S assessment 
Figure 15 provides an assessment of decision trees suitability for SoS M&S. 
4.10.3 Application strengths of decision trees 
Of relevance to SoS modelling is the research carried out into decision making within a 
phased mission, relating to adaptability and agility of systems (Andrews et al., 2008). 
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Figure 15 Decision tree M&S suitability 
 
4.11 Network models (graph theory) 
In this context, ‘network models’ means the use of graph theory to model networks, types 
of graph include (Chartrand, 1984); 
   flow graphs 
   bipartite graphs 
   multi-layered graphs. 
Different types of networks may be modelled, e.g., small-world networks where most 
nodes are not directly connected but can be connected via a series of ‘hops’ and  
scale-free networks, which include many highly connected nodes. Percolation models 
may be used to assess networks robustness to loss of nodes. 
Within the SoS domain research has been carried into the application of the clustering 
coefficient, generally used as a measure of the level of connectivity within a group of 
people, to determine connectivity between component systems (Dahlgren, 2007). 
4.11.1 Application to data looping case study 
The obvious application for network modelling and graph theory is connectivity between 
component systems within a SoS. Percolation models may be used to assess the 
robustness of multi-TDL networks. 
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4.11.2 Network models SoS M&S assessment 
Figure 16 provides an assessment of network models suitability for SoS M&S. 
Figure 16 Network models M&S suitability 
 
4.11.3 Application strengths of network models 
Network models are, by definition, highly applicable to the modelling of interactions 
within a SoS. They are suitable for modelling all types of SoS, from the highly specified 
directed to the more adhoc collaborative or virtual (Dahmann and Baldwin, 2008), such 
as social networks. 
4.12 Enterprise architecture framework 
EAFs are typically used to represent SoS, particularly in the defence domain, with 
MoDAF (Ministry of Defence, UK, n.d.) being the UK variant. Whilst they do provide a 
suitable structure, enabling the modelling of abstract to concrete concepts, the models are 
purely static with no dynamic capability, severely limiting the capability to predict 
emergent behaviour and model causal relationships. 
Generally the development of a MODAF model is based on numerous scenarios, 
however, this implies that component systems are known, as least at a generic level, 
meaning applicability is limited to directed and acknowledged types of SoS [as defined 
by Dahmann and Baldwin (2008)]. In order to add an executable element to DoDAF, the 
US equivalent to MoDAF, research is being undertaken to add a dynamic view through 
the use of coloured Petri nets (Li et al., 2012). 
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4.12.1 Application to data looping case study 
Scenarios may be developed using MoDAF or DoDAF, with scenarios defined in  
the operational views (OV). The OV-1a view utilises a pictorial format enabling 
communication between the model developers and the operational community. Once the 
scenarios are agreed and deemed to be operationally realistic, further operational views 
enable the nodes within the scenario to be elaborated and the information exchanges to be 
defined. The model may then be instantiated with specific systems through the system 
views (SV) allowing detailed analysis of data flows between the systems, including the 
presence of data loops. 
4.12.2 EAFs SoS M&S assessment 
Figure 17 provides an assessment of EAFs suitability for SoS M&S. EAFs are shown to 
be applicable to most of the dimensions, except ‘functions’ and ‘variability’. EAFs range 
of different viewpoints provides this close match with the dimensions, although they do 
not generally enable detailed modelling of functions, and due to their static nature are not 
suited to modelling variability or emergent behaviour within a SoS. Verification is 
generally limited to subject matter expert review. 
Figure 17 EAF M&S suitability 
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4.12.3 Application strengths of EA frameworks 
EA frameworks are commonly used to create static SoS models and are an essential 
technique in this domain. However, they are unsuited to identifying emergent behaviour 
because of their static nature, although a dynamic element is the subject of current 
research (Li et al., 2012). At present functions can be identified by EAs, but their 
behaviour cannot be modelled. 
4.13 Modelling languages 
Within the discipline of software engineering the Unified Modelling Language (UML) 
(OMG, n.d.b) is the currently the industry standard for software design, within the 
systems domain the Systems Modelling Language (SySML) (OMG, n.d.a) is used, and is 
an extension of a subset of UML. These modelling languages are not directly executable. 
However, executable UML is available, which derives code from the model to be used in 
implementation, requiring a very high level of detail to be captured in the model. The 
model effectively becomes the system. 
The model-based systems engineering (MBSE) approach may be applicable to a 
directed SoS, where the component systems are known and the SoS is designed. For a 
more ad-hoc SoS it is less applicable being more appropriate to the design of the 
component systems. The COMPASS project (Coleman et al., 2012) is carrying out 
research into defining a SoS modelling language, COMPASS Modelling Language 
(CML), which has an executable element. 
4.13.1 Application to data looping case study 
Sequence diagrams were used to demonstrate the information flow between systems and 
networks. Additionally, the same diagrams were used to analyse the processing flow 
within the requirement transactions. Use case helped to define both the scenarios and the 
forwarding requirements. A potential application would be the assessment of strategy for 
the implementation of data looping mitigation forwarding rules and the selection of 
candidate platforms for the introduction this capability. 
4.13.2 Modelling language SoS M&S assessment 
Figure 18 provides an assessment of modelling language suitability for SoS M&S. 
4.13.3 Application strengths of modelling languages 
Whilst UML is generally utilised in the software domain, it is possible the apply elements 
when specifying and designing SoS, SySML is possibly more applicable as it is intended 
to enable modelling of physical systems. CML is likely to become an important 
technique, as it is specifically intended for SoS modelling. 
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Figure 18 Modelling language M&S suitability 
 
5 Summary of modelling technique comparison 
This section collects the above results together in order to enable a side-by-side 
comparison of the modelling techniques assessed in this report. 
5.1 Modelling technique case study comparison 
Table 2 summarises the suitability of the assessed M&S techniques to the data looping 
case study. As the case study considers an operational scenario with fixed component 
systems, the lifecycle, variability and classification are constrained to a limited set of 
states; this results in all techniques being indicated as applicable for all of these 
dimensions. Techniques utilising a bottom up approach enable component systems to be 
modelled, although spatial behaviour is limited to those with a dynamic capability. It is 
noted that although EAF and modelling languages enable component systems to be 
modelled, their spatial behaviour cannot be replicated, due to their static nature. Bottom 
up techniques such as DEVS, Petri nets and ABMS are less suitable for more strategic, 
high level dimensions; system owners and concept of operation. 
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Table 2 Data looping suitability 
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5.2 Modelling technique SoS assessment 
Table 3 summarises the suitability of the assessed M&S techniques to more general SoS 
modelling, considering all SoS classifications and all phases of the lifecycle. This 
demonstrates that some bottom up techniques, such as DEVS, Petri nets and ABMS, 
whilst being highly applicable to the case study, which was concerned with the operation 
(or execution) phase, are less appropriate throughout the lifecycle. These techniques are 
also less suited to SoS with higher variability. This is because individual component 
systems are modelled; as a result if these systems change in the SoS lifetime then the 
model becomes redundant, exhibiting low resilience to variability. However, top down 
techniques, such as system dynamics are generally used to model more strategic 
dimensions rather than individual component systems and hence are more resilient to 
variability. 
5.3 General M&S comparison 
Table 4 provides a comparison of the surveyed M&S using general characteristics. For 
emergent behaviour to be generated by a model it generally must be dynamic. It can be 
seen that dynamic models tend to be more difficult to implement, based on the 
assumption that the complexity is greater than those of static models. However, the 
testability of these models is also greater as, being dynamic, they may be run against test 
cases. 
Table 4 General M&S attributes 
 Dynamic Ease of creation Verifiable 
DES/DEVS HIGH LOW HIGH 
Petri nets HIGH LOW HIGH 
ABMS HIGH LOW HIGH 
System dynamics HIGH LOW HIGH 
Surrogate models HIGH LOW HIGH 
ANN HIGH HIGH HIGH 
BNN LOW HIGH HIGH 
Markov models LOW HIGH HIGH 
Game theory LOW LOW LOW 
Decision trees LOW HIGH HIGH 
Network models LOW HIGH HIGH 
EAF LOW HIGH LOW 
Modelling languages LOW HIGH LOW 
5.4 Modelling technique classification 
Table 5 shows how each modelling technique, described in this report, related to a basic 
M&S taxonomy. Some entries in the table may appear contradictory, e.g., DEVS being 
both continuous and discrete. However, this does reflect the extensibility of DEVS, as the 
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Figure 19 SoS lifecycle and data availability 
 
Figure 20 M&S method data requirements 
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5.6 Limitations 
As stated previously in Section 2, the review of each technique is a qualitative assessment 
based on previous experience of modelling the problem presented in the data looping 
case study and wider experience of SoS modelling and research. The purpose of this 
activity is to provide a pragmatic and practical approach for SoS engineers, enabling 
appropriate techniques to be selected when modelling a SoS, at any point the lifecycle. 
6 Concluding remarks 
6.1 General comments on the M &S tools 
The generation of emergent behaviour requires a model to have a dynamic element. 
DES/DEVS and Petri nets provide a dynamic, highly structured bottom up approach to 
modelling and are both extensible, providing extensions for stochastic and continuous 
capability. DEVS is more developed in the SoS domain with processes available which 
support model development, e.g., DUNIP (Mittal et al., 2008). 
Petri nets are a more specialised modelling technique and their selection will likely 
depend on the practitioner’s experience. However, the use of Petri nets for the creation of 
executable DoDAF views (Li et al., 2012) represents an important development, which 
may become an essential SoS modelling approach. The structured nature of DES/DEVS 
and Petri nets does require a model to implement all component systems and interactions 
between them. 
ABMS provides a more flexible approach, through the definition of agents which 
abide by a set of behavioural rules, the interactions will then naturally occur as a result of 
these rules, potentially revealing unanticipated emergent behaviour. However, these 
techniques may be combined, i.e., an agent may be implemented using DEVS or Petri 
nets. ABMS is potentially more suited to the modelling of ad hoc SoS (collaborative, 
virtual) than DEVS and Petri nets, since models with different combinations of agents 
may be created and run relatively rapidly. A surrogate model generates an approximated 
nonlinear output of a system rather than modelling the actual system itself, ANNs may be 
utilised to generate these nonlinear models, as has been demonstrated in the BMD 
domain (Ender et al., 2010). Surrogate models themselves may be incorporated within 
agents, providing an efficient and flexible modelling solution. This approach should be 
considered where a high fidelity modelling is impractical due to complexity or the 
processing overhead would be excessive. 
System dynamics provides a dynamic, top down modelling capability, which can 
compliment the bottom up approaches and is more suited to modelling high level, 
strategic dimensions and behaviour, as opposed to low level modelling of individual 
component systems. 
BBNs and Markov models both provide another alternative probabilistic approach, 
suitable for strategic, decision and risk models. There is potential for lower model outputs 
to generate probability distributions as input to these models. Numerous software 
applications are available to enable the creation of these models, making them a practical 
option, however selection of nodes and determination of probability values does tend to 
be subjective and can result in less reliable results. 
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Game theory does require more specialist knowledge to implement models and is 
relatively immature in the SoS domain but it is unique in its capability to analyse pay-offs 
between component systems at the strategic level. Decision trees may have some use in 
assessing combinations of component systems and providing decision support, but BBNs, 
Markov and game theory models appear to be more applicable for SoS. 
Network models are, by definition, limited to the analysis of interactions within SoS. 
However, the interactions between the component systems are what enable the existence 
of a SoS; therefore network models are highly relevant and are also unique in supporting 
detailed analysis of these connections. 
EAFs are currently used most widely in modelling SoS, particularly DoDAF and 
MODAF in the military domains. These enable multiple views of SoS architecture and 
enable communication between operational and engineering communities. However, 
although this is a valuable approach, the models produced are static and therefore not 
able to generate emergent behaviour (noting the proposed executable view as discussed 
above). It is suggested that, generally, SoS modelling should utilise both static and 
dynamic models. EAFs and modelling languages are closely related, for example certain 
DoDAF/MODAF views may be specified in UML or SySML format. Again, modelling 
languages are typically static, although some tool vendors do provide an executable 
capability. Of major interest is the COMPASS modelling language, CML; although 
relatively immature it is specifically designed for SoS modelling. 
6.2 Selection of M&S methods 
The survey of the M&S methods using the SOI dimensions provides a framework for the 
selection of methods appropriate for a given context. The process for method selection, 
utilising this framework, is described below. 
6.2.1 Data looping M&S method selection 
For the data looping case study, a model is required to reproduce the recirculation of data 
through multiple networks and demonstrate the effect. 
The analysis of Table 1 shows that the key dimensions to be considered in this case 
are; component systems, interactions and functions. 
From Table 2, it is observed that DES/DEVS, ABMS and modelling languages are 
the only methods that are applicable to all three key dimensions. 
To demonstrate the effect of data looping, the model is required to be dynamic, 
eliminating the use of modelling languages, as indicated in Table 4. 
Consulting the general descriptions of the M&S techniques in Section 4, it is 
suggested that DES/DEVS is the most appropriate modelling option, as it is more suited 
to the queuing and transmission of data between component systems. However, although 
a modelling language (e.g., UML) is ruled out as a final M&S option it could be applied 
in the design of DES/DEVS model. 
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6.2.2 General SoS M&S method selection 
The following general process for M&S method selection is proposed: 
   determine model requirements, i.e., what is its purpose? 
   cross-reference the model requirements to the SOI dimensions and determine the key 
dimensions 
   from Table 4, select M&S techniques, which are applicable across dimensions 
   from the model requirements determine if dynamic behaviour is required;  
re-assess the list of selected models using Table 4 information. 
The following typical SoS problems are considered, demonstrating the application of the 
proposed process. 
6.2.2.1 Achieving interoperability 
Achieving interoperability within a SoS, e.g., in a close air support military scenario, 
requiring communication between ground and air forces. 
   Model purpose: assess communication capabilities of component systems and 
identify where gateways are required. Assume component systems are identified. 
   Key dimensions: component systems, interactions. 
   Applicable M&S methods (Table 3): DES/DEVS, Petri nets, ABMS, EAF, modelling 
language. 
   Dynamic behaviour required: no. A static analysis of the communication media will 
suffice. 
   Final M&S method selection: EAF, modelling language. 
6.2.2.2 Delivery of a directed SoS 
Delivery of a directed SoS; requiring coordinated component system development, e.g., a 
national healthcare system, enabling the exchange and storage of patient information, 
online booking and prescription management. 
   Model purpose: provide analysis of the maturity of component systems, enabling the 
determination of the current overall SoS maturity, highlighting risk of delivery 
failure, early in the lifecycle. 
   Key dimensions: lifecycle, system owners and operations, concept of operation, 
variability, classification. 
   Applicable M&S methods (Table 3): system dynamics, BNN, Markov models, game 
theory. 
   Dynamic behaviour required: Not essential. 
   Final M&S method selection: BNN, Markov models, game theory. 
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6.2.2.3 Situational awareness 
Achieving adequate situational awareness (SA) within a SoS, e.g. in a disaster relief 
scenario amongst cooperating agencies. 
   Model purpose: determine level of SA within an operational SoS. 
   Key dimensions: component systems, interactions, functions, nature of relationships, 
system, concept of operation/use/employment, owners an operations. 
   Applicable M&S methods (Table 3): modelling language. 
   Dynamic behaviour required: no. 
   Final M&S method selection: modelling language. 
6.2.2.4 Emergent behaviour 
Predicting emergent behaviour within a SoS, e.g. behaviour of traffic flows in an 
integrated platform system. 
   Model purpose: analysis of traffic flow and bottlenecks in SoS under varying load 
conditions. 
   Key dimensions: component systems, interactions, functions. 
   Applicable M&S methods (Table 3): DES/DEVS, ABMS, modelling languages. 
   Dynamic behaviour required: yes. 
   Final M&S method selection: DES/DEVS, ABMS. 
6.3 Future work 
This paper is intended to be a starting point for a wider survey of modelling techniques 
applicable to SoS, providing the basis for a structured technique selection process, 
depending on SoS type and context. 
Currently, the survey is limited to a single case study, however the results will be 
further enhanced through the examination of different case studies, including examples of 
different types of SoS across multiple domains. This will lead to more specific selection 
criteria for SoS modelling technique. 
As well as increasing the scope of case studies, additional modelling techniques 
should also be considered, such as the following: 
1 Monte Carlo simulation 
2 multi-criteria decision analysis 
3 failure modes and effects analysis 
4 highly optimised tolerance (HOT) (Wojcik, 2004) 
5 cost modelling 
   constructive systems engineering cost model (COSYSMO) (Valerdi, 2005) 
   standard financial modelling (Benninga, 1997) 
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6 risk modelling 
   dedicated risk modelling approaches (Rasmussen, 1997) 
7 reliability models 
   Jelinski-Moranda (JM) (Jelinski and Moranda, 1972)-reliability model 
   Littlewood-Verall (Littlewood and Verrall, 1974) 
   computer-aided software reliability estimation (CASRE)  
(Lyu and Nikora, 1992) 
   system Weibull distribution (Kapur and Lamberson, 1977) 
Whilst undertaking this survey it became apparent that a general resource does not 
currently exist outlining SoS modelling techniques and their applicability. It is hoped that 
the work described in this paper will form the basis of a just such a resource, which can 
be expanded and refined as the SoSE discipline matures. 
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1 Introduction	
 
The System of Interest (SOI) of a SoS and its dimensions were first discussed at the ESoS Academic 
Retreat in 2011. This workshop was held in order to discuss and progress these initial SOI dimensions 
and definitions. In this report I have analysed the voting from the questionnaires, compiled all 
comments received and recorded the results of the discussions from the workshop. 
As explained in the questionnaire, I intend to use the SOI dimensions as an aid to scope my own 
research into SoS Modelling and Simulation (M&S). However it is hoped their definition will assist 
the ESoS group as a whole. 
Thank you, for the responses relating to SoS M&S. As expected, within the time constraints of the 
workshop, we barely had time to discuss each dimension. So, although we did not discuss SoS M&S 
directly the information you provided is still of great use. 
2 Questionnaire	Responses	
A high proportion1 of the questionnaires were completed, which was very much appreciated. I have 
analysed the results by, firstly, just summing the response ratings and, secondly, looking at the 
variance of the responses for each dimension. The plot of variance is intended to show consensus 
amongst the responses, i.e. the lower the variance the greater the consensus. 
 
Figure 1 : Dimension Scores 
                                                            
1 75% of the questionnaires were completed. 
 Annex D-7 
 
2 
 
 
Figure 2 : Scoring Consensus 
Below, I have shown the relationship between the overall score of a dimension and the consensus. 
Perhaps predictably, the most ‘popular’ dimensions exhibit a higher level of consensus. 
 
Figure 3 : Scoring to Consensus Mapping 
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3 Workshop	Discussions	
The workshop attendees were; 
• Professor Michael Henshaw 
• Luminita Ciocoiu 
• Huazhong Fu 
• Sharon Henson 
• Allan Hodgson 
• Andy Kinder 
3.1 System	of	Interest	
The workshop began by considering the meaning of the SOI in the context of a SoS. It was agreed 
that the SOI of a SoS encloses everything that contributes to the SoS. This was then refined to, 
everything that contributes to the SoS emergent behaviour. The key is to determine the relevant 
part of the SoS as opposed to the environmental factors. 
 
 
Figure 4 : SOI, Wider SOI, Environment 
A SoS example was suggested, allowing the elements and dimension to be visualized. 
Purpose is to transport entities between London and Bristol. 
• Locomotion (trains) 
• Containers (trucks, carriages) 
• Mechanism (rail) 
• Control (signals) 
• Also ticketing and timetabling. 
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3.2 Component	Systems 
3.2.1 Questionnaire	Scores2	
 
Figure 5  : Component Systems Scores 
3.2.2 Questionnaire	Comments	
• You need to know what systems are within the SoS (as far as you can determine) 
• Do not see how you can bound your SoI if you cannot identify the component systems 
within your SoI boundary and those with which your SoI will have key interactions or 
dependencies in the SoS environment 
• Considering the hierarchy of SoS-Systems-Subsystems, do component systems encapsulate 
Systems and also Subsystems?  
• May need to think about groups vs. components/subsystems. 
• Defines what is actually in the systems of interest; but the representation of component 
systems could be done at the actual system level or the class/type of system. 
 
3.2.3 Workshop	Discussion	
By definition, all the component systems will only be known for a SoS classified as directed3 and to 
some extent acknowledged. In addition to specific systems it will be necessary to identify types of 
component systems, enabling this dimension to be determined for a collaborative or virtual SoS. 
However, further work is required to define these types of systems. We should attempt use 
established definitions. 
It was agreed that this is a key dimension, which is in line with the questionnaire responses. 
A link was identified between the level of abstraction of the dimensions and the phase in the SoS 
lifecycle. 
3.2.4 Workshop	Decisions	
• Keep this dimension. 
• Establish Component System type definitions. 
3.3 Interactions	
3.3.1 Questionnaire	Scores	
                                                            
2 Y axis = total score, x axis = likert scale numerical value 
3 Although the SoS classification, Virtual, Collaborative, Acknowledged and Directed is referred the workshop 
agreed that this definition is inadequate and required further refinement.  
 Annex D-10
 
5 
 
 
Figure 6 : Interactions Scores 
3.3.2 Questionnaire	Comments	
• Need to know both the interfaces, and the behaviour at the interfaces, when the systems 
interact 
• Is there an association between interactions and also interoperability i.e. NCOIC framework. 
• Need to consider close/loose coupling, where decisions are made, control, overriding, etc. 
• An SoS exists only because of interactions between constituent systems, so the interactions 
must provide some definition of the SOI.  As above, these could be at the individual 
interaction level or at the class/type of interaction level. 
• Maybe you can separate them in between and within component system interactions  
3.3.3 Workshop	Discussion	
The availability of interactions is important and related to performance and agility. The type of 
interactions also needs to be defined. There was some argument regarding the “order” of populating 
the dimensions of an SoS, i.e. do the component systems (types) need to be established before 
Interactions are defined, or vice-versa. An aid to establishing this “order” could be helped by the 
creation of a system dynamics model showing the relationships between the dimensions. 
3.3.4 Workshop	Decisions	
• Keep this dimension. 
• Define Interaction Types. 
3.4 Time	
3.4.1 Lifecycle	
3.4.1.1 Questionnaire	Scores	
 
 
Figure 7: Lifecycle Scores 
3.4.1.2 Questionnaire	Comments	
• Time is an important concept for an SoS (eg lifecycle phase, required period of operation, 
time available for configuration etc) but it is not a constant across all types of SoS 
• Lifecycle of SoS - how much different is this from other lifecycles e.g. CADMID? 
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• The SOI at a specific instant in time depends on what Systems are currently contributing.  
Frequency of change/replenishment of systems within the SoS could be a useful measure 
(slowly or quickly changing).  Life phases, rather than cycle, could be relevant to indicate 
current status of the SoS which is related to SOI 
• Maybe more important for a whole system. For example, if your SOI includes a whole 
subsystem then the importance of the dimension may be greater than if the SOI includes a 
part of a subsystem. 
3.4.1.3 Workshop	Discussion	
The respective timelines of the component systems needs to be considered, i.e. dynamism. It was 
also established that there is link between the point in the lifecycle and the ability to populate a 
dimension. E.g, as stated earlier, until the construction phase of an SoS the actual Component 
Systems may not be known but the types should be. It was argued that the lifecycle is an overarching 
dimension, affecting all other dimensions; the SOI effectively becomes 3-dimensional. Again, the 
lifecycle phases need to be defined. 
3.4.1.4 Workshop	Decisions	
• Keep this dimension. 
3.4.2 Latency	
3.4.2.1 Questionnaire	Scores	
 
Figure 8 : Latency Scores 
3.4.2.2 Questionnaire	Comments	
None. 
3.4.2.3 Workshop	Discussion	
It was agreed latency is covered by interactions so can be discarded.  
3.4.2.4 Workshop	Decision	
• Discard this dimension. 
3.4.3 Variability	
3.4.3.1 Questionnaire	Scores	
N/A – this dimension was an additional suggestion. 
3.4.3.2 Questionnaire	Comments	
• A SoS may become unstable with large variations in event times.  Can’t remember the paper 
that discusses this issue. 
3.4.3.3 Workshop	Discussion	
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Rate of change of systems can be high, engineering techniques required in design to handle this. 
The frequency of change of an SoS and also the rate of change need to be considered. This is linked 
to stability and also agility. i.e. variability, can be related to time in the sense that we might be 
interested in some sort of characteristic frequency representing change in the SoS 
Stability was linked to the following behaviour of the SOI; 
• Stable over time 
• Unstable, rapidly grows 
• Boundary changes 
3.4.3.4 Workshop	Decision	
• Add this dimension. 
3.5 Classification		
3.5.1 Questionnaire	Scores	
 
Figure 9 : Classification Scores 
3.5.2 Questionnaire	Comments	
• DoD 4 cases somewhat irrelevant – most SoS are a combination of these classes. 
• I get the feeling that some kind of classification system is important as I think there are likely 
similarities and differences that could be identified as pertaining to one group or another – 
but not sure if the current classification is fit for purpose – maybe we need a 
multidimensional one 
• The four classifications from the literature – need clear example to have an understanding of 
their meaning? Are these classifications mutually exclusive? 
• But tighter definition of the types is needed 
• Although the classification that we have at this moment may not be hugely representative 
for all types of SoS, the type of system may inform the way someone establishes or 
represents the SOI. 
3.5.3 Workshop	Discussion	
It was agreed that a single classification cannot define a SoS, it is better represented by an 
combination and that the published definitions are inadequate and need to be developed. 
The classification may be derived from the other dimensions. 
If dimensions are given a range then these will indicate classification. A SoS could then be classified 
by having proportions of directed, acknowledged, etc. 
3.5.4 Workshop	Decision	
• Keep this dimension. 
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• A single classification alone cannot always categorize a SoS. 
3.6 Functions	/	Services	
3.6.1 Questionnaire	Scores	
 
Figure 10 : Functions/Services Scores 
3.6.2 Questionnaire	Comments	
• Not sure what you mean – infrastructural support?  Tends to be overlooked  in the 
literature, but vital in practice 
• Yes if functions can be grouped or classified and can fit into some kind of overall 
classification as referred to above.  Obviously functionality required and available is critical 
to configuring and controlling an SoS but is it a key dimension in the same sense as the 
others 
• Does Services already contain functions in addition to engineering and commercial 
processes? How is service defined in this context? It might be a good idea to separate these 
two. 
• This seems relevant but perhaps less important than others.  The services or functions 
provided by individual systems seems to indicate something about the content of the SOI.  In 
terms of building or analysing a SoS, the question what services should I include in the 
analysis seems relevant. 
• In my opinion, although they are important, functions can go sometimes beyond the SOI. 
 
3.6.3 Workshop	Discussion	
It was decided that it is better to just refer to functions, as services potentially imply Service 
Oriented Architecture. ‘Functions’ is a more general term. 
3.6.4 Workshop	Decision	
• Keep this dimension but rename it to just ‘Functions’. 
3.7 Enterprise	Participants	
3.7.1 Questionnaire	Scores	
 
Figure 11 : Enterprise Participants Scores 
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3.7.2 Questionnaire	Comments	
• Determines nature of control in SoS.  Note, we don’t know how to design the interface 
between organisations that  are a different technology/lifecycle points. 
• If you rephrase this to SoS participants then yes – if you mean the SoS environment 
participants then not so much.  But again perhaps we are also looking for some kind of 
classification of participants such as controllers, users, maintainers etc 
• Enterprise and participants may also need to be separated. Enterprise in this context could 
be the organisations and the supply chain etc. Participants/Stakeholders/Users etc., may 
need another term and listed apart from the term Enterprise! 
• This may have more relevance for some types than others.  For instance, for virtual, maybe it 
is a) impossible to know, b) not much help when you do.  However, for collaborative and 
acknowledged, there is clearly a need to understand participation.  Probably also try for 
Directed, but may be not such a significant question. 
• ? Meaning personnel? 
3.7.3 Workshop	Discussion	
This is really about organisations and management, it was felt is would be better renamed to 
Systems Owners and Operations. 
3.7.4 Workshop	Decision	
Keep this dimension but rename it to Systems Owners and Operations. 
3.8 Capabilities	
3.8.1 Questionnaire	Scores	
 
Figure 12 : Capabilities Scores 
3.8.2 Questionnaire	Comments	
• Not as important as interactions – see above 
• The aim of SOS is to achieve some of capability 
• Same comment as functions until you start looking at differing overall capability depending 
on the particular configuration of an SoS.  Maybe this should tie in with Classification above 
• Does capabilities exhibit SoS or vice versa? There are different viewpoints associated to the 
term Capability. We may need a clear definition! Refer to Michael Henshaw paper on 
Capability Engineering Perspective Analysis. 
• Probably not, though the SOI might be important information for deciding on the SOI for a 
capability. 
• This can be covered by functions and interactions. 
• I believe it should belong to another level of dimensions. 
3.8.3 Workshop	Discussion	
It was agreed that this is adequately covered by the “Functions” dimension. 
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3.8.4 Workshop	Decision	
Discard this dimension. 
3.9 Disciplines	
3.9.1 Questionnaire	Scores	
 
Figure 13 : Disciplines Scores 
3.9.2 Questionnaire	Comments	
• The more that re involved in understanding what’s going on, the better. 
• Not sure you could capture this in a meaning way that would add anything to 
functions/services 
• Are these role specific disciplines? Disciplines could also be part o the component systems as 
each system may comprise a number of disciplines? 
• May be helpful, but I don’t think it defines the SOI. 
• This can be covered by component systems, or component of systems. 
• I believe it is subordinated to another dimension.  
3.9.3 Workshop	Discussion	
It was agreed, in line with several questionnaire comments, that this is not an applicable dimension, 
although it is related to the component systems and the overall SoS is does not help define the SOI. 
3.9.4 Workshop	Decision	
Discard this dimension. 
3.10 Concept	of	Operation	/	Use	/	Employment		
3.10.1 Questionnaire	Scores	
 
Figure 14 : Concept of Operation / Use / Employment 
3.10.2 Questionnaire	Comments	
• Useful for design; less useful for operations, due to effects of resilience, adaptability over life 
cycle 
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• Yes important to understand how different Conops might impact on the configuration or 
operation of an SoS 
• Are these just processes associated to SoS? CONOPS may also be part of TEPIDOIL or 
Component of Capability (CoC) i.e. processes. 
• Given that the individual systems can perform operations independently, I think the 
use/mission of the SoS is critical for defining the SOI for the SoS as opposed to the individual 
constituent systems. 
• This does not belongs to functionality. 
3.10.3 Workshop	Discussion	
It was agreed that this is a valid dimension. 
3.10.4 Workshop	Decision	
Keep this dimension. 
3.11 Geographic	Distribution	
3.11.1 Questionnaire	Scores	
 
 
Figure 15 : Geographic Distribution Scores 
3.11.2 Questionnaire	Comments	
• Vital – cultural and legal issues 
• Yes if it is pertinent to the operation or (re)configurability of an SoS 
• May be more relevant to some situations than others 
• Implications for logistics and additional costs. 
3.11.3 Workshop	Discussion	
After a fairly lengthy debate it was agreed that this dimension can be covered by ‘Interactions’. It 
was agreed that cultural and legal issues were important but are more 2nd order issues than direct 
SOI dimensions. 
3.11.4 Workshop	Decision	
Discard this dimension. 
3.12 Emergence	
3.12.1 Questionnaire	Scores	
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Figure 16 : Emergence 
3.12.2 Questionnaire	Comments	
• Critical issue; need to know and metricate this w.r.t. intended emergence (that’s why you 
are putting the SoS together), and highly necessary to estimate the unwanted emergence, so 
that you can build in resilience, adaptability.  Latter will probably be insufficient, due to 
surprises, but may result in less-costly amelioration efforts. 
• This is obviously important but what do we mean here.  Are we referring to the potential for 
emergence (desirable or undesirable), the impact, the likelihood etc.  Think we need to be more 
specific 
• As automation increases, unwanted emergent properties will become a big issue due to the 
loss of smart human ‘dampers’.  For example, planned automation developments relating to 
flight control around airports could result in multiple fuel-based disasters as increasing 
numbers of aircraft are restacked. 
• This one is tricky as you can include expected emergence but what about unexpected 
emergence? If it can be included, wouldn’t that be an output from the model/simulation 
rather than something that goes in? 
• Although emergence is an important property, I don’t think it defines the SOI. 
• Don’t know if this would be of any help as by looking at the emergent behaviour of 
subsystem (looking at intercomponent linkages) you can’t predict the emergent behaviour of 
the whole SoS because of the intracomponent linkages that one my miss. 
• This will likely determine the modelling 
3.12.3 Workshop	Discussion	
Whilst it was agreed Emergence is a critical issue with regards to a SoS it was decided that is a 
characteristic rather than a SOI dimension. In terms of modelling, if the dimension were inputs to a 
model then the emergent behaviour would be the output. It was re-iterated that if the SOI 
dimensions are fully defined then they will result in the SoS emergent behaviour and the SOI can be 
regarded as “complete”. 
3.12.4 Workshop	Decision	
Discard this dimension. 
3.13 Additional	Dimensions	
This section includes dimension that were suggested additions to the list originally circulated in the 
questionnaire. 
3.13.1 Levels	of	Control	
It was agreed that this is covered by the new ‘Relationships’ dimension. 
3.13.2 Maintainability	
This was deemed to be more of a characteristic. 
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3.13.3 Heterogeneity		
This was deemed to be more of a characteristic and is implied by the component types. 
3.13.4 Operational	and	Managerial	Independence	
This is covered by other dimensions. 
3.13.5 Relationships	
The workshop decided to introduce a new dimension; ‘Relationships’, which is distinct from 
interactions which is more concerned with the inter-connections between systems. This could 
include types such as 'peer-to-peer’. 
4 Summary	
The list of dimensions agreed by the workshop was; 
• Component Systems (including specific and general system types4) 
• Interactions (including types) 
• Lifecycle 
• Variability 
• Classification 
• Functions 
• Systems Owners and Operations 
• Concept of Operation / Use / Employment  
• Relationships 
5 Further	Work	
• Produce system dynamic model of dimension showing dependencies and causal effects. 
• Test dimensions against the SoS exemplars (potentially T-area SoS). 
• Further elaboration of each dimension definition. 
                                                            
4 System Types requires definition  
